TRI COUNTY OPERATIONS V. CURTIS SURGENER, ET AL
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED PINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PR OCED URE PR OMUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY COUR T OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : APRIL 20, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
'
Suittraut (90urf of ~k
2005-SC-0575-WC
K
TRI COUNTY OPERATIONS
V.
nA
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2005-CA-0017-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO. 01-74075
CURTIS SURGENER ; HON. R. SCOTT BORDERS,
ADMINISTATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS'
COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
In a decision that was affirmed by the Workers' Compensation Board (Board)
and the Court of Appeals, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) enhanced the claimant's
income benefit under KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 . Appealing, the employer asserts that the
finding supporting the enhancement was unreasonable under the evidence and that the
decision in Fawbush v. Gwinn, 103 S.W.3d 5 (Ky. 2003), should be revisited and
overruled . We affirm .
The claimant was born in 1964, completed 11 years of school, and earned a
GED . He performed odd jobs doing farm work during his late teens and early 20's, after
which he worked for a year as a gas station cashier. He also received vocational
training as a welder and worked in that field for about five years. Most of his work life
was spent performing machine maintenance in manufacturing facilities . In 1996, he
injured his lower back while crawling through an oven at a commercial bakery,
performing maintenance . A May 14, 1996, report indicated that after a course of
physical therapy, Dr. Brooks permitted him to return to work "without restriction,
limitation, or impairment" but urged him to lose weight.
The present claim arose on June 12, 2001, when the claimant injured his lower
back working in the defendant-employer's rebuild shop. When deposed by the
employer, he testified that he was on his knees, bending over, and pulling a 20-foot
piece of steel that weighed 150-175 pounds out of a rack. While doing so, he felt a
burning pain at his belt line that radiated into his leg and informed his supervisor . He
continued working and did not seek medical attention for a few months, hoping that the
pain would go away. He went to Jellico Occupational Health eventually and received
physical therapy and medication . A lumbar MRI revealed abnormalities, so he was
referred to Dr. Brooks who performed surgery in January, 2002 . After physical therapy
and four months off work, the claimant returned to part-time work and eventually to
work without restrictions. He received a raise upon his return.
The claimant testified that before the injury he worked in the rebuild shop,
rebuilding parts, machinery, fabrication tables, or whatever else needed to be repaired
or built. His post-injury work as a machine attendant required him to monitor one
machine and perform repairs as necessary. Asked if the work was similar to what he
did before the injury except that before the injury "you would fix and work on a large
assortment of things and now you fix and work on one machine," he responded, "Yes ."
He was not asked to compare the physical requirements of the jobs.
In July, 2003, the claimant returned to Dr. Brooks complaining that his symptoms
had worsened and that he had difficulty working . He filed an application for benefits in
December, 2003. His evidence consisted of medical reports from Dr. Brooks, his
treating physician, and reports of the evaluations that his attorney requested from Drs.
Forberg and Johnson. The employer's evidence consisted of the claimant's February
27, 2004, deposition and its subsequent deposition of Dr. Brooks. The parties
submitted the case on the record without a hearing .
Dr. Brooks' records indicate that he saw the claimant on November 27, 2001, for
complaints of severe back pain that radiated into the right leg. He diagnosed a
herniated disc at L5-S1 for which he performed surgery on January 16, 2002 . Reports
from February 26 and May 13, 2002, indicated among other things that he was urging
the claimant to try to lose weight. On May 20, 2002, Dr. Brooks permitted the claimant
to return to work for four hours per day with restrictions on pulling, twisting, and lifting .
He increased the limitation to six hours on June 3, 2002. On July 15, 2002, he
assigned a 15% impairment under DRE category II-III and released the claimant from
his care. The claimant returned approximately a year later, on July 8, 2003,
complaining that symptoms in his back and right leg had worsened and that "he was
having a difficult time with his work ." At that time, Dr. Brooks recommended updated
diagnostic testing and a re-evaluation .
When deposed by the employer, Dr. Brooks testified that the surgical findings
were consistent with a herniated disc that compressed the S1 nerve root. The
claimant's recovery was good, and he was released to full duty, without restrictions, on
July 15, 2002 . When the claimant returned in July, 2003, complaining of difficulties, Dr.
Brooks prescribed pain medication and ordered diagnostic testing . He had not seen
the claimant since then and had not prescribed any pain medication he might currently
be taking . Although he thought that the claimant would require further medical
-3-
treatment, it would not necessarily involve surgery . Dr. Brooks would advise the
claimant to avoid repetitive bending, stooping, climbing, crawling, and squatting . He
would limit sitting and standing and would limit lifting to 35 pounds . Questioned about
the 15% impairment rating, he explained that the claimant fell between DRE categories
II and III . He then revised the impairment to 13%, the maximum permitted for category
II . Asked if the claimant should continue trying to lose weight to help his back condition,
assuming that he continued to weigh 300 pounds or more, Dr. Brooks responded in the
affirmative .
Dr. Forberg evaluated the claimant on November 14, 2003. He took a history of
the work-related injury and subsequent treatment, noting that the claimant's back pain
had returned in July, 2003. The claimant complained of a constant, dull ; low back ache
on the right side. He reported that it eased when sitting and resting but that it worsened
with standing and bending. Dr. Forberg noted that the claimant presently took
Ibuprofen and Lorcet Plus for pain . He diagnosed a surgically-treated disc herniation at
L5-S1 and post-surgical pain syndrome, noting that it was common to see a recurrent,
chronic low back condition after such surgery . He assigned an 18% impairment under
DRE category Ill-IV and indicated that the claimant lacked the physical capacity to
return to the type of work he performed at the time of the injury . Dr. Forberg stated that
he would restrict the claimant from lifting more than 20 pounds, from prolonged
standing or sitting, and from bending, stooping, or twisting.
Dr. Johnson evaluated the claimant on February 20, 2004. The claimant gave a
history of the work-related injury and treatment . He reported that he took Flexeril off
and on, Soma as needed, and Lortab off and on; that he was able to perform his
present job "by a hair;" that he called in sick when his back was particularly
symptomatic ; and that he wished to undergo the additional diagnostic studies that Dr.
Brooks had recommended in July, 2003, but the employer's insurance company would
not approve them. Dr. Johnson examined the claimant, noting that he was 5'5" tall and
weighed 330 pounds, which was 30 pounds more than his usual weight. Dr. Johnson
diagnosed a surgically-treated herniated disc and a subsequent aggravation or
exacerbation of the condition with recurrent low back pain that radiated into the right
leg. Physical findings confirmed the existence of S1 radiculopathy. Dr. Johnson
assigned a 14% impairment and restricted the claimant from repeatedly lifting more
than 40 pounds, from repeatedly carrying more than 20 pounds, and from repeatedly
bending, twisting, or pulling . He would advise the claimant to avoid climbing and to limit
walking, standing, and sitting to his capability . Noting that the claimant had returned to
the type of work he performed at the time of the injury, Dr. Johnson indicated he
retained the physical capacity to do so . Noting also that the claimant's back and leg
pain returned in July, 2003, shortly after his return to work, Dr. Johnson thought that
updated diagnostic studies were warranted .
On February 9, 2004, the employer filed a wage certification, establishing that
the claimant's average weekly wage was $549 .00 per week, and also filed a job
description . The latter document bore the claimant's name but did not indicate whether
it pertained to his pre- or post-injury duties . It did indicate that he was required to lift 010 pounds and 10-20 pounds, each for 1-2 hours per day; to stand for 6-8 hours per
day; and to climb, kneel, bend, and reach, each for 1-2 hours per day.
The ALJ determined that the claimant was partially disabled and relied upon the
13% impairment that Dr. Brooks assigned at his deposition .
Convinced that the
claimant had met his burden under KRS 342 .730(1)(c)1, the ALJ stated :
The [ALJ] specifically finds that while the Plaintiff is earning an
equal or greater wage while operating the machine for the
Defendant/Employer, it is highly unlikely he is going to be able to
continue this into the indefinite future due to his continued
complaints of pain and the fact that he is having to take Ibuprofen
and Lorcet Plus on a daily basis in order to perform his job.
Plaintiffs job at the time of the injury consisted of being a rebuilt
shop person and fabricator[;] this required him to rebuild parts,
machinery, fabrication tables, or whatever needed to be fixed.
At the time of his injury, he was required to lift up to 150-170
pounds. The job he is doing now requires him to sit and watch a
machine run and if something happens, he will have to fix that one
machine .
The [ALJ] is persuaded that the Plaintiffs testimony that he does
not retain the physical capacity to return to the type of job that he
was performing at the time of the injury, and is further persuaded
that the Plaintiff will not be able to continue earning the wage that
equals or exceeds the wage at the time of the injury into the
indefinite future.
The employer's petition for reconsideration took issue with the finding that the
claimant was unlikely to be able to continue earning the same or greater wage
indefinitely . It maintained that Fawbush , supra , was factually distinguishable and
requested specific findings regarding the decision to award benefits under KRS
342 .730(1)(c)1 . The petition was denied as being a re-argument of the merits, after
which the employer appealed. Although acknowledging that "the quantity and quality of
the evidence makes this a decidedly close call" and that a different fact-finder might
have reached a different conclusion, the Board refrained from substituting its judgment
for that of the ALJ and affirmed . Likewise, the Court of Appeals affirmed .
As amended effective July 14, 2000, KRS 342.730(1)(c) provides, in pertinent
part, as follows :
1 . If, due to an injury, an employee does not retain the physical
capacity to return to the type of work that the employee performed
at the time of injury, the benefit for permanent partial disability shall
be multiplied by three (3) times the amount otherwise determined
under paragraph (b) of this subsection, but this provision shall not
be construed so as to extend the duration of payments ; or
2. If an employee returns to work at a weekly wage equal to or
greater than the average weekly wage at the time of injury, the
weekly benefit for permanent partial disability shall be determined
under paragraph (b) of this subsection for each week during which
that employment is sustained . During any period of cessation of
that employment, temporary or permanent, for any reason, with or
without cause, payment of weekly benefits for permanent partial
disability during the period of cessation shall be two (2) times the
amount otherwise payable under paragraph (b) of this subsection.
This provision shall not be construed so as to extend the duration
of payments.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 342.125, a claim may be
reopened at any time during the period of permanent partial
disability in order to conform the award payments with the
requirements of subparagraph 2. of this paragraph .
As enacted in 1996, KRS 730(1)(c)1 and 2 were separated by the word "and ."
As a consequence, the Board applied them concurrently when a claim met the criteria
for both. Fawbush, 103 S .W .3d at 12 . As amended in 2000, KRS 342 .730(1)(c)l and
2 are separated by the word "or," implying a legislative intent for only one provision to
be applied to a particular claim . Although a worker may meet the criteria of both
subsections simultaneously, the statute does not express a preference for applying one
subsection over the other. KRS 342.730(1)(c)4 permits a worker who ceases to earn
the same or greater wage to reopen at any time in order to receive a double benefit . It
does not permit a worker who meets the criteria of both KRS 342 .730(1)(c)1 and 2 at
the time of the initial decision to receive a triple benefit at reopening based on an
inability to continue to earn the same or greater wage.
The Fawbush court determined that if an individual meets the criteria of both
KRS 342 .730(c)(1)1 and 2, an AU is free to choose which subsection is more
appropriate under the facts . See also , Kentucky River Enterprises, Inc. v. Elkins, 107
S .W.3d 206, 211 (Ky. 2003). Depending on the available evidence, the likelihood of
being able to continue performing the post-injury job may be one of several factors
indicating that the worker probably will or will not be able to continue earning the same
or greater wage into the indefinite future . See Adkins v. Pike County Board of
Education , 141 S .W.3d 387, 390 (Ky. App. 2004). Although the employer urges the
court to reconsider, the arguments it raises presently were considered by the Fawbush
court and rejected . The decision was rendered in 2003, and the statute has not been
amended since then ; therefore, we infer that the legislature assents .
In Fawbush, supra, it was undisputed that the worker lacked the physical
capacity to return to work as a framing carpenter and that his permanent disability was
only partial . He testified that after temporary total disability benefits ceased he relied on
the generosity of friends . Eventually, another employer gave him work at a greater
wage, as a construction supervisor . Although the work was less strenuous than framing
carpentry, it was outside his medical restrictions and required him to take more than the
prescribed amount of narcotic pain medication. He testified that he did the work out of
necessity because he had no other income. Faced with a claim in which the evidence
supported applying both KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 and 2, the AU determined that the
worker's physical impairment permanently altered his ability to earn an income and
awarded benefits under KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 . Noting that it was unlikely he would be
able to continue earning the same or greater wage for the indefinite future, the court
determined that the evidence supported the decision to apply KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 .
In the present case, the ALJ determined that the claimant lacked the physical
capacity to return to the type of work he performed at the time of his injury ; however,
although his present wage was more than what he earned when he was injured, he
would not be able to continue earning such a wage indefinitely. The employer
maintains that there was no substantial evidence to support the conclusion . It
emphasizes that the claimant had worked as a machine attendant for almost two years
when he was deposed, and he did not testify regarding his present symptoms or the
effect of his back condition on his ability to continue performing the job. Statements
from Dr. Johnson's report indicating that the claimant experienced increased symptoms
of pain and was able to hold on to his present job "by a hair" were taken from the
patient history, did not explain why, and did not represent a medical opinion .
Likewise,
although Dr. Forberg's report indicated that the claimant complained of a constant dull
ache and took Ibuprofen and Lorcet Plus at that time, it did not reveal who prescribed
them or indicate that he took them daily.
KRS 342 .285 designates the ALJ as the finder of fact in workers' compensation
claims. As such, the AU is free to judge the weight and credibility of evidence and to
draw reasonable inferences from it. Paramount Foods, Inc . v. Burkhardt, 695 S .W .2d
418 (Ky. 1985). When more than one reasonable inference may be drawn from the
evidence, the ALJ may choose what to infer. Jackson v. General Refractories Co. , 581
S.W .2d 10 (Ky. 1979) ; Blair Fork Coal Co . v. Blankenship , 416 S .W .2d 716, 718 (Ky.
1967). The decision to apply KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 favored the claimant ; therefore, our
standard for review is whether there was "some evidence of substance to support the
finding, meaning evidence which would permit a fact-finder to reasonably find as it did ."
Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S .W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986).
It is clear that the claimant's physical restrictions would not permit him to engage
in the type of work he performed at the time of his injury, and it also clear that he
earned more when his claim was considered than he had when he was injured . What
is truly at issue is whether it was reasonable to conclude that the effects of the injury
were likely to prevent him from doing so indefinitely . Contrary to the employer's
assertion, this is not a casein which the ALJ failed to set forth sufficient facts to support
the ultimate legal conclusion . See Shields v. Pittsburgh and Midway Coal Min . Co. , 634
S .W.2d 440 (Ky. App . 1982). The opinion was 17 pages long and included a recitation
of the lay and medical evidence as well as a legal analysis . Moreover, the record
contained sufficient evidence to support the ultimate conclusion . See Louisville
Cooperage v. Knoppe , 695 S .W.2d 440, 441 (Ky. App. 1985); Stovall v. Collett , 671
S.W .2d 256 (Ky. App. 1984) .
In July, 2003, about a year after his return to lighter work, the claimant sought
treatment with Dr. Brooks for recurrent back and leg pain . He also complained that he
was experiencing difficulty working . Dr. Brooks recommended further diagnostic
testing, which was not performed. Although the ALJ's recitation of the evidence
included statements that the claimant made to Drs. Brooks, Forberg, and Johnson, the
employer has pointed to nothing in the analysis that indicates an improper reliance on
any statement. The evidence in this case clearly did not rise to the level of that in
Fawbush , supra , and would not have compelled a decision in the claimant's favor had
one not been made . Nonetheless, it was sufficient to permit a reasonable inference
that he would probably not be able to continue earning the same or greater wage
indefinitely. The Board and the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
Lambert, C.J . and Graves, Johnstone, Scott and Wintersheimer concur. Cooper
and Roach, JJ., dissent for the reasons set forth in Justice Cooper's dissenting opinion
in Fawbush v. Gwinn , 103 S .W.3d 5,13 (Ky. 2003) .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Walter W. Turner
Scott M .B. Brown
Jones, Walters, Turner & Shelton, PLLC
151 North Eagle Creek Drive
One Fountain Plaza, Suite 310
Lexington, KY 40509
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
CURTIS SURGENER :
McKinnley Morgan
Morgan, Madden, Brashear & Collins
921 South Main Street
London, KY 40741
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.