STEVE NORRIS V. CONWAY & HEATON, ET AL
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2005-SC-0564-WC
STEVE NORRIS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2004-CA-2157-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO . 01-00444
CONWAY & HEATON, HON . R. SCOTT
BORDERS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
The Workers' Compensation Board (Board) and the Court of Appeals affirmed
an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ's) order overruling the claimant's motion to reopen
his dismissed application for benefits. Appealing, the claimant asserts that the decision
in his initial claim was the product of mistake and that KRS 342.125(1)(c) authorized
reopening . Messer v. Drees, 382 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1964). We affirm.
The claimant was born in 1977 . He graduated from high school and then trained
in carpentry and cabinet making for about two years at a technical college. In 1998, he
began working for the defendant-employer as a motor vehicle mechanic . On May 18,
2000, the chain suspending a motor over his head slipped, causing it to fall some
distance and strike him on the head . His application for benefits alleged injuries to his
head, jaw, shoulders neck, back, and lower extremities .
When deposed, the claimant testified that the blow caused him to see stars but
did not knock him unconscious. Although he did not go to the hospital, he asked to see
a doctor because his head was bleeding in three or four places. He stated that the
doctor performed a physical exam that did not include x-rays, after which he returned to
work and completed his shift. On September 1, 2000, he began to miss work and to
see a chiropractor. He also saw Dr. Nazar, who ordered a lumbar MRI and kept him off
work. The claimant could not recall when Dr. Nazar released him, but he returned to
work in January, 2001, - beginning with light duty . He stated that he was performing
alignments presently, that he was paid for working 88 hours in the previous two weeks,
and that he earned $7.25 per hour plus overtime .
On September 1, 2000, Dr. Yuhas noted that the claimant complained of lower
back pain that sometimes extended into his legs. He gave a history of the work-related
incident, stating that the motor hit his head, compressing his body to the point that his
knees buckled . Dr. Yuhas found no significant abnormalities on neurological and
orthopedic exams except for a limited range of motion and a positive Valsalva
maneuver. Noting that the claimant reported no other trauma during the preceding
year, his opinion was that the symptoms were due to the work-related accident . He
recommended a course of chiropractic treatment and referred the claimant to Dr.
Nazar, a medical doctor .
On September 22, 2000, the claimant gave Dr. Nazar a history of low back pain
that began about three months earlier, one or two weeks after the accident at work . He
denied any other recent injuries. His present symptoms included a radiation of pain
down the back of both legs to the ankles. After a physical and neurological exam, Dr.
Nazar diagnosed a probable lumbar sprain/strain, noting that there were no associated
neurological aspects to the pain . In a report to Dr. Yuhas, he stated that the claimant's
neurological exam was normal and that although he had some very equivocal pain
involving his legs and back with straight leg raising, it did not follow a specific
neurological distribution . In Dr. Nazar's opinion, there was no evidence to support a
diagnosis of radiculopathy, and conservative treatment was the best strategy . After a
lumbar MRI performed on October 2, 2000, was normal, Dr. Nazar released the
claimant from his care .
On October 3, 2000, the claimant reported to the emergency room at Flaget
Hospital, complaining of back and leg pain . Dr. Parrish noted that he gave a history of
the work-related accident, stating that he had been sutured at the Flaget Health Center
but had no back or neck pain at that time . He reported that he experienced lower back
pain and trembling in his lower extremities while playing basketball about a month later .
He also reported that his symptoms had improved with chiropractic treatment but still
remained and that his employer required a statement from a physician rather than a
chiropractor . Dr. Parrish noted that when he informed the claimant that he would
probably refer him to Dr. Nazar, the claimant reported that he had seen Dr. Nazar
earlier that day regarding the MRI results, which were normal. Dr. Parrish noted that
the claimant then began to complain of dizziness, jaw discomfort, shoulders that felt like
they were popping out of place, and numbness down the back of his legs to the ankles .
Dr. Parrish diagnosed back pain for which he prescribed medication.
The claimant submitted records from Dr. Perez, which consisted primarily of offwork slips from October, 2000, through January, 2001 . They did not include a history or
any physical findings . Nor did they include an impairment rating.
The employer conceded that the accident occurred and that the claimant
suffered non-disabling head lacerations but maintained that his other problems were
unrelated to the accident . It also maintained that he earned more presently than he did
on May 18, 2000, and that the accident caused no compensable disability .
The memorandum of the August 16, 2001, benefit review conference (BRC)
indicates that the claimant sustained "alleged" work-related injuries on May 18, 2000,
noting "on all but head injury ." The parties stipulated that the employer paid $124.55 in
medical expenses but no income benefits. They limited the contested issues to extent
and duration of disability and also to work-relatedness and notice "on all but head
injury ." The BRC memorandum notes that the claimant failed to appear and that
counsel was unable to contact him . On September 25, 2001, the ALJ ordered the
claimant to show cause within 15 days why the claim should not be dismissed . The
record contains no response, and on May 29, 2002, the ALJ dismissed the claim
without prejudice .
On July 5, 2002, the claimant filed a second application for benefits based on the
May 18, 2000, accident . Among other things, the employer moved to dismiss the claim
on the ground that it was barred by limitations . The ALJ passed the motion to a
consideration of the merits and set the claim for a hearing .
At the hearing, the claimant denied having any pre-accident back problems . He
stated that he had only minor back pain after the accident, but it worsened over time,
began to affect his sleep, and eventually made it difficult to bend. His present
symptoms included low back and upper neck pain that he rated at ten on a scale of one
to ten . He stated that he continued to be treated by a chiropractor and Dr. Nazar and
that he was working for a different employer, operating a laminating machine .
When cross-examined, the claimant admitted that he did not seek treatment
from a medical doctor between May and October, 2000, and that he told Dr. Parrish his
neck and back pain began after he played a game of basketball . He testified, however,
that he had been responding to a question regarding when he realized that he could not
deal with his pain and had stated that it occurred when the pain affected his ability to
play basketball and other sports. He also testified that his employer terminated him not
long after his May, 2001, deposition and that he received unemployment benefits for six
months. After passing a pre-employment physical, he began working for his present
employer in May, 2002, earning $14 .54 per hour .
In a decision rendered on April 17, 2003, an ALJ determined that the claimant
received a blow to the head, that the injury was minor, and that any residuals he
suffered "arose out of some superseding event such as playing basketball ." Therefore,
the ALJ was not persuaded that the claimant met his burden of proving he suffered an
injury as defined by the Act. The claimant's petition for reconsideration requested
temporary total disability benefits, but the ALJ denied it as being a re-argument of the
merits . Although the claimant filed a notice of appeal, he later requested a voluntary
dismissal . The appeal was dismissed on July 11, 2003, at which point, the ALJ's
opinion and order became final. Therefore, it could not be disturbed "absent fraud,
mistake, or other very persuasive reason that would warrant reopening." Slone v. R &
S Mining, Inc. , 74 S.W .3d 259, 261 (Ky. 2002).
On April 5, 2004, the claimant filed a motion to reopen, asserting that there was
prima facie evidence of both a change of condition and mistake. See Messer v. Drees,
supra . Attached to the motion were three medical reports . The report of a thoracic and
lumbar spine MRI performed on April 2, 2003, noted cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and
sacral abnormalities . A December 4, 2003, cervical MRI report noted cervical spine
abnormalities . A January 7, 2004, letter from Dr. Nazar stated that, given the claimant's
young age, he attributed a moderate cervical disc herniation shown on the latter MRI to
the work-related accident and thought that it "might explain some of his [subsequent]
symptoms ."
The same ALJ who decided the initial claim noted that the claimant appeared to
be arguing that his cervical condition had worsened since the previous decision, that it
now required surgery, and that Dr. Nazar considered the condition to be work-related .
Whereas, the employer asserted that the motion was barred by limitations and by the
doctrine of res iudicata. After reviewing the file, the ALJ overruled the motion, citing
KRS 342.125(2) and noting that the previous claim was dismissed . In affirming, both
the Board and the Court of Appeals determined that the initial finding regarding
causation was final and that there was no evidence the finding had been prompted by a
mistake or misconception . Therefore, reopening was unauthorized .
KRS 342 .0011(1) defines "injury" as being a work-related traumatic event that is
the proximate cause producing a harmful change in the human organism as evidenced
by objective medical findings . In the initial proceeding, the claimant alleged that the
work-related blow to his head caused a number of harmful changes, including
lacerations to his head as well as pain and other symptoms in his neck, back, and lower
extremities due to the effects of the blow on his spine. He maintained that the
symptoms caused a temporary total disability from September 1, 2000, through January
1, 2001 . Although the employer conceded that the traumatic event caused lacerations
to the claimant's head that required medical treatment (i .e., an injury), it asserted that
the injury was not disabling . Moreover, it contested work-relatedness and notice
regarding the other harmful changes . After reviewing the evidence regarding the
contested harmful changes, the ALJ was convinced that they were due to some
superseding event rather than the work-related accident and dismissed the claim .
KRS 342.125 provides, in pertinent part, as follows :
(1) Upon motion by any party or upon an administrative law judge's
own motion, an administrative law judge may reopen and review
any award or order on any of the following grounds :
(a) Fraud;
(b) Newly-discovered evidence which could not have been
discovered with the exercise of due diligence;
(c) Mistake;
(d) Change of disability as shown by objective medical
evidence of worsening or improvement of impairment due to
a condition caused by the injury since the date of the award
or order.
(2) No claim which has been previously dismissed or denied on the
merits shall be reopened except upon the grounds set forth in this
section.
Messer v. Drees, supra, was decided under the pre-1996 definition of "injury." It stands
for the principle that KRS 342.125(1) permits reopening if evidence unavailable at the
time of the initial proceeding shows that "an award was substantially induced by a
misconception as to the cause, nature, or extent of disability at the time of the hearing ."
Id ., 382 S .W .2d at 213.
The claimant maintains that the Board and the Court of Appeals misconstrued
his argument. Acknowledging that symptoms due to harmful changes in his spine were
found not to be a work-related injury under KRS 342 .0011(1), he points out that the
claim also involved head lacerations, which the employer conceded were work-related
and the ALJ characterized as being a "minor injury." He maintains that the initial
decision was the product of a misconception regarding the nature and extent of that
"minor injury ." See Messer v. Drees, supra .
As the party requesting a reopening, it was the claimant's burden to make a
prima facie showing under one or more of the grounds set forth in KRS 342.125(1). He
accompanied his motion with MRI evidence of changes to his spine that occurred both
before and after the initial decision as well as Dr. Nazar's statement of a relationship
between the latter changes and the accident at work. This evidence did not relate to
the scalp lacerations or their effects; therefore, it did not warrant reopening that portion
of the claim on any ground . It was an attempt to re-litigate the final decision attributing
the contested harmful changes to a superseding event rather than the work-related
trauma . Under the circumstances, the ALJ did not err in refusing to reopen the matter.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
James D. Howes
Howes and Paige, PLLC
1501 Durrett Lane, Suite 200
Louisville, KY 40213
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
CONWAY & HEATON:
Walter E . Harding
Philip J . Reverman
Boehl Stopher & Graves, LLP
2300 Aegon Center
400 West Market Street
Louisville, KY 40202
.
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