COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. GERALD YOUNG
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RENDERED : NOVEMBER 22, 2006
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NO. 2005-SC-000556-DG
I
V/%
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
NO . 2003-CA-001342-MR
FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
INDICTMENT NO. 97-CR-01069-002
V.
GERALD YOUNG
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE MINTON
REVERSING
We accepted review of the Court of Appeals's decision that reversed the
trial court's denial of post-conviction relief to Gerald Young. The issue we must decide
is whether, in the context of a collateral attack on a judgment of conviction, prejudice to
the defendant must be presumed from trial counsel's failure to object to the allocation of
an inadequate number of peremptory challenges. The Court of Appeals answered this
question affirmatively. We disagree and, thus, reverse .
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .
The jury convicted Young of murder by complicity, and the trial court
followed the jury's recommendation by sentencing him to death . On direct appeal, we
reversed the sentence imposed by the judgment and remanded the case to the trial
court to conduct a new sentencing phase of the trial proceeding . Our opinion
summarized the pertinent facts and our holding as follows:
On June 13, 1997, Osama Shalash was fatally shot in
the Lexington Mall parking lot in front of Perkins' Restaurant
in Lexington, Kentucky. Appellants Gerald Young, Erskin
Thomas and Darrell Morbley were jointly indicted for his
murder. At trial, the Commonwealth proved that Shalash
and Young were cocaine traffickers and that Young regularly
purchased large quantities of cocaine from Shalash for
resale to lesser dealers. There was evidence that Young
intended to purchase $50,000.00 worth of cocaine from
Shalash, but that Shalash only had $25,000.00 worth of
cocaine to sell. Young paid Shalash $25,000.00 for the
cocaine and entrusted the remaining $25,000 .00 to the
possession of one of Young's associates, Leslie Mulligan .
There was evidence that Young had previously "shorted"
Shalash on another drug transaction . The Commonwealth's
theory of the case was that Shalash robbed Mulligan of the
$25,000 .00 at gunpoint ; and, in revenge, Young hired
Thomas to kill Shalash . To that end, Young arranged a
meeting with Shalash at the Lexington Mall parking lot.
Morbley, another of Young's associates, drove Thomas to
and from the Lexington Mall where Thomas shot and killed
Shalash . Thomas was convicted of murder and sentenced
to life in prison without benefit of probation or parole for
twenty-five years . Young was convicted of complicity to
murder and sentenced to death . Morbley was convicted of
facilitation of murder and sentenced to five years in prison .
Young and Thomas appeal to this Court as a matter of right.
Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) ; [Kentucky Revised Statutes]
KRS 532.075(1). Morbley's appeal was transferred to this
Court so that all three appeals could be considered together .
[Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure] CR 74.02(2) . We
reverse Young's sentence of death because there is no
aggravating circumstance applicable to his participation in
the murder of Shalash. KRS 532.025(2), (3). In all other
respects, the convictions and sentences imposed upon
Appellants are affirmed .'
At the conclusion of the trial on remand, the trial court sentenced Young to life in prison .
And Young filed a second direct appeal. While the second direct appeal was pending in
this Court, Young filed a motion in the trial court for relief from the judgment under
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11 .42.
While Young's RCr 11 .42 motion raised several issues, his main argument
was that he received one less peremptory challenge at trial than he was entitled to
receive under our construction of RCr 9.40 and that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise an objection at trial to this improper allocation of strikes . We expressly
declined to review the peremptory challenge issue on Young's first direct appeal
because it was not properly preserved.
The trial court denied Young's RCr 11 .42 motion without holding a
hearing, a decision he appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals. While that appeal
Young v. Commonwealth , 50 S.W .3d 148,155 (Ky. 2001) .
See Springer v. Commonwealth , 998 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1999). Of course, S ringer was
rendered after Young's original trial and conviction .
Young, 50 S.W.3d at 163 ("[s]ince this was a joint trial of three defendants and alternate
jurors were being seated, Appellants were entitled to a total of fifteen peremptory strikes .
RCr 9.40; (Sgringer v. Commonwealth , 998 S.W .2d 439,443-445 (Ky. 1999)]. Instead, they
were allotted a total of only twelve [sic] peremptories . As in [Gabow v. Commonwealth ,
34 S.W.3d 63, 74-75 (Ky. 2000)], Appellants did not object to the trial judge's erroneous
interpretation of RCr 9 .40 but argued only that the trial judge had the discretion to grant more
peremptory strikes to defendants in a death penalty case than are required by the rule. Thus,
as in Gabow , this issue was not preserved for appellate review. [Kentucky Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins . Co. v. Cook, 590 S .W.2d 875, 877 (Ky. 1979)].") All parties now agree that our
notation in Young, that defendants received only twelve peremptories was erroneous because
the defendants actually received fourteen peremptory challenges .
was pending in the Court of Appeals, we issued our opinion in Young's second direct
appeal . We affirmed the judgment and sentence of life imprisonment.
A little over a year later, the Court of Appeals decided Young's appeal
from the denial of his RCr 11 .42 motion .5 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision to deny Young relief on all issues in his RCr 11 .42 motion, except Young's
claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the improper allocation of
peremptory challenges . The Court of Appeals found that Young's failure to object to the
improper allocation of peremptory challenges meant that his counsel's performance was
deficient as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals then held that it would presume that
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Young because a trial court's failure to
allocate the proper number of peremptory challenges mandates reversal on direct
appeal . We granted the Commonwealth's motion for discretionary review and now
reverse the Court of Appeals's decision on that point .'
Young v. Commonwealth , 129 S.W.3d 343 (Ky. 2004).
s Young v. Commonwealth , 2003-CA-001342-MR
(rendered June 17, 2005).
s
See, e.g., Cook, 590 S.W.2d at 877 (holding that "proper allocation [of peremptory
challenges] between litigants is a substantial right which so pervades the process that its
erroneous application requires reversal as a matter of law if the issue is properly preserved
by the adversely affected litigant .").
Young did not file a cross-motion for discretionary review . So the issues raised in his
RCr 11 .42 motion that the Court of Appeals determined were properly denied by the trial
court are not before us. Perry v. Williamson , 824 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Ky. 1992) ("[o]ur rules are
specific that if the motion for discretionary review made by the losing party in the Court of
Appeals is granted, it is then incumbent upon the prevailing party in the Court of Appeals to
file a cross-motion for discretionary review if respondent wishes to preserve the right to argue
issues which respondent lost in the Court of Appeals, or issues the Court of Appeals decided
not to address. If the party prevailing in the Court of Appeals wishes further consideration of
such issues along with the issues for which discretionary review has been granted, the
prevailing party must file a cross[-]motion for discretionary review .").
11. ANALYSIS.
A. Standard of Review.
Our review of Young's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is guided
by the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Strickland v. Washington .$
Under Strickland, a petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must make two
distinct showings . First, the petitioner must show that his counsel's performance was
deficient.9 "This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."'°
Second, a petitioner must show that his counsel's deficient performance caused him to
suffer prejudice ." "This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable ."'2 The petitioner
must make both showings, or a reviewing court cannot grant relief. 13
B. Prejudice Must Be Shown and May Not Be Presumed .
Two facts are clear: (1) Young and his co-defendants received one less
peremptory challenge at trial than they were entitled to under our later elucidation of
RCr 9.40 in Springer and (2) Young's counsel did not object to that improper allocation.
And the Court of Appeals held that counsel's failure to object to this improper allocation
s
466 U .S. 668 (1984) . See Gall v. Commonwealth , 702 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Ky. 1985) ("[t]his court
is bound by the principles established by the Supreme Court of the United States in
[Strickland] in the context of analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments .") .
Strickland , 466 U .S. at 687.
10
Id
11
12 /
13
/d
of peremptory challenges constituted deficient performance by counsel . But we do not
need to decide whether Young's counsel's failure to object to the improper allocation of
peremptory challenges met the deficient performance prong of Strickland because we
conclude that Young has not met the prejudice prong of Strickland .14
If properly preserved, an improper allocation of peremptory challenges
may be grounds for an automatic reversal on a direct appeal . But this per se reversal
rule can apply only to direct appeals where the error is properly preserved, not to
collateral attacks where the error was unpreserved .
The Court of Appeals erred in two ways by applying the per se reversal
rule to Young's RCr 11 .42 motion. First, the standards governing relief on RCr 11 .42
motions are more stringent than those governing direct appeals. As the Court of
Appeals has noted, "(here are errors which would require reversal on direct appeal but
which do not justify vacating a judgment of conviction by a motion under RCr 11 .42 ."' s
So the putative per se reversal rule for improper allocation of peremptory challenges
that may apply on direct appeal cannot be mechanically applied to collateral attacks on
the judgment of conviction .
14 Id. at 697 ("a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before
examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . . .
If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.").
15
Cook, 590 S.W.2d at 877; S rin er, 998 S.W.2d at 444-445 . Because it is unnecessary to
the resolution of this case, we express no opinion whether Morgan v. Commonwealth ,
189 S.W.3d 99 (Ky. 2006), which was rendered after the Court of Appeals's decision in
Young's case and in which we held that a defendant's right to be tried by an impartial jury is
only violated if an unqualified juror actually participates in the decision, affects Cook's per se
reversal rule for properly preserved claims of improper allocation of peremptory challenges .
16
Schooley v. Commonwealth , 556 S.W.2d 912, 917 (Ky.App. 1977) . See also Commonwealth v. Pelfrev , 998 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Ky. 1999) (quoting Schoolev).
Second, Strickland expressly requires, with a few limited exceptions
inapplicable to the case before us, a movant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel
to make an affirmative showing that counsel's alleged deficiencies resulted in
demonstrable prejudice ." Thus, the Court of Appeals erred when it held that Young
was entitled to a presumption of prejudice stemming from his counsel's failure to object
to the improper allocation of peremptory challenges, meaning that we now must
determine whether Young has met the prejudice prong of Strickland .
Young's principal argument regarding prejudice is his repeated assertion
that he would have been entitled to receive a new trial on appeal if his counsel had
properly objected to the trial court's improper allocation of peremptory challenges and if
the trial court had overruled the objection. But Young's argument is inapposite because
the focus of the prejudice prong must be on whether there is a reasonable probability
that Young's trial would have ended with a different result, not his appeal. As noted by
the Eleventh Circuit, "f he Supreme Court in [Strickland] told us that when the claimed
error of counsel occurred at the guilt stage of a trial (instead of on appeal) we are to
gauge prejudice against the outcome of the trial: whether there is a reasonable
probability of a different result at trial, not on appeal . "18 So our focal point must be on
17 Strickland , 466 U.S. at 693 ("actual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in attorney
performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove
prejudice. The government is not responsible for, and hence not able to prevent, attorney
errors that will result in reversal of a conviction or sentence . Attorney errors come in an
infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be
prejudicial . They cannot be classified according to likelihood of causing prejudice. Nor can
they be defined with sufficient precision to inform defense attorneys correctly just what
conduct to avoid . Representation is an art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional in
one case may be sound or even brilliant in another. Even if a defendant shows that particular
errors of counsel were unreasonable, therefore, the defendant must show that they actually
had an adverse effect on the defense .") .
18
Purvis v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 734, 739 (1 1 th Cir. 2006) .
whether Young received a fundamentally fair and reliable trial, not whether he would
have been successful on appeal.' 9
Viewed in that light, Young's RCr 11 .42 motion must fail because he does
not allege any identifiable prejudice at trial that resulted from his counsel's alleged error
(e.g., that he would have struck a particular juror with the extra peremptory challenge) .
Because it clearly does not meet Strickland 's requirement that a post-conviction
petitioner make a showing of identifiable prejudice, Young's RCr 11 .42 motion must be
denied .
III. CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed ; and the trial court's order denying Gerald Young's RCr 11 .42 motion is
reinstated for the reasons set forth in this opinion .
All concur .
's Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506
U.S. 364, 369-370 (1993) ("[t]hus, an analysis focusing solely on
mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was
fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective . To set aside a conviction or sentence solely
because the outcome would have been different but for counsel's error may grant the
defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle him .") (internal footnote omitted).
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Gregory D . Stumbo, Esq.
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew B. Krygiel, Esq .
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Milton C. Toby, Esq.
P. O. Box 1425
Georgetown, KY 40324
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