CHANNING HARDIN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
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SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
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RENDERED : FEBRUARY 23, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,Supraur (9ourf of
2005-SC-0505-MR
APPELLANT
CHANNING HARDIN
V.
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS WINE, JUDGE
04-CR-2003
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
Affirminq
A jury of the Jefferson Circuit Court convicted Appellant, Channing Hardin, of
murder, first degree robbery, and tampering with physical evidence . For these crimes,
Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment . Appellant now appeals to this Court as a
matter of right. Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b) . For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm
Appellant's convictions .
On June 15, 2004, Appellant shot Jeremy Gray' four times in the head .
Appellant stated that he had arranged to meet the victim that day in order to buy
cocaine from him. Before the meeting, Appellant called a friend, Theran Harwood, and
asked him if he wanted to make some money. Appellant told Harwood that he intended
' The victim's name is Jeremy Gray; however, the Commonwealth interchangeably
refers to the victim as Jeremy Glass and Jeremy Gray.
to rob someone and that he would share some of the proceeds with Harwood if
Appellant could borrow Harwood's vehicle and gun . Harwood agreed, and when
Appellant met the victim, he was driving Harwood's vehicle and carrying Harwood's gun .
Appellant later claimed that the story about robbing someone was a pretext for obtaining
the vehicle and the gun from Harwood . He explained that he needed the vehicle for
transportation and the gun for protection during his transaction with the victim.
Upon meeting, Appellant and the victim drove to McNeely Lake Park in Southern
Jefferson County to conduct their business . Upon reaching a secluded spot, Appellant
claimed that the victim suddenly yelled, "give me all the s--t ." Then, the victim allegedly
pulled out his gun and fired a shot at Appellant . Appellant explained that once the
victim fired a shot at him, he pulled out the gun that he borrowed from Harwood and
shot the victim four times in self defense. Appellant told police that both he and the
victim fired an entire clip of ammunition at each other during their altercation . Appellant
then emptied the victim's pockets, took some cocaine, and dragged the body off the
trail . Appellant also said that he threw the victim's gun off a dock into McNeely Lake .
The Commonwealth presented evidence which contradicted Appellant's claim
of self defense . Harwood testified that he received $60 for his part in the robbery and
that this was not the first time Appellant had talked about robbing someone . Also, an
unrelated witness, who was flying a model airplane in the area at the time the victim
was shot, testified that he heard a gunshot, followed by a long pause, and then three or
four additional shots evenly spaced . The witness said that at least three shots were
fired, but not as many as six or seven shots. The medical examiner testified that any
one of the bullets found in the victim's head would have been immediately incapacitating
and fatal, thus casting more doubt on the "shootout" scenario . Further, after exhaustive
searching, authorities could not find any spent shell casings which indicated that the
victim shot at Appellant, nor could they find the victim's gun in McNeely Lake .
The jury rejected Appellant's self defense claim and convicted him of all charges.
Appellant's sole argument on appeal is the trial court erred to the substantial
prejudice of Appellant when it refused to admit certain evidence regarding the victim .
Appellant claims that this evidence indicated that the victim had intent and motive to rob
Appellant during the drug transaction . The Commonwealth counters that the evidence
was properly excluded as irrelevant and as hearsay.
Evidentiary questions concerning relevancy are reviewed for abuse of discretion,
and the admissibility of statements as exceptions to hearsay are reviewed for clear
error . See Love v . Commonwealth , 55 S .W .3d 816, 822 (Ky. 2001); Young v.
Commonwealth, 50 S .W .3d 148, 167 (Ky. 2001). Appellant correctly notes that since he
claimed self defense at trial, evidence indicating the victim's state of mind at the time of
the altercation is relevant and admissible pursuant to KRE 803(3) .2 See Bray v.
Commonwealth , 68 S .W.3d 375, 381-82 (Ky. 2002) . In this case, Appellant . claimed that
the victim had a compelling financial motive to rob him during their meeting . The victim
was a drug dealer, and it was alleged that he recently met a new buyer named "Rob."
Avowal testimony indicated that this new buyer expressed a desire to buy all the drugs
that the victim could supply. Accordingly, Appellant claims that the victim was anxious
to acquire money and drugs for resale to his new buyer .
2 Appellant also cites KRE 804(b)(3) to support his argument, which permits certain
statements against a declarant's penal interest to be admitted into evidence despite
their classification as hearsay. Because we find all relevant statements by the victim to
be admissible pursuant to KRE 803(3), we need not address the applicability of KRE
804(b)(3) .
The Commonwealth concedes that statements by the victim indicating that he
wanted to get money to buy more drugs for resale to his new buyer were relevant and
admissible pursuant to KRE 803(3) . However, the Commonwealth points out that the
trial court specifically permitted such evidence to be admitted during a bench
conference into the matter. What the trial court did not permit were details about the
new buyer, including his name, physical description, and type of automobile he drove .
Also, Appellant was not permitted to present testimony regarding an alleged drug
transaction that occurred between the victim and the new buyer just prior to the victim's
death. The trial court determined that physical descriptions of and transactions with the
new buyer were not relevant to show the victim's state of mind at the time of the
altercation . Furthermore, the Commonwealth argues that since the testimony reflected
adversely upon the victim's character, it would have been unnecessarily prejudicial even
if the testimony has some probative value .
In accordance with the trial court's ruling, Appellant was able to introduce to the
jury, through cross-examination, statements by the victim indicating his desire to gather
additional funds for the purpose of purchasing more drugs for a new buyer . After the
Commonwealth rested its case, Appellant asked to present avowal testimony outside
the presence of the jury. Appellant's avowal witnesses testified about the new buyer's
name/physical description and the fact that the victim sold drugs to this person just prior
to his death . One of the witnesses also testified that the victim quoted the buyer as
saying he'd like to do as much business with the victim as possible .
Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling which
precluded details regarding a drug transaction the victim had with the alleged new buyer
just prior to his death and the buyer's name/physical description . This information is not
indicative of the victim's state of mind at the time of his death and would have
unnecessarily maligned the victim's character. While we agree with Appellant that it
would likely have been helpful to clarify for the jury that this alleged new buyer was not
Appellant, the record does not indicate that such a clarification was necessary or would
have significantly impacted the verdict or Appellant's sentence. Accordingly, we find no
error, and even if error may be perceived, such error would be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment and sentence of the Jefferson
Circuit Court are affirmed .
All concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
J. Bart Adams
500 Kentucky Home Life Building
239 S . Fifth Street, Suite 500
Louisville, KY 40202
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
James C . Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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