MARK EDWARD NEWTON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : OCTOBER 19, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2005-SC-0496-MR
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MARK EDWARD NEWTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY M. EASTON, JUDGE
2005-CR-0032
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from a judgment based on a jury verdict which convicted Newton
of four counts of first-degree sodomy. He was sentenced to a total of 70 years in prison
and received a fine of $4,000 .
The questions presented are whether the evidence of bad character was
improperly admitted against Newton and did the trial judge incorrectly permit evidence
that bolstered the testimony of the victim .
The evidence in this case demonstrate that Newton engaged in oral and anal
sexual contact on multiple occasions with a female relative. She was between the ages
of 5 and 7 years at the time of the events. The victim testified about the incidents and
Newton testified denying any wrong doing . Upon conviction and sentence, this appeal
followed .
1. Introduction Of Character Evidence
Newton was once married but it ended in a divorce . He later married the
victim's aunt. Newton's prior spouse was a cousin of his then current wife and her
sister who was the victim's mother . At trial, the victim's mother was asked if she was
happy that Newton and her sister were married . She replied "not really". She was then
asked why she was not happy about the marriage . Newton objected but was
immediately overruled by the trial judge . The victim's mother then stated that she
witnessed difficulties between Newton and her cousin and she did not want to see her
sister "have to go through that".
The mere voicing of an objection to a question without any request for relief is
not sufficient to preserve the issue for review. Ferguson v. Commonwealth , 512
S.W.2d 501 (Ky. 1974). Although Newton objected to the question, he never objected
to the answer and did not request an admonition or mistrial. It is incumbent upon a
party to request relief from the trial judge.
Evidence of wrongs or acts is generally not admissible to prove a person's
character and to show conformity therewith . KRE 404(b). The comment could be
viewed as being evidence of wrongs or acts directed toward Newton's character. That
alone is not sufficient to prohibit its introduction . The intent of the testimony must also
tend to show conformity to that testimony. Here, the testimony did nothing more than
indicate the witnesses' dislike for Newton . It had no relationship to a character trait that
was at issue. There was no error.
Even if the statement could be construed as error it would not affect Newton's
substantial right to a fair trial . See RCr 9.24. The conviction will not be reversed unless
there is an indication beyond a reasonable belief it would change the outcome of the
trial . Chapman v. California , 386 U.S .18, 87 S .Ct. 824,17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) ; Stiles v.
Commonwealth, 570 S.W.2d 645 (Ky. 1978) . In this case, the testimony of the victim
provided overwhelming evidence of Newton's guilt. The simple non-responsive
statement from another witness is insufficient to cause reversal.
II. Bolstering of the Victim's Testimony
The victim disclosed the illegal sexual contact to her parents. They waited a
week and confronted her again before reporting the matter to the police . Both parents
testified regarding the wait and they along with another testified regarding the victim's
lack of being in trouble at school or at home because she was truthful and honest.
Bolstering is the enhancement of unimpeached testimony with other evidence.
See Black's Law Dictionary 186 (8th ed . 2004). Here, the additional evidence was used
to explain to the jury why the parents did not immediately report the incidents . It was
not intended to bolster or enhance the testimony of the victim. The parents wanted to
be as sure as they could be before reporting the events to the police . They waited a
week and then confronted the child again . They took great pains to be as sure as they
possibly could be that the disclosure was the truth . It was entirely reasonable to do so
and equally reasonable to explain to the jury why there was a one week delay before
reporting the crimes. The evidence did not infringe on the jury's role of assessing the
credibility of a witness. See Newkirk v.. Commonwealth , 937 S.W .2d 690 (Ky. 1996).
There was no error.
The judgment of conviction for four counts of First Degree Sodomy and the
resulting sentence of 70 years imprisonment is affirmed .
Graves, Minton, Scott and Wintersheimer, JJ., concur. Lambert, C.J ., concurs
and files a concurring opinion in which McAnulty, J., joins. Roach, J. concurs in result
only.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Donna L. Boyce
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane - Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
RENDERED : OCTOBER 19, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
'Sixpreztte Caurf of `ltrufurhv
2005-SC-000496-MR
MARK EDWARD NEWTON
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY M. EASTON, JUDGE
NO. 05-CR-00032
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
CONCURRING OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LAMBERT
I concur in result as to issue II, but only because the error was
unpreserved and does not rise to the requirements of palpable error. If Appellant had
objected I would vote to reverse for a new trial.
Additional facts are necessary . At trial, Rebecca Baumgardner, the
victim's stepmother, testified that when the victim first told her that she had been
molested, she and the victim's father decided to wait a week or so to ask the ten year
old child victim about it again to ensure the child was telling the truth . On the second
occasion, the stepmother spoke to the victim alone and told her that if she had been
lying, this was the one time she would not get into trouble if she would admit it. The
stepmother further stated that she told the victim they would go tell the police, but if the
victim later said she was lying she would be in big trouble with the police . The witness
stated that she waited for a week in order to ensure that the. victim was being honest .
Furthermore, she stated that the child victim did not get in trouble at school and did not
make up stories either at school or at home .
The Commonwealth elicited similar testimony from Ben Baumgardner, the
victim's father. The father testified that when his wife told him what the victim had
alleged about Appellant, they waited a week and questioned her again because he
knew if she said the same thing when they spoke to her the second time, it had to be
true. The father further testified that the victim never got in trouble at school or at home
for making up stories. Tina Baumgardner, the victim's mother, also testified that the
victim never got in trouble at school or at home for making up stories or telling lies .
KRE 404(a)(3) states that evidence of the character of a witness is not
admissible at trial except as permitted under KRE 607, KRE 608, and KRE 609.
Pertinent to this opinion, KRE 608(a) provides in part as follows :
Opinion and reputation evidence of character . The credibility
of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in
the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these
limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful
character is admissible only after the character of the
witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or
reputation evidence or otherwise .
"[I]t continues to be the law that evidence of good character cannot be introduced until
after the witness' character has been attacked ."' In this case, the victim's character for
truthfulness had not been attacked when the Commonwealth elicited the bolstering
testimony from the witnesses. "The word 'character,' used most narrowly and
accurately, describes the personal disposition or personality of an individual . . . . [A]
person's character is an intermediate fact that is offered to prove some other ultimate
1 Pickard Chrysler, Inc . v. Sizemore, 918 S.W .2d 736, 741 (Ky. App. 1995) .
fact, primarily to support an inference that a person acted (or did not act) in conformity
with his or her character on a given occasion ." 2 The obvious inference in this case was
that the victim never told lies, and was not lying in this instance . Very recently we
reaffirmed in Fairrow v. Commonwealth 3 that bolstering testimony is inadmissible
"because KRE 608(a)(2) requires credibility to be attacked before it is supported ." a. Had
the defense called into doubt the propensity of the victim to tell the truth, then the
bolstering testimony might have been proper. But generally, a witness may not vouch
for the truthfulness of another witness . This is because such testimony "remove[s] the
jury from its historic function of assessing credibility .,,6 This is particularly true when a
witness is allowed to state his opinion as to the truthfulness of another witness, where
that opinion leads, as it did in this case, to a conclusion that the defendant is guilty.
When the father and the stepmother testified that they waited a week
before asking the victim about the molestation, they were in essence saying, "we
believe the victim, so should you ." The majority excuses this evidence rules violation on
the basis that the "additional evidence was used to explain to the jury why the parents
did not immediately report the incidents . . . They took great pains to be as sure as they
possibly could be that the disclosure was the truth ." It is doubtful that the one week
delay could be perceived as a legitimate concern by either the defense or the
prosecution . No rational defense counsel would have attacked the ten year old victim's
credibility based on a one week parental delay in reporting to the authorities . But if
2 Fairrow v. Commonwealth , 175 S.W.3d 601, 605 (Ky. 2005) (citin Robert G. Lawson,
The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 2 .15[2], at 97 (4th ed. 2003)).
3 1d.
4
Id. at 606 (citations omitted) .
5 Stringer v. Commonwealth , 956 S .W .2d 883, 888 (Ky. 1997) .
6
Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S W 2d 690, 696 (Ky. 1996).
defense counsel had been so unwise, the parents devastating rebuttal would have been
proper. From the looks of this case the three veracity witnesses had but one purpose to tell the jury to believe the child victim .
Moreover, the additional testimony regarding the truthfulness of the victim
generally at school and at home had no bearing on the one week delay. It was a
transparent endorsement by the witnesses of the child's credibility.
Professor Lawson stated the reasons for the prohibition on bolstering
testimony as follows :
Good reasons exist for requiring litigants to defer efforts to
establish the credibility of witnesses until questions on the
subject have been raised by opposing parties . Permitting
credibility to be bolstered ahead of attack would waste
enormous amounts of time, increase risks of unfair
prejudice, and add unnecessarily to the difficulty and
complexity of litigation . To avert these effects, courts have
widely, if not universally, adopted prohibitions against
bolstering (or rehabilitating) the credibility of witnesses
before their credibility has been attacked .7
The effect of the bolstering testimony in this case was prejudicial to Appellant . Although
not reflected in the majority opinion, there was no physical evidence or evidence of any
kind against Appellant other than the testimony of the child victim. The jury was
required to believe the victim or believe Appellant's categorical denial . It cannot be said
that the bolstering testimony did not make the difference .
As it is clear that there was error in the admission of the bolstering
testimony, I now turn to the most difficult question in this case - whether this error
requires reversal . Appellant admits in his brief that this error is unpreserved, but asks
Lawson, supra, §4.00[2], at 265.
the Court to reverse based on palpable error. Our palpable error standard is contained
in RCr 10.26 and that rule states as follows :
A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a
party may be considered by the court on motion for a new
trial or by an appellate court on appeal, even though
insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate
relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest
injustice has resulted from the error.
Under this rule, reversal will only be granted if a manifest injustice has resulted from the
error . "To discover manifest injustice, a reviewing court must plumb the depths of the
proceeding . . . to determine whether the defect in the proceeding was shocking or
jurisprudentially intolerable ."8 The testimony of the victim was quite graphic and
detailed in describing the abuse. While the bolstering testimony was error and added
weight to the Commonwealth's case, I cannot conclude that there was manifest
injustice . Without the bolstering testimony, the Commonwealth nevertheless had highly
persuasive testimony from the child victim . I conclude, therefore, that the error did not
rise to the level of palpable error and join in the result of affirming the convictions .
McAnulty, J ., joins this concurring opinion .
8 Martin v. Com . , - S.W .3d i, 2006 WL 1358364 (Ky. 2006) .
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