JOHN HENRY LEWIS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
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SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : OCTOBER 19, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
"Suyrrmt Courf of ~i
NO. 2005-SC-000475-MR
JOHN HENRY LEWIS
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 03-CR-00323
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
John Henry Lewis appeals from his conviction in the McCracken Circuit
Court for murder and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. His sole argument
on appeal is that the trial court infringed upon his right to present a self-protection
defense when it prohibited him from testifying about prior specific acts of violence
known to him to have been committed by the murder victim . Because the trial court did
not, in fact, limit Lewis's testimony on that point, we find no error and affirm .
FACTS
Lewis and two women went to see a movie. Lewis parked his vehicle next
to the vehicle of Richard Hill. The vehicles were parked such that their driver-side doors
were adjacent . When Lewis and his companions returned to their vehicle after the
movie, Lewis accused Hill of bumping his car door and demanded that Hill apologize .
Hill's response did not satisfy Lewis, and he and Hill argued . When Hill allegedly dipped
his right shoulder as if reaching for something, one of the women in Lewis's car
exclaimed that Hill was reaching for a gun. Lewis then grabbed a pistol he had in his
vehicle and fired three or four shots toward Hill. Lewis then sped away.
Hill died from his gunshot wounds, and Lewis was charged with murder.
When he was arrested on these charges in Illinois a few weeks after the shooting, Lewis
told the arresting officer that he had shot Hill in self-defense . Toward that end, Lewis
filed a motion in limine seeking to be allowed to introduce at trial, among other matters,
evidence of Hill's prior violent acts that were known to Lewis at the time of the shooting
to explain Lewis's belief in the need to use force to protect himself. Lewis's motion
stated that he would introduce evidence of:
prior acts of violence, threats and hearsay evidence of such
acts and threats, in order to prove that [Lewis] so feared [Hill]
that he believed it was necessary to use physical force (or
deadly physical force) in self[-]protection . Further,
Defendant will provide evidence that he actually knew of
such acts, threats, or statements at the time of the
encounter . Saylor v. Commonwealth , [144 S.W.3d 812, 815816 (Ky. 2004)].
During a brief hearing on the motion, the Commonwealth stated its
agreement that, assuming the proper foundation were laid, Lewis could testify as to
specific prior violent acts by Hill. However, the Commonwealth pointed out that any
witness besides Lewis would be limited to testifying only that Hill had a general
reputation for violence . At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated that it was
in agreement with the Commonwealth's position . It appears that the trial court
essentially granted Lewis's motion.
The case proceeded to trial on the following day. During opening
statement, Lewis's counsel told the jurors that they would be hearing evidence in the
trial that Hill had a reputation for "pulling guns on people, routinely ." At that point, the
Commonwealth objected ; and while counsel was stating the objection, defense counsel
added, "John Lewis knew it." At the bench conference that followed, the Commonwealth argued that defense counsel's statement regarding Hill's reputation for pulling
guns on people was outside the bounds of the trial court's ruling in limine. The trial
court sustained the objection and admonished the jury to disregard defense counsel's
statement.
Lewis later testified in his own behalf and, when asked by his counsel if he
had an opinion as to Hill's reputation for peacefulness, responded that Hill was a "pretty
violent guy." Counsel did not ask Lewis about his knowledge of any specific instances
of alleged prior violent acts committed by Hill.
The jury found Lewis guilty of wanton murder and being a felon in
possession of a handgun . In accordance with the jury's recommendation, Lewis was
sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment for the murder conviction and ten years'
imprisonment for the possession of a handgun charge, to be served consecutively, for a
total maximum sentence of sixty years' imprisonment. This appeal followed .
ANALYSIS
It is unquestioned that "the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense ."" And we certainly agree with
Lewis's contention that he had a constitutional right to present evidence to the jury to
support his self-defense theory . But we do not find that Lewis's right to present
evidence in his behalf was abridged . In essence, we hold that Lewis cannot object to
not being allowed to introduce evidence that he did not attempt to introduce .
We clarified in Saylor, the case Lewis cited in his motion, precisely the
type of evidence a defendant claiming self-defense to a homicide may assert . Under
our ruling:
Generally, a homicide defendant may introduce evidence of
the victim's character for violence in support of a claim that
he acted in self-defense or that the victim was the initial
aggressor. . . . However, such evidence may only be in the
form of reputation or opinion, not specific acts of
misconduct . . . .
An exception exists, however, when evidence of the
victim's prior acts of violence, threats, and even hearsay
evidence of such acts and threats, is offered to prove that
the defendant so feared the victim that he believed it was
necessary to use physical force (or deadly physical force) in
self-protection, provided that the defendant knew of such
acts, threats, or statements at the time of the encounter. . . .
In that scenario, the evidence is not offered to prove the
victim's character to show action in conformity therewith but
to prove the defendant's state of mind (fear of the victim) at
the time he acted in self-defense .
'
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U .S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U .S .
479, 485 (1984)).
Sayl r, 144 S.W.3d at 815-816 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) .
But from our review of the record, Lewis did not attempt to testify about specific acts of
violence allegedly committed by Hill, despite being entitled to do so.
We have reservations about the adequacy of Lewis's in limine motion
itself. As we recently held, in order to preserve an alleged error for appellate review, a
motion in limine must "specify the evidence objected to[.],,3 In the case at hand, Lewis's
motion in limine tracked language from our holding in Saylor, citing the case. But the
motion did not disclose with any specificity the evidence sought to be admitted . A
motion in limine should be specific enough to inform the trial court, opposing counsel,
and the reviewing appellate court the specific grounds for any objection being made by
the motion or the substance of any evidence being offered by the motion . Since the
Commonwealth has not questioned the adequacy of Lewis's motion in limine, we will
not issue what would amount to an advisory opinion on whether Lewis's motion in limine
met the specificity requirement discussed in Lanham .
Assuming that the trial court's comments at the hearing on the motion in
limine granted Lewis's motion, we must determine if sustaining the Commonwealth's
objection during opening statement and admonishing the jury meant that the trial court
had changed its mind. After examining the record closely, we find that the ruling in
limine is consistent with the ruling on the Commonwealth's objection during opening
statement .
Lewis's counsel's opening statement informed the jurors that they would
hear testimony that Lewis knew of Hill's alleged propensity to point a firearm at people.
Clearly, under Saylor, the only person who would have been permitted to testify about
Lanham v. Commonwealth , 171 S.W.3d 14,22 (Ky. 2005).
those specific prior acts would have been Lewis . However, defense counsel's
statement at issue did not specify that Lewis alone would be testifying about Hill's
specific prior acts of violence . So the objection was well-taken, based upon the trial
court's comments at the hearing on the motion in limine . The trial court's sustaining the
objection cannot reasonably be construed as a decision to prevent Lewis himself from
testifying in accordance with Saylor, as the trial court had ruled in limine that he could.
Despite receiving permission of the trial court to do so, Lewis's counsel did
not ask Lewis if he was aware of any specific prior acts of violence by Hill. As we view
the record, the trial court did not prohibit Lewis from answering a question that, due to
either oversight or trial strategy, was never asked. Therefore, we have no way of
knowing what Lewis's answer to an unasked question would have been, nor do we
know if the Commonwealth would have objected to the question, nor whether the trial
court would have sustained that hypothetical objection . Since we clearly cannot
predicate reversible error on the hypothetical denial of a hypothetical answer to a
hypothetical question, Lewis's conviction must be affirmed .
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the McCracken Circuit Court is
affirmed .
All concur.
Commonwealth v. Ferrell, 17 S.W .3d 520, 525, n.10 (Ky. 2000) ("[w]ithout . . . a crystal ball,
reviewing courts can never know with any certainty what a given witness's response to a
question would have been if the trial court had allowed them to answer. Appellate courts
review records; they do not have crystal balls.").
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Shelly R. Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
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