GARY V. GAMBLE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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suprsme ~Vurf of
2005-SC-0439-MR
GARY V. GAMBLE
v.
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HON. JOHN GRISE, JUDGE
04-CR-009-001 AND 04-CR-333
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Gary Gamble, entered a plea of guilty to murder, burglary in the first
degree, and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree . Following a
penalty trial before a jury, Appellant was sentenced to seventy years in prison . He
appeals to this Court as a matter of right, asserting the following errors: (1) that the trial
court abused its discretion by requiring him to wear leg shackles during the
proceedings, and (2) that the trial court erroneously admitted photographs of the victim.
Finding no error, we affirm.
1. Background
The events underlying this appeal were set in motion by Kristie Gonzales. While
living in Bowling Green, she had dated Chris Page, who sold drugs out of his apartment,
according to Gonzales. When her relationship with Page soured, Gonzales relocated to
Louisville where she met and began dating Charlie Morse, a childhood friend of
Appellant . Gonzales told Morse about Page's drug dealing operations and the large
quantities of cash and drugs that were normally in Page's apartment. Eventually, the
two hatched a plan to rob Page. Morse recruited Appellant to participate in the scheme .
Appellant, Gonzales, and Morse drove from Louisville to Bowling Green in two
vehicles . The plan was for Gonzales to take one of the cars to pick up Page and drive
with him to a neighboring town. Meanwhile, Appellant and Morse would use the
opportunity to burglarize Page's apartment and return to Louisville in the second car.
Gonzales met Page according to plan, so Appellant and Morse proceeded to the
supposedly empty apartment . Unbeknownst to them, however, Page had been evicted
several months before and the unit had been rented to J . Corey Webster.
Appellant and Morse approached the apartment and knocked . Hearing no
response, Appellant kicked open the door. To their surprise, Webster was lying on a
couch near the door. One shot was fired at Webster, though the actual gunman is
unclear; both Appellant and Morse attribute the single shot to the other. The bullet
passed through the bottom of Webster's foot and lodged in the back of his neck,
causing his airway to swell shut . He later died in the parking lot as paramedics
attempted to save him.
Following the shooting, Appellant and Morse fled the apartment complex and
headed for Louisville . They reunited with Gonzales at a service station in Bullitt County.
Meanwhile, Louisville police had received an anonymous tip that Morse and Gonzales
were involved in the murder. Officers eventually located Gonzales and Morse, and took
them into custody for questioning . Morse refused to give a statement and was
released . Gonzales, however, made some incriminating statements and was held
overnight . The following day, she agreed to provide the details of the crime in exchange
for complete immunity . Her statement implicated Appellant, who was thereafter
arrested .
A Warren County grand jury indicted Appellant for murder, burglary in the first
degree, and for being a persistent felony offender in the second degree . Though
Appellant maintained that Morse had actually fired the gun that killed Webster, he
nonetheless entered a guilty plea to all three charges in exchange for the
Commonwealth's agreement to allow him to be sentenced by a jury. The
Commonwealth also agreed not to seek aggravated sentences of life without the
possibility of parole or life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years.
Following a sentencing trial, the jury fixed Appellant's sentence at fifty years in
prison for the murder charge and twenty years in prison for the burglary charge, to be
served consecutively. It also recommended a forty-year sentence for the PFO charge,
to be served in lieu of the burglary sentence. The trial court amended this ninety-year
total sentence to seventy years, the statutory maximum. Appellant now enters this
appeal as a matter of right. Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b) . Further facts will be developed as
necessary .
11. Use of Leg Shackles
Appellant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it required
him to wear leg shackles during his penalty phase trial. During a meeting in chambers
prior to the commencement of the proceedings, the trial court informed defense counsel
that Appellant would be required to wear leg shackles when he appeared in the
courtroom . Defense counsel objected, but the trial court overruled the objection, citing
security concerns. Appellant now argues that the trial court lacked reasonable
justification for the use of leg shackles, and that he was unduly prejudiced as a
consequence . Because the trial court articulated legitimate concerns warranting the
use of the restraints, we find no abuse of discretion .
Recognizing the inherent prejudice that flows from the use of physical restraints
when a defendant appears before a jury,
"[i]t has long
been the law in Kentucky that, in
the absence of special circumstances, an accused should not be forced to face the jury
in chains." Hill v. Commonwealth , 125 S.W.3d 221, 233 (Ky. 2004). The right to be free
of shackles when in the presence of the jury was codified in RCr 8.28(5): "Except for
good cause shown the judge shall not permit the defendant to be seen by the jury in
shackles or other devices for his physical restraint ." This Court has explained that the
use of shackles on certain defendants is necessary and permissible where the trial court
has "encountered some good grounds for believing such defendants might attempt to
do violence or to escape during their trials ." Tunget v. Commonwealth , 303 Ky. 834,
836, 198 S .W.2d 785, 786 (1947). Thus, when a trial court is faced with the decision to
shackle a defendant, it must balance "the serious prejudice that may result from
manacling a defendant in the presence of the jury" against the necessity of the
restraints in light of the particular circumstances of the case. Hill, 125 S .W.3d at 233.
The ultimate decision to shackle a defendant rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court, and will only be overturned on appeal upon a demonstration that this discretion
was abused . Commonwealth v. Conley, 959 S .W.2d 77, 79 (Ky. 1998) .
Here, the trial court based its decision to shackle Appellant on concerns for
courtroom security and decorum, taking into account the peculiar circumstances of the
case. The trial court specifically noted in the order denying Appellant's motion for a new
trial that it had "determined that specific factors unique to the case justified the leg
shackles ." Moreover, the trial court expressed its understanding that the routine
shackling of each and every defendant is not permitted . This Court, in Tunget,
theorized that the use of shackles is warranted in "one murder case out of an average
hundred coming to trial." Id., 303 Ky. at 836, 198 S .W.2d at 786. Referencing this
comment, the newly appointed trial judge in this matter remarked that his "one case had
come early ."
The trial court also noted the exceedingly brutal and senseless nature of the
crime-the unprovoked murder of a complete stranger in his own home--to which
Appellant had pled guilty . The court also expected rancor among Appellant and the key
witnesses. Morse, Appellant's co-defendant, was present in the courtroom and
scheduled to testify mere feet away from Appellant . As the trial court explained, "it
requires little imagination to presume great animosity between admitted murderers ."
Equal hostility was anticipated between Appellant and Gonzales, who had identified
Appellant to police in exchange for complete immunity, despite her own critical role in
the crime. The trial court also expressed its concern that courtroom decorum and
integrity would be compromised due to the explosive nature of the case, especially
since the victim's family was planning to be in the courtroom and would likely be sitting
near the man who had participated in this exceptionally wanton and brazen murder.
The trial court weighed these concerns against Appellant's right to be free from
shackles, and took significant measures to lessen any potential prejudice . The court
limited the restraints to leg shackles and did not require more visible and restrictive
handcuffs . The court also permitted Appellant to be seated at the defense table before
the jurors entered the courtroom, so that they would not view him walking in shackles .
Similar measures were taken when Appellant went to the witness stand . The court
refrained from admonishing the jury about the leg shackles because "to do so would
draw more attention to them and do more harm than good." The court also reasoned
that there was no need to admonish the jury that the use of leg shackles could not result
in an inference of guilt because Appellant had already admitted his involvement in the
crime.
Upon review of the record, we conclude that the trial court acted within its
discretion in requiring Appellant to wear leg shackles in the courtroom . The trial court
properly balanced the potential prejudice resulting from the use of the shackles against
legitimate concerns for courtroom safety and decorum. See Hill, 125 S.W.3d at 236.
Moreover, the court did not base its decision on general safety concerns applicable to
all criminal trials . Rather, it articulated specific factors particular to Appellant's penalty
trial . See Deck v. Missouri , 544 U .S. 622, 633,125 S.Ct. 2007, 2015 (2005)
("[A]ny . . .determination must be case specific; that is to say, it should reflect particular
concerns, say special security needs or escape risks, related to the defendant on trial.").
Where, as here, a defendant has admitted his guilt, it is not improper for the trial court to
consider a variety of factors, including the nature of the crimes, in determining whether
a security concern exists. See United States . v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1244 (11th Cir.
2005) (noting that in determining whether to shackle a defendant, the trial court's
"assessment may include consideration of, among other things, the criminal history and
background of each of the defendants, including whether the defendant has a history of
violent acts; the number of defendants being tried together; the nature of the charges
pending against the defendanto, including whether the charged offenses include violent
criminal conduct; any past history of conduct by a defendant that may have disrupted a
criminal proceeding ; and other circumstances, such as threatening behavior against
witnesses or court personnel, that may reasonably bear upon the safety of the
courtroom and its occupants or upon the danger of escape") . The trial court's ultimate
decision to use physical restraints is permissible where, as in the present matter, the
determination is justified by a legitimate interest in courtroom safety and decorum . See
Peterson v. Commonwealth, 160 S .W.3d 730, 734 (Ky. 2005) (affirming use of shackles
where defendant's "belligerent conduct prior to trial . . .raised a serious issue of
courtroom security").
We note also that the trial court took steps to minimize any potential prejudice by
allowing Appellant to enter and exit the courtroom in private, and by requiring only leg
shackles . Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that Appellant's guilty plea further
minimized the chance of undue prejudice . See Hill, 125 S .W .3d at 236 ("[T]he fact that
the jury already knew Appellant was a convicted criminal and a prisoner in a
penitentiary mitigated the prejudice naturally attendant to such restraint ."). In light of the
careful consideration given this matter, we are convinced that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion . See Kuprion v. Fitz,, eq rald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Ky. 1994) ("A
trial court abuses its discretion when its actions are arbitrary, unreasonable or
unsupported by sound legal principles .").
1111. Admission of Crime Scene and Autopsy Photographs
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting two crime scene
photographs and one autopsy photograph. Defense counsel objected, arguing that the
images are unduly graphic and gruesome and that they were rendered irrelevant due to
Appellant's guilty plea. The trial court overruled the objection, concluding that the
photographs held significant probative value outweighing any prejudice created by their
graphic nature . We likewise find no error.
All three challenged photographs depict the victim. The first photograph shows
Webster, covered in blood, sitting up at the crime scene as paramedics treated his
injuries. The second is a photograph of Webster's foot with a small metal rod inserted
to recreate the trajectory of the bullet. The third photograph was taken during the
autopsy, and shows the wound created by the bullet as it passed through Webster's
chin.
Otherwise relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial nature. KRE 403. Accordingly, when
determining whether to exclude evidence, "a trial court should consider three factors :
the probative worth of the evidence, the probability that the evidence will cause undue
prejudice, and whether the harmful effects substantially outweigh the probative worth."
Page v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W .3d 416, 420 (Ky. 2004). An appellate court will
overturn a trial court's ruling under KRE 403 only when there has been an abuse of
discretion . Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1996).
Here, all three photographs were relevant . The first photograph showed the
nature and extent of Webster's injuries, which assisted the jury in assessing the
character of the crime . See Thompson v. Commonwealth , 147 S.W.3d 22, 36 (Ky.
2004) ("[A] sufficient amount of evidence must be presented to the jury in a penalty
phase proceeding where no trial occurred, as the jury cannot be expected to make its
determination without a comprehensive understanding of the serious nature of the
charge ."). The second and third photographs, depicting the entry wounds on Webster's
foot and chin, were introduced to explain the trajectory of the bullet. Additionally, these
photographs, along with the medical examiner's testimony, provided information about
the position of the gunman from which the jury could conclude that the gun was fired
intentionally. We also reject Appellant's claim that the photographs were rendered
irrelevant by his guilty plea : "The Commonwealth . . . has a right to prove its case to the
jury with competent evidence even when the defendant pleads guilty ." Thompson , 147
S.W .3d at 36.
We disagree with Appellant's claim that the photographs' probative value is
outweighed by the prejudicial nature of overly graphic and heinous photographs.
Generally speaking, the gruesome nature of a photograph does not automatically
render it inadmissible . Funk v. Commonwealth , 842 S .W .2d 476, 479 (Ky. 1992) .
Rather, exclusion of graphic or gruesome photographs is warranted where the image
depicted is irrelevant and only serves to inflame the jury. See Clark v. Commonwealth,
833 S .W.2d 793, 795 (Ky. 1992) (gory photographs admitted to demonstrate
defendant's attempts to conceal his crime should have been excluded, where the
images had "no relevance to the crime scene, but served only to arouse passion and
shock at the sight of a gory event"). Here, the photographs accurately depict the nature
and extent of Webster's injuries at the time he died . They are not unduly prejudicial
simply because the wounds inflicted are unpleasant to view.
The trial court properly balanced the probative value of these photographs
against the potential for prejudice due to their graphic nature . The photographs were
necessary not only to demonstrate the character of the crime for purposes of
sentencing, but also to rebut Appellant's claim that the gun fired accidentally . Having
viewed the photographs, we agree with the trial court that the photographs are not so
intensely gruesome as to outweigh this probative value. There was no abuse of
discretion .
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Warren Circuit Court is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Donna L. Boyce
Appellate Branch Manager
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Bryan D. Morrow
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
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