CRANDELL L. SLONE V. KENTUCKY STATE POLICE, ET AL
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
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CIVIL PROCED URE PROMUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANA' OTHER
CASE INANY CO UR T OF THIS STA TE.
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RENDERED : JANUARY 19, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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CRANDELL L. SLONE
V.
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2004-CA-2347-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO. 00-81563
KENTUCKY STATE POLICE ; HON . RICHARD M.
JOINER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
In a decision that was affirmed by the Workers' Compensation Board (Board) and
the Court of Appeals, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the claimant
did not sustain a compensable injury because the motor vehicle accident in which he was
involved did not arise out of and in the course of his employment . Appealing, the
claimant asserts that his injury is work-related under the "traveling employee" exception
to the "going and coming" rule or the positional risk theory . Black v. Tichenor, 396
S .W .2d 794 (Ky. 1965) . We affirm.
The claimant worked as a state trooper from 1967 until his retirement in 1991 . In
1992, he returned to the department as a civilian, testing driver's license applicants . He
resided in Shelbyville . His official workstation was at Bowman Field in Louisville, but he
occasionally helped out in other counties when they were short-staffed . During the year
immediately preceding the accident in which he was injured, the claimant reported to the
employer's Taylorsville office on Tuesdays to perform testing . When doing so, he drove
his personal vehicle and went there directly from his home . He was not reimbursed for
mileage between his home and Bowman Field but was reimbursed for mileage between
his home and Taylorsville . When working in Taylorsville, he took a one-hour lunch break.
He testified that he drove 15-18 miles to his home for lunch because no restaurant in
Taylorsville suited him. He was not reimbursed for driving home for lunch.
On Tuesday, May 23, 2000, the claimant was involved in a head-on collision
when returning to Taylorsville from his home after lunch . Addressing the question of
work-relatedness, the ALJ noted that during the year immediately preceding the
accident, the claimant's regular assignment was to report to Bowman Field on four days
each week and to report to the Spencer County Courthouse in Taylorsville on Tuesday .
Based on the mileage reimbursement he received under the regulations, the ALJ
inferred that his official workstation was in Louisville. The ALJ also acknowledged that
when work involves travel away from the employer's premises, the worker is considered
to be within the course of the employment during the entire trip unless a distinct
departure on a personal errand is shown ; therefore, injuries that result from the
necessity of sleeping in hotels or eating in restaurants while in travel status are usually
compensable . Nonetheless, the ALJ determined that the travel at the time of the
claimant's accident was unrelated to his employment . He was not traveling to or from a
restaurant. He had been to his home and was returning to work at his regularlyassigned place of work on Tuesdays; therefore, he was not a traveling employee. On
that basis, the AU concluded that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of
the employment.
The Board noted that the payment of mileage was but one factor for the ALJ to
consider and determined that substantial evidence supported the finding that the
claimant was an employee with more than one work station at the time of his accident .
Rejecting the claimant's "positional risk" argument (that he would not have been involved
in the accident had he not been working in Taylorsville), the Board noted that such an
exception to the "going and coming" rule would swallow it. Finding no error, the Court of
Appeals affirmed .
The claimant continues to assert that the accident occurred while he was traveling
for the employer's benefit, that he was entitled to a one-hour lunch break during which he
was not required to stay on the employer's premises, and that he did not depart on a
personal errand that would interrupt his status as a traveling employee ; therefore, he is
entitled to coverage. Black v. Tichenor , supra . He emphasizes that his official
workstation was in Louisville and that he was reimbursed for mileage when he worked in
Taylorsville or other worksites away from Bowman Field. He complains that the
decisions below would deny coverage to any employee who travels to a site away from
his regular place of employment on a regular basis, due solely to the regularity of the
travel . In a "positional risk" argument, he asserts that but for the work he performed in
Taylorsville, he would not have been in what turned out to be a place of danger .
Therefore, the accident was due to his work and its effects were compensable. See
Kaycee Coal Company v. Short, 450 S .W.2d 262 (Ky. 1970) . We disagree .
The burden was on the claimant to prove every element of his claim, including
work-relatedness . Although he asserted that he was entitled to coverage under the
traveling employee exception to the going and coming rule, the AU concluded as a
matter of law that the accident "did not arise out of and occur in the course of his
employment with the Kentucky state police." Having failed to convince the ALJ that the
accident was work-related, the claimant's burden on appeal was to show that the
evidence in his favor was so overwhelming that it compelled a favorable finding as a
matter of law. Special Fund v. Francis , 708 S.W .2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986) .
Contrary to the claimant's assertion, his work was not akin to that of a traveling
salesman who makes regular calls on a number of customers. For the year preceding
his accident, he worked Mondays and Wednesdays through Fridays at his employer's
Bowman Field office and Tuesdays at its Taylorsville office, which was in an adjacent
county. Although his employer paid mileage for the trip between his home and
Taylorsville at the beginning and end of the day, it did not pay mileage for his trips home
for lunch. Under the circumstances, the evidence in the claimant's favor would have
permitted but was not so overwhelming as to compel a conclusion that he was a traveling
employee for the purposes of Chapter 342 when he worked at the Taylorsville office .
Special Fund v. Francis, supra .
Even if the ALJ had viewed the claimant as being in travel status when he worked
at the employer's Taylorsville office, we are convinced that the evidence would not have
entitled him to coverage. Nor would it have entitled him to coverage under the positional
risk theory. Corken v. Corken Steel Products, Inc., 385 S.W .2d 949 (Ky. 1964). As the
ALJ correctly noted, when work involves travel away from the employer's premises, a
worker is considered to be within the course of the employment during the entire trip
unless the individual is performing a personal errand that constitutes a distinct departure
from the work-related purpose of the trip . Kaycee Coal Company v. Short , supra ; Turner
Day & Woolworth Handle Company v. Pennington , 250 Ky. 433, 63 S.W.2d 490 (1933);
Standard Oil Company (Kentucky) v. Witt, 283 Ky. 327, 141 S.W.2d 271 (1940). For that
reason, injuries arising from the necessity of sleeping in hotels or eating in restaurants
while on travel status are usually found to be compensable . Arthur Larson and Lex K.
Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 25.01, et seg. (2005) . Reasonable
incidental travel in the vicinity of the worksite in order to obtain a meal is not considered
to be a personal departure, but what is reasonable depends upon the circumstances . Id.
This is not a case where work-related travel caused the claimant to be away from
home for an extended period of time . He was working in Taylorsville for one 8-hour day.
Furthermore, his reason for driving 15-18 miles to his home for lunch was that no
restaurant in Taylorsville suited him . Under the circumstances, it would not have been
reasonable to conclude that his work was the reason he made a 15-18-mile trip home for
lunch. Nor would it have been reasonable to conclude that his work was the reason for
his presence at what turned out to be a place of danger.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
Lambert, C .J ., and Cooper, Johnstone, Roach, and Wintersheimer, JJ ., concur.
Graves, J ., dissents by separate opinion in which Scott, J., joins.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Christopher P . Evensen
Tamara Cotton & Associates
429 West Muhammad Ali Blvd .
1102 Republic Building
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
K. Lance Lucas
Sutton, Hicks, Lucas, Grayson & Braden, PLC
130 Dudley Road, Suite 250
Edgewood, KY 41017
RENDERED : JANUARY 19, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,*uyrmr (gaurf of ~nfurkg
2005-SC-0403-WC
CRANDELL L. SLONE
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2004-CA-2347-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO . 00-81563
KENTUCKY STATE POLICE ; HON . RICHARD M.
JOINER, ANDMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE GRAVES
Appellant is entitled to relief if he can show that "the Board has overlooked or
misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in assessing the
evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice ." Western Baptist Hosp . v. Kelly, 827
S .W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992) . Because the majority has unreasonably disregarded
the precedent established by Black v. Tichenor, 396 S .W.2d 794 (Ky. 1965), I must
respectfully dissent.
Although the Board's decision may appear overtly reasonable in the eyes of the
majority, it is still erroneous if it overlooks controlling statutes or precedent (regardless
of how unreasonable the statutes or precedent may appear to be) . In Black v. Tichenor,
supra , our predecessor Court held that "employees whose work entails travel away from
the employer's premises are . . . within the course of their employment continuously
during the trip, except when a distinct departure on a personal errand is shown ." Id . at
797. The Black Court went on to cite Corken v. Corken Steel Products, Inc., 385
S .W .2d 949 (Ky. 1964) for the proposition :
We accept the view that causal connection is sufficient if the exposure
results from the employment. Corken's employment was the reason for
his presence at what turned out to be a place of danger, and except for his
presence there he would not have been killed .
Id . In Corken , the Court approved an award of compensation where a traveling
salesman was killed on a public street by a demented stranger during a lunch break that
he took in between sales calls . Id .
The majority acknowledges that Appellant's work required his traveling away
from his regular employer's premises and that obtaining a meal during such travel is
generally not considered a personal errand or departure. See Larson's Workers'
Comensation Law, § 25.01, et seq. (2005) . Rather, the majority finds that because
Appellant traveled 15-18 miles to obtain that meal, his actions were unreasonable and
thus, they could not be considered work-related .
The majority's argument is misplaced . First, there is no dispute that Appellant's
purpose was to obtain the meal (and thus, no party contends that the meal was just a
pretext for some other personal agenda). Therefore, no matter how unreasonable (or
perhaps unusual) traveling 15-18 miles for lunch may seem to us,' it does not
undermine the underlying premise that obtaining a meal during one's lunch break while
they are traveling away from the employer's premises is not a personal errand or _
departure . Moreover, the fact that Appellant was able to travel back to his home during
' Traveling what appears to be a long distance for lunch to city dwellers is not
necessarily perceived likewise for folks who inhabit rural or sparsely-populated areas .
In those areas, obtaining a meal or other daily necessities is not as simple as driving
down the street to a local strip mall or shopping mecca.
2
his trip fails to distinguish this case . The purpose underlying the traveling employee
exception is to compensate employees whose work obligations caused them to be
located at what turns out to be a place of danger . See Black v. Tichenor, supra ;
Corken , supra . That is exactly what happened here ; Appellant testified that he drove
home for lunch because he was unfamiliar with any suitable lunch providers in any area
more proximate . It is improbable that Appellant would have encountered this workrelated positional risk were it not for his obligation to travel to and from the off-premises
work site . See Olston-Kimberly Quality Care v. Parr, 965 S .W.2d 155, 158 (Ky. 1998)
(traveling nurse who was injured in an automobile accident on her way home from
visiting a patient was entitled to compensation under the traveling employee exception
since travel to and from the patients' homes was a service being offered by the
employer to its clients).
In addition, fault on the part of the injured worker is irrelevant when determining
whether one is entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. See, e .g .,
Adkins v. R & S Body Co . , .58 S.W.3d 428, 430 (Ky. 2001). Thus, the reasonableness
of Appellant's decision to travel 15-18 miles to obtain lunch should play no part in
determining whether traveling to and from lunch during an extended period of time away
from Appellant's regular work site should be compensated as work-related . See Black
v. Tichenor , supra , at 796 ("It is true that Tichenor could have driven his own car, could
have traveled by public transportation, and could have started early Monday morning
instead of riding Sunday night with his fellow employee, Black, but we do not consider
the freedom of choosing his mode of transportation or the method in which his salary
2 This is particularly true in this highly mobile society characterized by the personal
autonomy of operating private motor vehicles .
3
was computed as controlling factors in determining whether he was within the protection
of the Workmen's Compensation Act when his injuries occurred .")
The bottom line is Appellant's work required him to be away from his regular
employer's premises for a period of time long enough for him to be entitled to a lunch
break. Pursuant to our established caselaw, traveling to obtain a lunch during that
break does not disrupt his status as a traveling employee . Since this Court has not
seen fit to overrule established caselaw, I must respectfully dissent as Appellant's
actions clearly fell within the purview of the Act.
Scott, J ., joins this dissenting opinion .
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