VINCENT C. STOPHER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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AuprMt gaurf of
2005-SC-0371-MR
VINCENT C. STOPHER
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
CRIMINAL NO. 97-CR-615
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFI RMING
This appeal is from a decision of the circuit judge which denied post-conviction
motions based on RCr 11 .42, RCr 10 .02, RCr 10 .06 and CR 60 .02. Stopher challenges
his convictions for capital murder, four counts of assault in the third degree and wanton
endangerment . He was originally sentenced to death . On direct appeal, this Court
upheld the convictions and sentence . Stopher v. Commonwealth , 57 S.W .3d 787 (Ky.
2001).
The questions presented are (1) whether Stopher had ineffective assistance of
counsel, (2) whether there was alleged prosecutorial misconduct, (3) whether a juror
was biased, (4) whether the circuit court erred in denying discovery requests, and (5)
whether there was cumulative error .
Stopher contends that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance : (a) by
not submitting his complete medical records (b) by not calling particular witnesses, (c)
by not introducing the substance of an individual's statement when that individual
refused to testify, (d) by not obtaining a witness's SSI records, (e) by not knowing the
complete background of a witness, (f) by not introducing testimony concerning police
interrogation procedures, and (g) by not introducing more mitigating evidence.
Stopher argues that there was prosecutorial misconduct based on allegations of:
(a) suborned perjury, (b) suppressed impeachment evidence, (c) failure to obtain SSI
records, (d) failure to learn of allegedly favorable police treatment of a witness, and (e)
three witnesses' subsequent affidavits.
In March of 1997, a Jefferson County deputy sheriff responded to a report of a
disturbance at the residence of Stopher. When Stopher saw the deputy, he uttered a
series of obscenities and immediately attacked the deputy. He was able to obtain the
officer's handgun and shot him in the face . The deputy died of this wound . A witness to
the murder was then confronted by Stopher who pulled the trigger of the weapon, but it
jammed . Other officers arrived on the scene and Stopher vigorously resisted arrest.
During that struggle, he grabbed the gun of another officer and attempted to fire it but
was unsuccessful. During the struggle that occurred incident to the arrest, Stopher had
to be hit on the head before he would release the weapon . His wounds were consistent
with resisting arrest. As he was being loaded into the ambulance, he told an officer "I
hope that cop dies ." Upon the completion of evidence, the original case was submitted
to the jury which rendered a judgment of conviction.
On appeal this Court upheld the jury verdict . Almost a year later, Stopher sought
post-conviction relief in the circuit court. The circuit judge denied the motion after almost
three years of continued attempts to amend the various motions . The denial was based
on evidence in the record . No evidentiary hearing was conducted . Upon an adverse
decision, Stopher filed his appeal.
I . Standard of Review for RCr 11 .42
.
The arguments presented by Stopher arise from allegedly newly discovered
evidence or perjured testimony. Neither of those grounds may serve as the basis for a
motion for RCr 11 .42. Pursuant to that rule, the movant has the burden of establishing
convincingly that he was deprived of some substantial right which would justify the
extraordinary relief provided by a post-conviction proceeding . This Court has repeatedly
stated that a direct appeal issue may not be relitigated merely by repeating it as an
argument for ineffective assistance of trial counsel . Hodge v. Commonwealth , 116
S.W .3d 463 (Ky. 2003); Haight v. Commonwealth , 41 S.W.3d 436 (Ky. 2001); Baze v.
Commonwealth , 23 S.W .3d 619 (Ky. 2000). Such a motion must set out all facts
necessary to establish an alleged constitutional violation . The court will not presume the
facts omitted from the motion established the existence of any such violation . Sanders
v. Commonwealth , 889 S .W.3d 380 (Ky. 2002). It is well settled that any relief provided
by the rule is not a substitute for appeal and does not permit review of alleged trial errors
which do not rise to a denial of due process. Smith v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.2d 256
(Ky. 1967). Post-trial, ex arte, juror affidavits are not a basis for an RCr 11 .42 motion ;
Haight, supra ; Taylor v. Commonwealth , 63 S.W .3d 151 (Ky. 2001) .
In this case, Stopher has claimed seven different instances of ineffective
assistance of counsel . We will consider separate claims together but will give each
individual numbers and attention.
RCr 11 .42 is not to be used as a vehicle to raise issues which could have been
raised on direct appeal. Brown v. Commonwealth , 788 S.W.2d 500 (Ky. 1990). Issues
that have been previously raised on direct appeal are not proper when simply presented
in the form of ineffective assistance of counsel . The rule is intended to provide a vehicle
to review an erroneous judgment when the reasons requiring review are not available on
direct appeal . See Gross v. Commonwealth , 648 S.W .2d 853 (Ky. 1983). The rule
requires that convincing evidence be presented that a person has been deprived of a
substantial right. It is the denial of due process that is the principal focus of the rule and
the extraordinary relief sought. Smith, supra .
II. Investigation of Medical Records
Stopher argues that his defense counsel was ineffective by not interviewing
witnesses and identifying exculpatory evidence . He now claims that his counsel .should
have investigated evidence about the size of the pupils of his eyes. Pupil size can
sometimes be an indication of intoxication . Evidence presented during the trial showed
Stopher was lucid, engaged in reasonable conversation and seemed oriented to time
and place . Defense counsel did not obtain the medical records. One hospital record did
mention the pupil size but that was contradicted by another report just several minutes
later. There were additional factors besides intoxication that could have contributed to
any change in pupil size. Defense counsel avoided what could have been confusing
and contradictory evidence presented to the jury as part of a very reasonable trial
strategy . There was no error . The pupil size at the time of the admission to the hospital
did not require further investigation.
The trial judge carefully examined this question and ordered briefing on the
materiality of the information about pupil size . The circuit judge determined that defense
counsel did not act ineffectively by not obtaining medical records .
III . Intoxication Witnesses
Stopher contends that his counsel should have called a number of witnesses to
bolster his intoxication defense. Hindsight and second guessing a trial decision does not
fulfill the requirements of RCr 11 .42. See Foley v. Commonwealth , 17 S.W .3d 878 (Ky.
2000) . Stopher does not claim that counsel was deficient by not knowing of the
witnesses but rather simply disagrees with the trial strategy that was employed . See
Hodge, supra . There was no error or any abuse of discretion.
IV. Snodgrass Statement
Stopher asserts that his trial counsel should have introduced the substance of the
witness Snodgrass's statement through the defense investigator. This is simply a
restatement of a previously presented issue in the guise of RCr 11 .42 relief. It would
appear that Stopher is claiming that his defense counsel failed to question a witness
regarding statements made out of court and offered for the truth of the matters asserted .
He claims that the substance of the Snodgrass testimony would have established that
Stopher was on an LSD trip at the time of the murder. The witness never saw Stopher
take the drugs but according to Stopher, "He knew it anyway ." The jury was aware of
Stopher's activity before he killed the deputy, including the alleged drug use. It was not
error in the original case and is still not error. There is potential for confusion which
would have undermined the defense from this kind of strategy . This issue is mere
speculation and second guessing of the defense trial strategy . There was no error.
V. Social Security Disability Records
Stopher complains that his counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a release
in order to be able to present a witness named Porter's social security disability records .
That very same issue was previously addressed by this Court and found to be without
merit. Stopher, supra . It is well settled that one cannot convert an issue presented on
direct appeal into a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in order to relitigate the
issue as a collateral attack . Hodge, supra. The argument presented here is insufficient
to establish any ineffective assistance of counsel . There was no error when this Court
addressed this issue previously and we remain convinced of that decision now. There
was no error.
VI . Investigation of Witness Powell
Stopher argues that his trial counsel did not adequately investigate or present his
defense in that he did not obtain the criminal record of Powell . He claims that it was
error on the part of his counsel not to obtain Powell's 1997 misdemeanor charges or
determine the reason why Powell had his parole revoked . Stopher believes that this
information would have persuaded the jury to reach a different verdict. Powell testified
in an orange prison jumpsuit . The trial judge correctly concluded that the jury could
effectively weigh his credibility . We find no reason to disturb such a conclusion . The
failure of counsel to present marginally useful evidence did not change the outcome of
this trial . Stopher received a fair trial and this error, even if it was error, is totally
insufficient to require any reversal .
VII. Police Interrogation Procedures
Stopher contends that his defense counsel improperly failed to introduce
evidence showing that there was a lack of interrogation records to demonstrate that he
was too intoxicated to be questioned . Again, the value of this evidence is purely
speculative. When examining allegations of ineffective cross-examination based solely
on speculative statements, this Court has not indulged in second guessing trial counsel.
See Taylor, supra . A careful examination of the record demonstrates that defense
counsel employed a technically sound trial strategy in cross-examining the police
witnesses. The trial judge correctly determined that Stopher did not present specific
facts to justify relief in this proceeding . See Lucas v. Commonwealth , 465 S.W .2d 267
(Ky. 1971).
VIII . Mitigation Witnesses
Stopher alleges that his counsel was ineffective because of a failure to present
three witnesses in mitigation during the penalty phase of the trial. Stopher believes that
three long-time acquaintances of his would have been able to convince the jury that the
person who killed the deputy was an outstanding member of the community. This
is an
issue that was originally presented on direct appeal and is merely disguised as a new
issue for the purposes of RCr 11 .42. There is no error.
IX. Brady Issues
Stopher presents two issues where he claims that the prosecution did not provide
evidence required pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In that case, the
United States Supreme Court held that the federal due process clause required the state
prosecution to disclose to defense counsel any evidence favorable to the defense .
Failure to disclose such evidence is reversible error, however, only when there is a
reasonable probability that had it been disclosed, the result would have been different .
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S . 667 (1985). The evidence so presented must be
favorable to the defendant. It must have been suppressed by the prosecution and there
must be a showing of prejudice sufficient to establish a reasonable probability that the
result would have been different . See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
Here, Stopher claims that the prosecution deliberately withheld information
regarding a witness named Bishop who had offered to testify against another person in
an unrelated case. This matter was presented on direct appeal and as previously noted
will not be reviewed simply because it is restated as a collateral attack . Stopher had full
access to the record and the history of the witness. The prosecution did not engage in
any Brady type misconduct .
Stopher next maintains a claim regarding information about a witness named
Powell. This too was previously brought to the attention of this Court on direct appeal
and is not now appropriate under RCr 11 .42. There was no error when we first
examined the merits of these claims and there is still no error at this time .
X. Witness Recantation
Next Stopher argues that he is entitled to relief pursuant to RCr 10.02 and CR
60.02 because three witnesses, Porter, Powell and Hamilton have recanted their trial
testimony . All three have now signed affidavits stating that Stopher was extremely
intoxicated at the time the crime was committed . The trial judge correctly determined
that this alleged new evidence was insufficient to require a new trial. We find no reason
to substitute our view of the facts for those of the trial judge. in the absence of a showing
of an abuse of discretion . There was no such abuse . See Foley v. Commonwealth ,
supra .
It has long been held that a decision as to whether to grant a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence is largely within the discretion of the trial judge and the
standard of review is whether there has been an abuse of discretion. The grant of a new
trial is not required when the grounds are newly discovered evidence which is merely
cumulative or impeaching in nature . See . Epperson v. Commonwealth , 809 S .W.2d 835
(Ky. 1990). The recanted testimony of any trial witness is viewed with suspicion and
does not normally , require the granting of a new trial. Hensley v. Commonwealth , 488
S .W .2d 338 (Ky. 1961). The trial judge is always considered to be in the best position to
evaluate and determine the influences and motives that prompt any recantation .
Thacker v. Commonwealth , 453 S.W .2d 566 (Ky. 1970); Taylor v. Commonwealth , 175
S .W.3d 68 (Ky. 2005). It is not enough to merely show that a witness made
contradictory statements after the verdict . Anderson v. Buchanan , 292 Ky. 810, 168
S .W .2d 48 (1943).
XI . Relief Under CR 60 .02
In a criminal case, CR 60.02 relief may be obtained only when it is not available
by direct appeal or by RCr 11 .42 . The rule may be used only once a defendant has
availed himself of his right to direct appeal and sought relief under RCr 11 .42 . CR 60 .02
is not a separate method of appeal to be pursued in addition to other remedies.
McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S .W.2d 415 (Ky. 1997) . A defendant is foreclosed
from raising any questions under CR 60.02 which are matters that could have
reasonably been presented in an RCr 11 .42 proceeding . Gross, supra.
Here, the three witnesses named by Stopher did not recant their testimony. The
affidavit presented by Hamilton states that on the day of the murder, Powell and Stopher
were both extremely high on drugs and "very stoned ." At trial she testified that Stopher
looked "mad," "angry" and "crazy ." She clarified her testimony by stating that when she
said that Stopher looked "crazy," she meant he looked "pissed-off, angry ." She testified
that the day of the murder was the first time she had ever seen Stopher.
The affidavit of Powell was to the effect that he testified truthfully at the Stopher
trial, but that if anyone got the impression from his testimony that either Stopher or
Powell were not intoxicated because of LSD they were mistaken . Powell testified that he
and Stopher each voluntarily took two hits of LSD within a period of two or three hours
on the morning of the killing.
The affidavit of Porter stated that Stopher appeared to be on drugs at the time of
the murder and that he was out of his mind.
The trial judge determined that only Hamilton claimed to have recanted and found
that the affidavits of all three witnesses matched their trial testimony and that no new
evidence had been presented.
A new trial is justified only if the trial judge believes that a recantation is true . A
new trial will be granted only on newly discovered evidence if it is apparent that a
different result would have been reached by the jury at trial if the new evidence had
been available. The trial judge is always in the best position to evaluate the credibility of
such witnesses. Here, the trial judge properly concluded that the affidavits were
consistent with the testimony and that the alleged new evidence in the affidavits was
merely cumulative of the trial testimony of the affiants. Thus, a new trial was not
necessary . Epperson , supra. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying the
motion under either RCr 10 .02 or CR 60 .02.
XII . Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims
Stopher argues that his conviction may rest on false or perjured testimony. He
cites instances of prosecutorial misconduct, two involving the active suborning of perjury
and one alleging that the prosecution subverted the truth-seeking process .
False or perjured testimony is not a ground for relief under RCr 11 .42. Hargrove
v. Commonwealth , 396 S .W.2d 75 (Ky. 1965). Such testimony will not be grounds for
relief even with an affidavit that dramatically contradicts the testimony at trial . Fields v.
Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 638 (Ky. 1966).
The allegations regarding witness Bishop were raised on direct appeal. The trial
judge here refused to reconsider the arguments because they had been the subject of a
direct appeal which was rejected . This contention is the same as presented on direct
appeal where Stopher accused the witness of acting as a government agent.
In order to demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct, Stopher must show that 1) the
statement was actually false ; 2) the statement was material, and 3) the prosecution
knew it was false . Commonwealth v. Spaulding, 991 S .W.2d 651 (Ky. 1999), citing
United States v. Lochmondy , 890 F .2d 817 (6th Cir. 1989). Stopher's presentation here
does not meet any of these requirements.
The Commonwealth did not suborn perjury of witness Hamilton . Stopher
complains that the prosecution procured false testimony from Hamilton . He alleges that
the various affidavits from Hamilton indicate that the lead prosecutor urged her to lie at
trial and "told her to lie at trial regarding her cousin's intoxication ." The careful review of
the record indicates that Stopher obtained a variety of inconsistent affidavits from
Hamilton . The first was notarized on April 30, 2002, and states that Stopher and Powell
were both extremely high on drugs and "very stoned ." She further states that Powell
was "really paranoid'," and that Stopher "did not know what he was doing ." There is no
mention of suborned perjury.
On May 7, 2002, Hamilton swore that Powell was "severely hallucinating" and that
she was told by "a lawyer with glasses not to say Kevin was having bad
hallucinations . . . ." On June 18, 2002, Hamilton swore that she met with the prosecutor
and went over her testimony and later met with the defense and told them that Powell
was "severely hallucinating ."
The trial judge stated that Hamilton was on the stand for approximately 38
minutes and that she never said that Powell did not have hallucinations, was not stoned
or was not high . Hamilton clearly indicated that Powell was hallucinating by testifying
that Powell saw an orange tractor trailer that she did not see . She simply denied making
up the alleged statements to defense counsel . The trial judge concluded that any
allegations that there was suborned perjury were contradicted by the testimony given.
The prosecution did not subvert the truth seeking process regarding the Social
Security records of Porter. This argument is similar to one made earlier in regard to
Porter and the records . We have reviewed this claim and find that there is no error. The
Commonwealth, in its brief, classifies this as a possible prosecutorial misconduct claim
but we find there is no error no matter how you consider it.
All . Juror Misconduct
Stopher challenges the verdict on the basis of any affidavit obtained from Juror
479. The juror stated that she became aware when she saw a picture of the victim
during trial that she may have had an unpleasant encounter with him . She did not
disclose the nature of her encounter and she does not claim that she knew that she had
previously encountered the victim during voir dire. Stopher claims that although the juror
12
did not recognize the importance of the voir dire inquiries until she saw the picture of the
victim at trial, she ultimately gave incorrect answers to the questions. Stopher had a
right to exercise peremptory challenges intelligently as well as his right to an impartial
jury and that was compromised. He claims that whether intentionally or inadvertently,
the harm lies in the falsity of the information . Here, the juror gave inaccurate answers
and a correct response would have provided the defendant with a valid basis for
challenging for cause.
Stopher also contends that he was entitled to a hearing to prove actual bias.
Here, the information withheld by the juror that she had a negative encounter with a
victim would not give Stopher a basis to challenge for cause. A remote or speculative
influence on a juror does not affect the right of peremptory challenge. Crutcher v. Hicks ,
257 S .W.2d 539 (Ky. 1953).
Here, the motion of Stopher was simply restated in a motion brought in 2005
pursuant to CR 15.01 . That motion was denied by the trial judge who cited RCr 10 .04
which states that a juror cannot be examined to establish a ground for a new trial except
to establish that the verdict was made by lot. Nothing in Bowling v. Commonwealth , 168
S.W.3d 2 (Ky. 2005) or RCr 10.04 restricts the rule in the manner in which Stopher
argues .
In Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987), the U .S. Supreme Court found
that no evidentiary hearing was required to address allegations of drug use by a juror.
The Court cited the interest of protecting juror deliberations from intrusive inquiry along
with recognition of the significant procedural safeguards in place to reveal any juror
misconduct before a verdict is rendered.
XIV. Cumulative Error
Stopher claims cumulative error. However, we note that the previous claims of
error are without merit, and thus there is no basis for cumulative error in this case. See
Woodall v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W .2d 104 (Ky. 2001).
XV. Post Conviction Discovery
Stopher complains that he made two discovery motions, neither of which was
granted . The first motion asks for copies of all of his medical records that were in
possession of the Commonwealth as well as any exculpatory information regarding
deals or promises made with Powell, Bishop or Hamilton . He also sought any
information the prosecution had regarding the Social Security records of Porter.
The second motion was a general one based on Imbler v. Pachtman , 424 U .S .
409 (1976), which requires the prosecutor to inform the appropriate authorities of any
after acquired information that cast doubt on the correctness of a conviction .
Discovery is not an entitlement in a post conviction proceeding . Sanborn, supra ;
Haight, supra; Foley, supra . See also, Sanders v. Commonwealth , 89 S.W.3d 380 (Ky.
2002). It is well settled that any attempt to find new and beneficial information is not
allowed in post-conviction proceedings pursuant to RCr 11 .42. There was no error on
the part of the trial judge and no abuse of discretion.
Stopher received a fundamentally fair trial and an equally fair consideration of his
post-conviction motions brought pursuant to RCr 11 .42, RCr 10 .02, RCr 10.06, and CR
60.02 . He was deprived of no state or federal constitutional right.
The decision of the circuit judge in denying the motions is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
David Hare Harshaw III
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
207 Parker Drive, Suite 1
LaGrange, KY 40031
Dennis James Burke
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
207 Parker Drive, Suite 1
LaGrange, KY 40031
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Robert E. Prather
Assistant Attorney General
Michael A. Nickles
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort KY 40601
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