OLIVER HINKLE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE P UBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE,
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : JANUARY 25, 2007
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT
HON. WILLIAM T. CAIN, SPECIAL JUDGE
INDICTMENT N0. 2003-CR-00025
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
Affirming
A jury of the Knox Circuit Court convicted Appellant, Oliver Hinkle, of the
intentional murder of his estranged wife. For this crime, Appellant was
sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment . Appellant appealed as a matter of
right, and on February 23, 2006, this Court remanded Appellant's case to the
Knox Circuit Court for a determination as to whether a retrospective competency
hearing was constitutionally permissible . Hinkle v. Commonwealth, 2005-SC-342
(rendered February 23, 2006). On April 21, 2006, the Knox Circuit Court issued
an Opinion and Order finding that a retrospective competency hearing was
constitutionally permissible and that Appellant was competent at the time of his
February 2005 trial. Appellant now appeals this order; and for the reasons set
forth herein, we affirm.
Appellant contends the trial court erred to his substantial prejudice when it
determined that a retrospective competency hearing was constitutionally
permissible . In Thompson v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 22 (Ky. 2004), we
stated that "[t]he test to be applied in determining whether a retrospective
competency hearing is permissible is whether the quantity and quality of
available evidence is adequate to arrive at an assessment that could be labeled
as more than mere speculation ." Id. a t 32 (quoting Thompson v. Commonwealth ,
56 S.W.3d 406, 409 (2001)). "[F]actors bearing on the constitutional
permissibility of a retrospective hearing include : (1) the length of time between
the retrospective hearing and the trial ; (2) the availability of transcript or video
record of the relevant proceedings ; (3) the existence of mental examinations
conducted close in time to the trial date ; and (4) the availability of the
recollections of non-experts-including counsel and the trial judge-who had the
ability to observe and interact with the defendant during trial." Id .
In this case, Appellant was evaluated in February 2004 by Dr. Steven
Simon, a psychologist at the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center ("KCPC").
Dr . Simon opined that Appellant was competent to stand trial at that time, and
that Appellant's condition did not present a "close call" on the issue of
competency . Dr. Simon also testified that absent any substantial changes or
problems, he would expect Appellant to have remained competent at the time of
his February 2005 trial. Appellant's trial counsel also expressed an opinion that
Appellant was competent to stand trial and further offered to stipulate the findings
in Dr. Simon's report . Finally, a video record exists of all relevant proceedings in
this case and nothing in the record suggests or infers that Appellant may be
incompetent.
Upon review, we agree with the trial court that sufficient evidence was
available to conduct a meaningful competency hearing on remand . Appellant
principally complains that Dr. Simon's report is irrelevant and unreliable since it
was based on Appellant's condition approximately one year prior to trial. While
we agree that the weight of Dr. Simon's report is diminished due to this
considerable delay, we do not find such a delay to render the report completely
useless . Dr. Simon testified that Appellant's competency status was unlikely to
have changed between the time of his evaluation and Appellant's trial, especially
in light of the fact that Appellant's competency status was not a "close call."
Moreover, the trial court was able to review other evidence, such as opinions
made by Appellant's trial counsel and the video record . In light of the quantity
and quality of this substantial evidence, we find no error on the part of the trial
court.
We also reject Appellant's argument that there was not substantial
evidence to support a finding that Appellant was competent to stand trial in
February 2005 . The standard for competency is whether the defendant has
"sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him ." Thompson , supra at 32 (citation
omitted) . In this case, the evidence is more than sufficient to support a finding of
competency at the time of Appellant's February 2005 trial.
For the reasons set forth herein, the April 21, 2006 order of the Knox
Circuit Court is affirmed .
All concur .
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Emily Holt Rhorer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D . Stumbo .
Attorney General
George G . Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 23, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2005-SC-0342-MR
OLIVER HINKLE
V
APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM T. CAIN, JUDGE
2003-CR-0025
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REMANDING IN PART
This appeal is from a judgment based on a jury verdict that convicted Hinkle of
murder . He was sentenced to twenty years in prison .
The questions` presented are whether the trial judge properly denied a requested
instruction on first-degree manslaughter under extreme emotional disturbance ; whether
Hinkle was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal ; whether the failure to hold a
competency hearing denied Hinkle his right to due process ; and, whether improper
opinion testimony was admitted .
Hinkle was indicted for the murder of his estranged wife by intentionally shooting
and killing her with a shotgun. At trial, the Knox County Sheriff at the time and two of
his deputies testified that Hinkle admitted to them that he killed the victim. One of those
deputies recalled seeing a fresh cut in the webbing of the defendant's hand . When he
asked Hinkle how he received the injury, Hinkle replied that it happened when he fired
the gun .
DNA analysis confirmed that blood found on the gun was the defendant's .
Moreover, a forensic pathologist testified that Hinkle's injury was consistent with
weapon recoil. He also determined that the shotgun was fired from close range.
Hinkle confessed to a detective of the Kentucky State Police that he and the
victim had been arguing over "silly or stupid stuff." A Christmas tree was knocked over
a couple of times during their quarrel . Hinkle claimed that at some point he blacked out
and when he came to his senses, he was sitting on the couch holding the shotgun and
his estranged wife was dead. He then got up off the couch, placed his then ten-yearold daughter in the bathroom and called the Sheriff.
A state trooper testified that he interviewed the daughter at the scene. The
daughter indicated to the trooper that she was in another room of the house when she
heard a gunshot. Immediately afterwards, Hinkle told her that he shot the victim, but
that he did not mean to .
At trial, the daughter altered her previous account to indicate that she had
accidentally shot her mother. She claimed that her mother had attempted to sexually
assault her, so she had gotten the gun to scare the mother away. The daughter
testified that her father had awakened during this time and tried to grab the gun from
her possession, but the gun went off, striking her mother.
The jury convicted Hinkle of murder. He was sentenced to twenty years in
prison . This appeal followed .
I. Extreme Emotional Distress
The trial judge did not err when he denied a requested instruction on first-degree
manslaughter under extreme emotional disturbance as a lesser included offense of
murder. McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S .W.2d 464 (Ky. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1057, 107 S.Ct. 935, 93 L .Ed .2d 986 (1987), defined extreme emotional
disturbance as follows:
Extreme emotional disturbance is a temporary state of mind
so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one's
judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the
impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather
than from evil or malicious purposes . It is not a mental
disease in itself, and an enraged, inflamed, or disturbed
emotional state does not constitute an extreme emotional
disturbance unless there is a reasonable explanation or
excuse therefor, the reasonableness of which is to be
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's
situation under circumstances as the defendant believed
them to be .
Id. a t 468.
Essential to a finding of EED is the presence of a triggering event which remains
uninterrupted until the time of the criminal act. Fields v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W .3d
355 (Ky. 2001). Mere "hurt" or "anger" is insufficient to prove extreme emotional
disturbance . Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W .2d 76 (Ky. 1998). It must be proven
by some definitive, non-speculative evidence. Morg,an v. Commonwealth , 878 S.W .2d
18 (Ky. 1994).
Here, there was no evidence to support the granting of an EED instruction.
Statements by Hinkle to the Sheriff after he had shot his wife do not reflect upon his
mental state at the time of the shooting . Although there was some evidence of
marijuana and amphetamines in the victim's system, the claim that she could have
been uncommonly irrational and angry is speculative . The acknowledgment by Hinkle
that the argument he had with the victim had been over "silly or stupid stuff'
demonstrates that his judgment was not distorted ; he could accurately assess that the
quarrel had not justified his actions . The knocking down of the Christmas tree by both
the victim and Hinkle during their argument was not sufficient evidence of a triggering
event. The trial judge properly denied the requested instruction .
II. Directed Verdict
Hinkle was not entitled to a directed verdict on the murder charge because there
was sufficient evidence that the crime was committed intentionally . Our standard of
review of
a denial of a directed verdict of acquittal is well-settled and is stated in
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S .W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991) as follows : "On appellate
review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be
clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a
directed verdict of acquittal." Id . at 187.
Intent may be inferred from the act itself or from the circumstances surrounding
it. Talbott, supra . An inference is permitted because a person is presumed to intend
the logical and probabl e consequences of his conduct . See Parker v. Commonwealth,
952 S .W .2d 209 (Ky. 1997) . Intent may also be inferred from the character and extent
of the victim's injuries . Pollini v. Commonwealth, 172 S .W.3d 418 (Ky. 2005).
Here, the numerous admissions and confession by Hinkle, corroborated by the
autopsy results and the physical evidence, were sufficient to support his conviction for
murder. The alternate theory raised by Hinkle that his daughter shot the victim was an
issue strictly for the jury. The trial judge properly denied the motion for a directed
verdict .
III. Competency Hearing
Hinkle contends that the trial judge denied him due process of law when he
failed to hold a competency hearing as required by KRS 504.100(3) . He concedes that
this issue is unpreserved, but asks this Court to review the matter for manifest injustice
pursuant to RCr 10.26 .
Defense counsel advised the trial court at a pre-trial conference that he had used
expert funds to hire a psychologist to evaluate Hinkle . According to defense counsel,
the psychologist conducted some preliminary tests which detected some strong
indicators of neurological damage. He stated that the defendant had a closed head
injury in his early twenties, some seizures and other indicators . Defense counsel
expressed the opinion that the defendant "definitely' needed to be evaluated at KCPC.
No reports or documentation were offered to support his assertions . The trial court
ordered Hinkle to be evaluated for competency and criminal responsibility . It did not
include any facts in support of the order.
At a later pre-trial hearing conducted while Hinkle was at KCPC, defense counsel
stated, "Judge what I'll do if I get the report early, if we need a contested hearing, I'll
advise [the prosecutor] and you in writing . If as usual we don't, then (counsel nods his
head)." Ultimately, it was determined by the examining psychologist from KCPC that
Hinkle was competent and did not meet the criteria for being insane. No request was
made for a competency hearing and the trial commenced without one. It should be
noted that the circuit judge who ordered the competency evaluation was not the same
circuit judge who tried the case .
The standard of review in this matter is whether a reasonable judge, situated as
was the trial judge whose failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing is being reviewed,
should have experienced doubt with respect to competency to stand trial. Thompson v.
Commonwealth , 56 S .W.3d 406 (Ky. 2001) citing Mills v. Commonwealth , 996 S.W .2d
473 (Ky.1999) . If the reasonable judge, would not have experienced doubt, the lack of a
hearing may be considered harmless error. Id .
In Thompson , supra, the trial judge ordered a defendant evaluated to determine
his competency to stand trial, but did not hold a competency hearing following the
mental evaluation . This Court held that the order of the trial judge established the
sufficiency of his level of doubt as to Thompson's competence to plead guilty. That
order stated that the trial judge had been informed of issues of mental illnesses and
neurological problems which might affect the defendant's ability to perceive and
interpret information provided by counsel . This Court concluded that because of the
concerns expressed by the trial judge, the failure to hold the mandatory hearing
pursuant to KRS 504.100(3) violated the defendant's due process rights.
Pursuant to Thompson , we remand this case to the Knox Circuit Court for it to
determine whether a retrospective competency hearing is constitutionally permissible
under due process and, if necessary, to conduct such a hearing within 60 days from the
entry of this Opinion and Order. If the trial court rules that a competency hearing is not
constitutionally permissible, or if it determines that Hinkle was not competent to stand
trial, it shall enter an order granting a new trial pursuant to RCr 10 .02. Hinkle shall not
be retried until the trial court finds him competent to stand trial. If the trial court
determines that a retrospective competency hearing is warranted and constitutionally
permissible, and further finds that Hinkle was competent to stand trial, then it shall
make findings of fact in support of this conclusion in its order, which shall be appealable
by Hinkle .
Any appeal taken by either party from an adverse decision of the Knox Circuit
Court shall be consolidated with this appeal, which we abate pending the resolution of
the evidentiary hearing . Further, briefing on the matter shall be limited to ten pages by
each side and, like the hearing on remand, shall be limited to only those issues
addressed in this Opinion and Order. Finally, the Knox Circuit Court shall notify this
Court of its final disposition of this matter within ten days of the entry of its final order.
IV. Opinion Testimony
Hinkle complains that the trial judge erred when he allowed the detective and the
state trooper to offer an opinion that the daughter could not have handled the 12-gauge
shotgun. Defense counsel objected to the detective's opinion testimony, but did not
object to the state trooper's testimony. To the extent this issue is unpreserved, he asks
that it be reviewed for palpable error pursuant to RCr 10.26 .
The detective testified that he was familiar with 12-gauge shotguns and had a
similar weapon himself . He also stated that he was acquainted with the fact that a 12gauge shotgun had a very hard kick to it. The shotgun itself was then introduced as an
exhibit . The detective indicated that when the child was interviewed, she was a fairly
small 10-year-old .
When asked if he had an opinion as to whether she could even
handle or operate such a weapon, a general objection was made and overruled . The
detective then stated that the daughter would not be able to handle the gun because of
the amount of recoil .
Similar testimony was introduced during the examination of the state trooper. He
stated that at the time of the incident, the daughter was not much bigger than the
shotgun itself. He did not think she could have lifted the weapon up to a firing position .
Defense counsel did not object to this testimony.
A lay witness may testify to an opinion if it is rationally based on the witness's
perception and if it is helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue. KRE 701 . Here, the detective and the state trooper
saw the daughter at the time of the crime and both indicated that she was a small child .
The state trooper specifically noted that she had grown a lot since the time he saw her.
Under these circumstances, the opinion of the witnesses concerning whether the
daughter could have fired the gun was admissible.
In regard to the assignments of error, other than the competency hearing
questions, Hinkle received a fundamentally fair trial . He was not denied any of his due
process rights under either the federal or state constitutions .
The judgment of conviction is affirmed in part and remanded in part for a
retrospective competency hearing .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Emily Holt Rhorer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
George D. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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