JAMEYEL TARMAR HODGE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 21, 2006
allurf
2005-SC-000329-MR
JAMEYEL TARMAR HODGE
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN L. ATKINS, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 03-CR-562
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART
I. Introduction
Appellant, Jameyel Hodge, appeals his conviction for wanton murder, assault in
the first degree, fleeing or evading in the first degree, and tampering with physical
evidence. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Because the jury was improperly
instructed during the guilt phase of Appellant's trial, we reverse Appellant's wanton
murder and first-degree assault convictions but affirm his fleeing or evading in the first
degree and tampering with physical evidence convictions .
II. Facts
A party was held at the National Guard Armory building in Hopkinsville following
the annual football game between Hopkinsville and Christian County High Schools.
Attendance was high and witnesses described the party as "wall to wall" people . As the
evening progressed, the crowd became increasingly rambunctious, and overhead lights
were turned on twice to restore order. Shortly after midnight, a fight broke out near the
stage between two members of rival gangs from Hopkinsville, who identified themselves
by wearing either blue or red clothing . Minutes later, shots were fired inside the Armory
building . Corey Brodie was shot in the face ; the bullet lodged under his right eye .
Tameika Kendrick was shot in the abdomen and died the following morning . Accounts
of the exact circumstances of the shooting vary greatly .
Appellant testified that he was near the stage when the fight broke out. When he
pushed to the front, he saw several "blue" gang members beating his friend, Rudy
Wallace, a "red" gang member. As he continued to push towards Wallace, Appellant
was hit on the back of the head with a chair and he fell to the floor. Appellant rose and
made eye contact with Corey Brodie, a "blue" gang member. Appellant knew Brodie
from school, and testified that some animosity existed between the two and that they
had previously fought. In fact, Appellant testified that Brodie had driven through his
neighborhood that afternoon looking to "start trouble" with him. As Brodie looked at
Appellant, he lifted his shirt and revealed a gun in his waistband . Appellant turned
around to leave, but was handed a gun by his friend Michael Croney. According to
Appellant's testimony at trial, he turned back around to face Brodie, who was pulling a
gun from his waistband . Thinking that Brodie "was going to kill" him, Appellant fired one
shot in the air and then one at Brodie . Appellant fled on foot and threw the gun into
some bushes outside the Armory.
Corey Brodie was also near the stage when the fight erupted, and admitted that
he participated in beating Wallace . He witnessed Appellant get hit over the head with a
chair, and watched him fall to the ground . However, according to Brodie, he never lifted
his shirt to reveal a gun and, in fact, denied ever having a gun in his possession that
evening. According to Brodie, Appellant lifted a gun and pointed it at him, then pulled
his hood over his head and starting firing multiple shots both into the air and into the
crowd . Brodie testified that he made a "u-turn" to run away, but was shot; the bullet hit
Brodie in the face and lodged under his right eye. When interviewed by police that
evening, Brodie told officers that he did not see Hodge shoot him. However, at trial,
Brodie testified that he saw Hodge point the gun at him and fire it.
Tasha Haskins was also present at the Armory with her cousin, Tameika
Kendrick . After watching Appellant get hit in the head with the chair, Haskins testified
that he rose, pulled his hood over his head, and then raised a gun toward the ceiling .
He first fired a shot at the ceiling, then began shooting into the crowd as if "he was
shooting a water gun." Tameika Kendrick, who was standing nearby, fell to the ground
and said she had been shot . Haskins testified that she saw Appellant run out of the
building and that she followed him . She threw a boot at him and they both fell to the
ground . Appellant then pointed the gun at her face momentarily, but stood up and ran
away without firing it. However, in the statement she gave police that evening, Haskins
did not say that she had chased Appellant outside the building, nor did she say that he
had pointed a gun at her.
Several other witnesses gave accounts of the shooting . Rudy Wallace testified
that several "blue" gang members, including Brodie, were physically assaulting him on
the floor near the stage . During the melee, he saw someone hand Appellant a gun,
although he did not actually see Hodge shoot the gun from his vantage point. Ashley
Beamon testified that she saw multiple people waiving handguns moments before the
fight broke out. She further stated that she saw Appellant fire only two shots, one in the
air and one towards Brodie . However, she also testified that she heard multiple shots,
though some sounded differently than the original two gunshots. Antonio Artis likewise
testified that he heard multiple gunshots, and that they sounded as if they were being
fired from different guns and from different areas of the room.
Police arrived very shortly after the fight erupted and were exiting their vehicles
when the gunshots were fired. As Officer Scott Noisworthy approached the building,
Haskins identified Appellant, who was running across the parking lot. Officer
Noisworthy chased Appellant and watched as he threw a gun to his right onto a grassy
knoll. He apprehended Appellant several blocks from the Armory.
Officer Noisworthy instructed fellow officers to search the grassy knoll but they
found nothing . During a subsequent search of the building and its surroundings, a small
chrome revolver with black electrical tape wound around the grip was located on the
knoll identified by Officer Noisworthy. Another officer present acknowledged at trial that
a large crowd of people were moving through the area between the two searches.
Bullets were also recovered inside the building from a ceiling fan and the ceiling
itself. Later ballistics tests revealed that the revolver with the taped grip found on the
knoll fired the .22 caliber bullet that killed Tameika Kendrick . According to expert
testimony, the bullet retrieved from Brodie was also a .22 caliber. However, no ballistics
tests were performed to establish whether the Brodie bullet was fired from the same gun
that killed Tameika . Furthermore, Appellant was adamant during his testimony that the
gun he fired did not have black electrical tape around the grip.
He also testified that he
threw his gun into some bushes and that, being left-handed, he threw the gun to his left.
This testimony was partially corroborated by Haskins, who testified that the gun
Appellant allegedly pointed at her face did not have black tape around its grip. No
fingerprints were recovered from the gun with the taped grip.
Aside from the contradictory accounts of the evening and the conflicting
evidence, the exact circumstances were further obscured by the fact that each witness's
testimony was not without elements diminishing its credibility. Brodie admitted that he
had been drinking liquor for several hours prior to the shooting . He also admitted that
he lied to police that night about his involvement in the fight. Tasha Haskins admitted on
the stand that she had lied to her aunt, a police officer, about whether she was involved
in the initial fight. Beamon conceded that she left the Armory shortly after the incident
and made no attempt to contact the police about her account of the evening, despite
having personally witnessed the shooting .
Appellant was arrested following his apprehension by Officer Noisworthy. He
was charged with murder, assault in the first degree, fleeing or evading police in the first
degree, and tampering with physical evidence. A jury later found him guilty of all
charges, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment .
Further facts will be developed as necessary.
111. Arguments
Appellant now appeals his conviction as a matter of right, Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b),
asserting six claims of error: (1) improper jury instructions, (2) the admission of surprise
expert testimony, (3) the improper admission of a dying declaration, (4) prosecutorial
misconduct, and (5) cumulative error. Because the jury was improperly instructed, we
reverse . In addition, we will address those allegations of error that are likely to recur in
a retrial.
A. Jury Instructions
Appellant first argues that the trial court erroneously declined to instruct the jury
on lesser included offenses . Defense counsel moved the trial court to instruct the jury
as to imperfect self-defense with respect to the assault charge and all forms of
homicide. The motion was denied, and the jury was instructed only on wanton murder
and assault in the first degree with a self-protection qualifier . The jury found Appellant
guilty of wanton murder and, rejecting the self-protection qualifier, found him guilty of
first-degree assault. Because these instructions deprived the jury of the opportunity to
consider all levels of culpable mental states, we reverse and vacate the wanton murder
and first-degree assault charges.
At the outset, we note that the trial court has a duty to instruct upon the whole
law applicable to the case: "In a criminal case, it is the duty of the trial judge to prepare
and give instructions on the whole law of the case, and this rule requires instructions
applicable to every state of the case deducible or supported to any extent by the
testimony ." Taylor v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 355, 360 (Ky. 1999) ; see also RCr
9.54(1). An instruction on a lesser included offense is not required unless the evidence
is such that a reasonable juror could doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime
charged, yet conclude that he is guilty of a lesser included offense. Webb v.
Commonwealth , 904 S .W.2d 226, 229 (Ky. 1995) .
1 . The Assault Instructions
Appellant correctly argues that the trial court erroneously declined to instruct the
jury on imperfect self-protection . The law of imperfect self-protection arises from the
recognition that, in certain situations, a person might subjectively believe that the use of
force is necessary to protect himself, but is either reckless or wanton in so believing:
When the defendant believes that the use of force upon or toward the
person of another is necessary for any of the purposes for which such
belief would establish justification under KRS 503 .050 to 503 .110 but the
defendant is wanton or reckless in believing the use of any force, or the
degree of force used, to be necessary or in acquiring or failing to acquire
any knowledge or belief which is material to the justifiability of his use of
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force, the justification afforded by those sections is unavailable in a
prosecution for an offense for which wantonness or recklessness, as the
case may be, suffices to establish culpability.
KRS 503 .120(1).
This Court has explained that the purpose of the statute is to limit the application
of a self-protection defense, so that "a belief which is so unreasonable that it rises to the
level of wantonness or recklessness with respect to the circumstance then being
encountered by the defendant . . .does not result in acquittal, but rather in conviction of a
lesser offense for which wantonness or recklessness is the culpable mental state."
Elliott v. Commonwealth , 976 S.W.2d 416, 420 (Ky. 1998) . Though we were examining
the effect of KRS 503 .120(1) on homicide charges in Elliott , we also noted that "the
same analysis would apply to intentional and unintentional assaults as defined in KRS
Chapter 508." Id . at 418 n.1 .
Here, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial from which a reasonable
juror could conclude that Appellant's belief in the need to protect himself was wantonly
or recklessly held . While Appellant testified that Brodie was pulling a gun from his
waistband, Brodie denied ever having a gun in his possession. The jury is not required
to accept or reject each witness's testimony in its entirety, but may choose to believe or
disbelieve portions of each. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky.
1996) ("The trier of fact may believe any witness in whole or in part."). Accordingly, the
jury might have believed that Brodie was, in fact, showing Appellant a gun in his
waistband . However, the jury might have also believed that Appellant was wanton in
believing that this action, alone, gave him cause to fire the gun at Brodie. In fact, the
Commonwealth cross-examined Appellant as to this specific point, asking whether
Appellant really thought that "just showing you a gun in his waistband means you should
shoot [Brodie] in the face?" Alternatively, the jury might have believed that Appellant's
belief that Brodie was about to shoot him was recklessly formed in light of the chaotic
circumstances and crowded environment . In other words, a reasonable juror might
have believed that it was reckless for Appellant to conclude that Brodie actually was
reaching for a weapon, which even Appellant admitted was a split-second
determination .
Because either of these conclusions was reasonable based on the evidence
presented at trial, it was error for the trial court to exclude the theory of imperfect selfdefense from the jury instructions . Accordingly, in addition to the perfect self-protection
instruction, the trial court should have also attached an imperfect self-protection
instruction to the first degree assault charge . If the jury concluded, pursuant to this
instruction, that Appellant's belief in the need for self-protection was wantonly held, such
a finding would reduce the first-degree assault charge to second-degree assault
pursuant to KRS 508.020(c): "A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when
he wantonly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly
weapon or dangerous instrument." If, on the other hand, the jury determined that
Appellant's belief in the need for self-protection was recklessly held, a fourth-degree
assault conviction would result: "A person is guilty of assault in the fourth degree when
with recklessness he causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly
weapon or dangerous instrument." KRS 508.030(1)(b) ; see also Elliott, 976 S.W.2d at
420 n.3 (discussing the analogous effect of a self-protection qualifier to a charge of
intentional murder or first-degree manslaughter) .
Because the trial court declined to attach an imperfect self-protection qualifier to
the first-degree assault instruction, the jury was not permitted to fully consider
Appellant's claim of self-defense . The testimony at trial was extremely conflicted and
supported numerous conclusions concerning Appellant's mental state. There was
sufficient evidence upon which the jury could conclude that Appellant believed he
needed to protect himself, though this belief may have been wantonly or recklessly
formed . For this reason, it was error to exclude the imperfect self-protection instruction .
2. Homicide Instructions
Appellant is also correct that the jury was improperly instructed with respect to
the wanton murder charge . The trial court overruled Appellant's motion to instruct the
jury on all forms of homicide, and determined that the evidence warranted only an
instruction on wanton murder. Appellant argues that it was error to deny a selfprotection qualifier to the wanton murder charge and, additionally, that it was error to
refuse to instruct the jury on lesser forms of homicide . The evidence presented at trial
warranted a first-degree manslaughter instruction with both self-protection and imperfect
self-protection qualifiers attached, in addition to the wanton murder instruction .
However, Appellant was not entitled to independent instructions as to second-degree
manslaughter or reckless homicide.
a . The Wanton Murder Instructions
We first address Appellant's allegation that a self-protection and imperfect selfprotection qualifier should have accompanied the wanton murder instruction . The trial
court correctly rejected this request, as the plain language of the justification statute
specifically prohibits an instruction on self-protection with either a wanton murder or
reckless homicide charge when the victim is an innocent bystander:
When the defendant is justified under KRS 503.050 to 503.110 in using
force upon or toward the person of another, but he wantonly or recklessly
injures or creates a risk of injury to innocent persons, the justification
afforded by those sections is unavailable in a prosecution for an offense
involving wantonness or recklessness toward innocent persons .
KRS 503.120(2); see also Phillips v. Commonwealth , 17 S .W.3d 870, 875-876 (Ky.
2000) (finding no error where trial court refused an instruction on self-protection to a
charge of wanton murder based on the plain language of KRS 503.120(2)).
b. First-Degree Manslaughter Instructions
However, by simultaneously denying an instruction on first-degree manslaughter,
the trial court recreated the dilemma previously characterized by this Court as the
"Shannon problem," referring to the holding of Shannon v. Commonwealth , 767 S .W .2d
548 (Ky. 1988). "The so-called `Shannon problem' derives from the fact that . . . a
defendant can be deprived of a valid defense merely because the indictment charged
him with wanton murder, second-degree manslaughter or reckless homicide, instead of
intentional murder or first-degree manslaughter." Elliott, 976 S.W.2d at 421 . Here, the
"Shannon problem" has been recreated : the decision to instruct the jury only as to
wanton murder effectively removed Appellant's claim of self-defense-whether perfect
or imperfectfrom the jury's consideration .
This problem was compounded by the trial court's erroneous determination that
Appellant was not entitled to a first-degree manslaughter instruction . There was
evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Appellant intended to cause
Brodie serious physical injury, but killed Tameika Kendrick as a result of his conduct.
See KRS, 507.030(1) ("A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when, with
intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such
person or of a third person."). Both Appellant and Brodie testified that there was great
animosity between them, and that they had fought on at least one prior occasion.
Appellant also testified that he was suspended from school as a result of this prior
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altercation with Brodie . Moreover, nearly every witness present that evening testified
that Appellant was hit from behind with a chair as he watched his close friend being
severely beaten by Brodie's friends ; Brodie himself admitted that he participated in this
assault . It is entirely reasonable, based on this testimony, to conclude that Appellant
was sufficiently incensed by these circumstances to shoot Brodie with the intention of
causing serious injury.
The Commonwealth is incorrect that Appellant's conductthat is, firing a gun
directly at a human being-demonstrates, as a matter of law, intent to kill that would
defeat the necessity of a first-degree manslaughter instruction . While it is certainly
possible for a juror to infer intent to kill by this conduct, Appellant's own testimony
justified an instruction embodying his claim that he did not intend Brodie's death.
Appellant testified at trial that he "didn't mean to hurt nobody" and specifically denied
that he was "trying to kill" Brodie, but rather that he was "trying not to get [his] own life
taken." Thus, based on this testimony, the jury could have rejected Appellant's claim
that he was acting in self-defense, but believed that he lacked an intent to kill Brodie.
Moreover, this Court has previously recognized that the firing of a gun at another
person does not necessarily establish an intent to kill as a matter of law: "[A] reasonable
juror could conclude that these defendants fired at [the victim] not intending to kill him
but intending only to injure him to the extent necessary to effect their escape." Luttrell v.
Commonwealth , 554 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Ky. 1977) (finding error where the trial court
refused to instruct the jury on second degree assault in addition to attempted murder,
because "the question of whether intent to kill or intent to injure should be inferred from
the evidence is one that should have been presented to the jury via an instruction on
assault in the second degree") . While the circumstances of a shooting may, in many
instances, support only a conclusion that the gunman intended his victim's death, the
evidence in the present matter was too conflicted to support this singular conclusion . Cf.
Crane v. Commonwealth, 833 S .W. 813, 817 (Ky. 1992) (finding no error in refusal to
instruct on lesser included offenses of second-degree manslaughter or reckless
homicide, where uncontroverted physical evidence established that the gun was fired
either intentionally or, at the least, wantonly) . Therefore, the proposed instruction on
first-degree manslaughter was improperly rejected .
Furthermore, a self-protection and imperfect self-protection instruction should
have accompanied the first-degree manslaughter instruction . While KRS 503.120
prohibits an imperfect self-protection defense where the culpable mental state is wanton
or reckless and the victim is an innocent bystander, it has no applicability to a firstdegree manslaughter charge, as first-degree manslaughter is a crime of intent. The
evidence presented at trial supported both instructions with respect to Tameika
Kendrick's death .
Here, the jury was entitled to believe that Appellant was acting in self-defense
when he shot Brodie, based on his testimony to that effect . Though Appellant testified
that he only fired one shot at Brodie and one shot at the ceiling, the jury was entitled to
disbelieve this testimony, particularly in light of the testimony from Haskins and Brodie
that Appellant fired additional shots . Whether Appellant fired these additional shots in
an attempt to protect himself from Brodie is a question properly left to the fact-finder.
Regardless, the jury could have concluded that Appellant did, in fact, fire additional
shots and that one of these bullets hit Tameika Kendrick, while simultaneously believing
that Appellant was firing at Brodie in self-protection .
Additionally, Appellant was entitled to an imperfect self-protection qualifier
attached to the first-degree manslaughter instruction . As discussed above, with respect
to the assault instructions, the established circumstances of the evening supported a
conclusion that Appellant might have wantonly or recklessly believed that he needed to
protect himself from Brodie. Because the jury could have concluded that Appellant was
either wanton or reckless in this belief, and that he fired more than one shot in his
attempt to protect himself from Brodie, he was entitled to an imperfect-self-protection
instruction . The effect of this finding would reduce a first-degree manslaughter offense
to second-degree manslaughter (if Appellant's belief in the need for self-protection was
wantonly held) or to reckless homicide (if the belief was recklessly held). Elliott, 976
S .W .2d at 420 n .3.
c. Second-Degree Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide
Finally, Appellant argues that he was entitled to instructions on the lesserincluded offenses of second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide . Appellant
correctly states that the fact that the self-protection and imperfect self-protection
instructions attached to the first-degree manslaughter charge might have reduced the
offense to second-degree manslaughter or reckless homicide does not affect whether
he was entitled to independent, or so-called "stand-alone," second-degree
manslaughter or reckless homicide instructions . Stated otherwise, while the jury might
have rejected the argument that Appellant wantonly formed his belief in the need for
self-protection, it might have believed that Appellant behaved wantonly with respect to
the result of his conduct, i.e. Tameika's death. This Court has previously explained :
Since the language of KRS 503 .120(1) limits [the analysis of an imperfectself-defense theory] to whether the defendant was wanton or reckless with
respect to a circumstance, e.g ., whether he needed to act in selfprotection, it has no application to whether he was wanton or reckless with
13
respect to the result of his conduct, e.g., whether his act would cause the
death of another person .
Elliott, 976 S .W.2d at 420.
Appellant is incorrect, however, that the evidence warranted independent
instructions on second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide . The difference
between wanton murder and second-degree manslaughter is the character of the risk
created : wanton murder requires a showing that the conduct created "circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to human life" and "a grave risk of death to another
person ." KRS 507 .020(1)(b) . Second-degree manslaughter requires only a showing
that the defendant behaved wantonly in disregarding "a substantial and unjustifiable
risk." KRS 507 .040(1); KRS 501 .020(3). "The difference between wanton murder and
second-degree manslaughter, involuntary murder, continues to be, as the penal code
originally intended, where there is evidence from which the jury could find
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life." Estep v.
Commonwealth , 957 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Ky. 1997).
In the present matter, the jury would only be required to consider the nature of
the risk created by Appellant's conduct after having rejected his claims of self-defense .
The jury would then consider the nature of the risk created by Appellant's conduct-i .e.,
firing into a heavily crowded room with no valid justification---and whether he
consciously disregarded this risk. Such conduct is the epitome of wanton murder and
supports only the conclusion that Appellant acted with an extreme indifference to human
life. See KRS 507 .020 cmt. ("Typical of conduct contemplated for inclusion in `wanton'
murder is : firing into a crowd, an occupied building or an occupied automobile ."); see
also Saylor v. Commonwealth , 144 S.W.3d 812, 818-820 (Ky. 2004).
For similar reasons, Appellant was likewise properly denied an independent
14
instruction as to reckless homicide . "A person is guilty of reckless homicide when, with
recklessness he causes the death of another person ." KRS 507.050(1). In order to be
convicted of reckless homicide, the jury would have to believe that he failed to perceive
the substantial and unjustifiable risk created by his conduct. KRS 501 .020(4). No
reasonable person would fail to perceive the risk created by firing a gun into a crowded
room . See Adcock v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Ky. 1986) (finding no error
in denial of reckless homicide instruction where defendant severely beat an eighty-yearold woman). There was no error in the denial of an independent reckless homicide
instruction .
3. Remedy
The contradictory nature of the testimony, particularly the eyewitness accounts of
the incident, provided credible evidence upon which the jury could reach several
differing conclusions as to Appellant's mental state. This tangled web of evidence was
only further obscured by the lack of conclusive evidence that Appellant actually fired the
bullet that killed Tameika Kendrick . As we explained in Commonwealth v. Wolford:
The convoluted and contradictory testimony presented in this case is the
perfect example of why fact-finding in a criminal case is delegated to a
jury. We reiterate the long-standing rule that where, as here, a defendant
claims an alibi, or the evidence is purely circumstantial and does not
conclusively establish his state of mind at the time he killed the victim , it is
appropriate to instruct on all degrees of homicide and leave it to the jury to
sort out the facts and determine what inferences and conclusions to draw
from the evidence.
4 S.W.3d 534, 539-40 (Ky. 1999) (emphasis added). Because the jury instructions with
respect to homicide and assault did not permit the jury to consider all ranges of culpable
mental states, the wanton murder and assault in the first-degree convictions are
reversed . Upon retrial, the jury must be instructed on all charges that are reasonably
supported by the evidence.
15
B. Additional Allegations of Error
Appellant argues that expert testimony concerning the caliber of the bullet that
killed Tameika Kendrick was erroneously admitted in violation of CR 7 .24, depriving
defense counsel of a reasonable opportunity to defend against the testimony . The
expert's testimony indicated that a .22 caliber bullet killed Tameika Kendrick and injured
Brodie, and was therefore relevant to the wanton murder and assault charges. As the
substance of the expert's testimony is now known, and it is expected that further, more
conclusive tests will be performed on the bullet prior to another trial, it is unlikely that
this alleged error will recur upon trial. For this reason, we need not address the issue .
Terry v. Commonwealth , 153 S .W.3d 794, 797 (Ky. 2005). Furthermore, we need not
address this argument with respect to Appellant's convictions for fleeing or evading
police and tampering with physical evidence, as this testimony in no way supported or
was relevant to these convictions .
Appellant also alleges the improper admission of a dying declaration .
Specifically, Appellant argues that it was error to permit Haskins to testify that Tameika
Kendrick had identified Appellant as her assailant moments after being shot . Because
this issue may arise upon retrial, we will address it. Without specifically determining
whether the statement was a dying declaration, we conclude that it would have been
properly admitted as an excited utterance . KRE 803(2); see Soto v. Commonwealth ,
139 S.W.3d 827, 860-861 (Ky. 2004).
Finally, we note that Appellant's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are
unlikely to recur upon retrial of the homicide and assault charges, and we therefore
need not address them. With respect to the fleeing and tampering with evidence
convictions, we again need not address the merits of this argument as any alleged error
16
is undoubtedly harmless. The evidence of Appellant's guilt of those crimes was
overwhelming and substantially comprised of his own admissions. The alleged error
was non-prejudicial beyond a reasonable doubt. Epperson v. Commonwealth , 809
S.W.2d 835, 838 (Ky. 1991).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the fleeing or evading police in the first-degree and
tampering with physical evidence convictions are affirmed . Appellant's wanton murder
and first-degree assault convictions are reversed and remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion .
Lambert, C.J .; Graves, McAnulty, Minton, Roach and Scott, JJ., concur.
Wintersheimer, J ., concurs in result only.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Christopher N. Lasch
Yale Law School
Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization
127 Wall Street
New Haven, Connecticut 06511
Michael L. Goodwin
Goodwin & Lasch, P.S.C.
6008 Brownsboro Park Boulevard
Louisville, Kentucky 40207
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
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