RENE GARCIA ROBLERO V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : OCTOBER 19, 2006
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,*upretnE Courf of
2005-SC-000301-MR
[OAT
RENE GARCIA ROBLERO
V.
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'
.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HON. PHILLIP R. PATTON, JUDGE
NO. 04-CR-00034
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
1. INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Rene Garcia Roblero, was convicted of wanton murder and
tampering with physical evidence in the December 23, 2003, shooting death of
Jose Juan Carillo Blanco . The jury recommended sentences of twenty years and
one year, set to run concurrently . Appellant's subsequent motions for a new trial
and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict were denied, and the trial judge
sentenced Appellant according to the jury's recommendations on March 23,
2005 . Appellant now appeals his conviction and sentence as a matter of right
pursuant to Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b), alleging the trial court committed several
:
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errors, viz (1) that the trial court committed reversible error by allegedly failing to
adhere to the requirements regarding court-appointed interpreters ; and, (2) that
the Commonwealth's alleged failure to provide timely discovery constitutes
reversible error. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm Appellant's
conviction and sentence .
If . FACTS
On December 23, 2003, Jose Juan Carillo Blanco, also known as "Brian,"
was shot and killed in the trailer he shared with his brother Fermin Rivera Blanco
and his cousin Ruben Torres Blanco on the seven-hundred acre farm of their
employer, Steve McClard . The men all worked on McClard's tobacco farm, and
as of December 21, 2003, all of the season's tobacco work had been completed,
and the next day McClard paid the men. On that same day, Jose returned from
Bowling Green in a truck, which he claimed was his.
Somewhere between six and six-thirty on the morning of the murder,
Fermin answered a knock at the trailer door, and recognizing the visitor as
Appellant, opened the door and allowed Appellant to enter. Fermin testified that
he saw no one else with Appellant during this time . Appellant asked to speak to
Jose, who was still asleep. Appellant insisted that Fermin wake Jose, and
Fermin, who was aware that Jose had owed a debt to Appellant, complied and
woke Jose. Fermin then returned to his bedroom, but remained awake . It was
during this time that Fermin and Ruben, who had awaked sometime after Fermin
let Appellant into the trailer, overheard Appellant ask Jose who the truck parked
outside belonged to.
Shortly thereafter, Fermin and Ruben heard gunshots come from inside
the trailer. After waiting several minutes, Ruben entered the living room and
found Jose alone, shaking and barely able to speak because of a gunshot wound
to his neck. Ruben testified that before dying, Jose muttered "my compadre ."
Fermin then joined Ruben in the living room, and the two then sought help from
McClard and Karen Elmore, a girlfriend of one of their friends who was also
bilingual. McClard and Elmore then directed police and emergency services to
the trailer, and Elmore assisted in translating Kentucky State Police Detective
Kevin Pickett's interview of Fermin and Ruben.
Elmore testified that on her way to the trailer that morning, she passed a
white car that had been wrecked approximately a half mile from the trailer, its
headlights still on and the driver's door open . Upon police inspection, it was
discovered the car, a white Honda Accord, had the Tennessee license plate for
Appellant's black Dodge van. Later that day, Trooper Todd Combs, a canine
handler, brought his dog to the accident scene and allowed him to acquire the
scent in the car. Thereafter, the dog followed a single scent trail that led from the
back of the car, up a hillside, followed by a turn at a fence-line, through standing
water in a marshy area by a pond and into another open field; however, the dog
soon lost the scent. The trooper then took the dog back to the car in hopes of
finding another scent trail, but the dog followed the same trail as before,
suggesting to the trooper that only one person exited the wrecked vehicle. After
obtaining a warrant to search the car, police uncovered an eight-millimeter pistol
under the driver's seat and a loaded magazine for a Lorcin .380 pistol on the
passenger-side floorboard .
Back at the trailer, Detective Damon Childers recovered an unfired .380
cartridge from the living room floor and five spent .380 shell casings from the
floor and counter of the adjacent kitchen. Another bullet was recovered from the
kitchen wall .
Around dusk of the following day, Appellant appeared at the home of
Edward and Karen Wilson, who lived two to three miles from the murder scene .
The Wilsons were aware that a murder suspect was still at-large, and thus were
suspicious when Appellant approached and asked for water . Appellant also
carried an empty milk jug and asked Edward if he could take him to a nearby
store for gas. Fearing a confrontation may provoke Appellant, Edward agreed
and the two proceeded to a nearby gas station . In the meantime, Karen called
911 and told the operator what was happening and where the men were going .
Once at the gas station, Appellant asked Edward if he would buy him
some food. Edward, suspecting Appellant would try to take off in his truck, asked
the store clerk to call 911 . Within minutes, Trooper Chris Spradlin arrived and
placed Appellant under arrest. Upon searching Appellant, a knife was recovered
from his pants pocket.
Once at the Barren County jail, Detective Pickett read the arrest warrant to
Appellant, who responded to Det. Pickett in English that he did not commit the
murder, but that his friend "Pepe" did it. According to statements taken during
the interview, Appellant and Pepe went to the victim's trailer early that morning.
Appellant stated that Pepe hid behind the door and waited until Jose entered the
room before shooting him . Appellant stated that he then fled the scene and that
Pepe took the white car and drove away. Appellant did not tell the officers
Pepe's last name or where to find him .
Days later, Karen Elmore was asked to bring Fermin and Ruben to the
police station, where they positively identified Appellant as the murderer. During
this time, Elmore translated for the officers a conversation she initiated with
Appellant . Elmore later testified that Appellant told her somebody named "Pedro"
killed Jose. However, Detective Pickett also testified that Appellant said he was
forced to drive to Jose's trailer by a person he believed Appellant to call Pepe.
On January 5, 2004, Jim and Don McClard, brothers and farming partners
of Steve McClard, found a Lorcin .380 handgun and detached magazine in a
ditch adjacent to the road on which the victim's trailer was located . However,
due to rusting and subsequent rust-removal by Kentucky State Police firearms
examiners, it was impossible to compare the bullets found in the victim's body
and at the scene to bullets fired from the weapon in the lab. Despite the
condition of the Lorcin . 380, however, KSP firearms examiner Jeffery Doyle
testified that the bullets found in the trailer were fired from a six-right rifled barrel,
such as that found in a Lorcin .380 . Moreover, all of the cartridges found at the
scene had passed through the chamber of the same weapon, and Doyle testified
that at least one of the cartridges recovered had been fired from the Lorcin .380
recovered from the ditch. The other weapon recovered from the car, an eightmillimeter pistol, was only capable of firing blank cartridges, according to Doyle's
testimony.
During Appellant's trial, several witnesses testified as to Appellant's
peacefulness and truthfulness . Appellant's brother and sister-in-law testified that
they had never seen Appellant possess a handgun, and they had never seen
weapons or ammunition when they visited his apartment. Appellant was
subsequently convicted and sentenced for the murder of Jose Juan Carillo
Blanco, and he now appeals .
III. ANALYSIS
A. Court-appointed Interpreter provided for defendant.
In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court
committed reversible error in failing to adhere to the requirements for interpreters
as provided by Amended Order 2004-3 of this Court regarding Amendments to
the Rules of Administrative Procedure, Part IX (Procedures for Appointment of
Interpreters) . See also KRS 30A.405(2) . It is Appellant's contention that the
interpreter appointed on his behalf was so lacking in providing interpreting
services that Appellant was not effectively present for his trial as provided by RCr
8.28(1) . The Commonwealth, however, argues that the issues presented on
appeal are not preserved .
The raising of an issue for the first time in a motion for a new trial or a .
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict does not preserve the issue for
appeal . Byrd v. Commonwealth , 825 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Ky. 1992), overruled on
other grounds by Shadowen v. Comonwealth , 82 S.W.3d 896 (Ky. 2002).
Similarly, "[a] defendant cannot await the verdict of the jury before presenting an
objection to improprieties that occurred during the trial[ .]" Patrick v.
Commonwealth , 436 S.W .2d 69, 74 (Ky. 1968) . We have held that a
contemporaneous objection is required in order for a party to preserve trial
errors. RCr 9.22; Salisbury v. Commonwealth , 556 S.W.2d 922, 926 (Ky. App.
1977) (holding that RCr 9.22 requires contemporaneous objection because it
gives the trial court an opportunity to correct any errors in the proceedings) ;
Commonwealth v. Pace , 82 S.W.3d 894, 895 (Ky. 2002) ("The general rule is
that a party must make a proper objection to the trial court and request a ruling
on that objection, or the issue is waived .").
After reviewing the record, we find that Appellant failed to properly
preserve this issue for appellate review. Appellant urges this Court, however, to
consider the alleged errors to be structural errors,' rather than procedural or trial
errors, thus obviating the requirement for a contemporaneous objection . We
note that Appellant provides no case law, and we have found none, to support
the notion that alleged defects in interpretation services provided to a Spanishspeaking defendant rise to the level of a structural error. Moreover, we decline to
find that the facts of this particular case necessitate such a ruling, as any of the
alleged errors or defects could have been remedied by the trial court had a
contemporaneous objection been made . Nonetheless, Appellant requests this
Court to review the allegations for substantial error pursuant to RCr 10.26.
"RCr 10 .26 provides that an alleged error improperly preserved for
appellate review may be revisited upon a demonstration that it resulted in
manifest injustice ." Butcher v. Commonwealth , 96 S.W .2d 3, 11 (Ky. 2002).
Manifest injustice may be found where there is "a palpable error . . . which affects
the substantial rights of a party and relief may be granted for palpable errors only
upon a determination that a manifest injustice has resulted from the error." Partin
v. Commonwealth , 918 S .W .2d 219, 224 (Ky. 1996) . Furthermore, a palpable
error "must involve prejudice more egregious than that occurring in reversible
error." Ernst v. Commonwealth , 160 S .W.3d 744, 758 (Ky. 2005) .
' "A `structural' error . . . is a `defect affecting the framework within which the trial
proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself ."' Johnson v.
United States, 520 U .S. 461, 468,117 S.Ct. 1544, 1549, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)
(quoting Arizona v. Fulminante , 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S .Ct. 1246, 1265, 113
L.Ed .2d 302 (1991)) .
Palpable error review requires a fact-intensive inquiry of the entire record
and involves a case by case analysis . Id. (citing United States v. Younq, 470
U .S. 1, 16,105 S.Ct. 1038,1046-47, 84 L.Ed .2d 1 (1985)) . "This means, upon
consideration of the whole case, the reviewing court must conclude that a
substantial possibility exists that the result would have been different in order to
grant relief." Id. (citing Jackson v. Commonwealth , 717 S .W.2d 511 (Ky. 1986)) .
We find that Appellant suffered no manifest injustice in this case as there
is no substantial possibility that the result would have been different . Over the
course of the proceedings at which Appellant's presence is mandated by RCr
8.28(1), three court-appointed interpreters were provided for Appellant.
Appellant alleges that during the pre-trial conference, conferences in the judge's
chambers, and even during his trial, the interpreters provided for him were
unqualified and violated several of the canons set forth in the Code of
Professional Responsibility for Interpreters, and that the trial court otherwise
failed to adhere to the requirements for interpreters as set forth in Section 62 of
Amended Order 2004-3, Amendments to the Rules of Administrative Procedure
AP Part IX (Procedures for Appointment of Interpreters).
Initially, we note that the interpreters provided by the Court were Qualified
Level I interpreters pursuant to Rule of Administrative Procedure, Part IX, Section
8. The trial court was well within its discretion in selecting these interpreters to
assist Appellant during the course of the trial, including arraignment and all other
2 Section 6 of Amended Order 2004-3 provides, in pertinent part, that "[w]hen
interpretation for two or more hours is required without breaks, a team of two
interpreters should be appointed."
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critical stages of the trial where Appellant's presence is mandated by RCr
8.28(1).
Appellant also claims that on several occasions the interpreter
paraphrases the statements of witnesses and asks clarifying questions of
witnesses in violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
Interpreters, that on other occasions the interpreter is not providing simultaneous
interpretation, and that at times the interpreter is not interpreting at all. These
alleged irregularities, however, do not rise to the level of palpable error.
Viewing the record in its entirety we find, again, there is no substantial
possibility the result would have been different . Furthermore, these alleged
errors could have been remedied by the trial court had contemporaneous
objection been made as Section 11 of the Amendments to the Rules of
Administrative Procedure AP Part IX provides for the removal of an interpreter
"upon request of the person for whom the interpreter is appointed or on the
court's own motion."
Finally, we note that an interpreter was available to Appellant during the
critical stages of his trial. RCr 8.28(1) requires that "[t]he defendant shall be
present at the arraignment, at every critical stage of the trial including the
empaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of the
sentence." Although the record reveals a lull in translation during arraignment
and the suppression hearing, we have no reason to believe that Appellant was
not apprised of the circumstances . Furthermore, we have no way of reviewing
whether or not the interpreter provided translation during the trial as the trial
judge ordered that the microphone at the defense table be muted following the
prosecutor's opening statement, most likely in an effort to prevent the
interpretation from being amplified . Thus, Appellant was the only one in a
position to complain of the translation services being provided to him, and as we
have noted, he failed to bring these contentions to the attention of the trial court.
Likewise, the alleged errors do not rise to the level of substantial error as
provided in RCr 10.26.
B. Alleged failure to provide timely discovery.
On February 23, 2004, the trial court entered an order of discovery
pursuant to RCr 5.16, 7.24, and 7.26. In response, the Commonwealth furnished
to Appellant two volumes of discovery materials, as well as individual items as
they were later received . In his second and final assignment of error, Appellant
alleges the Commonwealth failed to provide timely discovery and failed to
disclose exculpatory evidence pursuant to the order, and that reversal is thus
required . The Commonwealth argues that some of the alleged discovery
violations are not preserved for appellate review as no contemporaneous
objection was offered by Appellant during trial and upon introduction of evidence
and testimony subject to discovery . The Commonwealth likewise insists that
some of the evidence to which Appellant now objects was unknown to it at the
time of discovery .
"A discovery violation justifies setting aside a conviction `only where there
exists a "reasonable probability" that had the evidence been disclosed the result
at trial would have been different."' Weaver v. Commonwealth , 955 S .W.2d 722,
725 (Ky. 1997) (citations omitted) . Furthermore, "the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
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process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution ." Brady v. Maryland,
373 U .S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); see also
Commonwealth v. Key, 633 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Ky. 1982) (holding that the failure to
disclose may violate the defendant's due process rights and right to a fair trial) .
Similarly, the Commonwealth has a duty to disclose to the defendant any
exculpatory witnesses. See Lowe v. Commonwealth , 712 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Ky.
1986) . However, to be entitled to a new trial, Appellant bears the burden of
showing that the evidence withheld is favorable to him and material to either guilt
or punishment. Sanders v. Commonwealth , 89 S.W .3d 380, 385 (Ky. 2002).
Thus, Appellant "has the burden of establishing that there is a reasonable
probability that the result of the trial would have been different if the allegedly
withheld exculpatory [evidence] were disclosed to the defense ." Id. at 386 (citing
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 279,119 S.Ct. 1936, 1948, 144 L.Ed.2d 286
(1999)) . However, "[d]ue process does not require the prosecutor to disclose
information already known by the defendant or counsel and available from a third
party." Id. at 385 .
1. Timely Discovery
Because Appellant's claims of error involve several different issues, it is
best to evaluate each claim independently. In this instance, Appellant claims that
certain evidentiary items were not provided until a couple of weeks or days
before trial . Specifically, Appellant claims that audiotapes of the 911 calls and
transcribed statements of Ed and Karen Wilson were not furnished until January
14, 2005, eleven days before the trial was originally set to begin . Appellant also
claims that a copy of the transcribed 911 calls was not received until January 18,
2005, seven days before the trial. Further, Appellant argues that the firearms
trace summary and a copy of a new audiotaped statement of the Appellant were
not provided until January 25, 2005, the day the trial had originally been
scheduled to begin .
The Commonwealth, however, rebuts Appellant's claims and notes that
the trial had been continued from January 25, 2005, to May 24, 2005. The
parties had agreed to the continuance because of Appellant's late statement to
Det. Pickett, wherein he purported to provide specific information about "Pedro."3
Further investigation, however, revealed nothing more concerning Pedro.
However, shortly after the continuance was granted, both sides agreed to return
the case to the docket for trial on January 27, 2005. Moreover, Appellant
announced he was ready for trial on January 27, 2005 . Thus, he cannot now
claim noncompliance with the discovery order as he has waived his right to
complain by announcing he was ready to begin . Barclav v. Commonwealth , 499
S.W.2d 283, 285 (Ky. 1973).
2. Statements and testimony of Fermin Blanco and Ruben Blanco.
During the trial, the Commonwealth claimed the motive for Jose's murder
was an argument over a debt of $2500 that the victim allegedly owed Appellant .
Appellant argues that when Fermin Blanco, the victim's brother, testified at trial,
3 There is some dispute concerning when Appellant mentioned the name "Pedro"
and to whom he mentioned the name . Detective Pickett testified that he heard
the name "Pepe" upon first interviewing Appellant. However, Karen Elmore, who
later initiated a conversation with Appellant at the police station days after his
arrest, testified that she heard Appellant on that day say "Pedro" as the alleged
shooter. This issue is discussed, infra.
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he stated that he heard Appellant ask Jose who the truck outside belonged to
and whether or not the phone in the trailer was working. Appellant objected
during this testimony, arguing that the statement was not provided in discovery,
which was overruled by the trial court. Appellant then argued in support of his
motion for a new trial that this information is exculpatory and argues the same on
appeal.
Likewise, when Ruben Blanco, the victim's cousin, testified, he testified
similarly that he heard Appellant ask the victim about the truck and phone, to
which Appellant did not object. Ruben also testified that when he entered the
living room and found Jose barely alive that Jose said to him, "my compadre ."
Appellant did not object to this statement, but now claims on appeal that this
statement was also not provided in discovery.
The record, however, reveals that Appellant's trial counsel argued that
Fermin and Ruben's statement concerning the truck and phone were exculpatory
in support of his motion for
a new trial, but later claimed that the statements were
incriminating because someone planning a murder would want to know who an
unfamiliar truck parked outside belonged to as well as whether the residents of
the trailer were capable of calling the police . Furthermore, the Commonwealth
claims that Appellant was provided with Fermin and Ruben's written signed
statements pursuant to RCr 7.26, but that the prosecutors were not aware of
particular statements about the pickup truck or telephone as this information was
not part of their original statements . The trial court was evidently aware of this
4 Fermin Blanco's written statement included a statement that he heard the
Appellant and victim argue over the alleged debt prior to hearing gunshots, but
he did not testify as to this statement.
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fact as the trial judge indicated such when he denied Appellant's motion for a
new trial.
The fact that additional information not contained in a witness's written
statement may come out in trial "is not an infrequent occurrence ." Yates v.
Commonwealth , 958 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Ky. 1997) . Moreover, "[t]here is no
authority that would require a trial judge to confine a witness's testimony to the
four corners of his or her written statement. Trial lawyers scrutinize the motive or
basis for such omission or additions through the art of cross-examination ." Id .
Thus, we find that Appellant was not prejudiced by the fact that the
Commonwealth's witnesses testified to information not contained in their original
written statements . There was no error in the admission of such testimony.
As for Appellant's contention that Fermin's testimony concerning the
victim's exclamation of "my compadre" was not disclosed, we likewise find no
prejudice . It is difficult to understand how this statement may have further
bolstered Appellant's claim that someone bolted from behind the door and shot
the victim, as was his defense. The victim's exclamation could have meant any
number of things, and this fact, again, could have been addressed on crossexamination . Furthermore, the Commonwealth's similar lack of knowledge as to
this statement supports such a ruling.
3. Appellant's Post-Arrest Statements .
Several days after Appellant's arrest, Karen Elmore, a friend of the
Blancos, brought Fermin and Ruben to the jail to identify Appellant. While there,
Elmore initiated a conversation with Appellant, wherein Appellant gave a second
statement in which he mentioned that "Pedro" had hidden behind the door and
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that he was the actual murderer. Appellant claims that he was surprised by
Elmore's testimony concerning this statement and argues that Elmore was acting
as an agent of the police when Appellant made this statement. Appellant argues
that the statement was exculpatory and that had he known about this statement
prior to trial, further investigation could have been done, and it may have made a
difference in whether or not Appellant testified in his defense .
This argument lacks merit. If indeed there had been a person named
"Pedro," no one other than Appellant was in a better position to disclose to
defense counsel that this statement had been made . As we have stated before,
"due process does not require the prosecutor to disclose information already
known by the defendant or counsel and available from a third party." Sanders ,
89 S.W.3d at 385 . Thus we find that Appellant was not prejudiced .
Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to support Appellant's
claim that Elmore was acting as an agent of the police when she initiated a
conversation with Appellant . In order to be considered an agent of the police in
this situation, we would have to find that Elmore was a "state actor" or that her
questioning was the "functional equivalent" of an interrogation . See Roberson v.
Commonwealth , 185 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Ky. 2006) (discussing, in the context of
whether the waiver of Miranda rights was valid, the application of the state actor
and functional equivalent doctrines) . We find neither circumstance applicable in
this situation and likewise find Appellant suffered no undue prejudice for the
reasons previously mentioned .
4. Knife found in Appellant's pocket.
During a search of Appellant's person following his arrest, Kentucky State
Trooper Chris Spradlin discovered a knife in one of his pants pockets. This fact
was first disclosed during Edward Wilson's testimony at trial when he testified as
to the events that occurred when he gave Appellant a ride to the gas station .
Appellant failed to object to this testimony ; however, defense counsel complained
prior to Trooper Spradlin's testimony that the recovery of the knife was not in
Trooper Spradlin's report, but she did not request to admonish the jury
concerning Wilson's previous testimony. The knife itself was never offered into
evidence, and Trooper Spradlin was not asked about the knife and did not
mention it when he testified .
Although no contemporaneous objection was made by Appellant during
Wilson's testimony, the issue is nonetheless preserved for review as the
substance of Appellant's complaint concerning this issue was brought to the trial
court's attention . Nonetheless, Appellant's failure to request an admonition,
which could have cured any alleged prejudice, renders the issue waived for
appeal . Brock v. Commonwealth , 391 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Ky. 1965) . Moreover,
the fact that there is nothing in the record concerning the knife and the fact that
the knife itself was never produced, much less offered into evidence, supports a
finding that Appellant suffered no prejudice . Appellant had before it the same
police report that was in possession of the Commonwealth . It is thus troubling
that Appellant would complain that the Commonwealth bore the burden of
providing this information . Furthermore, we note that RCr 7.24 does not require
the disclosure of the fact that knife was confiscated from Appellant upon his
arrest.
- 1 6-
5. Scent trail picked up by K-9 unit.
Appellant's final argument concerning the alleged discovery violations
involves the fact that the K-9 unit in this case picked up a scent that led in a
northerly direction from the wrecked Honda Accord, a detail Appellant alleges
was not disclosed . Appellant argues the significance of this due to the fact that
he was later discovered due south from the car's location.
A review of the record reveals that Appellant did not make a
contemporaneous objection when the testimony concerning this fact was elicited
at trial . Nonetheless, Appellant contends that the evidence of this fact is
exculpatory given his location in relation to the tracked scent.
We find the argument inapposite . Although the failure to disclose
potentially exculpatory evidence, regardless of good or bad faith on the part of
the prosecution, ordinarily violates due process, in order for Appellant to be
afforded a new trial on this basis he bears the burden of showing the reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had this
information been disclosed to the defense. Sanders , 89 S.W.3d at 385.
In this case, Appellant exited a wooded area on the Wilson's property
south of the car's location and opposite of where the K-9 unit tracked the scent a
day earlier . However, the record reveals that Appellant did not travel in a single
direction and that the scent trail followed by the K-9 unit ended abruptly,
suggesting the scent trail had "dried up ." Furthermore, Appellant was discovered
about thirty-five hours after the murder occurred, which offered sufficient time to
travel the mile or so from the scene to the Wilson property . Moreover,
Appellant's defense counsel even used the fact of the K-9 units tracking in a
northerly direction in her closing argument.
Finally, Appellant argues that had this information been disclosed, defense
counsel could have investigated several Hispanic males who lived in a trailer
close to where the scent trail ended . However, Kentucky State Trooper Michael
May searched the trailer with the permission of the Hispanic male that resided
there and indicated in his report that the trailer was within the search area .
Furthermore, this notion does not support Appellant's theory in his defense that
another person forced him to drive from Tennessee to the Blancos' trailer to
commit the murder. Given the totality of the circumstances and the evidence
against Appellant, we find that there was no reasonable probability that the
outcome of the trial would have been any different .
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm Appellant's conviction and
sentence .
All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Karen Shuff Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
James Havey
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
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