CHERYL LYNN GABOW V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : DECEMBER 21, 2006
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CHERYL LYNN GABOW
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET P. COLEMAN, JUDGE
NO. 95-CR-0075
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Cheryl Lynn Gabow, was convicted of complicity to commit murder in
the Hardin Circuit Court and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole for twenty-five years . She appeals this conviction as a matter of right, Ky.
Const . § 110(2)(b), raising five issues for review. Finding no error, we affirm.
Background
The charges in this case arise from the murder of Fred Gabow, Appellant's husband .
Following eight years of marriage, during which the couple had two children, Appellant filed for
divorce . Later that year, Appellant became romantically involved with David Brangers, who
subsequently moved in with Appellant . Meanwhile, Mr. Gabow began a relationship with
Teresa Reeder (now Mauk).
According to Brangers' testimony, Appellant began talking about killing Mr. Gabow
shortly after she filed for divorce. Brangers was present when Appellant discussed her
thoughts about killing Gabow with her then 17-year-old nephew, Joey Wolfe. Wolfe referred
her to Sam McMillen, who later met with Appellant . During this meeting, Appellant asked
McMillen to kill Mr. Gabow and he agreed . At a subsequent meeting, McMillen introduced
Appellant to his cousin, James Cecil, whom he had recruited to participate in the crime .
Appellant agreed to pay McMillen and Cecil with funds she expected to collect from Mr.
Gabow's life insurance policy. The three also agreed that the murder should appear to be a
robbery so as not to jeopardize the insurance funds, and should occur prior to the finalization
of the divorce .
Over the next several days, the three put their plan into action . Appellant gave
McMillen and Cecil money to purchase a gun, though the exact amount was disputed at trial .
Appellant also drove the two to Mr. Gabow's trailer, and examined nearby roads for possible
escape routes. However, as the days passed, Appellant became increasingly agitated that
McMillen and Cecil had not completed their task .
The following Friday evening, Fred Gabow was sitting at the kitchen table in his trailer
when he was shot in the head . His girlfriend, Teresa Mauk, was in the living room when she
heard shots fired through the kitchen window and saw Mr. Gabow sink to the floor. She
immediately called 911, and Mr. Gabow was transported to a Louisville hospital . He died two
days later. Thereafter, Appellant confessed her involvement in the murder .
Appellant admitted that she hired McMillen and Cecil to murder Mr. Gabow, gave
them money to purchase a gun, and agreed to pay them $10,000. However, she
insisted that she told both of them days before the murder that she "didn't want it to
happen, that she didn't want them to do anything ." Still, Appellant was unable to
identify any action on her part to prevent the murder or any attempt to inform Mr.
Gabow of the plot . During his own confession, Cecil denied that Appellant ever
renounced the conspiracy . McMillen, on the other hand, gave inconsistent statements
as to whether Appellant had attempted to cancel the plot.
Following her confession, Appellant was charged and later tried jointly with Cecil
for Mr. Gabow's murder. Both were convicted and received sentences of life without
the possibility of parole for twenty-five years . The conviction was affirmed by this Court
in Gabow v. Commonwealth, 34 S .W.3d 63 (Ky. 2000). However, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky granted Appellant's subsequent
petition for writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that an unredacted, taped confession
by Cecil was improperly admitted, at trial. Gabow v. Deuth, 302 F. Supp.2d 687 (2004) .
On retrial, Appellant was again convicted of complicity to murder and received a
sentence of life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years . She now appeals
that conviction as a matter of right, raising five issues for review.
Additional facts will be developed as necessary.
Testimony of Joseph Okay
Appellant first argues that trial court erred in allowing Joseph Okay, a cousin of
Mr. Gabow's mother, to testify. According to Appellant, Okay was permitted to testify in
violation of RCr 7 .26, causing substantial prejudice . Upon review of the record, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Okay to testify and
that no reversible error occurred .
On the first day of voir dire, defense counsel moved to prohibit the testimony of
Okay on two grounds: that the written statement and a transcribed interview had not
been provided to defense counsel within forty-eight hours as required by RCr 7.26(1),
and that Okay had not been previously identified as a potential witness as required by a
prior discovery order. At the hearing on the matter, the trial court required the
Commonwealth to show cause why the document was provided only twenty-four hours
prior to trial, rather than the forty-eight hours required by RCr 7.26(1). The
Commonwealth's Attorney explained that it was only about a week before the trial was
scheduled to begin that he learned that Okay had relevant information . Because Okay
lives in Michigan, an investigator from the Attorney General's Office conducted a phone
interview with Okay on February 10, transcribed the interview, and faxed it to the
prosecutor the same day. On February 15, the transcribed interview was faxed to
defense counsel and the trial began the following day. Concluding that the
Commonwealth had established good cause for the delay in furnishing Okay's
statement, the trial court permitted Okay to testify. He ultimately took the stand on
February 28.
Okay's testimony primarily concerned Appellant's behavior at a family gathering
following Mr. Gabow's funeral, which was held at his trailer. Okay testified that
Appellant was unusually preoccupied with Mr. Gabow's belongings, even collecting and
removing several items that day. Okay stated that Appellant continually discussed how
she planned to spend the anticipated insurance proceeds, and described her behavior
as rude and cold . The testimony, however, was limited only to information that was
contained in the transcribed statement. Appellant now argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by allowing Okay to testify absent sufficient notice pursuant to RCr
7 .26(1).
RCr 7 .26(1) states :
Except for good cause shown, not later than forty-eight (48) hours prior to
trial, the attorney for the Commonwealth shall produce all statements of
any witness in the form of a document or recording in its possession
which relates to the subject matter of the witness's testimony and which
(a) has been signed or initialed by the witness or (b) is or purports to be a
substantially verbatim statement made by the witness . Such statement
shall be made available for examination and use by the defendant.
Rulings on evidentiary matters, including the determination to allow a certain
witness to testify, are left to the sound discretion of the trial court . Such decisions will
only be reversed on appeal upon demonstration that the trial court abused its
discretion . Barnett v. Commonwealth, 979 S .W .2d 98, 103 (Ky. 1998). Furthermore,
when considering a violation of the "forty-eight hour rule" set forth in RCr 7.26(1), there
must be actual prejudice affecting the substantial rights of the defendant caused by the
delay to warrant reversal, otherwise the error is harmless. Beatty v. Commonwealth ,
125 S.W .3d 196, 202 (Ky. 2003); RCr 9.24.
Having reviewed the record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's
decision to allow Okay's testimony. The Commonwealth provided a reasonable
explanation for the delay in furnishing the statement to defense counsel . While defense
counsel did not receive the document until the day before trial, the trial court noted that
the violation of RCr 7.26(1) amounted only to one day. Furthermore, though the
possibility of a continuance was discussed at the hearing, defense counsel never
moved for such relief. Finally, because Okay was not scheduled to be called until late
in the Commonwealth's case, the trial court acknowledged that defense counsel would
have at least a week to review Okay's statement prior to cross-examination .
Nonetheless, Appellant argues that she was prejudiced by the Commonwealth's
tardiness . According to Appellant, the delay prevented defense counsel from
interviewing other persons present at the family gathering who might have been able to
contradict Okay's observations . This Court has previously explained that a defendant is
prejudiced by a violation of RCr 7.26(1) if "as a result of the error, he was denied
access to information which, had he possessed it, would have enabled him to contradict
or impeach the witness or establish some other fact which might reasonably have
altered the verdict." Hicks v. Commonwealth , 805 S.W.2d 144, 149 (Ky. 1990) . Here,
defense counsel never moved the court for a continuance, which would have afforded
time for the further investigation which Appellant now argues was needed .
Furthermore, once Okay's statement was provided to the defense, counsel still had
thirteen days to prepare for cross-examination before Okay took the stand . For these
reasons, we cannot conclude that the Commonwealth's tardiness denied defense
counsel an opportunity to further investigate Okay's statement and, therefore, Appellant
was not prejudiced .
The trial court's decision to admit Okay's testimony was based on a careful
consideration of the underlying reason for the violation of the "forty-eight hour rule."
Because the Commonwealth provided a legitimate explanation, we find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court's conclusion that good cause was established . Furthermore,
there is no indication that Appellant's substantial rights were prejudiced . There was no
error.
Admission of 911 Calls
Appellant next argues that the trial court erroneously admitted tapes of Mauk's
calls to 911, which she placed immediately after Mr. Gabow was shot . Defense counsel
objected, on the grounds that the recording was irrelevant, overly prejudicial, and
cumulative of other evidence. The trial court reviewed the tapes outside the presence
of the jury and concluded that they were admissible pursuant to the excited utterance
exception of the hearsay rule found at KRE 803(2). Upon review of the record, we find
no error.
The tape contained the phone call that Mauk made to 911 shortly after Mr.
Gabow was shot . During the recording, a hysterical Mauk explains to the operator that
Mr. Gabow was shot and bleeding profusely . She describes the noise that she heard
and her discovery of the bullet hole in the window. Mauk also explains the nature and
extent of Mr. Gabow's injuries to the operator, noting that he was immediately
unconscious . Because Mauk remained on the line until police arrived, the recording
also established the time frame between the shooting and the point at which
emergency services arrived .
Determinations as to the admissibility of taped recordings lie within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Johnson v. Commonwealth , 90 S .W .3d 39, 45 (Ky. 2002) .
Otherwise relevant evidence may be excluded if the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice . KRE 403 . "The outcome of
a KRE 403 balancing test is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and that
decision will only be overturned if there has been an abuse of discretion, i.e., if the trial
judge's ruling was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles." Cook v. Commonwealth, 129 S.W.3d 351, 361-62 (Ky. 2004) .
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to admit the recording .
The 911 recording was clearly relevant : it established the sequence of events on the
evening Mr. Gabow was shot and contained a description of Mr. Gabow's injuries and
the crime scene . Appellant's argument that the recording lacked relevancy because
Ms. Mauk was present at trial to testify to the same facts lacks merit. Though Ms. Mauk
testified as to much of the information contained on the recording, the recording
provided a contemporaneous and more detailed description of a crime that occurred ten
years earlier. See Pollini v. Commonwealth , 172 S .W .3d 418, 423-24 (Ky. 2005)
(where recorded 911 call was properly admitted though caller also appeared as a
witness at trial, as the recording "functioned to put the sequence of events into context
for the jury") .
We likewise reject Appellant's assertion that the probative value of the recording
was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial value. As explained above, the
recording held significant probative value and cannot be considered unduly prejudicial
simply because Ms . Mauk was distressed and crying during the phone call. It is well
settled that the Commonwealth has the prerogative to prove its case by competent,
relevant evidence of its choosing . Johnson v. Commonwealth , 105 S .W.- 3d 430, 439
(Ky. 2003) (quoting Barnett v. Commonwealth , 979 S .W.2d 98,103 (Ky.1998)) .
Though emotional, this recording provided relevant information concerning the
circumstances of the crime and its immediate aftermath . See Edmonds v.
Commonwealth , 906 S.W.2d 343, 346-47 (Ky. 1995) .
Testimony of David Brangers
According to Appellant, the trial court erroneously admitted evidence that she
had previously solicited Allen Humphries to kill Mr. Gabow. At trial, the Commonwealth
sought to elicit testimony from David Brangers that Appellant had approached
Humphries about killing Mr. Gabow before ultimately conspiring with McMillen and
Cecil . The trial court, however, sustained defense counsel's objection to this proposed
testimony, concluding that the Commonwealth had not provided sufficient notice of
testimony of any prior conspiracy. Nonetheless, because the Commonwealth argued
that the statements were admissible as statements by a co-conspirator in furtherance of
the conspiracy, the trial court allowed limited further examination by the Commonwealth
to establish Brangers as a co-conspirator. In an attempt to elicit this admission from
Brangers, the Commonwealth three times asked why he and Appellant went to
Humphries' home about a year before Mr. Gabow's murder. Only moments into this
further questioning, however, Brangers expressly denied conspiring with Appellant . No
further reference to Humphries or any alleged prior conspiracy was permitted .
Though the trial court's ruling was ultimately favorable, Appellant nonetheless
argues that the foundational questioning regarding Humphries unduly prejudiced her
because it was conducted in the jury's presence . During this questioning, the
Commonwealth repeatedly asked Brangers why he and Appellant made the visit to
Humphries. However, Brangers was never permitted to answer this question ; defense
counsel successfully objected prior to any response . Appellant now argues that, even
absent an express response from Brangers, the jury was given enough information from
which to infer the purpose of the visit and that she was unduly prejudiced as a result.
An error is prejudicial when the substantial rights of the defendant have been
adversely affected . Abernathy v. Commonwealth , 439 S .W.2d 949, 952 (Ky . 1969).
Here, Brangers was never permitted to expressly state Appellant's purpose in visiting
Humphries. Furthermore, the reference to Humphries was brief and isolated, and the
jury was given no additional explanation of Humphries' identity or relationship with
Appellant. Though a juror might have made an inference from this line of questioning, it
is simply too speculative to conclude that the reference to Humphries, absent further
details, necessarily informed the jury that Appellant had previously attempted to solicit
him to kill Mr. Gabow. "No conclusion of prejudice . . . can be supported by mere
speculation ." Kinser v. Commonwealth , 741 S .W .2d 648, 653 (Ky. 1987), habeas
granted sub nom. on other grounds . Vincent v. Parke. 942 F.2d 989 (6th Cir.1991) .
Motion for Mistrial
Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it denied her motion for a mistrial.
She argues that the Commonwealth improperly withheld an investigative report until
trial, frustrating any effective cross-examination of the report's preparer and causing her
substantial prejudice . Upon review of the record, we find no error.
The "report" at issue is actually a document prepared by Dennis Spaulding, an
investigator for the Attorney General. Prior to Spaulding's testimony, McMillen testified
about a conversation between the Commonwealth's Attorney and him concerning a
possible deal in exchange for his testimony : apparently, McMillen wanted assurances
that he would be transferred to a different prison facility after providing his statement.
Spaulding, who was present at this meeting, was called to rebut certain portions of
McMillen's testimony concerning that conversation . On cross-examination, Spaulding
acknowledged that he had referred to his notes from the meeting prior to testifying.
Defense counsel approached the bench and informed the court that no report or
document had been furnished . Notably, the Commonwealth's Attorney stated that he
was also unaware that Spaulding had documented the conversation . At this point,
Spaulding produced the document and defense counsel continued cross-examination .
The trial court also informed the jury that both defense counsel and the
Commonwealth's Attorney were previously unaware of this report. Following
Spaulding's testimony, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which was denied.
There are two applicable procedural rules that prevent us from finding any error
in the trial court's denial of a mistrial . First, RCr 7 .26(1) requires the production of
documents relating to the subject matter of the witness's testimony provided that the
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document (a) has been signed or initialed by the witness or (b) is or purports to be a
substantially verbatim statement made by the witness. The record indicates that
Spaulding's report was neither a "substantially verbatim statement" of the witness nor
was it signed or initialed by McMillen or Spaulding . Thus, the document was not a
discoverable statement within the meaning of RCr 7.26. See Hillard v. Commonwealth ,
158 S.W .3d 758, 766 (Ky. 2005).
Moreover, RCr 7 .24(2) specifically excludes this type of document from
discovery :
This provision authorizes pretrial discovery and inspection of
official police reports, but not of memoranda, or other
documents made by police officers and agents of the
Commonwealth in connection with the investigation or
prosecution of the case, or of statements made to them by
witnesses or by prospective witnesses (other than the
defendant) .
The document with which Spaulding refreshed his memory is clearly a memorialization
of his mental impressions of the meeting with McMillen ; it is not an official police report.
In Cavender v. Miller, 984 S .W.2d 848, 849 (Ky. 1998), this Court explained that RCr
7 .24 specifically exempts the notes of an investigating police officer from production .
See also Hillard, 158 S .W .3d at 766 .
The trial court has broad discretion in determining when a mistrial is necessary .
Gosser v. Commonwealth, 31 S .W.3d 897, 906 (Ky. 2000). A defendant's motion for a
mistrial should only be granted where there is a "manifest necessity for such an action
or an urgent or real necessity ." Id. citing Skaggs v. Commonwealth , 694 S .W.2d 672,
678 (Ky.1985). Here, no discovery rules were violated involving Spaulding's report.
Moreover, we find no indication that Appellant was otherwise prejudiced by Spaulding's
testimony so as to warrant a mistrial . Defense counsel requested and was given the
document, which he reviewed before choosing to continue with cross-examination .
Further, the jury was informed that defense counsel had not received the report, which
prevented any possible confusion about the issue or an inference that defense counsel
was ill-prepared . The motion for a mistrial was appropriately denied .
Rebuttal Testimony of Teresa Mauk
In her final allegation of error, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing Mauk's rebuttal testimony . During direct examination, Appellant
testified extensively about her motivation to kill Mr. Gabow. A primary reason given was
that Mr. Gabow did not visit with his children enough . At a bench conference, the
Commonwealth explained that it would call Mauk to rebut this portion of Appellant's
testimony. Moreover, the Commonwealth sought Mauk's testimony that, on the Friday
evening that Mr. Gabow was killed, the children were supposed to have been visiting
their father, but that Appellant had altered this arrangement days before the murder.
While defense counsel agreed that Mauk could testify as to visitation generally, he
objected to testimony about a planned visit on the night Mr. Gabow was murdered. The
trial court overruled the objection, concluding that Appellant's testimony about visitation
had opened the door for rebuttal.
On the stand, Mauk stated that Mr. Gabow had adhered to the visitation
agreement and was a very involved father. She then stated that the children were
supposed to have visited on the night that Mr. Gabow was murdered, but that Appellant
said that they would instead come over the following morning . Mauk then immediately
clarified that she was not present when Appellant made this statement . Defense
counsel objected to the testimony as hearsay; the trial court sustained the objection and
admonished the jury. However, the trial court did permit Mauk to provide a non-hearsay
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version of the statement: that the children were supposed to visit that evening, but that
the visit never occurred . Appellant now argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in permitting Mauk's rebuttal testimony .
Without specifically determining whether any error occurred, we can nonetheless
conclude that any supposed error was harmless. During cross-examination of Mauk,
prior to her rebuttal testimony, defense counsel asked her whether visitation normally
occurred from Friday night to Sunday night, which Mauk confirmed . Defense counsel
then asked if this arrangement ever changed, and whether the children ever came on
Saturday morning instead of Friday night. Mauk replied that it was rare for the children
to come on Saturday morning, but that it sometimes happened. Referring to the
weekend that Mr. Gabow was killed, Mauk then elaborated, "I know it happened that
weekend but I can't recall specifically any other weekend that occurred ." Thus, prior to
her rebuttal testimony, defense counsel had already elicited Mauk's testimony that the
visitation arrangement had been altered on the evening of the murder.
An error in the admission or exclusion of evidence is harmless when there is no
reasonable possibility, absent the error, that the verdict would have been different .
Hodge v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 824, 849 (Ky. 2000). Because the jury had
already heard the substance of Mauk's rebuttal testimony during cross-examination,
there is little possibility that the jury was prejudiced by Mauk's subsequent statement.
Reversal is not required .
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court is affirmed .
All concur .
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Emily Holt Rhorer
Department for Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Room 118, Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
James C . Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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