KEVIN MICHAEL RAIFORD V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED," PURSUANT TO THE RUES OF
CIVIC PROCEDURE FROMULGATED. BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYINANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : AUGUST 24, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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KEVIN MICHAEL RAIFORD
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES D. ISHMAEL, JR., JUDGE
04-CR-1059
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
A Fayette Circuit Court jury convicted Kevin Michael Raiford of first-degree
robbery, receiving stolen property over $300, and being a persistent felony offender in
the first-degree . In accordance with the jury's recommendation, the trial court
sentenced Raiford to 35 years in prison . Thus, he appeals to this Court as a matter of
right. The single issue on appeal is: did the trial court err in denying Raiford's motion
for a new trial after the complaining witness on the robbery charge notified the
Commonwealth's Attorney after the trial but before final sentencing that he recognized
one of the jurors as a customer of his gas station . Because we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that Raiford did not meet his burden of
proof on the issue of undisclosed juror bias, we affirm.
Because this appeal is limited to one issue, our focus will be on the facts related
to that issue and not on the facts underlying the conviction . We will not recount those
1
facts other than to state that Raiford was convicted of robbing Andy Aullman on July 17,
2004, while Aullman was working at the Marathon Gas Station located at 1100 South
Broadway in Lexington, Kentucky. Consequently, Andy Aullman's trial testimony was
crucial to Raiford's conviction.
1. Facts Related to the Issue of the Relationship between the Juror and the
Complaining Witness and the Voir Dire Proceedings
For the time period of around July 2003 to August 2004, the juror, Donna
Holland (juror number 746), had been a customer of the gas station that Andy Aullman
owned and where he also worked. Of further coincidence, on December 15, 2004, just
before Aullman testified at Raiford's trial, he took several bad checks written to his
station to the office of the Commonwealth's Attorney for prosecution . Holland had
written two of those checks totaling $600 .
During the voir dire before impaneling the 12-member jury, the Commonwealth's
Attorney informed prospective jurors of the witnesses whom she would call . The
purpose of reading the names of the witnesses was to determine if anyone knew any of
the witnesses, and, if so, to allow the attorneys and the court to explore the nature of
the relationship and ascertain any biases. The Commonwealth's Attorney stated that
she would call Andy Aullman who owns the Marathon Gas Station on South Broadway .
After the Commonwealth's Attorney read her witness list, the trial court followed
up and asked if any members on the panel recognized any of those names as persons
with whom he or she might have had an association or dealings in the past . Donna
Holland, who eventually became a juror, did not respond that she knew Andy Aullman.
Nor did she respond when the trial court asked if anyone recognized the Marathon Gas
Station on South Broadway, where the robbery occurred .
After the trial, but before final sentencing, the office of the Commonwealth's
Attorney served Donna Holland with notice of the check charges. In response to the
notification, Holland contacted Aullman on December 18, 2004. She told him that she
had filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and she believed that he had been listed as a creditor
and that the checks had been taken care of. She asked him if she could make
payments to him, but he told her that he wanted to proceed with the prosecution .
11. Raiford's Motion for a New Trial
Four days after speaking with Holland, Aullman contacted the Commonwealth's
Attorney who had prosecuted Raiford's case to notify her of his contact with Holland . In
turn, the Commonwealth's Attorney notified Raiford's attorney and the trial court.
Raiford's attorney made a motion for a new trial on the ground of undisclosed juror bias.
The trial court heard Raiford's motion on February 7, 2005, and conducted an
evidentiary hearing. During the evidentiary hearing, Raiford called Aullman and Holland
to testify.
111. Aullman's and Holland's Testimony at the Evidentiary Hearing
Aullman testified that he recognized Holland when he was testifying in Raiford's
trial . He recognized her as a customer of the Marathon station . Aullman cashed her
payroll and personal checks every couple of weeks, for which he would charge a fee of
two percent. Sometimes, she would ask him to hold her personal checks for a couple
of days before he deposited them, and he would do as she asked.
Aullman and Holland never engaged in more than a typical cashier-customer
conversation . Aullman did not call her by name, and he could not recall if she called
him by name . The last time she had been in the station was about six months ago,
which was July or August of 2004. At that time, he cashed two of Holland's personal
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checks, which were each in the amount of $300. Aullman later discovered that both
checks were bad .
Holland recognized Aullman by sight when he testified at Raiford's trial. She did
not, however, recognize his name when asked during voir dire as she only knew
Aullman by the nickname that she heard her co-workers use, which was "Scrap ." Nor .
did she recognize the address of the Marathon station because there were several
Marathon stations on South Broadway, and no one provided the cross-street, which
would have triggered her memory.
Once she recognized Aullman at trial, Holland did not believe she needed to alert
the court because she reflected back on the voir dire proceedings and the follow-up
questions asked of a member of the panel after responding that he or she knew a
witness. The follow-up questions typically related to whether the juror believed that he
or she could be fair and impartial in light of knowing a witness. Because Holland
believed that she could still be fair and impartial, she did not alert the trial court that she
knew Aullman .
At the time of Raiford's trial, Holland was not aware that the checks she cashed
at the Marathon station were outstanding and that she owed money to Marathon. She
only thought something about her circumstances with Aullman after the
Commonwealth's Attorney's office served her with notice of the check prosecution .
IV. Trial Court's Ruling on the Motion for a New Trial
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court held that Raiford had
not met his burden of proving that Holland had willfully concealed anything in voir dire.
In so holding, the trial court made two factual findings on the video record that we find
important to our review: (1) that Holland did not recognize Aullman's name or the
particular Marathon station when read during voir dire; and (2) that Holland did not do
anything to conceal any bias against Raiford on the basis of her relationship with
Aullman .
V. Our Standard of Review
In deciding whether the trial court erred in denying a motion for a new trial, three
standards of review are applicable . First, a trial court is vested with broad discretion
when deciding the motion . See Whelan v. Memory-Swift Homes, Inc . , 315 S .W .2d 593,
594 (Ky. 1958). Second, as a reviewing court, this Court will not reverse the trial court's
decision unless we conclude that the trial court has abused its discretion . See id .
Third, when an issue warrants factual findings by the trial court in support of its
decision, this Court will not disturb those factual findings unless we conclude that they
are clearly erroneous . See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S .W.2d
409, 414 (Ky. 1998).
VI. Undisclosed Juror Bias
Guided by the appropriate standards, we turn to the law pertaining to
undisclosed juror bias. A person charged with a crime has a constitutional right to a
trial by a "fair and impartial jury composed of members who are disinterested and free
from bias and prejudice, actual or implied or reasonably inferred." See Tayloe v.
Commonwealth, 335 S .W.2d 556, 558 (Ky. 1960). When a person challenges the
fairness of the trial on the basis that he or she did not have an impartial jury, the United
States Supreme Court has a held that a person must demonstrate both of the following
before he or she is entitled to a new trial : (1) that a juror failed to answer honestly a
material question on voir dire; and (2) that a correct response would have provided a
valid basis for a challenge for cause. See McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v.
Greenwood 464 U .S. 548, 556, 104 S. Ct. 845, 850, 78 L. Ed . 2d 663 (1984) (test cited
with approval by this Court in Adkins v. Commonwealth , 96 S.W.3d 779, 796 (Ky.
2003)).
In this case, the trial court concluded after hearing Raiford's proof that Raiford
did not demonstrate the first element -- that Holland failed to answer honestly a material
question on voir dire. We will not disturb the trial court's findings in support of this
conclusion as they are supported by Holland's testimony and not contradicted by any
other evidence . Raiford demonstrated that Holland was mistaken, not dishonest.
See
McDonough, 464 U .S . at 555 (reasoning that invalidation of the result of a three-week
trial because of a juror's mistaken, though honest response to a question, would be "to
insist on something closer to perfection than our judicial system can be expected to
give").
Raiford argues that the trial court should have presumed juror bias on the part of
Holland as a matter of law because she deliberately concealed her prior knowledge of
and relationship with Andy Aullman during the trial . In supporting this contention,
Raiford relies on the fact that Holland admitted that she recognized Aullman -- not by
name, but by appearance -- after he began testifying in the trial. Raiford contends that
Holland should have informed the trial court that she knew Aullman once she
recognized him .
While Raiford's argument is persuasive to those of us in the legal community, we
do not believe that all citizens summoned to serve on a jury would know what to do in
Holland's circumstances . In deciding the merits, we return to one of the trial court's key
factual findings in this case -- that Holland did not do anything to conceal any bias
against Raiford on the basis of her relationship with Aullman .
Even if Holland became aware at a later point in the trial that she knew Aullman
and had cashed checks at his Marathon station, the trial court concluded that her failure
to advise the court of such a relationship was not done in an effort to conceal any bias.
This is a matter left to the trial court's sound discretion . Having reviewed the entirety of
the evidentiary hearing and having observed the careful balancing that the trial court
undertook in reaching its decision, we do not agree with Raiford that the trial court
abused its discretion in this case.
Before we conclude our opinion, we must address the Commonwealth's motion
to strike Raiford's reply brief on the basis that it does not comply with the substantial
requirements of CR 76.12(4)(c). In its motion, the Commonwealth takes issue with
Raiford's accusation in his reply brief that the Commonwealth's counterstatement of the
case (in its brief) contained pure speculation and supposition when discussing Holland's
reasons for not alerting the trial court once she recognized Aullman .
We deny the motion to strike . As stated above, this Court reviewed the
evidentiary hearing on Raiford's motion in its entirety. Having done so, we were able to
separate Raiford's impassioned arguments from the facts and procedural history and
allow Raiford some latitude in his reply brief.
We affirm the trial court's denial of Raiford's motion for a new trial and judgment
of conviction .
All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Shelly R. Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Department for Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Ky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Kristin N. Logan
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Ky 40601
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