MITCHELL WILLOUGHBY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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MITCHELL WILLOUGHBY
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D . PAYNE, JUDGE
1983-CR-152-2
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from orders which denied post-conviction motions pursuant to CR
59 .05 and RCr 11 .42. Willoughby was found guilty by a jury of three counts of murder
in 1984 and sentenced to death for two of the murders and life in prison for the third
murder.
The questions now presented are: 1) whether effective assistance of counsel
was provided regarding the testimony of Dr . Schwartz and the preparation of and
investigation of the mitigation phase of the case; and 2) whether it was error not to
consider the cumulative impact of alleged ineffectiveness, to decline to provide funding
for post-conviction relief, or not to conduct an evidentiary hearing on additional
mitigation witnesses in regard to the CR 59.05 motion.
Willoughby was indicted in 1983, along with two codefendants, for the three
murders . Codefendant Hutchins entered a plea of guilty to two counts of hindering
prosecution and testified against Willoughby and the other codefendant Halvorsen.
The underlying offenses were summarized by this Court in Willoughby v.
Commonwealth , 730 S .W.2d 921 (Ky. 1986). The bodies of two men and a woman
were found in the Kentucky River. Each victim had been shot to death . Two of the
victims were found on the side of the bridge, each bound with a blue and yellow rope
that was attached to a heavy rock. The third victim was found in the river below the
bridge wrapped in a sheet that was also bound in a blue and yellow rope attached to a
heavy rock . Willoughby testified at trial and took all of the responsibility for the
shootings . On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the jury verdict.
This case is before this Court in regard to the effectiveness of trial counsel, a
1972 law school graduate who was employed at the Fayette County Legal Aid as a
public defender. Specifically, Willoughby appeals from the orders of the circuit judge
overruling post-conviction motions.
Defense counsel filed motions for a new trial and judgment notwithstanding the
verdict that were overruled. A presentence investigation report was filed and final
judgment and the sentence of death were entered on September 15, 1983. The
conviction was affirmed by this Court in Willoughbv , supra. Certiorari was denied by the
United States Supreme Court in Willoughbv v. Kentucky , 484 U.S .' 982, 108 S .Ct. 496,
98 L . Ed .2d 495 (1987).
In 1988, Willoughby filed a motion pursuant to RCr 11 .42 on the basis of
ineffective assistance of counsel and other allegations. Following those events,
pleadings and an original action were then filed which delayed the case ; specifically
relating to the disqualification of a judge and the entire Fayette Commonwealth
Attorney's Office, as well as the substitution of Department of Public Advocacy
personnel with private counsel for Willoughby and Halvorsen .
Willoughby was represented by the DPA for five years when private counsel
assumed responsibility for the case in 1993. During the following years, the
proceedings were delayed, largely over the attempt to get funds for an expert and
investigative services . In 1997, the trial judge issued an order for an evidentiary hearing
to be held in 1998 . At that time, the original defense trial counsel testified regarding his
experience, workload, preparation and strategy for the trial. He frequently answered
that he did not have a sufficient recollection of the circumstances to answer questions
propounded by both sides in view of the 15-year gap between trial and the evidentiary
hearing . This was due in part because his file had been dissected and pieced apart for
the direct appeal and a trial on charges in another county.
Other witnesses at the evidentiary hearing were Steven Bright, an attorney, and
law professor and director of the Southern Center for Human Rights, who among other
things acknowledged that the ABA guidelines that he cited during his testimony were
adopted in 1989, six years after the trial of this case . Other witnesses were the parents
of Willoughby and Dr. Peter Schilling, a forensic psychologist who testified that he
believed that Willoughby suffered from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and was
probably suffering from this affliction at the time of the crime, as well as substance
abuse disorder. Dr. Schilling did admit that his intelligence testing indicated that
Willoughby had an I.Q. of 91 . Post-hearing briefs were filed in the RCr 11.42 action in
1998. Thereafter the case sat dormant for four years . In 2003, counsel for Willoughby
filed a supplemental brief. In November of that year, the circuit judge entered an order
denying the RCr 11 .42 motion. In 2005, a trial judge denied a CR 59.05 motion . This
appeal followed .
I . Standard of Review
Haight v. Commonwealth , 41 S.W .3d 436 (Ky. 2001), states the standard for RCr
11 .42 motions . In such proceedings, the movant has the burden to establish
convincingly that he was deprived of some substantial right which would justify the
extraordinary relief given by post-conviction proceedings . The post-conviction relief
afforded by this rule is not a substitute for appeal and it does not permit review of
alleged trial errors which fall short of a denial of due process. See Smith v.
Commonwealth , 412 S.W .2d 256 (Ky. 1967) and Dorton v. Commonwealth , 433
S .W.2d 117 (Ky. 1968).
The federal standard for such review is found in Strickland v. Washington , 466
U .S. 668, 104 S .Ct. 2052, 90 L .Ed .2d 674 (1984), which establishes a two-prong test
for determining ineffective assistance of counsel . A petitioner must show both
incompetence and prejudice : 1) he must show that the representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and 2) that there is a reasonable probability that
because of the unprofessional conduct, the . result of the proceedings would have been
different . Accord Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L .Ed . 2d 389
(2000). See also United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1992) . A defendant is
not guaranteed error-free counsel or counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but
counsel likely to render and who does render reasonably effective assistance. Beasley
v. United States, 491 F .2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974); McQueen v. Commonwealth , 949
S .W.2d 70 (Ky. 1997).
.
When considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellate
court must review the matter on the totality of the evidence before the trial judge or jury.
We must assess the overall performance of defense counsel throughout the case in
order to determine whether the identified omissions overcome the presumption that
defense counsel rendered reasonably effective professional assistance . See
Kimmelman v. Morrison , 477 U .S. 365, 106 S .Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed . 302 (1986).
Essentially, appellant must identify specific errors and demonstrate that they were
objectively unreasonable under the circumstances at the time of the trial, rebut the very
strong presumption that the actions were taken as a result of trial strategy, and
demonstrate that the errors prejudiced the right to a fair trial and that there is a
reasonable probability of a different verdict, but for the errors. See generally ,
Strickland, supra ; Martin v. Mitchell, 280 F.3d 594 (6 th Cir. 2002) ; and Taylor v.
Commonwealth , 63 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2002).
Certainly, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
reasonable competence, but not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight .
Yarbrough v. Gentry, 540 U .S. 1, 124 S.Ct. 1, 157 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003). The purpose of
the Sixth Amendment is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial .
Willoughby has failed to meet the standards required to prove ineffective assistance of
defense counsel in each of the claims he raises here.
11 . Testimony of Dr. Schwartz
Willoughby argues that his counsel was ineffective because he called Dr.
Charles Schwartz to testify during the guilt phase of the trial. Among the reasons he
presents is that his counsel was a victim of burnout because of overwhelming caseload .
The circuit judge decided against such a theory noting that, among other things, the
testimony from defense counsel indicated that he had adequate time to prepare for the
case. An examination of the record indicates that the caseload was lightened when he
was assigned this case; that he had every afternoon available to work on the case; that
he had exclusive use of an investigator; and that he went to the DPA offices to discuss
the case and review their materials .
The allegations of the overload of cases must be considered in the context of the
1983 trial . Trial counsel indicated that it was much tougher to get experts in 1983 as
compared to 1998. He was able to hire Dr. Robert Granacher who was a well known
forensic psychiatrist frequently referred to as the "best in the field" with specific
"expertise" in drug problems. Dr. Granacher had a reputation for being a good defense
witness . Unfortunately for Willoughby, the testing done by Dr. Granacher did not yield
favorable results . He was not called to testify, largely because he confirmed the
conclusion of Dr. Schwartz that Willoughby suffered from antisocial personality disorder
and that he could conform his conduct to the law on the day of the shootings . In
addition, Dr. Granacher found no mental illness or biological condition that could be
used as a defense.
It was not unreasonable for trial defense counsel to call Schwartz as a witness.
No prejudice arose from the testimony on cross-examination regarding the personality
disorder. The personality evidence was cumulative because Willoughby himself
testified that he was discharged from the Navy because of "unsuitability, personality
disorder." A second psychiatrist, Dr. Atcher, testified in the mitigation phase of the trial.
He was cross-examined by the Commonwealth and also gave clinical information
regarding the anti-social personality disorder.
At trial, Dr. Schwartz provided favorable testimony . The testimony of Dr.
Schwartz regarding intoxication at the time of the arrest complimented testimony from
Willoughby, law enforcement and jail personnel . Trial counsel admitted that the
testimony of Dr . Schwarz regarding intoxication was not as strong as he had hoped as
compared to the pretrial interview .
The contention that trial counsel overlooked the diagnosis of Dr. Schwartz
regarding personality disorder is without merit. There is no doubt that counsel realized
that his client had personality problems . Moreover, Willoughby's mother also testified
that she gave defense counsel the Navy discharge paperwork which reflected some
personality disorders .
The mere fact that the Schwartz testimony was not as helpful as counsel may
have hoped is not the basis for relief. Based on his analysis of the interview, trial
counsel determined that Schwartz would give valuable testimony. Such a decision was
reasonable and is particularly understandable insofar as the pretrial interview was more
favorable than the testimony at trial .
Any complaint that defense counsel should be found ineffective simply because
a witness does not ultimately testify as favorably as when that witness was interviewed
prior to trial is not required by Strickland . Here, counsel reasonably investigated the
entire matter and made a strategic choice to call the witness . He was not ineffective .
Defense counsel made a reasonable investigation and a strategically correct
selection to call Dr. Schwartz in regard to the intoxication defense theory and mitigator
in this case . It is not ineffective assistance simply because some of the testimony
contains unfavorable information . See Bunch v. Thompson , 949 F.2d 1354 (4th Cir.
1991).
Ill . Preparation and Investigation/Mitigation Phase
Willoughby now contends that his defense counsel inadequately prepared and
investigated the mitigation phase of the case. He alleges that defense counsel did not
begin preparing for mitigation until conviction and that he did not investigate the
defendant's life history.
Willoughby asserts that his attorney inadequately investigated and prepared the
mitigation case. His complaint is based almost entirely on part of an answer from the
ineffectiveness hearing. He argues that trial counsel testified that he did not begin to
prepare for mitigation of penalty in Willoughby's trial until after the jury convicted . This
statement was taken out of context in argument and ignores other parts of the
testimony by trial counsel . The record clearly demonstrates that this contention is
without merit . Defense trial counsel's statement was in effect that he placed as much
mitigation evidence as possible into the guilt phase. As noted in Harper v.
Commonwealth , 978 S.W .2d 311 (Ky. 1998), when a jury sits in both phases of a
capital murder trial, all evidence introduced in the guilt phase may be considered by the
jury during the penalty phase. Trial counsel observed that his goal in the case was first
to get a sentence less than death. In his four previous capital cases, this strategy had
been successful . In 1983, it was a common practice to introduce mitigation evidence in
this manner. It should be obvious that trial counsel did not wait until the penalty phase
to prepare for the mitigation of the penalty . There is no basis for an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim .
Evidence was presented in both the penalty and mitigation phases in regard to
intoxication, self-defense, emotional disturbance, mental state/depression, youth,
remorse, good family and lack of sleep. A careful examination of the record indicates
that the defense counsel at trial put forth one of the best possible mitigation cases that
was available to him .
Willoughby also maintains that additional mitigation evidence should have been
presented . The majority of the alleged additional evidence is from interview summaries
attached to the CR 59 .05 motion after the denial of the RCr 11 .42 motion . As such, the
motion did not present a proper basis for a grant of relief pursuant to CR 59.05. See
Gullion v. Gullion, 163 S .W.3d 888 (Ky. 2005). The witness summaries were
comprised essentially of communications to DPA counsel, all without the benefit of
cross-examination or any analysis as to the potential unfavorable testimony within the
summaries. These summaries were not presented at the RCr 11 .42 hearing and do not
indicate any misdeed by defense trial counsel in not presenting these witnesses. See
Tinsley v. Million , 399 F.3d 796 (6 th Cir. 2005). The so-called life history documents
were also simply attached to the CR 59.05 motion and never presented at the RCr
11 .42 hearing .
We must conclude the trial counsel was not ineffective in presenting mitigating
evidence. Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of
mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at
sentencing . Nor does Strickland require defense counsel to present mitigating
evidence at sentencing in every case. Wiggins v. Smith , 539 U .S . 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527,
156 L.Ed .2d 471 (2003).
A reasonable investigation is not one that the best defense lawyer blessed with
not only unlimited time and resources, but also the inestimable benefit of hindsight
would conduct. See Baze v. Commonwealth , 23 S.W .3d 619 (Ky. 2000). In any event,
decisions relating to witness selection are normally left to the judgment of counsel and
will not be second-guessed by hindsight. See Foley v. Commonwealth , 17 S.W.3d 878
(Ky. 2000); Morrow, 977 F.2d at 222 The true test is whether the performance by
defense counsel is so deficient that it renders the result unreliable . See Darden v.
Wainwright , 477 U.S . 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L .Ed .2d 144 (1986).
Here, the evidence claimed by Willoughby as additional mitigation was
cumulative to the central mitigation issues . Presentation of a social life history would
have created not only duplicitous and cumulative evidence. Defense trial counsel was
not deficient in his performance and was not ineffective in the investigation and
presentation of mitigation evidence .
IV. Presentation of Expert Testimony
Willoughby complains that his trial counsel was ineffective in presenting expert
testimony particularly by the failure to provide life history records to Dr. Granacher .
Four psychological evaluations were performed on Willoughby. The claim is that
deficient performance was obvious and that Willoughby was prejudiced because the
jury never heard any of the mitigating evidence that could have been adduced in a
competency report, such as the one rendered by Dr. Peter Schilling . The argument
also relies on a summary of the testimony given by Stephen Bright, a lawyer and law
professor .
The Bright testimony regarding the reasonableness of defense counsel was
offered generally . He never specified that the gathering of records to supply experts
was a standard at the time of this trial . Actually, he acknowledged during his testimony
that the ABA Guidelines he was using for his opinions were adopted in 1989, six years
after Willoughby's trial . The effectiveness of defense counsel is considered based on
the professional requirements in existence at the time of the trial. The fact that experts
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were found who would testify favorably as long as twenty years later in some cases, is
irrelevant . Horsely v. Alabama, 45 F.3d 1486 (11 th Cir. 1995). Defense counsel does
not perform unreasonably merely by not ruling out every possible psychological
mitigator through specialized evaluations . Carter v. Mitchell, 443 F.3d 517 (6th Cir.
2006). Here, the conclusion by Dr. Schilling involved an objective diagnosis model that
was 14 years from existence at the time of the trial . This case is clearly distinguishable
from Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1998). In the Bean case, the penalty
phase was described as cursory and disorganized . In that case, counsel also ignored
recommendations by two mental health professionals that had examined the accused in
the early stages of the case and strongly recommended further testing to evaluate the
organic brain damage suffered by Bean .
None of the records were introduced at the RCr 11 .42 hearing . The only
evidence of their contents was based on statements made by defense counsel when
questioning Bright and Dr. Schilling . Such records were available prior to the RCr 11 .42
hearing and their contents should not be considered at this time .
Under all the circumstances, the insufficient testimony of Bright, as well as the
failure to introduce any of the records, is not a proper ground to demonstrate that
defense trial counsel was ineffective or deficient or that the outcome of the trial was in
any way prejudiced .
V. Cumulative Impact
Willoughby argued before the circuit court about the interdependence of the
three prior claims of ineffectiveness as they relate to the verdict in the penalty phase.
He states that trial counsel's effectiveness should be considered as a whole. We
certainly agree.
However, as previously stated in this opinion, the defense trial lawyer
was not ineffective. As noted in Sanborn v. Commonwealth , 975 S .W.2d 913 (Ky.
1998), "in view of the fact that the individual allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel are unconvincing, they can have no cumulative effect ." That is the situation
here.
VI . Adequacy of Funding
Although, as the Commonwealth argues, the claim for investigative funding was
not adequately raised in the circuit court, nevertheless, we will review it at this time .
Willoughby contends that there were nine witnesses who would have testified
regarding the adequacy of funding as to the meaningful exercise of his right to postconviction relief . Among the witnesses who would or could have testified but did not do
so were his grade school teacher; a friend who would have testified that he was doing
drugs "like crazy" and was not sleeping ; a co-worker who could have testified that he
was a good worker; a cousin who would have testified that he was her favorite in her
husband's family and was a caring person; a fellow inmate from Blackburn Correctional
Complex who could have testified that there were no disciplinary problems while in
prison and that he was a good and easy going person; and two other inmates from the
Fayette County Jail who would have testified that he was in bad shape and looked like
he was going to die.
Two other individuals testified at trial but Willoughby now claims that defense
counsel did not ask the witness about Susan Hutchens and Leif Halvorsen, the
codefendants in the original murder trial who could have testified that Hutchins was a
wild person, and another witness who testified at trial that he grew up with Willoughby
and that he only met with the defense counsel briefly just before taking the stand and
did not feel that he got an opportunity to say everything that he wanted to say.
12
This Court has consistently held that in post-conviction collateral attacks, the
only purpose is to provide a forum for known grievances and not the opportunity to
search for grievances . See Stopher v. Conliffe, 170 S .W.3d 307 (Ky. 2005) ; Hodge v.
Commonwealth, 116 S .W .3d 463 (Ky. 2003); Haight v. Commonwealth , 41 S.W .3d 436
(Ky. 2001).
The requirement to provide funds to indigent defendants for necessary experts
as held in Binion v. Commonweaath , 891 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1995), has not been
extended to post-conviction matters . The complaint that the trial judge erred by not
granting funds is unconvincing .
VII . Evidentiary Hearing on Additional Mitigation Witnesses
Willoughby asserts that it was error to fail to hold an evidentiary hearing
regarding additional mitigation witnesses contained in a CR 59 .05 motion. He claims
that the inability to put on additional witnesses was directly attributable to the lack of
investigative funds . He further contends that the reason the additional evidence did not
come out at the hearing was because his then post-conviction counsel was ineffective .
Willoughby acknowledges that Murray v. Capital Giarratano , 492 U .S. 1 (1989)
and Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S . 551 (1987), direct that there is no right to effective
assistance of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding . However, Willoughby relies on
Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U .S. 722 (1991), which he says left undecided whether
effective assistance of counsel attaches to a proceeding in which constitutional claims
can, for the first time, be raised .
CR 59 .05 provides that a motion to alter, amend, or vacate a judgment, or enter
a new one, shall be served not later than ten days after the entry of final judgment . It
has been held that the new grounds for relief may not be asserted for the first time in a
13
CR 59 .05 motion in the absence of a showing of newly discovered evidence that could
not have been discovered earlier with the exercise of due diligence . See Gullion , supra ;
accord United States v. Battle , 272 F.Supp.2d 1354 (N.D. Ga . 2003), a death penalty
case rejecting an attempt under F.R .C.P 59(e) to present new evidence after a
collateral attack motion had been denied.
Here, the witness's summary of additional mitigation witnesses was part of a
large group of documents provided by Dr. Schilling in preparation of the RCr 11 .42
hearing. Applying the standards of Gullion, we find no basis for the claim of error.
Reliance on Coleman , supra, and Evitts v. Lucev, 469 U .S. 387 (1985), is
unpersuasive . This Court, as well as the United States Supreme Court has rejected the
argument in Lucev, supra , or equivocal arguments that apply to collateral attack
proceedings. Cf. Hodge, supra . As has been stated many times, a collateral attack is
not a substitute for an appeal. The principles governing direct appeals are not
applicable to such motions. Hodge , supra .
Here, Willoughby was not denied any of his federal or state constitutional rights
to effective assistance of counsel or due process. The decision of the trial judge is
affirmed .
All concur except McAnulty and Minton, JJ., who concur in result only
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
David H . Harshaw
Assistant Public Advocate
Dennis J. Burke
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
207 Parker Drive, Suite 1
LaGrange, KY 40031
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew R. Krygiel
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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