BOBBI PILE (AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THERESA ANN FOLTZ, DECEASED) V. CITY OF BRANDENBURG AND JOHN MILLER, OFFICER
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CORRECTED : MARCH 22, 2007
RENDERED : DECEMBER 21, 2006
TO BE PUBLISHED
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2005-SC-0047-DG
BOBBI PILE (AS EXECUTRIX OF THE
ESTATE OF THERESA ANN FOLTZ,
DECEASED)
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APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
2003-CA-0988-MR
MEADE CIRCUIT COURT NO. 01-CI-00212
CITY OF BRANDENBURG AND
JOHN MILLER, OFFICER
APPELLEES
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE WINTERSHEIMER
REVERSING
This appeal is from an opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming the summary
judgment of the trial court for the city and a police officer in a wrongful death action .
The questions presented are whether the controlling decision in this case is
Jones v. Lathram ; whether the Court of Appeals erred in not considering discretionary
acts as distinguished from ministerial acts; whether a special relationship is necessary
for negligence claims of this nature ; whether the officer was negligent per se; whether
the active operating, controlling and ownership of a motor vehicle is ministerial, and
whether there was a superseding cause for the injury to and death of the victim .
Theresa Ann Foltz was killed on July 12, 2000 when she drove around a curve
on Highway 1638 and was struck head-on by a motor vehicle owned by the City of
Brandenburg and assigned to Officer John Miller . The vehicle was operated at the time
of the accident by Timothy Blackwell, a handcuffed prisoner in the vehicle .
Officer Miller had been dispatched to the scene of an accident at about 9:45 p .m .
on July 12 . Off-duty Meade County Deputy Jailer Embrey witnessed the accident in
which intoxicated driver Blackwell wrecked his van and traveled backwards down an
embankment near the Embrey residence . The 39-year-old Blackwell attempted to flee
the scene by foot, but Embrey managed to apprehend him and then place him in
handcuffs before summoning police . Officer Miller, a young policeman with several
months of experience, answered the call in his city police cruiser.
When preliminary breath testing of Blackwell revealed a reading of at least .287,
Blackwell allegedly was secured in handcuffs and was placed in a 3 point restraint in the
back of the police cruiser which was separated from the front seat by a plexiglass shield.
Officer Miller was driving the cruiser and Embrey was a passenger in the front seat as
they left the Embrey residence enroute to the jail . Officer Miller stopped the police cruiser
in the highway, got out to go down the embankment to gather information regarding the
van, and left the keys in the ignition with the engine and the emergency lights on . This in
effect left the cruiser in running condition . Shortly thereafter, Embry also got out and
went to assist with traffic control on the highway . As the sole remaining occupant of the
cruiser, Blackwell somehow was able to maneuver into the front seat and proceeded to
drive the cruiser away at a high rate of speed . Within minutes, the police cruiser crossed
the center line and crashed head on into the car driven by 57-year-old Theresa Ann
Foltz. Both the still handcuffed Blackwell and Mrs . Foltz died at the scene .
The circuit judge granted the motion of the city and the officer for a summary
judgment based on the reasoning of City of Florence v. Chipman, 38 S.W.3d 387 (Ky.
2001), as to foreseeability . The circuit judge also determined that the taking of the
vehicle by Blackwell was a superseding intervening cause of the death of Mrs . Foltz,
thereby precluding recovery from the city or Officer Miller, citing Frank v. Ralston , 145
F.Supp. 294 (W.D.Ky. 1956)
Both the circuit judge and the majority of the Court of Appeals panel
acknowledged no duty on the part of either of the defendants absent any "special
relationship" as considered in the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case of Ashby v. City of Louisville ,
841 S.W .2d 184 (Ky.App. 1992). The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals held that
there is a public policy limiting the tort liability of officers. This Court accepted
discretionary review.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment procedure authorized by CR 56.01 et seq. is intended to
expedite the disposition of cases and if the grounds provided by the rule are established,
it is the responsibility of the trial judge to render an appropriate decision . The grounds
for such a judgment are: 1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and 2) the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The summary judgment
procedure is not a substitute for trial. See Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, 683 S .W.2d
255 (Ky. 1985); Steelvest Inc . v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S .W.2d 476 (Ky.
1991); James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St . Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814
S.W.2d 273 (Ky. 1991).
The circuit judge must examine the evidentiary matter, not to decide an issue of
fact, but to discover if a real or genuine issue exists. All doubts are to be resolved in
favor of the party opposing the motion . The movant should not succeed unless a right to
judgment is shown with such clarity that there is no room left for controversy and it is
established that the adverse party cannot prevail under any circumstances . Here, the
facts are not in question . Thus, we must consider the second prong of the rule as to
whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
It has long been considered that it is necessary to base a case of negligence on a
showing of a breach of duty and causative factors . In order to determine whether a duty
exists and has been breached, foreseeability of harm is an essential element . It is not
necessary to know the identity of the person endangered or the scope of such danger .
The obligation of a police officer in regard to individual citizens is not founded on
foreseeability alone but rather upon the existence of a special relationship to the person
likely to be injured . Two conditions are required . 1) The victim must have been in state
custody or otherwise restrained by the state at the time the injury producing act
occurred, and 2) the violence or other offensive conduct must have been committed by a
state actor.
Here, there is no question that Blackwell was in custody. Then our inquiry must
proceed to whether the violence was committed by what can be defined as a state actor.
Our examination focuses on the police officer and his responsibilities to third parties in
the performance of his duty . The operation of a police cruiser is ministerial in nature .
The operation of the vehicle is a daily routine responsibility, not a discretionary act and is
subject to the applicable regulations of the city police department as well as statutory
traffic regulations . Negligent operation of an emergency vehicle by a police officer who
violates existing police procedures and regulations, or appropriate statutes, is actionable
and is clearly outside of the scope of the "special relationship doctrine ." KRS 189.430,
provides in pertinent part that "no person operating or in charge of a motor vehicle shall
permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition and
removing the key . . . ." The clear purpose of the statute is to prevent the theft or
unauthorized use of the vehicle and for the protection and safety of the general public.
The victim here was a member of that protected class.
I . Jones v. Lathram
In Jones v. Lathram , 150 S.W.3d 50 (Ky. 2005), Officer Lathram was operating a
police cruiser at the time of the fatal collision . This Court determined that the officer
undertook a ministerial act in responding to an emergency call for assistance from a
fellow officer . The court stated that the act of safely driving a police cruiser, even in an
emergency, is not an act that typically requires any deliberation or exercise of judgment.
This court in a unanimous decision reversed the affirmance of a summary judgment
and held that the officer was not entitled to qualified official immunity from liability .
The act of safely controlling a police cruiser is not a discretionary act, but rather
a ministerial function . In this case, Officer Miller had control of the operation of his
police cruiser . Thus, it would be a ministerial act requiring reactive decisions based on
duty, training and overall consideration of public safety . The question of whether
Officer Miller was negligent in operating his police cruiser under all the facts and
circumstances is a matter for the jury or trier of fact. Thus, summary judgment was
inappropriate in this case. The Court of Appeals also acknowledged that Officer Miller
was obviously negligent in the performance of his duty at the time in question .
II. Discretionary versus Ministerial Acts
In Jones v. Lathram , the language of Yanero v. Davis , 65 S .W.3d 510 (2001)
provides in part that an officer or employee is afforded no immunity for tort liability for
the negligent performance of a ministerial act, i .e., one that requires only obedience to
the orders of others or whether the officer's duty is absolute, certain and imperative,
involving merely execution of specific acts arising from a fixed and designated fact.
Any local government such as the City of Brandenburg could be liable for
negligence arising out of the acts or omissions of its employees in the discharge of their
ministerial duties . See KRS 65.2003(3) . The negligent operation of an emergency
vehicle by a police officer which violates existing police procedures or regulations or
statutory traffic regulations is certainly actionable and outside the scope of the common
law doctrine of "special relationship" relied on by the City and Officer Miller.
KRS 189.430(3) states in pertinent part:
No person operating or in charge of a motor
vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended
without first stopping the engine, locking the
ignition and removing the key . . . .
The clear purpose of this statute is to prevent theft or unauthorized use of a motor
vehicle as well as for the protection and safety of the general public. Cf. OAG 79.559. If
this statute had been properly followed, the tragic accident would not have occurred . As
noted in the dissent by Judge Taylor, police officers are exempt in certain emergency
situations from the application of traffic regulations as noted in KRS 189.940 . Specific
statutes give police exemptions from certain other traffic regulations as noted in KRS
189.450(7) . However, in this case there is no statutory exception or exemption that
relieves Officer Miller from KRS 189 .430(3). The "special relationships" doctrine has no
application to the issue of whether Officer Miller may disregard applicable traffic laws
and regulations that he was obligated to obey in the performance of his duties.
The question of whether Officer Miller was negligent in the operation of his police
cruiser is reserved for the jury.
Ili . Negligence Per Se
As urged by the Foltz estate, negligence per se is merely a negligent claim with a
statutory standard of care substituted for the common law standard of care . See Real
Estate Marketing, Inc. v. Franz, 885 S .W.2d 921 (Ky. 1994) . Clearly, Officer Miller
violated the statute by leaving the vehicle without first stopping the engine or removing
the ignition key. KRS 446.070 provides that "a person injured by the violation of any
statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the
violation, although a penalty of forfeiture is imposed for such violation ."
IV. Superseding Cause
The appellees argue that even if it was determined that the officer owed a duty of
care to the deceased victim, the tortious conduct of Timothy Blackwell was a
superseding cause of the injury and death . They contend that but for the unlawful
conduct of Blackwell, the victim would not have died in this accident and that the fatal
consequences were outside of the control of Miller after Blackwell stole the police cruiser
and drove it in a reckless manner so as to crash head on . They further claim that the
question of forseeability is without merit because the officer could not contemplate that
the prisoner would steal the cruiser and kill someone . The appellees maintain that a
superseding cause is an independent force that relieves the original actor from liability.
See NKC Hospitals, Inc. v. Anthonx, 849 S .W .2d 564 (Ky.App. 1993) ; Bruck v.
Thompson , 131 S.W.3d 764 (Ky.App. 2004) . We do not agree.
Com ., Transportation Cabinet v. Babbitt , 172 S .W.3d 786 (Ky. 2005), provides an
instructive analysis of the superseding cause doctrine . Babbitt , supra, involves the
claims of three individuals denied by the Board of Claims. The case involved the
erection of guardrails, barriers and rumble strips that were intended as warnings to
motorists . It states that the rationale for the doctrine of superseding cause has been
substantially diminished by the adoption of comparative negligence, and ultimately holds
that the negligence of a motorist in driving a vehicle off the roadway was not a
superseding cause so as to prevent liability on the part of the transportation cabinet.
Quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 440 (1965), the opinion asserts that a
superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by its intervention
prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence
is a factor in bringing about. See also Donegan v. Denney , 457 S.W .2d 953 (Ky. 1970) .
Bruck, supra, is distinguishable on its facts. As noted in Anthony , supra, the
intervening act or event must be of independent origin, unassociated with the original
act. Here, the officer had an intoxicated person handcuffed in the back of his cruiser .
The officer left the cruiser with the key in the ignition and the engine running, arguing
that it was necessary to leave the vehicle so that the air conditioner would be in
operation and to power the emergency lights on the vehicle . Another guide in assessing
these situations noted in Anthony is that the intervening act or event must, itself, be
capable of bringing about the injury, and that the intervening act must not have been
reasonably foreseeable by the original actor.
It is clear that leaving the key in the vehicle was a negligent act which created the
opportunity for the prisoner to escape with the vehicle and operate it in the fashion which
caused the ultimate fatality . Bruck involved a situation where the key was left in the
ignition while the vehicle was in the driveway and determined that the statute did not
apply to a private driveway . Here, the officer backed out of the driveway and stopped to
pick up a tennis shoe belonging to the prisoner . The officer then drove further up the
road to check on the van to obtain license information . He then left the motor running
with the key in the ignition so as to allow the air conditioning to continue because the
temperature was in the mid-70's and to keep the battery from running down.
Under all the circumstances, we must conclude that the tortious conduct of
Blackwell was not an intervening or superseding cause of the fatal accident .
V . Chipman, Fryman and Ashby
The cases cited by the majority of the Court of Appeals involve different issues
and are clearly distinguishable on their facts. Reliance on the City of Florence v.
Chipman, supra, and Fryman v. Harrison , 896 S.W .2d 908 (Ky. 1995), is misplaced. All
owners, operators and persons in control of motor vehicles owe a duty to all other
persons using the roadway pursuant to KRS 304.39, the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act.
There is nothing in that Act that exonerates police officers from the duty of care not to be
negligent in the operation or control of their vehicle .
Chipman has to do with whether or not an officer should have arrested someone .
The fact that the officer has no duty to protect another person from a crime or accident is
not an issue here . The negligence of Officer Miller and the violation of the statute made
it possible for Blackwell to take the vehicle and cause it to crash . This is not a question
of whether the police should have arrested someone . The case here raises the issue of
ordinary care in violation of the statute.
Fryman , supra . relates to a criminal defendant being released from jail without a
bail bond being properly posted. The defendant was released from jail and
approximately two months later assaulted the victim. Harrison argued that the jailer and
the clerk were negligent in the completion of the bond revocation documents and that
the jailer was negligent in releasing the prisoner. Once again, in this situation, Officer
Miller violated the statutory requirement of leaving the keys in the ignition . Ashby notes
that in Kentucky personal liability for a public officer's or public employee's negligent
performance of the duty depends in part on whether the powers or duties in question
were ministerial or discretionary . We believe the responsibilities here were ministerial
rather than discretionary . Thus, we further conclude that the authorities cited do not
apply.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court is reversed . The public
duty doctrine does not provide a shield for the city or the officer from liability . The
responsibility of the officer was to remove the key from the vehicle, and the ultimate theft
of the car by the prisoner and resulting fatal accident was not an intervening or
superseding event . Summary judgment was improper because the moving party was
not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
This matter is remanded to the circuit court for trial .
Lambert, C .J ., Graves and Scott, JJ . concur. McAnulty, J., dissents by separate
opinion and is joined by Noble, J.
Minton, J ., not sitting .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Brett Butler
123 South Seventh Street
Louisville, KY 40202-2703
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES :
David Paul Bowles
LANDRUM & SHOUSE LLP
220 West Main St., Suite 1900
Louisville, KY 40202
Robert Thomas Watson
LANDRUM & SHOUSE LLP
220 West Main Street, Suite 1900
Louisville, KY 40202
RENDERED : DECEMBER 21, 2006
TO BE PUBLISHED
617uyrtmt
C~vurf of `rnfurkV
'Pt
2005-SC-0047-DG
BOBBI PILE (AS EXECUTRIX OF THE
ESTATE OF THERESA ANN FOLTZ,
DECEASED)
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
2003-CA-0988-MR
MEADE CIRCUIT COURT NO. 01-CI-00212
CITY OF BRANDENBURG AND
JOHN MILLER, OFFICER
APPELLEES
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE McANULTY
Respectfully, I dissent. I believe that the major difficulty in resolving this case
stems from the fact that the wrong party was sued. Officer Miller had placed the
prisoner in the custody of Deputy Embry, and Deputy Embry assumed control of the
prisoner . It follows that Officer Miller cannot be regarded as a cause of the accident .
Additionally, the actions of the prisoner were a superseding act which precludes liability
for the accident on the part of Officer Miller or the City.
The rule is stated that, "[a] superseding cause is an intervening independent
force; however, an intervening cause is not necessarily a superseding cause . . . . if the
resultant injury is reasonably foreseeable from the view of the original actor, then the
other factors causing to bring about the injury are not a superseding cause ." NKC
Hospitals, Inc. v. Anthony , 849 S .W .2d 564, 568 (Ky. App . 1993) . In the case at bar,
the resulting injury was not foreseeable to the original actor - that being Officer Miller .
He handcuffed his prisoner, put him in the back seat of the police vehicle with a
Plexiglas divider in place, and left him in the custody of another law enforcement officer .
It was not foreseeable to Officer Miller that the prisoner would then be left alone and
allowed to escape and cause the ensuing accident . He did not leave the prisoner
completely alone . He thus did not commit an act of negligence . Therefore, the events
which followed must surely be considered an independent chain of events which were
not foreseeable .
Further, I do not believe the majority opinion convincingly distinguishes this case
from those in which the special relationship test was applied . The special relationship
test is an additional test when the issue is whether law enforcement failed to protect by
their acts or omissions . I regard the real issue in the case at bar as whether Mrs. Foltz
was not protected by the law enforcement officials from a drunk driver. Thus, the
special relationship test must be considered for this case. Under the special
relationship test, the victim, Mrs. Foltz, was not in state custody or otherwise restrained
at the time the injury-producing act occurred . Therefore, the police officer had no
affirmative legal duty to act on behalf of Mrs . Foltz. Fryman v. Harrison , 896 S.W .2d
908, 909-10 (Ky. 1995).
I believe the trial court's decision was sound in granting summary judgment to
the City and Officer Miller. I would affirm the Court of Appeals' opinion .
Noble, J., joins this dissent .
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2005-SC-0047-DG
BOBBI PILE (AS EXECUTRIX OF THE
ESTATE OF THERESA ANN FOLTZ,
DECEASED)
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
2003-CA-0988-MR
MEADE CIRCUIT COURT NO. 01-CI-00212
CITY OF BRANDENBURG AND
JOHN MILLER, OFFICER
APPELLEES
ORDER
The Opinion of The Court rendered December 21, 2006, is corrected on
its face by substitution of the attached pages 1 and 6 in lieu of pages 1 and 6 of
the original opinion . Said correction does not affect the holding of the original
Opinion of the Court .
ENTERED : March 22, 2007
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