CLARENCE RICE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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,*Uyrtme Courf of
2004-SC-1076-MR
CLARENCE RICE
V.
i
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HON. GREGORY BARTLETT, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 04-CR-00469
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
The Appellant, Clarence Rice, was convicted of first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance (second offense) and persistent felony offender, firstdegree . He was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment and appeals to this
court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b) .
The Appellant alleges that the trial court erred (1) in denying his motion to
suppress evidence seized in a warrantless search of his automobile post-arrest,
(2) in allowing Sergeant Stevens to testify as an expert, despite the
Commonwealth's failure to give adequate notice, (3) by allowing the prosecution
to define reasonable doubt during voir dire, (4) by refusing to instruct the jury on
facilitation, (5) by overruling his motion for directed verdict on the count of firstdegree trafficking on insufficiency of the evidence, and (6) in admitting testimony
regarding a loaded pistol clip found in his glove compartment because the
prejudicial effect of such testimony vastly outweighed its probative value.
After reviewing the record, we affirm Appellant's convictions .
FACTS
On January 25, 2004, Officer Michael Taylor (Taylor) of the Elsmere
Police Department saw the Appellant, Clarence Rice, leave the Elsmere MinitMart and get into the passenger side of his 1989 red Cadillac, which at the time,
was being driven by Troy Brown . Taylor knew Rice and at the time believed
there was an outstanding warrant for him . Taylor then pulled behind Rice's
vehicle, got out and knocked on the passenger-side window of Rice's vehicle.
Rice rolled down his window and Taylor informed him he believed there was an
outstanding warrant for his arrest. Rice responded that he did not believe there
was . Taylor then called dispatch to confirm and was notified that there was an
active warrant for Rice .
He then informed Rice that the warrant was current and asked him to step
out of the vehicle. Rice rolled up his window, spoke to the driver and put his left
hand in his pocket . At this point, Taylor testified he saw the tip of a plastic baggie
in Rice's left hand which was partially in his pants pocket . Rice then opened the
door and fled.
Taylor pursued him on foot for approximately one and a half blocks until
Rice gave himself up. He was then arrested and searched, but no contraband
was found in his possession . He was then placed in another cruiser and taken to
the Elsmere police station .
Taylor then retraced his flight path to see if Rice had divested himself of
any contraband during the flight.
Finding nothing, he returned to the Minit-Mart
where Officer Girdler had arrived and secured the scene, including Rice's
vehicle . At this time the driver, Troy Brown, was outside the vehicle. Taylor then
called to have the vehicle towed off the Minit-Mart parking lot.
Prior to the tow truck's arrival, Taylor searched the vehicle and discovered
two baggies - a "corner-cut baggie" inside the other - containing a total of 5 .14
grams of crack cocaine . It was located on the rear, passenger-side floor board of
the car. He also discovered a pistol clip containing five 9mm bullets in the glove
compartment. The car was later towed.
Prior to trial, the trial court overruled Appellant's motion to suppress the
evidence . Thereafter, on October 8, 2004, a Kenton County jury found Rice
guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance, first-degree, second offense .
During the sentencing phase, Rice was found to be a first-degree persistent
felony offender and sentenced to twenty.years in the state penitentiary.
1.
THE SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S AUTOMOBILE WAS LAWFUL AS
A SEARCH INCIDENT TO AN ARREST AND AS A SEARCH OF AN
AUTOMOBILE BASED UPON PROBABLE CAUSE.
The Appellant argues that the search was unreasonable and therefore
violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as
Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution . We disagree .
The facts of the search are not in dispute and have been previously set
out. Although the trial court did verbally mention from the bench that there was
"sort of a combination" of different theories justifying the search, the trial court's
written order did not use one exception to bolster another in order to uphold the
search . Instead, it found three separate and independent grounds for justifying
the search .
In Thornton v. United States, 541 U .S. 615, 124 S .Ct. 2127, 158 L.Ed.2d
905 (2004), the Supreme Court held that an officer can search the passenger
compartment of a vehicle incident to a lawful arrest of a "recent occupant." In
acknowledging this rule to be a natural extension of New York v. Belton , 453 U .S.
454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), the Supreme Court held that the
"Belton Rule" applied even when the officer made initial contact with the arrestee
after the arrestee had left the vehicle .
The Appellant here makes the same
argument as was made in Thornton and Belton, to the effect that the right to
search the vehicle terminates once the arrestee no longer has access to the
vehicle in order to access weapons or effect destruction of evidence .
"[U]nder the strictures of petitioner's proposed `contact initiation' rule,
officers who do so will be unable to search the car's passenger compartment in
the event of a custodial arrest, potentially compromising their safety and placing
incriminating evidence at risk of concealment or destruction .
The Fourth
Amendment does not require such a gamble." Thornton , 541 U .S . at 621-22,
124 S .Ct. at 2131 . Moreover, "the right to search an item incident to arrest exists
even if that item is no longer accessible to the defendant at the time of the
search . So long as the defendant had the item within his immediate control near
the time of his arrest, the item remains subject to search incident to an arrest."
Northrop v. Trigpett, 265 F.3d 372, 379 (6th Cir. 2001)(citation omitted) .
As
many commentators have noted, the rule under Belton and Thornton is no longer
based upon the fact that the arrestee might grab a weapon or evidentiary item
from his car. See Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search For a Reason : An Empirical
Re-examination of Chimel and Belton 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 657, 675 (2002) ; David
M . Silk, When Bright Lines Break Down : Limiting New York v. Belton 136 U. Pa .
L: Rev. 281, 290-291(1987) .
In Clark v. Commonwealth, 868 S.W.2d 101 (Ky. App. 1993), it was stated
that searches incident to legal arrest "provide, in correlation to automobiles, that
where there is probable cause to support a custodial arrest, that same probable
cause justifies a search of the entire automobile passenger compartment." Id. at
107 (citing Commonwealth v. Ramsev, 744 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Ky. 1987) ; New
York v. Belton , 453 U.S . 454, 460-63,101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864-66, 69 L.Ed .2d 768
(1981)) . "[S]ection 10 of the Kentucky Constitution provides no greater protection
than does the Federal Fourth Amendment ." Lafollette v. Commonwealth , 915
S .W .2d 747, 748 (Ky. 1996) .
In light of the outstanding warrant for Appellant's arrest, which officer
Taylor had just confirmed, the Appellant's flight and the "baggie" which Taylor
saw in Rice's hand just before his flight and the further fact that Appellant had not
thrown the contraband away during his flight, sufficient justification existed for
searching the Appellant's vehicle as soon as practical after the arrest and the
search of the flight path . If nothing else, Thornton recognizes that the distance
one moves from a vehicle, prior to arrest, is not a factor in the determination of
the legality of the search, under circumstances such as existed in this case .
Thus, the arrest and search of the Appellant's vehicle under these
circumstances was proper, notwithstanding that he fled the vehicle . Thus, the
trial court ruled properly that the evidence seized should not be suppressed .
II .
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
ALLOWING AN OFFICER TO TESTIFY THAT THE AMOUNT OF
THE DRUGS IN RICE'S POSSESSION WERE INDICATIVE OF
TRAFFICKING.
Sergeant Stephens of the Northern Kentucky Drug Strike Force testified at
trial as an expert witness regarding trafficking. He testified that "hard core users"
of crack cocaine were addicted and will seek to get high continuously. Typically,
these users could only afford hits between $20 and $40 dollars at a time and
would buy from .01 to .03 grams of crack. Larger "rocks" of crack weighed 3.5
grams to 4 grams and would range in price from $100 dollars to $150 dollars per
gram. Smaller rocks could be broken off from the larger ones and sold at prices
ranging between $10 and $30, depending upon the size of the rock.
He also
testified that dealers often had "corner cut bags" to hold small rocks of crack for
sale . In the instant case, the bag found in Appellant's car contained 5.14 grams
of crack cocaine and had a smaller "corner cut bag" with a single rock inside an
outer bag with the rest of the crack. Sergeant Stephens performed no tests,
scientific or otherwise, and made no written reports in connection with the case .
Appellant objected to Sergeant Stephens's testimony on the grounds that
no notice had been given that Sergeant Stephens would be called as an expert
or as to the substance of his testimony . The trial court overruled the objection on
the grounds that RCr 7.24(1) does not require notice or disclosure of witnesses.
The trial court based its ruling in part on the fact that it could not have been too
surprising that the Commonwealth would call an expert to testify about the
difference between a drug user (possessor) and a drug trafficker . In fact, the
Commonwealth noted that an expert is always called in possession versus
trafficking cases . Commenting on the Appellant's allegations of surprise as to
this issue, the trial court noted : "Defense attorneys can't play stupid ."
The Defendant argues that the absence of such disclosures violated his
right to meaningfully confront witnesses against him according to the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and that the fact of non-disclosure
is a factor to be considered on the prejudicial scale in KRE 403 evaluations .
However, in times past, the Commonwealth was under no duty to give
information to the accused as to what proof would be introduced, except such as
was conveyed through the charge set out in the indictment. See Patterson v.
Commonwealth , 66 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Ky . 1933), overruled in part by Jett v.
Commonwealth , 436 S .W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969) ; see also, Lewis v. Commonwealth ,
190 Ky. 160, 227 S.W. 149, 150 (1920) . Today however, criminal discovery is
controlled primarily by RCr 7.24 and 7.26, along with RCr 6 .22 and RCr 5.16(3) .
RCr 7.24(1) provides, in relevant part:
Upon written request by the defense, the attorney for
the Commonwealth shall . . . permit the defendant to
inspect and copy . . . any relevant . . . (b) results or
reports of physical or mental examinations, and of
scientific tests or experiments made in connection with
the particular case . . . .
RCr 7.26 deals with witness statements, which is not relevant here since
there were no such statements or reports from this witness. Neither is RCr 6.22
or RCr 5.16(3) relevant to the considerations herein . Moreover, witness lists are
not required under RCr 7.24(1) and may not be compelled. Lowe v.
Commonwealth, 712 S.W.2d 944, 945 (Ky. 1986) see also , King v. Venters , 596
S .W .2d 721 (Ky. 1980) .
Trained police officers, relying on their personal experience, routinely
testify that certain quantities of drugs are more consistent with dealing, rather
than personal use . See Sargent v. Commonwealth , 813 S .W.2d 801 (Ky. 1991) ;
Kroth v. Commonwealth, 737 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1987) . "[I]t is difficult to imagine
that Quinn's counsel, an experienced attorney, would fail to realize that the
government would offer testimony that the amount of crack cocaine found in
Quinn's car was more consistent with distribution than with possession for
personal use." Quinn v. United States, 230 F.3d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 2000) . Quinn
upheld the trial court's admission of the same type of evidence, even though
FRCP 16(a)(1)(b) requires that a summary of any expert testimony be given to
the opposing party in criminal cases. FRCP 16(a)(1)(b), unlike RCr 7.24(1), is
not restricted to only "results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and
of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with a particular case."
Since the witness's testimony did not deal with "physical or mental examinations,
and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with a particular case,"
there was no requirement of disclosure under RCr 7 .24(1) . In that no statement
or report existed, RCr 7.26(1) was inapplicable.
"The rules of civil procedure shall be applicable in criminal proceedings to
the extent not superseded by, or inconsistent with, [the] rules of criminal
procedure." RCr 13.04 . However, "it is patently clear from a reading of RCr 7 .24
that the rule was designed to govern pretrial discovery in criminal trials."
Robinson v. Commonwealth , 86 S .W.3d 54, 57 (Ky. App. 2002) . Thus CR
26.02(4) is inapplicable .
The Appellant relies upon Vires v. Commonwealth , 989 S.W .2d 946 (Ky.
1999), for his argument that, RCr 7.24 notwithstanding, the Commonwealth is
obligated to provide the defense with the substance of all experts opinions.
Vires , however, dealt with the opinions of a Kentucky State Police accident
reconstructionist based upon a physical site examination.' In fact, the officer did
not do an accident reconstruction but merely testified to physical site facts, which
had been disclosed to the defense through the photographs and the police
investigative report . With the disclosure of the relevant site photography having
been made, Vires was decided on the basis that the officer "did not rely upon any
undisclosed premise as a basis for his conclusion ." Vires, 989 S .W .2d at 948 .
In this case however, Sergeant Stephens's testimony did not involve a
physical site examination and the points which the testimony addressed, the
amount of the crack cocaine and the existence of the "corner cut bag," were
disclosed to, and known by, the Appellant. Thus, Vires is inapplicable to the
facts in this case .
Moreover, Sergeant Stephens testified in this case and was on the stand,
subject to cross-examination . The confrontation clause guarantees a defendant
the right to confront witnesses against him and his right to cross-examination. It
does not guarantee that his cross-examination will be successful, in whatever
way, or to whatever extent, a defendant might wish . See Delaware v. Fensterer,
474 U.S . 15, 20,106 S.Ct. 292, 295, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) .
' Vires assumed that the RCr 7.24(1)(b) reference to "results or reports of
physical or mental examinations" referred to physical site examinations, rather
than just medical physical or mental examinations. It did not, however, decide
this question .
Simply put, the issue faced by Appellant was one that Appellant knew
would be an issue in this type of case and his right to confront the issue and his
right to cross-examine the opposing witnesses were not impinged by
the rulings of the court.
III.
THE PROSECUTION IMPROPERLY DEFINED REASONABLE
DOUBT DURING VOIR DIRE.
During voir dire, the prosecutor commented on the standards of
reasonable doubt, stating:
Beyond a reasonable doubt. I didn't
grow up in the Matlock era, but
apparently my parents did and they
are huge fans of it. I can't tell you
what beyond a reasonable doubt is.
I can't define it. I can tell you it is
not beyond a shadow of a doubt, as Matlock
used to say that it was.
At this point the defense made an objection, which was overruled by the
trial court . The prosecutor, however, continued her comments on reasonable
doubt as follows :
When we talk about reasonable doubt, we can just talk
about doubts in general . Who's married? We have a
lot of married people here . Before you got married did
you have some doubts about whether or not you
wanted to get married? Probably? I am not married .
The entire thing just scares me to death . I would have
a lot of doubts that I am not even sure are reasonable .
Despite the fact that you still have doubts, did you still
get married anyways? They were reasonable, that's
alright . So when you think about reasonable doubt,
that's what I want you to think about it. (Emphasis
added) . There's no way that you can prove to an
absolute certainty that your marriage was going to be
perfect, that you guys were going to get along all the
2 Rice had the opportunity to cross-examine the officer during his expert
qualification outside the presence of the jury, but did not undertake to ask any
such questions .
_10-
time, that you would never fight, that at no point would
you have to sleep on the couch, you couldn't do that.
That's beyond a reasonable doubt. (Emphasis added) .
Having already objected to this line of comment, Rice made no further
objection to the prosecution's continuing comments .
In Commonwealth v. Callahan , 675 S .W.2d 391, 393 (Ky. 1984), we held it
improper for counsel to give any definition of "reasonable doubt at any point in
the trial ." The comment criticized in Callahan was as follows :
Id . at 392 .
The burden is on the Commonwealth to prove Mr.
Callahan and Mr . Pack guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt . You may ask yourself exactly what does that
mean . My interpretation of that is that if there is any
doubt in your mind at all, it doesn't matter how much
doubt. I mean if it's just a little bit, then you have to find
my client not guilty.
Again in Marsch v. Commonwealth , 743 S.W.2d 830, 832-34 (Ky. 1988),
we reversed for improper comments concerning the meaning of reasonable
doubt. In Marsch, we noted :
[t]he Commonwealth engaged at length in a discussion
of reasonable doubt . He asked Kirk if he equated
"beyond a shadow of a doubt" with "reasonable doubt ."
He provided an example using himself as a
hypothetical witness to an accident and suggested to
the prospective juror that his hypothetical testimony
would satisfy the `reasonable doubt' standard, but
might not eliminate any possibility of doubt. Finally, the
attorney for the Commonwealth explained that there
was a significant distinction between being convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt and being convinced
beyond all or a shadow of a doubt .
Id at 832 (emphasis added).
Then in Sanders v . Commonwealth , 801 S .W.2d 665, 671 (Ky. 1990), we
again reviewed a prosecutor's voir dire comments .
Id. at 671 .
In a criminal trial, do you realize that the
Commonwealth has the burden of proving the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that does
not mean beyond all doubt or a shadow of a doubt?
Would any of you all hold the Commonwealth to a
higher standard of proof than the reasonable doubt
standard?
Having some question as to whether or not the foregoing comment was
even error, we affirmed the conviction noting :
Id . a t 671 .
Assuming, without deciding, that an error would have
occurred had objection been raised and overruled, we
are wholly unconvinced, considering the
circumstances, that absent this putative error the
defendant may not have been found guilty of a capital
crime, or the death penalty may not have been
imposed .
We noted in Sanders that a remark, similar to the one above, which we
had also reviewed in Callahan , "did not constitute any attempt to define
reasonable doubt." Id . at 671, n .4.
In Caudill v. Commonwealth , 120 S.W .3d 635, 675 (Ky. 2003), we
affirmed the conviction, although the prosecutor made the statement that "just
because there is a question or some unanswered part of the case, that [doesn't
mean] there is automatically reasonable doubt." We held that such comment "did
not impermissibly define reasonable doubt." Id . at 675 (citing Callahan , 675
S.W.2d 391(Ky. 1984) . Moreover, as in Sanders , "we [were] wholly unconvinced,
considering the circumstances, that absent this putative error the [appellants]
may not have been found guilty of a capital crime, or the death penalty may not
have been imposed ." Id . at 675-76 .
Then again in Johnson v. Commonwealth , _ _ _ S .W.3d _ _ _, _ _ WL
3500288, *3-4 (Ky. 2005), we affirmed a conviction where the prosecutor made
the following comment :
Let's try an interactive thing. Let me get a show of
hands . How many have heard the term "Beyond a
shadow of a doubt"?
[Prospective jurors respond.]
I think it's safe to say everybody raised their hand. Not
surprisingly because this week, especially since I've
mentioned it, you'll see it on the TV or you'll hear it on
the radio, or you'll read it in the newspaper, or you'll
read it in a novel or a book or something--beyond a
shadow of a doubt . Now listen carefully . There ain't no
such thing in the criminal justice system in the United
States of America . That's one of the myths that has
arisen . Nobody has to prove anything beyond a
shadow of a doubt.
In affirming in Johnson, we held :
Id. at *9.
[T]he prosecutor in this case simply informed the jury
that the Commonwealth did not have to prove its case
beyond a shadow of a doubt and that the proper
standard was proof beyond a reasonable doubt . He
offered no hypothetical to explain "beyond a
reasonable doubt" and did not engage in a lengthy
discussion of the standard . Furthermore, the
prosecutor . . . told the jury that he could not define
"reasonable doubt ."
We further stated : "Additionally, even if one is convinced that the
statement by the prosecutor in this case constituted error, that error was
harmless." Id . at *10. It was significant to us that every juror on the panel in
Johnson raised their hand when asked whether or not they were familiar with the
term "beyond a shadow of doubt."
probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt."' Taylor v. Kentucky, 436
U .S . 478, 485-86, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 56 L.Ed.2d 468 (1978)(citation deleted) .
Allowing counsel to define the term "reasonable doubt" would dilute the standard .
The analogy offered by counsel in this case did just that and was error.
The Commonwealth argues, however, that this issue is not preserved as
the Appellant did not renew his objection to the prosecutor's subsequent
comments . We disagree . Under RCr 9 .22, when an appropriate objection is
made to a particular line of inquiry, it is sufficient to preserve the issue for review
as to that fine of inquiry upon the grounds of the objection previously made .
Osborne v. Commonwealth , 867 S .W.2d 484, 491-92 (Ky. App . 1993) .
We have previously noted counsel's . . . objection to
the relevancy of the testimony . Counsel then noted that
he felt bound by Kentucky law and statutory authority
to concede the admissibility of the evidence . Hence, he
did not make a contemporaneous objection each time
the evidence was introduced . We are inclined to
conclude that, under the circumstances and given
counsel's reasonable interpretation of case law, his
comments should be deemed [an] . . . adequate
objection .
Id . at 491- 92.
To place a burden upon counsel to object on the same grounds each and
every time the particular line of inquiry resumes would be wasteful of the court's
time and resources, as well as disrespectful of the court's rulings .
The above notwithstanding, RCr 9.24 commands that, "the court . . . must
disregard any error . . . in a proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights
of the parties." Thus, even errors of a constitutional magnitude are subject to
harmless error analysis . Chapman v. California, 386 U .S. 18, 24, 87 S .Ct. 824,
17 L. Ed.2d 705, 24 A.L. R .3d 1065 (1967) . See also Jackson v. Commonwealth ,
- 1 5-
717 S .W.2d 511(Ky. App.
1986) .
"What [this] really boils [down] to is that if upon
a consideration of the whole case this court does not believe there is a
substantial possibility that the result would have been any different, the
irregularity will be held nonprejudicial ." Abernathv v. Commonwealth , 439 S .W.2d
949, 952 (Ky. 1969),
overruled on other grounds by Blake v. Commonwealth,
646
S.W .2d 718 (Ky. 1983) .
In this case Officer Taylor saw the tip of the clear plastic baggie extending
from the Appellant's left hand, which was partially in his pants pocket. The
Appellant then fled, was caught and his vehicle searched. The officers then
found the baggie containing the 5.14 grams of crack cocaine with the smaller,
corner cut bag with a single rock of crack, inside the outer bag. It was located in
the floor behind the passenger's seat, from which Appellant had fled. No one
had been sitting in the rear seat of the vehicle at the time .
Upon these facts, the Appellant was convicted of trafficking in a controlled
substance first-degree, second offense . Given the evidence, the jury verdict
would have been no different had the remarks regarding reasonable doubt not
been made . Thus, the error was harmless .
IV.
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FACILITATION
INSTRUCTION
The Appellant argues he was entitled to a facilitation instruction . "Although a
trial judge has a duty to prepare and give instructions on the whole law of the
case, including any lesser included offenses which are supported by the
evidence . . . that duty does not require an instruction on a theory with no
evidentiary foundation . . . ." Houston v. Commonwealth , 975 S .W.2d 925, 929
-
1 6-
(Ky. 1998)(emphasis added) .
Here the trial court determined there was no
evidence to support the instruction and refused to give it.
In fact, there was no evidence of any kind that the driver of the car (Troy
Brown) had possessed the crack cocaine found behind Appellant's car seat . The
evidence was that Appellant possessed it - a portion of the bag was seen in his
hand at the time his hand was partially in his pocket, just before he fled.
This aside, if a jury could have possibly inferred the driver was the
possessor of the cocaine, there was no evidence that Rice knew that Brown
possessed it and that he was attempting to facilitate the offense . The court
committed no error in this regard .
V.
APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITIELD TO A DIRECTED VERDICT
The Appellant next argues he was entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal on the first-degree trafficking charge due to insufficiency of the
evidence . Not having preserved the error, he asks that it be reviewed under the
"palpable error" rule, RCr 10 .26. To be reviewable under the palpable error rule,
there must be error in the first instance, even though unpreserved . Here there
was simply no error regarding sufficiency of the evidence . The standard on
appeal is whether, under the evidence at hand, it would be clearly unreasonable
for a jury to find guilt. Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky.
1991) . That is clearly not the case.
Appellant was confronted in the passenger seat of his own car. The
officer saw the tip of the plastic baggie in Appellant's hand, which was partially in
his pants pocket.
When the officer moved to get a better view, he lost sight of
Appellant's left hand momentarily and thus Appellant had the opportunity to place
- 1 7-
the baggie in the floor behind his car seat. He fled, was apprehended, the car
was searched, and the baggies and the drugs were found . The officer verified
that Appellant hadn't thrown anything away during the pursuit . This is sufficient
evidence that Appellant was the one who placed the baggies behind the car seat
before he fled . See Burnett v. Commonwealth, 31 S .W .3d 878, 881 (Ky. 2000) .
Thus, given the quantity of the drugs found (5.14 grams of crack) and the
"corner cut baggie," along with Sergeant Stephens's testimony regarding the
amounts normally possessed by users versus traffickers, it was plainly
reasonable for the jury to infer the drugs were possessed with the intent for sale .
There being no error, there can be no "palpable error."
VI.
EVIDENCE THAT A LOADED PISTOL CLIP WAS FOUND IN THE
APPELLANT'S CAR WAS ADMISSIBLE
Lastly, the Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence
that the officers found a pistol clip with five 9mm bullets in the Appellant's glove
compartment, in that it was unduly prejudicial under KRE 403 . The issue was
preserved based upon Appellant's timely objection to the evidence .
Sergeant Stephens, in his testimony about the different indicia between
users and traffickers, testified that dealers often carry weapons to protect their
drugs or cash. The pistol clip with the bullets was found in the glove
compartment of the Appellant's vehicle, although no weapon was located .
However, Officer Girdler, who arrived on the scene approximately 10-15 seconds
after Officer. Taylor had radioed he was in foot pursuit of Appellant, testified that
when he arrived, Troy Brown, the driver of Appellant's vehicle, was out of the car
and talking on a payphone at the Minit-Mart. Officer Girdler, upon his arrival,
patted down Mr. Brown and found no weapons . The opportunity existed,
-18-
however, for the pistol to have been secreted away - had one been there. That
aside, the existence of the clip in Appellant's vehicle is circumstantial evidence
that a pistol, which the clip fits, exists - wherever its location . Thus, evidence of
the finding of the clip was relevant circumstantial evidence that there had been a
pistol in the Appellant's vehicle at one time or another. This itself was relevant
under Sergeant Stephens's testimony on the different indicia between users and
traffickers .
However, the evidence must also past the test of KRE 403. KRE 403
provides that "[a]Ithough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice."
However,
in using the rule, "[w]e must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to its
proponent, `maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect ."'
Sutkiewicz v. Monroe County Sheriff, 110 F.3d 352, 360 (6th Cir. 1997). "An
appellate court should reverse a trial court's ruling under KRE 403, only if there
has been an abuse of discretion ." Thompson v. Commonwealth , 147 S.W.3d 22,
36 (Ky. 2004).
In this case there was an issue as to whether or not the Appellant was
guilty of possession or guilty of trafficking . Sergeant Stephens testified that
traffickers generally have weapons they use to protect their drugs or cash.
Evidence of a loaded clip in the Appellant's car was some evidence that he had,
or did have at sometime or another, a weapon in his vehicle . In that there was
no evidence that he had ever used the weapon, or had ever used any weapon
inappropriately, and given the fact that a substantial number of people have
weapons, the prejudicial effect of this evidence would be minimal. It would,
- 1 9-
however, still remain relevant, under the evidence presented, for whatever value
it had, as to whether or not he was
a possessor or trafficker of the
cocaine found
in his possession . Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
entry of this evidence .
For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment and sentence of the trial court is
affirmed .
Graves, Johnstone, Roach, Scott and Wintersheimer, JJ ., concur .
Lambert, C.J ., and Cooper, J ., dissents, for the reasons set forth in his dissenting
opinion in Johnson v. Commonwealth , _ _ _ S.W.3d
(slip op. at 8-
11), 2005 WL 3500288 (Ky. 2005), ii-e, that it was reversible error to permit the
prosecutor to define "reasonable doubt ."
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Shannon Dupree
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
James C . Shackleford
Criminal Appellate Branch
1024 capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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