COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. CHARLES JONES
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AS CORRECTED : DECEMBER 1, 2006
RENDERED : NOVEMBER 22, 2006
TO BE PUBLISHED
(9vurf Vf
NO. 2004-SC-001017-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
.
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
NO. 2003-CA-002178-MR
HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
INDICTMENT NO. 03-CR-00002
CHARLES JONES
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE MINTON
AFFIRMING
We granted the Commonwealth of Kentucky's motion for discretionary
review of the Court of Appeals's decision, which held that a pat-down search of Charles
Jones exceeded the proper bounds of the "plain feel" exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement . Because the incriminating nature of the contents of
a pill bottle produced from Jones's pants pocket was not apparent until the pill bottle
was removed from the pocket, we agree and, thus, affirm.
1 . FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
Officer John Teagle arrested Jones and charged him with first-degree
possession of a controlled substance, tampering with physical evidence, and resisting
arrest. Jones filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized by Teagle before
the arrest contending that the search and seizure did not fall within the plain feel
exception . At the suppression hearing, both the Commonwealth and Jones acquiesced
in the trial court's suggestion that there was no need to call Teagle as a live witness
because his testimony would be in accordance with his written report. So the only facts
in the record simply derive from this report.
According to the report, Teagle went to Jones's residence to serve an
emergency protective order (EPO) on Jones. When he arrived, he saw a man leaning
into the driver's side window of a vehicle . The man walked away when he noticed
Teagle . Teagle asked him to stop and to approach. He ignored Teagle's request, kept
walking away, and attempted to enter Jones's residence. Teagle put his hand on the
door of the residence to keep it from closing. The man then returned to the front porch
and, when asked, identified himself as Charles Jones . Teagle then informed Jones that
he was there to serve an EPO on him, at which time Teagle noticed a bulge in Jones's
right front pants pocket. Teagle asked Jones what was in the pocket and Jones replied,
"nothing ." Because the EPO stated that Jones had assaulted his wife with a handgun,
Teagle made a protective pat down of Jones. The bulge felt like a prescription medicine
bottle . Teagle then "asked" Jones to remove it from the pocket, and Jones reluctantly
did so. When Teagle asked Jones to see the bottle, Jones stepped off the porch ;
opened the bottle ; and flung its contents, which turned out to be Oxycontin pills, into a
nearby ditch . After a struggle, Teagle arrested Jones.
At the suppression hearing, after reading Teagle's report into the record
and making comments about the facts of the case against Jones, as well as other
reported plain feel cases, the trial court announced that Jones's motion to suppress was
denied . Neither side called witnesses nor made oral argument. More importantly, a
close review of the videotape of the suppression hearing reveals that although the trial
court spoke about plain feel and about Jones's case for over thirty minutes, the trial
court never made any findings to support its denial of Jones's motion. And the trial
court did not later issue a written order containing findings.
After his motion to suppress was denied, Jones entered a conditional
guilty plea to all of the charges against him. Jones was ultimately sentenced to a
maximum of one year in prison each for the possession of a controlled substance
charge and the tampering with physical evidence charge, and to twelve months for the
resisting arrest charge . The possession of a controlled substance sentence and the
tampering with physical evidence sentences were ordered to be served consecutively
with each other but concurrently with the resisting arrest sentence, for a total effective
sentence of a maximum of two years' imprisonment . Additionally, that two-year
sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to a one-year sentence Jones
received for an unrelated offense . Jones then appealed to the Court of Appeals
contending that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed . The majority found that
Teagle acted properly when he conducted a pat down of Jones because the EPO stated
that Jones had used a handgun against his wife. But the majority concluded that
because it was not immediately apparent that the pill bottle in Jones's pocket contained
contraband, Teagle exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry ' stop and frisk when he
ordered Jones to remove the pill bottle from his pocket. The dissent opined that
Teagle's search of Jones was a valid warrantless search under the totality of the
circumstances . Despite the fact that the issue of whether Jones consented to the
search was neither argued nor ruled upon by the trial court, the dissent also concluded
that the warrantless search of Jones was proper because Jones had consented to the
search by virtue of having assented to Teagle's request to remove the bottle from his
pocket. We granted the Commonwealth's motion for discretionary review.
I1. ANALYSIS .
The Commonwealth argues before this Court that (a) the totality of the
circumstances provided Teagle probable cause to believe that the pill bottle contained
contraband, even though Teagle could not readily ascertain that fact by touch alone ; or,
in the alternative, (b) the warrantless search was valid because Jones consented to it.
We disagree with the Commonwealth's first argument, and we find that the second
argument has not been preserved for our review.
A. Standard of Review .
Motions to suppress are governed by Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 9.78 . That rule provides that a court facing a motion to suppress "shall
conduct an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury and at the conclusion
Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968) .
2
In fact, only one sentence of the Commonwealth's thirteen-page brief to the Court of
Appeals is devoted to the issue of consent .
thereof shall enter into the record findings resolving the essential issues of fact raised
by the motion or objection and necessary to support the ruling ." When reviewing an
order that decides a motion to suppress, the trial court's findings of fact are "conclusive"
if they are "supported by substantial evidence ."3 Using those facts, the reviewing court
then conducts a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to those facts to
determine whether the decision is correct as a matter of law.4
The truncated suppression hearing in this case hampers our review.
Although not mentioned by the parties or the Court of Appeals, our review of the
suppression hearing revealed a dearth of evidence presented about the search . There
were no live witnesses called and no oral argument presented. Most importantly,
although the trial court spoke at length about the Fourth Amendment issues presented
in Jones's case and what it perceived to be the similarities and dissimilarities to reported
plain feel decisions, the trial court failed to make any findings, either orally or in writing,
as is required by RCr 9.78. Rather, the trial court ended its discourse by stating that the
motion to suppress was denied "for the reasons the court has expressed in this ruling
from the bench ."
RCr 9.78 requires a trial court to hold an "evidentiary hearing" before
resolving a motion
to suppress.
Therefore, both Jones and the Commonwealth had the
right to introduce evidence for or against Jones's motion. But Jones has not claimed
error resulting from the trial court's failure to permit him to introduce evidence in support
RCr 9.78.
See, e.g., Adcock v Commonwealth , 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998).
See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 738 (8th ed. 2004) (defining evidentiary hearing as "[a] hearing
at which evidence is presented, as opposed to a hearing at which only legal argument is
presented.") .
of his motion to suppress . And Jones stipulated that Teagle would testify in accordance
with his written report and made no objection to the adequacy of the proceedings. So
we are constrained to find that Jones has waived this issue, and we decline to rule on
our own motion that Jones failed to have a proper evidentiary hearings
But before we can address the merits of the Commonwealth's arguments,
we must first decide whether the lack of specific findings by the trial court prevents us
from undertaking a meaningful review of this case. Because reviewing courts are
required to give great deference to the factual findings made by the trial court, it is
essential that the trial court discharge its responsibility to make express findings that
sufficiently resolve the legal issues presented by a motion to suppress.' Nevertheless,
given the parties' lack of disagreement as to the pertinent facts, as evidenced by the
stipulation to Teagle's report, we do not believe that this case requires remand for the
entry of findings .
The lack of findings in this case makes it similar to Coleman v.
Commonwealth .$ In Coleman, we also lamented the lack of findings by the trial court;
but we proceeded to review the merits of the issues, holding that:
Although we agree that written findings greatly facilitate
appellate review, and we recognize that it is sometimes
difficult to discern the basis for a trial court's ruling from onthe-record free-form analysis, we do not believe this is a
Mitchell v. Hadl, 816 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Ky. 1991) (holding that Supreme Court rarely rules
on issues not raised by parties as "[o]rdinarily, this Court confines itself rather closely to
deciding only those issues which the parties present . We take the view that counsel and the
courts below have sufficiently identified the issues; that we need not redefine the question in
the last stage of the litigation .") .
Moore v. Commonwealth , 634 S.W.2d 426, 433 (Ky. 1982) ("[t]he provisions of RCr 9.78 are
mandatory.") .
100 S.W.3d 745 (Ky. 2002).
case where we are "left in the dark" as to the basis for the
trial court's ruling. [Jones] offered no evidence to contradict
the Commonwealth's evidence at the hearing, and, in his
brief to this Court, [Jones] does not contest the factual
testimony at the hearing . Furthermore, when considered in
the context of the immediately preceding evidentiary hearing,
the trial court's oral comments sufficiently display its factual
findings . . . .
Given the nature of [Jones's] argument on appeal, the
primary issue here is a legal, rather than a factual one. . . .
The trial court's oral comments on the record sufficiently
documented its legal conclusion . . . . Thus, we believe the
record below allows us to adequately review the trial court's
ruling on [Jones's] motion to suppress.9
Accordingly, based on its comments at the hearing, we discern that the trial court's
findings would have been that Teagle had a right to pat down Jones for weapons based
on the allegations in the EPO. Furthermore, based on the plain feel doctrine, Teagle
had probable cause to believe that the pill bottle he discovered in the pat down was
contraband based on the totality of the circumstances . Those circumstances were
(1) seeing Jones leaning into the window of a parked car, (2) seeing Jones's retreat,
(3) his refusal to comply with the request to stop, and (4) hearing Jones say that he had
"nothing" in his pocket despite the visible bulge in the pocket . So the question before us
is whether these facts fall within the plain feel exception to the warrant requirement .
B. The Plain Feel Exception .
We begin our analysis by noting that the question of whether Teagle acted
properly in patting down Jones is not before us. Both the trial court and Court of
Appeals concluded that Teagle had a right to go to Jones's residence to serve the EPO
and that Teagle had a right to engage in a protective pat down of Jones based on the
!d. at 749 (internal footnote omitted) .
EPO's allegations of violence .'° Since Jones did not file a protective cross-motion for
discretionary review of the Court of Appeals' ruling, the propriety of the pat down itself
and Teagle's conduct before the pat down are not properly before us." The only
question that is properly before us is whether the Court of Appeals concluded correctly
that the search in this case was not valid under the plain feel doctrine .
Under our settled jurisprudence, "[i]t is fundamental that all searches
without a warrant are unreasonable unless it can be shown that they come within one of
the exceptions to the rule that a search must be made pursuant to a valid warrant . 02
Among the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement is the doctrine of plain
view and its corollary, plain feel. Under the plain feel doctrine, "[w]hen a police officer
lawfully pats down the outer clothing of a suspect and feels an object whose contour or
mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there is no violation of privacy beyond
that already permitted by the pat down search for weapons. The warrantless seizure of
such materials is justified under the same principles expressed in the plain view
10
Terry , 392 U.S. 1 ; Baker v. Commonwealth , 5 S.W.3d 142,146 (Ky. 1999) ("[w]hen an
officer is justified in believing that an individual, who is unquestionably not cooperative, may
be armed, it would be clearly unreasonable to deny that officer the authority to take
necessary measures to determine whether the individual is, in fact, carrying a weapon, and
to alleviate the threat of physical harm .").
Perry v. Williamson, 824 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Ky. 1992) ("[o]ur rules are specific that if the
motion for discretionary review made by the losing party in the Court of Appeals is granted,
it is then incumbent upon the prevailing party in the Court of Appeals to file a cross-motion
for discretionary review if respondent wishes to preserve the right to argue issues which
respondent lost in the Court of Appeals, or issues the Court of Appeals decided not to
address . If the party prevailing in the Court of Appeals wishes further consideration of such
issues along with the issues for which discretionary review has been granted, the prevailing
party must file a cross motion for discretionary review.") .
12
Cook v. Commonwealth , 826 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Ky. 1992).
doctrine . "'3 Seizing upon the "immediately apparent" requirement, the Court of Appeals
found that the plain feel exception was inapplicable because "[p]rior to inspecting the pill
bottle removed from Jones's pocket, the officer had no way to know whether or not
Jones had a valid prescription for the medicine in the bottle, thus the contraband nature
of the item was not readily apparent."
The Court of Appeals's focus on the "immediately apparent" requirement
was proper because both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have held
that the incriminating nature of an object seized under both the plain view and the plain
feel exceptions must be "immediately apparent ." 14 But, as we recently noted, "[t]he
interpretation of `immediately apparent' has presented reviewing courts with significant
difficulty ."15 And despite the courts' inability precisely to define "immediately apparent,"
it is clear that the phrase "immediately apparent" does not alter the fundamental issue:
whether an officer contemporaneously has probable cause to believe that the object
being felt is contraband, taking into account the totality of the circumstances . 16
13
Commonwealth v. Whitmore , 92 S.W.3d 76, 80 (Ky. 2002) (internal citations omitted) . See
also Minnesota v. Dickerson , 508 U .S . 366, 375 (1993).
14
Whitmore, 92 S.W .3d at 80; Dickerson , 508 U .S. at 375-376 ("[i]f a police officer lawfully
pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its
identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond
that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons ; if the object is contraband, its
warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the
plain-view context .") (emphasis added).
15
Commonwealth v. Hatcher,
16
S.W.3d
, 2006 WL 1358363 (Ky. 2006) .
See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741 (1983) (plurality opinion) (noting that phrase
"immediately apparent" in plain view doctrine was an "unhappy choice of words" since it had
been read improperly to require a higher degree of certainty than probable cause .) ;
Commonwealth v. Cullen, 816 N.E.2d 1228, 1239 (Mass .App.Ct. 2004) ("[u]nder both the
plain view and feel doctrines, whether a thing plainly viewed or plainly felt may be
constitutionally seized is to be measured by whether there is probable cause to believe in
the incriminating character of the object."); State v. Jones, 641 So.2d 688, 690 (La.Ct.App .
"[P]robable cause is a fluid conceptturning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a
neat set of legal rules."" Thus, in order to determine if probable cause has been
shown, the "principal components" a reviewing court must examine are "the events
which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the decision whether these
historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,
amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause ."'8 Thus, as evidenced by the use
of the adverb "immediately' to modify the adjective "apparent," probable cause must be
met at the time the officer touches the item in question and post-touching conduct
cannot be used retroactively to find probable cause.'9 Although an appellate court must
defer to the findings of fact made by a trial court, "as a general matter determinations of
reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed [de novo] on appeal."2°
Since the trial court made no real findings of fact in this case, our review is completely
de novo.
1994) (holding that "'[i]mmediately apparent' requires only that the officer have probable
cause to believe an item is contraband ."); Ball v. United States, 803 A.2d 971, 975 (D .C.
2002) ("'[i]mmediately apparent' for purposes of plain feel analysis does not mean that an
officer must know for certain that the item felt is contraband, only that there is probable
cause to associate the item with criminal activity.") .
17
Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S . 213, 232 (1983).
18
Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).
19
Commonwealth v. Crowder, 884 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Ky. 1994) (Lambert, J., concurring)
("[t]hus, to justify seizure . . ., the police officer must, on discovery of an item or object on the
person of a suspect, simultaneously conclude that the object is not a weapon and that it is
contraband other than a weapon. Such decisions must be made instantaneously and as
a part of the same thought process. No further inquiry as to the nature of the object is
permitted.") (emphasis added) .
zo
Ornelas , 517 U .S. at 699.
- 1 0-
Our review of Minnesota v. Dickerson and Crowder compels us to find that
Teagle's search of Jones does not fall within the plain feel exception . In each of those
cases, as in the case at hand, the criminal nature of the item discovered during a "plain
feel" search was not readily apparent until the item was moved or manipulated by the
officer.
In Dickerson , two police officers observed a person leaving a known crack
house. Once the person saw the police, he turned and walked in the opposite direction .
Their suspicions aroused, the officers stopped the person and conducted a pat down .
During that pat down, the officers discovered a small lump in the suspect's jacket
pocket. After squeezing and sliding the lump, the officer decided that the lump was
cocaine. The Supreme Court held that the search was not justified under the plain feel
doctrine because the illegal nature of the lump was only apparent after the officer
manipulated it, meaning that it did not satisfy the "immediately apparent" requirement for
plain feel searches . Similarly, in Crowder, a known drug dealer was seen in an area
known for drug trafficking. When the person saw the police, he walked away from them .
The officers engaged in a pat down and felt what the officer believed could have been a
small bindle of drugs. We ultimately held that the search was not justified under the
plain feel exception because the incriminating nature of the bindle was not readily
apparent during the pat down.22
21
Dickerson, 508 U.S . 366, 375 ("[i]f, however, the police lack probable cause to believe that
an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the objecti.e., `if its incriminating character [is not] "immediately apparent,"' Horton [v. California] . . .
496 U .S. [128], at 136, 110 S.Ct., at 2308the plain-view doctrine cannot justify its seizure."
22
884 S.W.2d at 652 (plurality opinion) .
Applying Dickerson and Crowder to the case at hand compels a finding
that the search of Jones does not fall within the plain feel exception . In many respects,
the facts in those cases are more compelling than those found in this case because,
unlike those cases, there is no suggestion in the sparse record that Jones's residence
or neighborhood were either high-crime areas in general or were known specifically as
being narcotics-trafficking hotspots, nor is there any indication that Jones himself was
suspected of being a drug trafficker . As did the suspects in Dickerson and Crowder ,
Jones began to walk away once he noticed the presence of authorities . But even if
Jones's retreat from Teagle is considered to be a "flight," that flight, in and of itself, is
insufficient to establish probable cause .
Next, we note that there is nothing inherently illegal or incriminating about
leaning into a car window while talking to the driver of a vehicle. Such an action could
only have been potentially incriminating if Teagle had testified that based on his training
and experience, drug dealers frequently lean into car windows to facilitate drug
transactions . However, the record contains no such observation by Teagle, nor does it
contain anything showing Teagle's level of experience and training in narcotics
interdiction .
Finally, and most importantly, like the objects felt by the officers in
Dickerson and Crowder, the incriminating nature of the object in Jones's pocket was not
23
See, e.g., United States v. Margeson, 259 F.Supp. 256, 265 (E.D . Pa. 1966) ("flight, in and
of itself, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause for otherwise anyone, who does not
desire to talk to the police and who either walks or runs away from them would always be
subject to a legal arrest. Such a procedure cannot be countenanced under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments as presently interpreted by the Supreme Court.") ; 6A C.J.S. Arrest
§ 35 (2006) ("[t]he flight of a suspect at the approach of a peace officer, or flight from the
scene of a crime, may not in and of itself constitute probable cause for arrest .") .
- 1 2-
obvious until the object was manipulated or moved. As noted by the Court of Appeals,
"[p]rior to inspecting the pill bottle [after it was] removed from Jones's pocket, [Teagle]
had no way to know whether or not Jones had a valid prescription for the medicine in
the bottle, thus the contraband nature of the item was not readily apparent." There is
nothing inherently incriminating about carrying a pill bottle in one's pocket.
Moreover, although we certainly do not endorse Jones's false statement to
Teagle that there was "nothing" in his pocket, such a dishonest answer is certainly less
incriminating than being seen walking from a known crack house, as in Dickerson, or
being a known drug dealer standing in the precise location where an anonymous caller
had told the police the suspect used to sell drugs, as in Crowder.
Additionally, in Commonwealth v. Hatcher, 24 we recently rejected the
Commonwealth's analogous claim of plain view under facts more incriminating to the
suspect than those found in this case . In Hatcher, police responded to an anonymous
claim of an allegedly abandoned minor. When they arrived at the home in question, an
adolescent eventually opened the door, at which time an officer saw a pipe sitting on a
table. Based on his training and experience, the officer believed the pipe was used to
smoke marijuana . Because the pipe could have been legally used to smoke tobacco,
however, the officer did not know the pipe was drug paraphernalia until he entered the
room, picked up the pipe, and then smelled marijuana .25 We held that the search was
not valid under plain view because "[a]Ithough the pipe appeared suspicious to Officer
Carr, further investigation was required to establish probable cause as to its association
24
25
S.W .3d
, 2006 WL 1358363
Id. at *4.
-13-
with criminal activity, and thus it simply was not immediately incriminating ."26 In the
case at hand, there was no testimony from Teagle stating that his training and
experience caused him to believe the pill bottle in Jones's pocket was contraband . And,
furthermore, a pill bottle is frequently and commonly used for legal purposes, unlike the
special pipe in Hatcher, which the officer testified was widely used to smoke
marijuana. Thus, because the unique facts of this case are less incriminating than
those we found not to constitute plain view in Hatcher , we cannot accept the
Commonwealth's argument that Teagle's search of Jones falls under the plain feel
exception.
In summary, the minimal facts in the record do not support a finding that
the search in this case falls under the plain feel exception to the warrant requirement .
Thus, we affirm the Court of Appeals' decision on this point.
C. Consent.
Like plain feel, consent is one of the established exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement .2$ Although it concedes that it did not raise the issue
of consent to the trial court, the Commonwealth now contends that Jones consented to
the search and seizure because he merely acquiesced to Teagle's request to remove
the bottle from his pocket. Indeed, Teagle's report states that he asked Jones to
remove the pill bottle from his pocket and that Jones reluctantly complied .
26
Id
27
Id
28
Cook, 826 S.W.2d at 331 .
- 1 4-
Ordinarily, we do not permit parties to raise new arguments on appeal .
In fact, this general prohibition is even more important in cases involving the
voluntariness of a consent to a search because "[w]hether a consent to search was
voluntarily given is a question of fact to be determined by a preponderance of the
evidence from the totality of all the circumstances ."30 Accordingly, the issue of consent
is a fact-intensive question that is not subject to appellate review if it is not first
presented to the trial court .31 Thus, as we recently held Hatcher, the Commonwealth's
failure to raise the issue of consent before the trial court leaves that issue unpreserved
for our review.32
111. CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed ; and this case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to suppress the
evidence obtained during Teagle's warrantless search of Jones .
2s
Kennedy v. Commonwealth , 544 S.W .2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1976) ("[t]he appellants will not be
permitted to feed one can of worms to the trial judge and another to the appellate court.").
30
Talbott v. Commonwealth , 968 S.W.2d 76, 82 (Ky. 1998). See also Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
31
Talbott , 968 S.W.2d at 82 ("[t]he issue [of consent] is a preliminary question to be decided
by the trial judge, KRE 104(a), whose factual findings are conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence . RCr 9.78[.])"
32
Hatcher, 2006 WL 1358363 at *4 ("[w]e note that the Commonwealth devotes a great deal of
effort in this Court, as it did in the Court of Appeals, in arguing that the pipe was produced
as a result of a consensual search . However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that such
claim is not preserved for review . Indeed, the Commonwealth's sole theory during the
suppression hearing was one of "plain view," and we limit our opinion herein to that context.
At no point did the Commonwealth contend that Hatcher's son voluntarily consented to the
search, and we do not undertake at this time to determine the [legal] validity of a minor's
consent to a search of the family residence .").
- 1 5-
Lambert, C .J .; McAnulty and Roach, JJ., concur. Scott, J ., dissents by
separate opinion in which Graves and Wintersheimer, JJ ., join.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Gregory D. Stumbo, Esq.
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael L. Harned, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Shannon Dupree, Esq.
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
Euva D . May
Assistant Public Advocate
Appellate Division
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
AS CORRECTED : DECEMBER 1, 2006
RENDERED : NOVEMBER 22, 2006
TO BE PUBLISHED
~ix~remQ ~Vurf o f
2004-SC-001017-DG
e
"
W-A *
enfu~k~r
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RON JOHNSON, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 03-CR-00002
CHARLES JONES
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE SCOTT
Respectfully, I must dissent. Although the majority opinion espouses the Court of
Appeals' ruling that Officer Teagle had a "reasonable suspicion" that the Appellee was
armed and thus the Terry pat down was proper, it has nonetheless found, by relying on
the plain feel exception to the, warrant requirement, that the evidence was insufficient to
support the conclusion that Officer Teagle's pat down satisfies the "immediately
apparent" requirement for plain feel searches. Minnesota v. Dickerson , 508 U .S. 366,
375, 113 S .Ct. 2130, 2137, 124 L.Ed .2d 334 (1993). Moreover, the majority
characterizes Appellee's response that he had "nothing" in his pockets as being "less
incriminating than being seen walking from a known crack house, as in Dickerson , or
being a known drug dealer standing in the precise location where an anonymous caller
had told the police the suspect used to sell drugs, as in Crowder."
I find, however, that based upon the totality of the circumstances, Officer Teagle
had probable cause to seize the pill bottle .
In Dickerson, su ra, the United States Supreme Court analogized the plain feel
doctrine to the plain view doctrine in the context of a legitimate
Ter search, opining
that "[r]egardless of whether the officer detects the contraband by sight or by touch . . .
the Fourth Amendment's requirement that the officer have probable cause to believe
that the item is contraband before seizing it ensures against excessively speculative
seizures ." Dickerson, 508 U .S. at 376, 113 S.Ct. at 2137 (emphasis added) (citing
Ybarra v. Illinois , 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (contemplating the
possibility that police officers could obtain probable cause justifying a seizure of
contraband through the sense of touch). Significantly, the United States Supreme Court
rejected the State's argument in Ybarra, only because "[t]he initial frisk of Ybarra was
simply not supported by a reasonable belief that he was armed and presently
dangerous," as required by Tom. Ybarra , 444 U.S. at 92-93, 100 S.Ct. at 343.
Thus contraband may properly be seized during a
Ter search
if the item's
identity is immediately apparent and if the officer has probable cause to believe the item
is contraband . When considered under the totality of the circumstances, we should find
that probable cause exists for the seizure of suspected contraband.
For example, in Commonwealth v. Cullen , 816 N.E.2d 1228, 1238 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2004), the Massachusetts Court held that while no "direct evidence" of the
incriminating nature of stolen coins in the defendant's pocket was present, a "host of
circumstantial evidence" provided the incriminating linkage between the coins and the
burglary . Moreover, probable cause itself is recognized as a "fluid concept, turning on
the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts, not readily, or even
usefully reduced to a neat set of rules ." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U .S. 213, 232, 103 S.Ct.
2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Probable cause has further been defined as a
"reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than
mere suspicion ." United States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 1990) (emphasis
added) . And the test for probable cause is whether "there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Gates, 462 U.S.
at 238, 103 S .Ct. at 2332 (emphasis added). Thus no "actual showing of [criminal]
activity" is required so long as there is only a probability or substantial chance such
activity has occurred . United States v. Wright , 16 F.3d 1429, 1438 (6th Cir. 1994).
Even more persuasive is the notion that determinations of probable cause are
based on the "totality of the circumstances," involving a practical, common-sense review
of the available facts known to the officer at the time of the search . Gates , 462 U .S. at
238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332 . The Court of Appeals has recognized such in Baltimore v.
Commonwealth, 119 S.W.3d 532, 539 (Ky. App. 2003), wherein it held that the probable
cause standard is
[a] flexible concept[ ] to be applied in a commonsense manner based on
the totality of the circumstances in each case. In determining the totality
of the circumstances, a reviewing court should not view the factors relied
upon by the police officer(s) to create reasonable suspicion in isolation but
must consider all of the officer(s) observations and give due regard to
inferences and deductions drawn by them from their experience and
training .
(Emphasis added). Furthermore, the court held that "'the likelihood of criminal activity
need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of
satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard ."' Id . (quoting United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S . 266, 274, 122 S .Ct. 744, 751, 151 L.Ed .2d 740 (2002)); see also
Commonwealth v. Banks, 68 S .W .3d 347, 351 (Ky. 2001) ("Thus, if non-threatening
contraband is immediately apparent to the officer from the sense of touch while the
officer is conducting a lawful pat-down search, the officer is not required to ignore the
contraband and can lawfully seize it.")
The precedent set by the majority opinion in this case would require an officer,
confronted with an individual suspected of being armed, to have proof beyond probable
cause before seizure of suspected contraband can occur. Such a result is not only
unnecessary under the Fourth Amendment, but is not required under the totality of the
circumstances present in this case . Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals and reinstate the ruling of the Harlan Circuit Court.
Graves and Wintersheimer, JJ., joins this dissent.
,Suyrmr (9ourf of ~Rmfurkij
NO. 2004-SC-001017-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
NO. 2003-CA-002178-MR
HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
INDICTMENT NO . 03-CR-00002
CHARLES JONES
APPELLEE
ORDER
On the Court's own motion, the Opinion rendered November 22, 2006, in
the above-styled case shall be corrected by the substitution of new pages 1 and 3 of the
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Scott and substitution of a new page 1 of the majority
opinion attached hereto. Said modification does not affect the holding, and is made
only to reflect the correction on page 3 of the dissenting opinion .
Entered: December 1, 2006.
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