JOHN BRITT V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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.9upraur dourf of
2004-SC-0956-MR
JOHN BRITT
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BALLARD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM LEWIS SHADOAN, JUDGE
04-CR-0008
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, John Britt, was convicted in the Ballard Circuit Court of complicity to
manufacture methamphetamine and engaging in organized crime . He was sentenced
to a total of twenty-five years imprisonment and appeals to this Court as a matter of
right. Ky. Const. § 110 (2)(b) . For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the convictions .
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Appellant was involved in a methamphetamine manufacturing operation along
with seven other co-defendants : Teresa Collier (Appellant's mother), James Swann and
his fiancée Amy Wilson (fugitives from Missouri), Jerry Layton (Collier's boyfriend),
Jason Copeland, Angela Penrod (Appellant's girlfriend at the time), and Teresa
Summers (Swann's mother, who has not been apprehended) : Before trial, Swann,
Wilson, and Penrod all pled guilty in exchange for reduced sentences and testimony
implicating the remaining defendants .
The Collier house was the subject of surveillance by the Ballard County Sheriff's
Department for three weeks. The house was ultimately searched, and chemicals and
equipment used to manufacture methamphetamine using the "red phosphorous"
method were seized. The group also used a house on Hazelwood Road to cook
methamphetamine . A search of this location also uncovered supplies for making
methamphetamine.
Testimony showed Swann was the main cook of the methamphetamine, and
Appellant was a protege, of sorts . Members of the group routinely took turns
purchasing ingredients for manufacturing methamphetamine in hopes the purchases
would not raise suspicions . Amy Wilson also testified the group would keep some of the
methamphetamine for personal use, and sell the rest of the batch for money to buy
additional ingredients .
Appellant asserts six claims of error in this appeal : 1) sufficiency of the evidence
on the KRS 506.120 (engaging in organized crime) charge ; 2) double jeopardy ; 3) trial
court error in allowing amendment of the indictment; 4) sufficiency of the evidence on
the complicity to manufacture methamphetamine charge ; 5) trial court error in denying
Appellant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during unconstitutional search and
seizure ; and 6) trial court error in denying motion to separate witnesses.
We find Appellant's claims are without merit; however, each argument is
addressed below.
Appellant first claims the trial court improperly denied his motion for directed
verdict on the organized crime charge. Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to
prove Appellant was involved in trafficking in a controlled substance, one of the
statutory qualifiers of a criminal syndicate under KRS 506.120(3). The crux of
Appellant's complaint concerns the definition of "traffic" found in KRS 218A.010(28)' :
Traffic, except as provided in KRS 218A .1431, means to
manufacture, distribute, dispense, sell, transfer, or possess
with intent to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or sell a
controlled substance .
Appellant asserts that KRS 218A.1431 provides an exception to the general
definition of "traffic" applicable only to methamphetamine offenses, whereby
"manufacture" is not included in the definition . If this interpretation is correct, Appellant
could not be convicted of organized crime because he was not trafficking in a controlled
substance ; rather, he was aiding the manufacture of methamphetamine, which is not an
enumerated criminal syndicate statutory qualifier .
We disagree with Appellant's argument and find it unnecessary to conduct
extensive statutory interpretation. "On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is,
if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt,
only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal ." Commonwealth v.
Benham, 816 S .W .2d 186, 187 (Ky . 1991). The organized crime statute does not
require the Commonwealth to prove trafficking in a controlled substance actually
occurred . Hill v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221, 233 (Ky. 2004). Illegal trafficking is
part of the definition of "criminal syndicate," and evidence of trafficking goes only to
Appellant cites the former version KRS 218A.010 ; in 2005 the definitions were renumbered and subsection 28 is now subsection 34.
3
prove the group qualified as a criminal syndicate under KRS 506 .120(3)(e) . Id .
Accordingly, Appellant violated the organized crime statute once he "provided material
aid" to maintain the criminal syndicate, in contravention of KRS 506.120(1)(b) . As a
result, the testimony and evidence presented by the Commonwealth was sufficient to
present this issue to the jury.
II .
Appellant next alleges his convictions of complicity to manufacture
methamphetamine and engaging in organized crime constitute double jeopardy .
Appellant argues the organized crime charge stems from one incident of manufacturing
methamphetamine, and manufacturing is also the basis for the complicity charge .
We look to the double jeopardy analysis set forth in Blockburger v. United States ,
284 U .S. 299, 52 S .Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed . 306 (1932). This Court interpreted the
Blockburger test as, "whether the act or transaction complained of constitutes a violation
of two distinct statutes and, if it does, if each statute requires proof of a fact the other
does not." . Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805, 811 (Ky. 1996) .
Sufficient proof was introduced to show Appellant furthered the activities of the
criminal syndicate, and additional evidence proved Appellant manufactured
methamphetamine with his co-defendants . Accordingly, we find no double jeopardy
violation in this case because the statutory offenses of organized crime and complicity
to manufacture methamphetamine each require proof of facts the other does not.
Ill.
Appellant next claims the trial court erred by allowing the Commonwealth to
amend the date of occurrence listed on the indictment. Appellant argues "other bad
acts" evidence was admitted because the original indictment listed only December 9,
2003, while the amended indictment included the month of November through
December 9, 2003.
We disagree with Appellant's assertion . The trial court may allow amendment of
the indictment if no new offense is charged, and the defendant is not substantially
prejudiced. RCr 6 .16 . We do not find Appellant was substantially prejudiced by the
amendment . The Commonwealth did not present evidence of uncharged offenses
committed during the revised time period ; rather, the evidence introduced at trial was
offered to prove elements of the charged crimes .
Furthermore, in Gilbert v. Commonwealth , 838 S .W .2d 376, 378 (Ky. 1992), we
upheld the amendment of an indictment altering the year the offense occurred . This
Court noted, "[the defendants] were not surprised or misled by the indictment or its
amendment ." Id. In this case, we are likewise compelled to find the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by allowing amendment of the indictment.
IV.
Appellant's fourth claim of error stems from the trial court's denial of a directed
verdict of acquittal on the complicity to manufacture methamphetamine charge.
Appellant contends he cannot stand convicted of complicity to manufacture because he
did not possess all of the necessary chemicals or equipment required by Kotila v.
Commonwealth , 114 S.W.3d 226 (Ky. 2003) (superseded by statute in KRS
218A.1432(1)(b) (2005) (now requiring possession of two or more chemicals or two or
more items of equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine) .
"On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a
whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is
entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal ." Benham , supra at 87.
Appellant opines there was no red phosphorous found, which is a required
ingredient for the "red phosphorous" method of manufacturing methamphetamine . We
disagree, however, because there was testimony that Appellant and his co-defendants
manufactured methamphetamine at two different locations . At the Hazelwood house, a
quantity of matchbooks with the covers and strike pads ripped off were found along with
burned matchbooks found in a "burn barrel" in the backyard . This is sufficient
circumstantial evidence that Appellant and his co-defendants possessed red
phosphorous at some previous point in time . In Varble v. Commonwealth , 125 S .W .3d
246, 254 (Ky. 2004), we observed it is for the jury to deduce from the evidence whether
all of the ingredients were possessed contemporaneously . Likewise, in Pate v.
Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 593, 596 (Ky. 2004), we noted possession of
methamphetamine ingredients could be actual or constructive . Furthermore, exercising
dominion and control over the contraband demonstrates constructive possession, which
need not be exclusive . Id. In this case, Appellant, Collier, and Layton each held a key
to the Hazelwood house . .
Accordingly, sufficient evidence was introduced for a jury to convict Appellant of
complicity to manufacture methamphetamine . The trial court did not err by denying
Appellant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal .
V.
Appellant next alleges the trial court erred by denying Appellant's motion to
suppress evidence received from an unconstitutional search and seizure .
Employees of Sutton's Drugs notified the Ballard County Sheriff's Department
regarding a suspicious woman who purchased pseudoephedrine tablets on repeated
occasions . The employees described the woman as well as the car she was driving .
Acting on this information, Deputy Jones initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle, driven by
Teresa Summers. After an initial denial, Summers admitted to purchasing the pills and
delivering them to the Collier residence . Deputy Jones did not further detain Teresa
Summers. After advising his superiors of the situation, he drove to the Collier residence
with intent to secure the premises, concerned that Teresa Summers would "tip off' the
occupants to destroy evidence because the police were suspicious .
Appellant responded to Deputy Jones' knock on the front door. Appellant moved
aside and allowed Deputy Jones to pass through the doorway into the house . At this
time Deputy Jones heard a toilet flush. The toilet was located behind a doorway that
was covered by a hanging blanket. Deputy Jones ordered the occupants out of the
bathroom . After no response, Deputy Jones removed the blanket, finding codefendants Swann and Wilson flushing pseudoephedrine pills down the toilet . Deputy
Jones did not search the dwelling further, but gathered the occupants in the front room
and phoned the county attorney to secure a search warrant. At that time, Teresa
Collier, the lessee of the house, arrived . Collier voluntarily consented to a search of the
premises and executed a written consent form . Thereafter, additional officers entered
the home and searched for evidence of manufacturing methamphetamine . After Swann
was in custody, he admitted to flushing the pills and made other incriminating
statements regarding manufacturing methamphetamine at the Collier residence and at
the Hazelwood house.
It is fundamental that police cannot conduct a warrantless search of a private
home absent exigent circumstances . Commonwealth v. McManus, 107 S.W.3d 175,
177 (Ky. 2003) . On a motion to suppress, the trial court's findings of fact are
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence . RCr 9 .78. In this case the trial court
found the warrantless search constitutional on grounds that Deputy Jones entered the
Collier home under exigent circumstances, and the subsequent search of the premises
was conducted pursuant to written consent of the lessee.
We find there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the trial court.
The Collier home had been under police surveillance for three weeks on suspicion the
occupants were operating a methamphetamine lab . Additionally, the police had
received information that Swann and Wilson, fugitives from Missouri, were staying at the
Collier residence . The police had also witnessed Teresa Summers at the Collier house
on numerous occasions, thereby corroborating the information obtained during the
traffic stop conducted by Deputy Jones . Furthermore, the police knew the occupants of
the Collier home purchased high-grade iodine (an ingredient in "red phosphorous"
methamphetamine) from a local farm supply store the day before the traffic stop .
Accordingly, as a matter of law we are bound by the findings of the trial court because
we find no abuse of discretion or clear error.
We also note, however, it may be. unnecessary to rely on the exigent
circumstances exception in this case. Deputy Jones was allowed entry to the Collier
home by Appellant, who is Collier's son. Therefore, it appears Deputy Jones lawfully
entered the Collier home with Appellant's consent and secured the premises until
Teresa Collier arrived and gave consent to a full search .
VI .
Appellant's final contention is the trial court erred by denying his co-defendant's
motion to separate witnesses. Counsel for co-defendant, Layton, moved to separate
witnesses after two of the Commonwealth's witnesses had already testified . Appellant
concedes his defense counsel did not join the motion, nor make a separate motion for
separation . RCr 9.22 states a party claiming error must "mak[e] known to the court the
action which that party desires the court to take or any objection to the action of the
court . . . ." We find Appellant's claim is not preserved for our review because he failed
to request separation of witnesses from the trial court.
Appellant alternatively urges review as palpable error. RCr 10.26. We find
Appellant has not suffered substantial prejudice by failing to invoke separation of
witnesses under KRE 615 . "The rule was adopted to prevent witnesses who have not
yet testified from altering their testimony in light of evidence adduced at trial ." Justice v.
Commonwealth , 987 S.W.2d 306, 315 (Ky. 1998) . Appellant fails to show how he
suffered prejudice, only mentioning Angela Penrod was able to hear the testimony of
other witnesses before she testified . Appellant does not suggest any witness testimony
was falsified or otherwise altered as a result of not being separated. See Id .
Furthermore, we note that the trial court did grant separation of the primary witness for
the Commonwealth, Amy Wilson, on the second day of the trial . Accordingly, we find no
set of facts which rise to the level of palpable error.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment and sentence of the Ballard Circuit Court
are affirmed .
Lambert, C .J., Cooper, Graves, Roach, Scott, and Wintersheimer, J .J ., concur.
Johnstone, J., concurs in result only.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Shannon Dupree
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 301, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
James C. Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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