KEVIN HUBER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTA NT N-0 TiCE
NOT TO BE PUBLISI~ED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PR OCEll URE FROMtILGATED. BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : AUGUST 24, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
*upreme Courf of I
C
'
2004-SC-000912-MR
KEVIN HUBER
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HON. JOHN R. GRISE, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 04-CR-00589
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING IN PART REVERSING IN PART
Appellant, Kevin Huber, was convicted in the Warren Circuit Court on
September 10, 2004, of eleven felony counts of theft by deception over $300,
thirteen misdemeanor counts of theft by deception under $300, and of being a
persistent felony offender (PFO) in the first degree. Final judgment was entered
on September 24, 2004, sentencing Appellant to twenty years imprisonment, a
fine of $6500 and court costs of $160. Appellant now appeals to this Court as a
matter of right pursuant to Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b), alleging several assignments
of error, viz. : (1) that a directed verdict of acquittal was warranted as the
Commonwealth failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically
as to count eleven of the indictment ; (2) that the trial court erred when it
proceeded with the combined Truth in Sentencing and Persistent Felony
Offender phase before having the jury fix his punishment on the thirteen
misdemeanor counts; and, (3) that the trial court erred when it sentenced
Appellant to court costs and fines notwithstanding KRS § 534.040(4). For the
reasons set forth herein, we affirm Appellant's conviction, but reverse that part of
his sentence regarding fines and court costs levied as a result of his
misdemeanor convictions and remand to the trial court for proper sentencing in
accordance with this opinion.
FACTS
Appellant was employed by Express Personnel, a temporary employment
agency in Bowling Green, Kentucky. Appellant and another employee, Courtney
Burkhart, were assigned to work with Sargumi Company, which was doing
business at, and provided product support for, Car Top Systems (CTS), a
Bowling Green company . The two were placed under the supervision of Charles
Coulter, an employee of Sargumi Company . Sargumi required employees to
sign in upon arriving at work and sign out when leaving . However, many times,
for example, Burkhart would sign for himself, Appellant and Coulter as they
arrived and left work at the same time on most occasions. Appellant and
Burkhart would report their hours worked to Express Personnel by filling out
weekly time sheets, and Coulter would sign them before Appellant and Burkhart
each faxed their own timesheets to Express Personnel.
After Appellant had been working for approximately six months, a question
arose concerning the number of hours listed on his timesheets . Although
Appellant initially dodged any questions from Coulter about the issue, he later
admitted to Coulter that he had been adding hours to his timesheets "for a while ."
In doing so, Appellant also admitted that he had a blank timesheet with Coulter's
signature already filled out, allowing Appellant to simply add the additional hours
and then fax the timesheet to Express Personnel.
Coulter immediately fired Appellant and later discovered, after meeting
with Express Personnel, that Appellant had claimed excessive hours for the
previous six to eight weeks. The excessive hours became obvious when the
hours Appellant reported were compared to the sign in sheets used by all
employees. In fact, it was very unusual for any of Coulter's employees to work
overtime, and even rarer for work to occur on weekends . By the time Appellant's
scheme was discovered, he was claiming almost twenty-four hours of unworked
overtime per week, much of it for work on Saturdays.
Following Coulter's calls to Express Personnel, Appellant was requested
to come into the agency's office for questioning . There, Appellant admitted to
several officials, including Express Personnel manager Joan Boone and owner
Rhonda Lafollette, that he had padded his timesheets . Appellant also disclosed
the forgery method he used to ensure Coulter never knew what he was doing .
Appellant finally admitted to cashing the inflated paychecks and that he knew it
was wrong.
Bowling Green Police Detective Darrell Bragg later questioned Appellant
concerning the matter. When asked, Appellant admitted to Det. Bragg that he
had padded his timesheets and was being paid for hours that were not worked.
Appellant was then indicted by the Warren County Grand Jury in August of 2004
on twenty-six counts,' which included twelve felony counts of theft by deception
' Appellant was originally indicted for a single count of theft by deception over
$300 and a persistent felony offender in the first degree . These were later
dismissed on motion of the Commonwealth .
-3-
over $300, thirteen misdemeanor counts of theft by deception under $300, and
one count of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree . Appellant was
then convicted of eleven of the twelve felony counts, as well as all thirteen of the
misdemeanor counts. The jury recommended twenty years on each of the
felonies to run consecutively, and they recommended a $500 fine on all
misdemeanor counts, except one, in which the jury recommended a twelve
month jail sentence. The trial judge later reduced Appellant's sentence to twenty
years, the maximum allowed by law for persistent felony offenders in the first
degree involving Class D felonies . Additionally, the trial court imposed a fine of
$6500, plus court costs, but deferred payment until Appellant was released from
prison . It is from this judgment and sentence that Appellant now appeals.
ANALYSIS
A. Motion for directed verdict.
Appellant alleges that the trial court improperly denied his motion for
directed verdict of acquittal with respect to count eleven of the indictment. Of the
twenty-six total counts, count eleven specifically charged Appellant for theft by
deception in the amount of $367.50 for the week ending October 19, 2003, a
felony charge . KRS § 514.040(1), (7) . Appellant contends that the
Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient for a jury to convict him beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The Commonwealth, however, disputes whether this issue is properly
preserved . The Commonwealth concedes that Appellant's trial counsel did in
fact make a motion for directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the
Commonwealth's case, but claims that Appellant failed to renew this motion
following the close of all the evidence .
[A] motion for directed verdict made after the close of the
Commonwealth's case-in-chief, but not renewed at the close of all
evidence, i .e., after the defense presents its evidence (if it does so)
or after the Commonwealth's rebuttal evidence, is insufficient to
preserve an error based upon insufficiency of the evidence.
Schoenbachler v. Commonwealth, 95 S.W.3d 830, 836 (Ky. 2003) .
The record indicates beyond contravention, however, that during
discussion on jury instructions, Appellant's motion for directed verdict as to all
counts had been renewed, but specifically with respect to counts ten, eleven and
twelve. The renewed motion came after presentation of all the evidence. The
trial judge then overruled the renewed motion on grounds that there was
sufficient evidence such that a jury finding of guilt would not be clearly
unreasonable . Thus, Appellant's motions for directed verdict were properly
preserved .
Appellant's contention that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for
directed verdict of acquittal hinges on the allegation that the Commonwealth's
evidence was insufficient as to whether or not Appellant actually received and
cashed the paycheck concerning count eleven . Additionally, Appellant argues
that the only evidence upon which his conviction for count eleven was premised
involved hearsay evidence from a witness with no personal knowledge of
whether or not Appellant actually received and cashed the paycheck for the week
regarding count eleven . However, because Appellant did not object to the
alleged hearsay during trial, he has waived his right to present this argument on
appeal .
When ruling on motions for directed verdict, a trial court must assume all
the evidence presented by the Commonwealth is, in fact, true, "leaving questions
of weight and credibility to the jury." Baker v. Commonwealth , 973 S .W .2d 54, 55
(Ky. 1998) (citation omitted) . The trial court is further required to "consider not
only the actual evidence, but also `must draw all fair and reasonable inferences
from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth ."' Lawson v. Commonwealth ,
53 S .W.3d 534, 548 (Ky. 2001) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted) .
"On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence
as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal ." Commonwealth v.
Benham , 816 S .W.2d 186,187 (Ky. 1991) (citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill , 660
S .W .2d 3 (Ky. 1983)) . Stated differently, if after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, "any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" then a directed
verdict of acquittal may not be granted . Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319,
99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Furthermore, the task of the
reviewing body is not to ask itself whether it believes that guilt was established
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, but whether a rational trier of fact could have
reasonably found so. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319; Commonwealth v. Jones, 880
S.W.2d 544, 545 (Ky. 1994).
In this case, the Commonwealth clearly established beyond a reasonable
doubt that Appellant was involved in an ongoing scheme whereby he was
consistently padding his time sheets and receiving payment for hours which he
did not work. Furthermore, the Commonwealth introduced ample testimony
alleging that Appellant had claimed more hours than he had actually worked, that
he openly confessed to doing so to more than one person, and that he had in fact
received payment for these unworked hours. Appellant also admitted to Express
Personnel owner Rhonda Lafollette that he was receiving inflated paychecks and
cashing them. Thus, we find that a reasonable trier of fact could have found
Appellant guilty as to count eleven of the indictment when the evidence is viewed
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and hold that the trial court
correctly overruled Appellant's motion for directed verdict as to all counts .
Appellant's remaining argument, though not preserved for review, is that
the only evidence from which a jury could reasonably find him guilty of count
eleven was testimony from Joan Boone, manager of Express Personnel .
Appellant alleges Ms. Boone had no personal knowledge as to whether Appellant
actually received and cashed the check in question . KRE 602 . Appellant further
argues that Ms. Boone's testimony was hearsay and based on statements from
someone in the corporate office that the check had been distributed and cashed.
KRE 801(c), 802. Initially, Appellant objected to a photocopy of what was alleged
to be a cleared check, issued by Express Personnel to the Appellant for the week
in question . The trial court sustained this objection on the basis that the
photocopy was illegible . However, Appellant never objected at trial when Ms.
Boone testified that Appellant's check for this week was distributed and cleared
Express Personnel's account.
This Court has addressed a similar issue, under very similar
circumstances, in Sherley v. Commonwealth , 889 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1994) . In
Sherley, as in the case at bar, the appellant complained of hearsay testimony,
though he failed to object to the testimony during trial, and thus failed to preserve
it for appellate review . This Court held that "[e]rror on appeal cannot be
considered in the absence of a proper objection to preserve that error for
appellate review." Id. at 796 (citing Todd v. Commonwealth , 716 S.W .2d 242
(Ky. 1986)). Nevertheless, we held the alleged error in Sherlev to be harmless
as the complained of hearsay evidence was cumulative and there was "no
substantial possibility that the result would have been any different ." Id.
Though unpreserved, if any error resulted from the admission of Ms.
Boone's testimony, it would be nonetheless harmless, as the Commonwealth
submitted ample evidence, including statements from various witnesses that
Appellant confessed to padding his timesheets and being paid for unworked
hours, from which the jury could reasonably conclude Appellant's guilt as to the
count in question . Moreover, a "[c]onviction can be premised on circumstantial
evidence of such nature that, based on the whole case, it would not be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Graves v.
Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 858, 862 (Ky. 2000) . Here, we have a case where,
"when the various items of evidence are added together, a mosaic appears upon
which a reasonable jury could look and conclude that appellant was guilty ."
Davis v. Commonwealth , 795 S.W.2d 942, 947 (Ky. 1990) . Thus a jury finding of
guilt was not clearly unreasonable, despite the admission of hearsay evidence for
which Appellant failed to object .
Finally, we see no reason to review this issue for substantial error under
RCr 10.26 . "[T]his is not an extraordinary case in which a constitutional violation
has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent ." Sherley ,
889 S.W.2d at 798 (citation omitted) .
Finding no error otherwise, we affirm Appellant's conviction and uphold
the trial court's denial of a directed verdict of acquittal on this issue as the
evidence was sufficient that a jury determination of guilt as to count eleven was
not unreasonable.
B. Truth-in-sentencing/persistent felony offender phase.
In Appellant's second assignment of error, he argues the trial court erred
when it proceeded with the combined truth-in-sentencing/persistent felony
offender (TIS/PFO) phase of the trial before having the jury fix his punishment
regarding the thirteen misdemeanor convictions . In making this argument,
Appellant contends that this Court's certification of law regarding KRS §
532 .055(1) in Commonwealth v. Philpott, 75 S .W.3d 209 (Ky. 2002), applies in
this instance . Appellant also correctly points out that this alleged error is not
preserved for appellate review, but nonetheless requests this Court to review the
record under the substantial error standard of RCr 10.26.
Initially, we find that Appellant's argument is correct. In certifying the law
in Philpott, supra, we stated that "[i]f, upon the conclusion of the trial of a
multicount indictment, the jury returns verdicts finding the defendant guilty of both
felony and misdemeanor offenses, and if either of the parties intends to offer
evidence pursuant to KRS 532.055(2)," then the jury must immediately be
instructed on the penalty range for the misdemeanor convictions first, "after
which the procedure described in KRS 532.055(2) and (3) shall be followed with
respect to the felony convictions ." Philpott, 75 S.W.3d at 213-14.
The trial court in this case erred in failing to adhere to the well-reasoned
decision in Phil ott, supra. However, because the Appellant failed to preserve
this issue for appellate review, we must now determine whether manifest
injustice resulted from the trial court's failure to act in accordance with the law.
We do not believe that a substantial error occurred in this case, as the result
would have been the same had the court adhered to the proper procedure in
sentencing Appellant, and thus Appellant suffered no manifest injustice .
"RCr 10.26 provides that an alleged error improperly preserved for
appellate review may be revisited upon a demonstration that it resulted in
manifest injustice ." Butcher v. Commonwealth , 96 S.W.2d 3, 11 (Ky. 2002) .
Manifest injustice may be found where there is "a palpable error . . . which affects
the substantial rights of a party and relief may be granted for palpable errors only
upon a determination that a manifest injustice has resulted from the error." Partin
v. Commonwealth, 918 S .W.2d 219, 224 (Ky. 1996). Furthermore, a palpable
error "must involve prejudice more egregious than that occurring in reversible
error." Ernst v. Commonwealth , 160 S.W.3d 744, 758 (Ky. 2005).
Palpable error review is a fact-intensive inquiry and involves a case by
case analysis . Ernst, 160 S.W.2d at 758 (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S.
1, 16,105 S.Ct. 1038,1046-47, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)) . "This means, upon
consideration of the whole case, the reviewing court must conclude that a
substantial possibility exists that the result would have been different in order to
grant relief." Id. (citing Jackson v. Commonwealth , 717 S .W.2d 511 (Ky. 1986)).
Thus, we look to determine whether the punishment imposed on Appellant for the
thirteen misdemeanor convictions would have been different as a result of the
-10-
court's error in combining the TIS/PFO phase of the trial with the misdemeanor
sentencing .
KRS § 514.040(7) provides that theft by deception under $300 is a Class
A misdemeanor. KRS § 534.040(2)(a) in turn provides that a fine of $500 is to be
imposed where the defendant is found guilty of a Class A misdemeanor .
Furthermore, KRS § 532.090(1) states that a Class A misdemeanor may be
punishable by up to, but no more than, 12 months imprisonment, and this is
considered a "definite term" of imprisonment. Finally, KRS § 534.040(1)
provides :
Fines and imprisonment for misdemeanors shall not be mutually
exclusive . In any case where imprisonment is authorized, a fine
may be levied in addition to the imprisonment, or a fine may be
levied in lieu of imprisonment. Whether the fine is to be levied as
the sole penalty or as an additional or alternative penalty shall be in
the discretion of the judge or jury as the case may be . If the trial is
by jury, the jury shall have the discretion . This rule shall apply in all
cases where a fine is not the exclusive penalty authorized by law.
Appellant received a fine of $500, as required by KRS § 534.040(2) for a
Class A misdemeanor, for twelve of the thirteen misdemeanor counts, and he
received a sentence of imprisonment for twelve months for the last misdemeanor
count pursuant to KRS § 532.090(1) . The jury had only these two options in
rendering its punishment. Further, fines and imprisonment are not mutually
exclusive, and imposing one does not negate the other. KRS § 534.040(1) . In
any event, Appellant's twelve month prison sentence was set to run concurrently
with his persistent felony offender in the first degree charge - the maximum
allowed by law. Thus, Appellant would serve no additional time in prison on his
misdemeanor convictions .
While we do not diminish the importance of a bifurcated penalty phase as
required by Phil ott, supra, we find the trial court's failure to do so in this case did
not result in manifest injustice .
C. Court costs and fines levied in contradiction of KRS § 534.040(4).
In Appellant's final assignment of error, he alleges the trial court
improperly assessed fines and costs against him despite the fact that the trial
court had already recognized his indigent status pursuant to KRS Chapter 31 .
Furthermore, Appellant again correctly points out to this Court that this alleged
error is not preserved for appellate review, but nonetheless requests the Court to
review the issue pursuant to the substantial error standard of RCr 10.26.
Having already enunciated the standard when reviewing unpreserved
errors for substantial error and manifest injustice, we find that, in this case, the
trial court's failure to recognize Appellant's indigent status resulted in manifest
injustice . But for the court's error, the result would have been different .
Appellant was found to be indigent under KRS Chapter 31 and also had a
Department of Public Advocacy attorney appointed to represent him in the
underlying action . After filing a notice of appeal and a motion to proceed on
appeal in forma paugeris , the trial court entered an order adjudging Appellant to
be indigent, per KRS § 453.190 and KRS § 31 .110(2), and granted his motion to
proceed on appeal without payment of costs. Appellant had also signed an
affidavit of indigency on March 31, 2004.
KRS § 534.040(4) provides : "Fines required by this section shall not be
imposed upon any person determined by the court to be indigent pursuant to
KRS Chapter 31 ." Furthermore, KRS § 23A .205(2) states that "taxation of court
costs against a defendant, upon conviction in a case, shall be mandatory . . .
unless the court finds that the defendant is a poor person as defined by KRS
453.190(2) and that he or she is unable to pay court costs and will be unable to
pay court costs in the foreseeable future ."
Here, the jury fixed Appellant's punishment for twelve of the thirteen
misdemeanor convictions at $500 for each Class A misdemeanor, pursuant to
KRS § 534 .040(2)(a) . This must have been an oversight by the trial court.
Appellant was an indigent person as provided for by the laws of this
Commonwealth, and thus any levying of fines is specifically prohibited in this
instance.
The trial court also levied court costs by failing to check the box on the
final judgment marked "court costs are waived due to defendant having been
found to be a `poor person' under KRS 453 .190(2) ." KRS § 23A.205(2) requires
the court to find that the Appellant is unable to pay the costs and will be unable to
pay the costs in the foreseeable future . Thus, upon remand, the court must, in
addition to its earlier ruling finding that Appellant was a "poor person" as defined
in KRS § 453.190(2), find that Appellant is and will be unable to pay the court
costs.
Although Appellant's underlying convictions are not affected by this ruling,
the case must be remanded so that the court can enter the appropriate
punishment, which would involve removing fines for twelve of Appellant's thirteen
misdemeanor convictions due to his indigent status . Appellant's twelve month
sentence as fixed by the jury for his remaining misdemeanor conviction, pursuant
to KRS § 532.090(1) would thus be set to run concurrently with his sentence for
-13-
his persistent felony offender status. Remanding is also necessary so that the
trial court can assess whether or not court costs are appropriate in this instance .
Thus, we reverse that portion of the final judgment imposing fines and
costs and remand the issue to the circuit court for resentencing in accordance
with this opinion.
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Donna L. Boyce
Julie Namkin
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Damon L. Preston
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 301
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.