CHRISTOPHER NUCKOLS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : JUNE 15, 2006
,Siturmur Courf of ~i
2004-SC-000886-MR
CHRISTOPHER NUCKOLS
V.
D 7IS-G-010
DA
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HON . PHILLIP R. PATTON, JUDGE
NO. 03-CR-000482
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART
Appellant, Christopher Nuckols, was convicted in the Barren Circuit Court for
first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, first-degree burglary, first-degree
kidnapping, attempted first-degree sodomy, fourth-degree assault, third-degree
terroristic threatening, and theft by unlawful taking under $300. After a jury trial,
Appellant was sentenced to twenty years in prison for the rape and to varying terms of
imprisonment on the remaining charges, all to run concurrently . He now asks that we
reverse his convictions on three of the underlying charges-first-degree kidnapping,
fourth-degree assault, and third-degree terroristic threatening-but does not challenge
any of the remaining convictions or ask that we grant him a new trial. Specifically, he
claims that his conviction for kidnapping should have been dismissed pursuant to KRS
509.050, the kidnapping exemption statute, and that his convictions for assault and
terroristic threatening should have been dismissed because they amount to double
jeopardy as prohibited in both the United States and Kentucky Constitutions and by
KRS 505 .020 .
1. Background
The underlying facts in this case are largely undisputed by the parties. On
September 6, 2003, the victim returned home from work between 10:00 and 10 :30 p.m.
She was 6
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months pregnant. After a short visit from friends, the woman heard
someone enter her home and shortly thereafter was confronted by a large AfricanAmerican man with a stocking covering his face, later identified as Appellant . He
appeared to be carrying a small paddle in the back of his shorts.
Immediately, Appellant grabbed the victim's cell phone and shut and locked the
door to her home . He threatened the woman, grabbed her breast, and instructed her to
perform oral sex on him. When she refused, Appellant threw her over the side of a
recliner, pulled her pants off, ripping her underwear, and attempted to have anal
intercourse with her. At some point, Appellant struck the victim in the face. Next,
Appellant threw the victim to the floor and, after repeated failed attempts at anal
intercourse, forced her to engage in vaginal intercourse . After ejaculating, Appellant left
the victim's home . During the course of the attack, Appellant repeatedly told the victim
to "shut up," threatened to harm her baby, and referred to her by name . The victim
testified that she recognized Appellant as a neighbor, but did not know his name . She
stated that she remembered having spoken with him briefly on the day she moved into
her house .
After waiting a short time, the victim, whose cell phone had been stolen by
Appellant, left her home and went to a local convenience store to call the police. A
Glasgow police dispatcher received her telephone call early in the morning of
September 7, 2003 . The dispatcher testified at trial that the victim was distraught and
claimed to have been raped. Officers responded to the call, and the woman gave a
description of her assailant before being takers to a local emergency room for
examination and treatment of minor injuries. While at the hospital, the victim was
questioned by officers and identified Appellant in a photo lineup. At least one officer
also went to the victim's residence, the site of the incident, where he observed signs of
a struggle and a plastic lawn chair placed under one of the windows of the victim's
house .
After Appellant was identified, officers went to his house, which was located just
down the street from that of the victim . Appellant was apprehended at the rear of the
residence and officers obtained consent from his mother to search the home . During
the search, police found : a fan blade that had been removed from a ceiling fan, used
condoms, and wadded panty hose. Officers also observed two plastic lawn chairs,
which were similar to the one found under the window at the victim's residence .
Appellant and his mother were transported to the police station for questioning .
Appellant initially denied any involvement with the attack. As the questioning
progressed, Appellant made admissions indicating his involvement in the attack.
Appellant then confessed to police that he had taken the victim's cell phone and had
thrown it out in a park after the assault. Later that night, Appellant led police to the
phone.
Because he was 17 at the time of the incident, Appellant was initially charged in
juvenile court . Shortly thereafter, the Commonwealth moved to transfer the case to
circuit court and to proceed against Appellant as a youthful offender in accordance with
KRS 640.010. The district court granted that motion on September 25, 2003. Trial
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began on July 1, 2004 and lasted just two days. After trial, but before sentencing,
Appellant filed a pro se motion asking for post-trial DNA testing . The court granted the
motion . Testing was completed prior to final sentencing and showed that DNA samples
from bodily fluids recovered from the victim's body matched samples provided by
Appellant . The report concluded that "[t]he estimated frequency of this profile is one
person in six quadrillion based on the United States African American or Caucasian
populations ." On September 27, 2004, Appellant was sentenced to twenty years in
prison as recommended by the jury. He appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky.
Const. ยง 110(2)(b) .
11. Analysis
As noted above, Appellant claims that his convictions for first-degree kidnapping,
third-degree terroristic threatening, and fourth-degree assault were improper. He
argues that he should not have been prosecuted for kidnapping pursuant to the
kidnapping exemption statute, KRS 509.050. He also argues that the remaining two
convictions were improper because they subjected him to double jeopardy as prohibited
by the Federal and Kentucky Constitutions and by KRS 505 .020 . At the outset, we
must address the Commonwealth's contention that the errors asserted by Appellant
were not preserved at trial.
Appellant's first claim of error-that prosecution for kidnapping was precluded by
the exemption statute-was preserved by his timely motion for a directed verdict. That
motion was offered at the close of the Commonwealth's proof on the afternoon of July 1,
2004, and was renewed after his own evidence was submitted on the morning of July 2,
2004 . In his initial directed verdict motion, Appellant specifically objected to the
kidnapping charge, stating that he did not believe there was any proof of conduct in
excess of what is ordinary to commit the other charged offenses. This claim was
consistent with the presentation of the kidnapping charge in the original indictment and
tracked the language of the kidnapping exemption statute . The Commonwealth and
trial court responded to Appellant's contention, stating that the kidnapping charge in the
indictment had been amended to read, "The Grand Jury charges that on or about
September 6 or 7, 2003, in Barren County, Kentucky, the defendant committed the
crime of KIDNAPPING when he unlawfully restrained [the victim] with intent to
accomplish or advance the commission of a felony ." It must be noted, however, that the
motion to amend, as well as the order amending the indictment were not filed in the
record until July 2, 2004, the second day of trial . Furthermore, it is apparent from the
record that when Appellant's counsel moved for a directed verdict on July 1, 2004, he
was unaware that the indictment had been amended .
In addition, while reviewing the proposed jury instructions in the judge's
chambers, Appellant's counsel specifically objected to the instruction on the kidnapping
charge, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to allow conviction . Although
Appellant's counsel never explicitly raised the applicability of the kidnapping exemption
statute, he had alluded to it in his initial directed verdict motion, arguing that there had
not been any proof of conduct in excess of that normally necessary to complete -the
charged offenses . Given these circumstances-Appellant's apparent lack of notice
regarding the amendment of the indictment, his timely motions for directed verdict, and
his consistent objections to the kidnapping charge--we believe Appellant did enough to
preserve the issue for our review.
Appellant acknowledges that he did not specifically preserve his double jeopardy
claims . However, we have typically allowed review of such claims even if not properly
preserved for review. See Sherlev v. Commonwealth , 558 S .W.2d 615, 618 (Ky. 1977) .
Although we questioned the wisdom of this approach in a later case, we nevertheless
continued to follow the rule set forth in Sherlev . See Baker v. Commonwealth , 922
S .W.2d 371, 374 (Ky. 1996) . As such, we will review Appellant's double jeopardy
claims despite the fact that they are unpreserved .
A. Applicability of the Kidnapping Exemption Statute
The first issue we must address is the applicability of the kidnapping exemption
statute, KRS 509.050, which provides :
A person may not be convicted of unlawful imprisonment in the first
degree, unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, or kidnapping when
his criminal purpose is the commission of an offense defined outside this
chapter and his interference with the victim's liberty occurs immediately
with and incidental to the commission of that offense, unless the
interference exceeds that which is ordinarily incident to commission of the
offense which is the objective of his criminal purpose . The exemption
provided by this section is not applicable to a charge of kidnapping that
arises from an interference with another's liberty that occurs incidental to
the commission of a criminal escape.
As we stated in Gilbert v. Commonwealth , 637 S .W.2d 632 (Ky. 1982), "[t]he purpose of
the statute is to prevent misuse of the kidnapping statute to secure greater punitive
sanction for rape, robbery and other offenses which have as an essential or incidental
element a restriction of another's liberty ." Id . at 635 .
We have held that the applicability of the kidnapping exemption statute is a
question of law that is to be decided by the trial court . Calloway v. Commonwealth , 550
S.W.2d 501, 502-03 (Ky. 1977) ("[T]he application of KRS 509.050 is to be determined
by the trial court and not by a jury in the absence of standards by which a jury could
make such a determination ."). In a recent case we set forth the requirements that must
be met before the kidnapping exemption will apply:
Application of the exemption is determined on a case-by-case basis. A
three-part test must be satisfied before the exemption is applicable . First,
the criminal purpose must be the commission of an offense defined
outside Chapter 509; second, the interference with the victim's liberty must
occur immediately with and incidental to the commission of the underlying
offense ; and finally, the interference with the victim's liberty must not
exceed that which is normally incidental to the commission of the
underlying offense .
Murphy v. Commonwealth , 50 S.W.3d 173, 180 (Ky. 2001) (internal citations omitted) .
The Commonwealth concedes that the first two prongs of the three-part test-namely, that the purpose of the kidnapping was the commission of a crime defined
outside Chapter 509 and that the interference with the victim's liberty must occur
immediately with and incidental to the commission of the underlying offense--were
satisfied in this case . As to the third prong, however, the Commonwealth argues that
Appellant's actions interfered with the victim's liberty to a greater extent than would
normally be associated with crimes of this type. The factual basis of this claim was the
undisputed testimony that upon entering the victim's home, Appellant seized her cell
phone and then shut and locked the door. Appellant contends that the kidnapping
exemption statute would be meaningless if it can be avoided by proof of such peripheral
facts. We agree.
The proof at trial was uncontroverted that Appellant assaulted the victim
immediately after entering her home and securing the door. Likewise, the proof
demonstrated that Appellant departed immediately after completing the attack. There
was no proof that Appellant restrained the victim in any way either before or after the
attack . This is precisely the sort of case in which the kidnapping exemption statute is
designed to apply. In Timmons v. Commonwealth , 555 S.W .2d 234 (Ky. 1977), we
discussed KRS 509.050, noting:
In retrospect, we think it might have been well for the drafters simply to
omit the "unless" clause, because it is hard to see how a restraint could be
"immediately with and incidental to" the commission of another offense
and at the same time exceed "that which is ordinarily incident" to the
commission of such other offense . The consensus view of the court is to
resolve the ambiguity in favor of the "immediately with and incidental to"
phraseology, which means that the statute will be construed strictly and
restrictively unless and until it be amended to the contrary . Therefore, if
the victim of a crime is going to be restrained of his liberty in order to
facilitate its commission, the restraint will have to be close in distance and
brief in time in order for the exemption to apply. If the victim is restrained
and transported any substantial distance to or from the place at which the
crime is committed or to be committed, the offender will be guilty of an
unlawful imprisonment offense as well.
Id . at 240-41 . In this case there can be no question that the restraint on the victim's
liberty was "immediately with and incidental to" the commission of the underlying
crimes . Likewise there was no evidence, apart from Appellant locking the door, which
might indicate restraint which "exceed[ed] that which is ordinarily incident to
commission" of such an offense. As we wrote in Timmons, it is difficult to imagine a
factual scenario in which the "unless" clause would operate to prevent application of the
exemption statute . Suffice to say, this is not such a case. In light of the foregoing, the
trial court erred in allowing Appellant's conviction for kidnapping in the first degree and
that conviction is reversed .
B. Double Jeopardy
Next, we must determine whether Appellant's convictions for third-degree
terroristic threatening and fourth-degree assault should be reversed as violations of
statutory and constitutional protections against double jeopardy . Both the Federal
Constitution, via the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Kentucky Constitution,
in Section Thirteen, prohibit multiple prosecutions for the same criminal offense . In
addition to the constitutional protections, Kentucky has also enacted a statute, KRS
505.020, which outlines the principles to be applied in determining whether a single
course of conduct will give rise to multiple criminal convictions .
In Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1997), we "declare[d] that
double jeopardy issues arising out of multiple prosecutions henceforth will be analyzed
in accordance with the principles set forth in Blockburger v. United States , supra , and
KRS 505.020 ." Id. at 811 . Specifically, we held that "[d]ouble jeopardy does not occur
when a person is charged with two crimes arising from the same course of conduct, as
long as each statute `requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."' Id.
at 809 (quoting Blockburger v. United States , 284 U .S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct . 180; 182, 76
L .Ed . 306, 309 (1932)). As noted in Bur e, KRS 505.020(1)(a) and (2)(a) codify the
Blockburger test. 947 S .W.2d at 809.
Appellant contends that he may not be convicted of fourth-degree assault and
third-degree terroristic threatening because the facts used to prove those charges were
also used to prove the forcible compulsion element of his convictions for first-degree
rape and first-degree sexual abuse. But this misconstrues the applicable test as set
forth in Bur e . In Matthews v. Commonwealth, 44 S .W.3d 361 (Ky. 2001), the Court
applied the Blockburger test, as set forth in Burge, and concluded that a drunken driver
who collided with and caused injury to another party could be convicted of both fourthdegree assault and first-degree wanton endangerment . The Court reasoned :
These offenses each require proof of an element which the other does
not. See Commonwealth v. Burge, Ky., 947 S.W .2d 805, 811 (1996) .
Assault in the fourth degree requires a finding of physical injury, whereas
wanton endangerment does not. Wanton endangerment requires conduct
which creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to
another, whereas fourth-degree assault does not. Thus, Appellant's
argument is without merit.
Matthews, 44 S .W.3d at 365. Similarly, in McKinney v. Commonwealth , 60 S .W.3d 409
(Ky. 2001), the Court upheld convictions for second-degree arson, three counts of
abuse of a corpse, and tampering with physical evidence for a defendant who had
attempted to conceal evidence of a triple-murder by burning a building containing the
bodies . Although the charges all stemmed from the single act of setting fire to the
building, the Court held "[i]t is clear that each charge requires proof of at least one fact
which the other two do not." Id. at 510.
Turning to the facts of this case, we must consider whether Appellant's
convictions for assault and terroristic threatening are appropriate in light of his
convictions for rape and sexual abuse. As in Matthews, we must consider whether
"[t]hese offenses each require proof of an element which the other does not." 44 S.W.3d
at 365 . An individual is guilty of fourth-degree assault under KRS 508.030(1)(a) if "[h]e
intentionally or wantonly causes physical injury to another person." In this case, the
evidence showed that Appellant injured the victim by striking her in the face . An
individual is guilty of third-degree terroristic threatening under KRS 508 .080(1)(a) if "[h]e
threatens to commit any crime likely to result in death or serious physical injury to
another person or likely to result in substantial property damage to another person." 1n
this case, the evidence showed that Appellant had threatened to kill the victim and her
unborn child . First-degree rape requires proof that an individual "engages in sexual
intercourse with another person by forcible compulsion," KRS 510.040(1)(a), and firstdegree sexual abuse requires proof that an individual "subjects another person to
sexual contact by forcible compulsion." KRS 510 .110(1)(a). For the purposes of both
statutes, the definition of "forcible compulsion" is set forth in KRS 510 .010(2) :
"Forcible compulsion" means physical force or threat of physical force,
express or implied, which places a person in fear of immediate death,
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physical injury to self or another person, fear of the immediate kidnap of
self or another person, or fear of any offense under this chapter. Physical
resistance on the part of the victim shall not be necessary to meet this
definition .
Applying the Blockburger test, it is clear that both first-degree rape and firstdegree sexual abuse require proof of elements-proof of sexual intercourse and proof
of sexual contact, respectively-that are not required for conviction of either fourthdegree assault or third-degree terroristic threatening . The question remains whether
the fourth-degree assault and third-degree terroristic threatening charges contain an
element that is different from the elements of the rape and sexual abuse charges.
Both first-degree rape and first-degree sexual abuse require proof of forcible
compulsion which, as defined in KRS 510.010(2), need not include any proof of physical
injury . Fourth-degree assault requires proof of "physical injury to another person."
Because fourth-degree assault requires proof of physical injury, which is not a required
element of either first-degree rape or first-degree sexual abuse, Appellant's contention
that his conviction for fourth-degree assault and the two sex crimes amounted to a
violation of double jeopardy principles is without merit.
Similarly, third-degree terroristic threatening requires proof of a threat "to commit
any crime likely to result in death or serious physical injury to another person." On the
other hand, forcible compulsion, the relevant element of first-degree rape and firstdegree sexual assault, only requires a "threat of physical force, express or implied ."
The key distinction is in the nature and severity of the threatened behavior. The threat to
commit a crime, the key element of third-degree terroristic threatening, is simply
different than a threat of physical force as contemplated in the statutory definition of
forcible compulsion Although, this is a somewhat more subtle distinction than the
requirement of physical injury, it is nonetheless dispositive of the issue . While the facts
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of a case might often give rise to charges under both statutes, one can imagine a
scenario where a threat of physical force sufficient to establish forcible compulsion
would be insufficiently specific to justify a conviction for third-degree terroristic
threatening . Thus, Appellant's contention that his conviction for third-degree terroristic
threatening was in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy is also without
merit .
111. Conclusion
Appellant has challenged convictions that were scheduled to run concurrently
with more serious offenses . In these cases, we have acknowledged that our decision to
reverse will not result in any change in the term of Appellant's sentence. Beaty v.
Commonwealth , 125 S.W.3d 196, 214 (Ky . 2003). Nevertheless, we have noted that
"[t]he separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse
collateral consequences that may not be ignored ." Ball v. United States , 470 U .S. 856,
865, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 1673, 84 L .Ed.2d 740 (1985) (quoted with approval in Beaty) .
As we have noted, Appellant has not appealed his convictions for first-degree
rape, first-degree sexual abuse, first-degree burglary, attempted first-degree sodomy
and theft by unlawful taking under $300. However, for the reasons set forth above,
Appellant's conviction for first-degree kidnapping is reversed and the judgment of the
court as to that charge is vacated . Appellant's convictions for fourth-degree assault and
third-degree terroristic threatening are affirmed .
Lambert, CJ ; Johnstone, Roach and Scott, JJ., concur . iiriintersheimer, J.,
concurs in result only.
Cooper, J., dissents in part and would also vacate the conviction of terroristic
threatening because it merged into the forcible compulsion element of the offense of
rape in the first degree .
Graves, J ., dissents and would not reverse Appellant's kidnapping conviction .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Gail Robinson
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
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