GEORGE EDWARD MALONE JR. V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. f' PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
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SUPREME CO URT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
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CASE INANY COUR T OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 21, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,*uyrrmr Courf of
2004-SC-000885-MR
GEORGE EDWARD MALONE, JR.
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
NO. 03-CR-000494 AND 03-CR-000970
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
In the spring of 2002, the victim, Candace Bell, became a pen pal with
Appellant, George Edward Malone, Jr ., one who was in prison . On Bell's first prison
visit with Appellant, they began a sexual relationship . After Appellant was paroled in
August of 2002, the couple moved in together.
Bell and Appellant had a tumultuous relationship from the start. In
January of 2003, Bell approached the apartment of Mr. Andre Owen with cries for help
and screams that someone was trying to kill her. Upon opening his door, Owen
observed Bell "balled up" on his doorstep . She entered Owen's apartment and he
called 911 for assistance . Emergency personnel took Bell to the emergency room
where the examining physician observed various abrasions and bruises on her head,
arm, hand, elbow and knee, and that both eyes were swollen. During the examination
Bell revealed that she had been raped and sodomized by Appellant. Specifically, she
stated that Appellant had beaten her for several days, choked her with a belt to the point
of loss of consciousness, sexually assaulted her both vaginally and anally with his penis
and with a screwdriver and stuffed a sock in her mouth while tying her up with duct tape.
She later repeated these statements to a detective, adding that Appellant would not
allow her to leave the apartment.
Appellant was charged and indicted on one count of kidnapping, one
count of wanton endangerment in the first degree, two counts of rape in the first degree,
two counts of sodomy in the first degree, one count of assault in the fourth degree and
of being a persistent felony offender (PFO) in the first degree . At trial, Bell's testimony
differed significantly from the prior statements she had made at the hospital and to
detectives immediately following the incident . However, a jury returned a verdict of
guilty on all counts. Appellant was sentenced to fifty years on each of the rape counts
and each of the sodomy counts, all to run concurrently. He was sentenced to twenty
years for kidnapping and twenty years for wanton endangerment, to run concurrently .
The fifty-year and the twenty-year concurrent sentences were ordered to run
consecutively for a total of seventy years . Appellant appeals to this court as a matter of
right,' asserting that the trial court erred by refusing to strike a juror for cause, permitting
certain evidence of other crimes and bad acts to be introduced, prohibiting the
introduction of certain letters written by the victim, and failing to instruct the jury on
unlawful imprisonment in the second degree .
Appellant asserts that his conviction should be reversed due to prejudicial
error resulting from the trial court's refusal to strike juror number 59413 for cause.
1 Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) .
During voir dire, certain jurors expressed doubt about their ability to observe the
presumption of innocence before all the evidence was presented . One juror specifically
alluded to the fact that a grand jury had returned an indictment indicating probable
cause . The trial court responded with a thorough explanation of the indictment process
and emphasized the presumption of innocence .
Upon completion of voir dire, defense counsel moved the court to excuse
certain jurors for cause based on their doubts regarding the presumption of innocence.
When the motion was made to strike juror number 59413, the trial court noted that
although this juror had initially voiced concern over her ability to observe the
presumption, she retreated from this view following the court's explanation .
Accordingly, the court denied the motion to strike the juror for cause.
Appellant contends that the trial court confused the juror in question with
juror number 80776 who had also commented on the presumption of innocence during
voir dire. It does appear that the trial court may have been mistaken initially as to the
juror's identity. However, the trial court also noted that juror number 59413 retreated
from her position and did not voice concerns following the court's explanation of the
presumption of innocence. As the camera remained on the trial judge during her
explanation and during follow-up questions, the video record does not reveal the jurors'
non-audible responses . However, the video record does reveal that the trial court,
using a diagram of the jurors' seat and badge numbers, diligently made written notes of
juror responses throughout voir dire . Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion by refusing to strike the juror. Moreover, to demonstrate
2 Mabe v. Commonwealth , 884 S .W.2d 668 (Ky. 1994).
reversible error, Appellant must show not only that the trial court abused its discretion,
but also that he was prejudiced by the error. In the instant case, even assuming that
the trial court confused the two jurors, no prejudice resulted as the trial court granted
defense counsel's motion to strike juror number 80776 for cause and Appellant used a
peremptory challenge to excuse juror number 59413. Under Morgan, there was no
error.
Appellant also claims error in the trial court's admission of evidence of
certain other crimes and bad acts, which included Appellant's prior assaults on the
victim, violation of a no contact order, parole violations, and his possession of a stolen
automobile . Prior to trial, the Commonwealth provided notice of its intent to introduce
evidence of Appellant's prior assaults on the victim, the primary assault having been
one which occurred in November or December of 2002, only a month or two before the
acts giving rise to this case. This resulted in the victim's flight to a shelter in
Elizabethtown . Appellant objected to the introduction of this evidence . After a hearing,
the trial court held that evidence of the prior assault was admissible and deferred ruling
on the admissibility of any additional assaults until trial. At trial, the Commonwealth did,
in fact, solicit from the victim evidence of one additional prior incident of Appellant
slapping her. However, no contemporaneous objection was made, rendering the issue
unpreserved . Thus, we will review the only preserved issue, the assault that prompted
the victim to flee to the shelter in Elizabethtown .
At the pre-trial hearing, the trial court ruled that evidence of the identified
assault was admissible because it occurred close in time to the charged acts, was
3 Moroan v. Commonwealth , 189 S .W.3d 99 (Ky. 2006).
sufficiently similar to the charged acts, and was offered to demonstrate a pattern of
conduct and to negate the assertion that some of the injuries were inflicted accidentally .
Evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible to prove the defendant's
character.4 However, KRE 404(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of legitimate purposes
for which such evidence may be admitted . For example, prior bad acts evidence may
be admissible, inter alia, to prove motive, intent, plan, or absence of mistake or
accident .5 In this instance, the trial court concluded that evidence of the prior assault
was similar in nature as it involved physical abuse against the same victim for similar
reasons; and that both altercations were provoked by suspicions and accusations of
infidelity. Furthermore, the evidence was offered to prove that the injuries were not
accidentally inflicted as Appellant asserted . After concluding that evidence of the
assault was being offered for a legitimate purpose under KRE 404(b), the trial court
determined that its prejudicial effect did not outweigh its probative value and it therefore
satisfied the balancing test of KRE 403. As "abuse of discretion is the proper standard
of review of a trial court's evidentiary rulings," s Appellant must demonstrate that the trial
court's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, or unsupported by sound legal principles.7
As noted above, the trial court articulated sound reasons for exercising its discretion to
admit evidence of the prior assault. Thus, Appellant's contention is defeated .
With respect to the evidence of Appellant's violation of a no contact order,
we discover no abuse of discretion. This order was granted subsequent to the
occurrence of the charged acts. At trial, the victim stated that she had fabricated the
4 KRE 404(b).
5
_Id .
6 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson , 11 S .W .3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000) .
Id.
allegations of abuse in her initial statements to medical personnel and law enforcement
officers. The Commonwealth asserted that Appellant's violation of the no contact order
was admissible in support of its theory that the victim changed her story because of
Appellant's influence over her. Thus, it appears that there was a legitimate purpose for
admission of this evidence . That the testimony revealed the victim initiated and
voluntarily maintained contact with Appellant and ultimately married Appellant supports
admission of the challenged evidence.
Appellant also asserts error in the admission of evidence of his prior
parole violations . The trial court acknowledged that generally such evidence would not
be admissible, but could be properly admitted in the instant case because Appellant had
put the issue of his compliance with parole conditions directly at issue. Specifically,
when asked certain questions about his conduct during the time of the offenses,
Appellant offered his parole status as proof that he would not have been using drugs or
engaging in other prohibited conduct. Thus, the trial court concluded that the
Commonwealth had a good faith basis to cross-examine Appellant regarding his prior
compliance with parole conditions . We discern no abuse of discretion in this ruling .
Appellant claims error for failure of the trial court to grant a mistrial when a
law enforcement witness testified that his first association with Appellant involved a
pursuit of Appellant in a stolen car. Upon defense counsel's objection, the trial court
immediately stopped the testimony . The Commonwealth stated that it had expected the
officer to testify that his first association was when Appellant was in custody. Defense
counsel requested a mistrial which was denied by the trial court. The court did,
however, admonish the jury to disregard that testimony. A trial court has broad
discretion in determining whether errors create a manifest necessity for a mistrial .$
Here, the trial court concluded that the testimony was not unduly prejudicial, especially
given the fact that Appellant had allowed the jury to know that he was already
incarcerated despite the trial court's willingness to exclude such evidence . Thus, as the
trial court determined, any prejudice was cured by the admonition . Refusal to grant a
mistrial was not an abuse of discretion .
The next issue concerns the trial court's refusal to admit into evidence
letters that the victim sent Appellant several months after the incident. Appellant was
permitted to establish the victim's apparent obsession with him prior to the incident.
Additionally, the trial court allowed Appellant to establish that the victim sent numerous
letters after the fact. However, after reviewing the letters sought to be introduced, the
trial court found nothing within them that appeared to have any relationship to the
events surrounding the charged acts . Again, we discern no abuse of discretion in this
ruling .
Appellant's final contention is that the trial court erred by failing to instruct
the jury on unlawful imprisonment in the second degree as a lesser included offense of
kidnapping . The trial court did instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of
unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, but concluded that the evidence would not
support a conviction for second degree unlawful imprisonment . A person is guilty of
unlawful imprisonment in the second degree when he knowingly and unlawfully
restrains another person .9 If he does so under circumstances which expose the victim
8 Shabazz v. Commonwealth , 153 S.W .3d 806 (Ky. 2005).
9 KRS 509.030.
to a risk of serious physical injury, then he is guilty of unlawful imprisonment in the first
degree .'°
Appellant argues that the jury could have found that Appellant restrained
the victim, but rejected the testimony that he strangled her with a belt to the point of
unconsciousness . Such a determination, the Appellant asserts, would have supported
a conviction of unlawful imprisonment in the second degree . However, the victim's
severe injuries demonstrate exposure to a risk of serious physical injury. Thus, the trial
court correctly concluded that the evidence would not support a theory that Appellant
restrained the victim, but did not expose her to a risk of serious physical injury.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's convictions are affirmed .
All concur.
1 0 KRS 509.020 .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Daniel T. Goyette, Louisville Metro Public Defender
Elizabeth B. McMahon, Assistant Public Defender
Office of the Jefferson District Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Room 118, Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
Kristin N . Logan
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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