DEMETRIUS MAURICE WILSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2004-SC-000800-MR
DEMETRIUS MAURICE WILSON
APPEAL FROM McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HON. CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
NO. 03-CR-00328
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE ROACH
AFFIRMING
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Demetrius Maurice Wilson, was convicted of murder and sentenced to
twenty-one years in prison. He now contends that the trial court erred (1) by refusing to
suppress certain statements he made to police after his arrest, and (2) by admitting
evidence of Appellant's prior bad acts. Finding no error, we affirm Appellant's
conviction .
IL BACKGROUND
During the early morning hours of August 8, 2003, Captain Ed McManus of the
Paducah Police Department was conducting a traffic stop near an area of downtown
Paducah known as "The Set" when he heard a series of three gunshots, followed by a
fourth gunshot about thirty seconds later. McManus called for backup, dismissed the
traffic offender, and went to investigate the gunshots.
Officer Tim Melton responded to McManus's request for backup, and arrived at
"The Set" shortly after receiving the call. A large number of people were fleeing the
area . After a brief search of the area, the officers located the victim, Reginald Knox,
behind a nearby building. Mr. Knox had been shot, but was still breathing . The officers
checked him for a weapon or identification, and found neither . Mr. Knox was then
transported to the hospital where he later died from his injuries.
Following a short preliminary investigation by Detective Brian Krueger and other
members of the Paducah Police Department, Appellant became a suspect in the
shooting . Detective Krueger and the other officers "put out word" that they wanted to
interview Appellant . The Monday morning immediately following the crime, Appellant's
stepfather contacted Detective Krueger and made arrangements for Appellant to come
in for an interview. Later that morning, Appellant, along with his mother, stepfather, and
uncle arrived at the Paducah Police Department, where Detective Krueger and
Detective Danny Carroll first interviewed Appellant .
In the course of this first interview, Appellant told police that he had been at "The
Set" on the night of the crime and had gone behind a building to urinate. He further
stated that while he was behind the building, someone put a gun to his head and
demanded the contents of his pockets . Appellant claimed that after a brief scuffle the
alleged robber, who turned out to be Mr. Knox, fired two shots at Appellant . Appellant
said that he then fired two shots at Mr. Knox, and that Mr. Knox fired a final shot at
Appellant.
After this interview, Appellant and his family members at the police station
accompanied police to "The Set," where Appellant walked police through the area,
explaining his version of the events of August 8, 2003. Afterwards, the officers told
Appellant that his story was not consistent with evidence from the crime scene . The
police further intimated that "The Set" was equipped with video cameras, which had
recorded the events of August 8, though no such video equipment existed. The police
then suggested that Appellant and his family go to lunch to think things over and return
in the afternoon .
Upon returning from lunch, Appellant's stepfather informed Detective Krueger
that the family had consulted with an attorney, who advised Appellant not to speak with
police . Appellant repeated this claim to another officer, stating further that if the police
wished to speak with him, they should contact his attorney . After making this statement,
Appellant was immediately arrested and taken into an interview room at the police
station.
Once in the interview room, police officers read Appellant his Miranda rights,
which Appellant said he understood . The officers then asked Appellant if he wished to
make another statement . Appellant began to give a statement that was inconsistent
with those made in his first interview.
In this second statement, Appellant again
claimed that he was urinating behind a building when Mr. Knox walked up and put a
pistol to his head . However, Appellant then stated that Mr. Knox struck him in the head
with the gun, knocking Appellant to the ground . Appellant claimed Mr. Knox began to
hit him, took items from Appellant's pockets, and then fled . Appellant got up, chased
after Mr. Knox, and fired three shots from his own gun . Appellant said he then heard two
more gunshots, at which point he fired another shot and saw Mr. Knox fall to the
ground . Appellant stated he then threw his revolver into an adjacent grassy area and
ran home.
Appellant was indicted for murder on September 5, 2003 . Following a two-day
trial in July 2004, the jury found Appellant guilty of intentional murder . After a brief
penalty phase, he was sentenced to twenty-one years in prison. He appeals to this
Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b).
III. ANALYSIS
We address the issues in the order in which they appear in Appellant's brief.
A. Suppression of Statements to Police
Appellant first claims that his pretrial motion to suppress the statements he made
to police following his arrest should have been granted. He argues that the statements
should have been suppressed because he had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent and right to counsel before his arrest and subsequent interview. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S .Ct. 1602 (1966). He also claims that he did not
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive these rights before making his second
statement to police. The Commonwealth argues that Appellant's Fifth Amendment
rights had not attached when he attempted to invoke them, and that his alleged
invocation represented a request for counsel that was ambiguous at best.
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court's findings of fact are
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. RCr 9.78; see also Talbott v.
Commonwealth , 968 S.W.2d 76, 82 (Ky. 1998). This court then reviews de novo the
application of the law to the facts . Welch v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 407, 409 (Ky.
2004).
We agree that if Appellant had validly invoked his Miranda rights at the police
station before his second statement was made, further interrogation by police would
have been inappropriate, requiring the suppression of any subsequent statements . See
Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S . 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885 (1981) ("We further
hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the
police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."). However, we agree
with the Commonwealth's contention that Appellant's rights to silence and counsel had
not yet attached when he attempted to invoke them upon returning to the police station,
because he was not in custody. Thus, Appellant did not, and indeed could not, invoke
his Miranda rights at that time .
Though the United States Supreme Court has not specifically held that a suspect
cannot anticipatorily invoke his Miranda rights, the Court has stated in a footnote :
We have in fact never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights
anticipatorily, in a context other than "custodial interrogation"--which a
preliminary hearing will not always, or even usually, involve. If the
Miranda right to counsel can be invoked at a preliminary hearing, it could
be argued, there is no logical reason why it could not be invoked by a
letter prior to arrest, or indeed even prior to identification as a suspect.
Most rights must be asserted when the government seeks to take the
action they protect against. The fact that we have allowed the Miranda
right to counsel, once asserted, to be effective with respect to future
custodial interrogation does not necessarily mean that we will allow it to
be asserted initially outside the context of custodial interrogation, with
similar future effect.
McNeil v. Wisconsin , 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3, 111 S .Ct. 2204, 2211 n .3 (1991) (citations
omitted) .
A number of jurisdictions have relied on this footnote to hold that Miranda rights
do not attach outside the context of custodial interrogation, and that a suspect therefore
cannot invoke those rights unless he or she is subject to custodial interrogation . See
United States v. Vega-Figueroa , 234 F.3d 744, 749 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that "[i]n
order for Miranda rights to be invoked, there must be (1) custody and (2) interrogation");
-
Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1244 (3rd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S . 1160, 115
S.Ct. 1122 (1995) ("Because the presence of both a custodial setting and official
interrogation is required to trigger the Miranda right-to-counsel prophylactic, absent one
or the other, Miranda is not implicated ."); Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 197 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1283, 120 S.Ct. 2761, 147 L.Ed .2d 1022 (2000) (holding
that a defendant may not invoke the protections provided by Miranda when he was not
in custody) ; United States v. Wyatt, 179 F.3d 532, 537 (7th Cir. 1999) ("The Fifth
Amendment right to counsel safeguarded by Miranda cannot be invoked when a
suspect is not in custody, even if in anticipation of future custodial interrogation ."
(citations omitted)) ; United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 337 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The
Miranda right to counsel attaches only in the context of custodial interrogation ."); United
States v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 1342, 1348 (11th Cir . 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1088,
119 S .Ct. 840 (1999) ("We . . . hold that Miranda rights may be invoked only during
custodial interrogation or when interrogation is imminent."); People v. Avila , 89 Cal .
Rptr.4th 320, 329 (Cal . Ct. App. 1999) ("Allowing an anticipatory invocation of the
Miranda right to counsel would extend an accused's privilege against self-incrimination
far beyond the intent of Miranda and its progeny."); Sapp v. State, 690 So.2d 581, 586
(Fla. 1997) (requiring "the invocation to occur either during custodial interrogation or
when it is imminent"); State v. Aubuchont , 784 A.2d 1170, 1177-78 (N .H . 2001); State v.
Wamess , 893 P.2d 665, 668 (Wash. Ct. App . 1995) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment right to
counsel cannot be invoked by a person who is not in custody ."); State v. Bradshaw , 457
S .E.2d 456, 467 (W .Va. 1995) ("[T]he Miranda right to counsel has no applicability
outside the context of custodial interrogation ."). The Illinois Supreme Court has ably
expressed the theory behind the rule against anticipatory invocation of the Miranda
rights as follows :
We agree with the reasoning of these federal and state cases. It is
not surprising that virtually every Supreme Court opinion involving Miranda
has used the phrase "custodial interrogation ." It is custodial interrogation
with which Miranda was concerned . It is the right to an attorney during
custodial interrogation that Miranda and its progeny protectp . That right
does not exist outside the context of custodial interrogation . One cannot
invoke a right that does not yet exist.
People v. Villalobos, 737 N .E.2d 639, 645 (111. 2000). In light of these cases, it is clear
that the Fifth Amendment rights protected by Miranda attach only after a defendant is
taken into custody and subjected to interrogation . Any attempt to invoke those rights
prior to custodial interrogation is premature and ineffective.
To determine whether a suspect is in custody for the purposes of Miranda , a
court must consider the totality of the circumstances . But "the ultimate inquiry is
simply
whether there [was] a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree
associated with a formal arrest." Stansbury v. California , 511 U.S . 318, 320, 114
S.Ct.1526, 1529 (1994) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U .S. 1121, 1125, 103 S .Ct .
3517, 3520 (1983)); see also Gomez v. Commonwealth , 152 S.W.3d 238, 241-242 (Ky.
2004) . The circumstances surrounding Appellant's attempted invocation of his Miranda
rights indicate that he was not under formal arrest and that his freedom of movement
was not restrained .
Appellant argues that because he was arrested immediately after invoking his
Miranda rights, his freedom was in effect restrained at the time he asserted those rights .
However, "[a] policeman's unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a
suspect was `in custody' at a particular time ; the only relevant inquiry is how a
reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation ."
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S . 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151 (1984). Therefore, the
intentions of police are irrelevant and the inquiry into whether Appellant was in custody
turns on whether a reasonable person in a similar situation would have believed that he
or she was free to leave. Thompson v. Keohane , 516 U.S . 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 465
(1995).
There is no evidence that Appellant's freedom of movement was in any way
restrained when he entered the police station and allegedly invoked his rights to silence
and counsel . Most compelling is the fact that Appellant made this "invocation" when he
voluntarily returned to the police station after having been allowed to go to lunch with his
family . Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free to leave.
Thus, we conclude that Appellant was not in custody when he attempted to invoke his
Miranda rights to silence and counsel . For that reason Appellant's Miranda rights had
not yet attached, and he could not at that time make a valid assertion of those rights .
Appellant did not invoke his rights after being arrested . Thus, the statements he made
after being taken into custody were not obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment
rights, and the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress the
statements .
B. Prior Bad Acts
Appellant also claims that improper character evidence was admitted against him
at trial, in violation of KRE 404(b). Specifically, Appellant asserts that the evidence of
his statement that Mr. Knox robbed him of "money and weed," introduced through the
testimony of Detective Krueger, is unduly prejudicial character evidence and therefore
should not have been admitted at trial. Appellant argues that evidence of his
possession of marijuana on the night of the shooting should not have been admitted
because it was offered only to show criminal predisposition . The Commonwealth
argues that the marijuana evidence fits the motive exception to the rule against
character evidence contained in KRE 404(b)(1) .
In determining the admissibility of other crimes evidence under KRE 404(b), a
court must engage in an analysis of the relevance of the evidence, the probative value
of the evidence, and prejudice to the defendant. Bell v. Commonwealth , 875 S.W.2d
882, 889 (Ky. 1994).
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence ." KRE 401 . In this instance, the marijuana
evidence was relevant because it tended to make the prosecution's theory that the
shooting incident stemmed from a "drug deal gone bad" more probable . Further, the
evidence also indicated that the shooting was intentional, rather than the result of a
mere attempt to frighten the victim.
The inquiry into the probative value of the evidence turns on whether evidence of
a prior bad act or uncharged crime is "sufficiently probative of its commission by the
accused to warrant its introduction into evidence." Bell , 875 S.W.2d at 890. In the
present case, the challenged evidence consisted only of Detective Krueger's recitation
of Appellant's own statement as to what Mr. Knox allegedly had taken from him in the
course of the robbery . Because the challenged evidence was Appellant's own
admission that he committed the prior bad act, it is clearly probative of the fact that
Appellant did in fact possess marijuana on the night of the shooting . The statement is
sufficiently probative to warrant its introduction into evidence.
The third step in determining the admissibility of prior bad acts is to balance the
probative nature of the evidence and the potential prejudice to the defendant from its
introduction. Daniel v. Commonwealth, 905 S.W .2d 76, 78 (Ky. 1995) . Appellant argues
that the evidence that he possessed marijuana is unfairly prejudicial, and was
introduced only to portray Appellant as an unsavory person who would be more likely to
commit murder. We disagree . While possession of marijuana is a serious crime,
evidence of such a crime is not so prejudicial as to preclude its introduction for the
purpose of establishing a motive for a murder.
The burden is on the Commonwealth to show both that the evidence fits within
an exception to the rule against character evidence, and to demonstrate that the
probative nature of the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. Daniel v.
Commonwealth , 905 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Ky. 1995) ; Funk v. Commonwealth , 842 S .W.2d
476, 480 (Ky. 1992) . The Commonwealth met this burden by showing that the evidence
of Appellant's possession of marijuana on the night of the shooting-marijuana that he
claims Mr. Knox stole from him-was offered to establish his motive for shooting Mr.
Knox. See Adkins v. Commonwealth , 96 S.W.3d 779, 792-793 (Ky. 2003) ("Evidence of
drug use is not probative of a propensity to commit homicide, robbery, or burglary, and
this evidence was not introduced for that purpose . Instead, evidence of Appellant's
cocaine possession and of his fear of the police `because of drugs' was relevant to
prove a motive for the homicide, robbery, and burglary, a purpose explicitly authorized
by KRE 404(b)(1) ." (citation omitted)) . The Commonwealth's use of the evidence
therefore clearly falls within the exceptions to the rule against character evidence listed
in KRE 404(b)(1) .
We therefore hold that the trial court did not err by admitting the evidence that
Appellant possessed marijuana on the night of the shooting .
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the McCracken Circuit Court is
affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Margaret Foley Case
Appeals Branch Manager
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 301
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Shelly R. Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane - Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Kristin N. Logan
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
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