PHILLIP A. WHALEY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : MARCH 23, 2006
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,supumt tourf of
2004-SC-0733-MR
PHILLIP A . WHALEY
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WOODFORD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL F. ISAACS, JUDGE
2002-CR-0033
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from a judgment convicting Whaley of kidnapping, receiving stolen
property valued over $300, second degree escape, second degree wanton
endangerment, third degree criminal mischief and as a second degree persistent felony
offender . He was sentenced to serve a total of 44 years in the penitentiary .
Whaley presents five questions for review : 1) whether there was error when the
trial judge did not conduct an evidentiary hearing before finding Whaley competent to
stand trial ; 2) whether a bench trial was appropriate absent a signed waiver; 3) whether
there was error when Whaley was not allowed to appear in clothing other than the
prisoner uniform ; 4) whether there was sufficient evidence of escape to maintain a
conviction ; and 5) whether improper victim impact testimony was allowed .
Whaley was a chronic cocaine user . He ingested cocaine for several days in a
row by the time he arrived in Versailles on a July morning . He had been involved in an
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accident in Ohio earlier and ultimately stole a car and fled that area . After consuming
alcohol, more cocaine and arming himself with a BB gun and a kitchen knife, he
eventually stopped the vehicle in front of a local retail store . He grabbed a female
pedestrian who just happened to be walking by and forced her into the store at
knifepoint. An off duty firefighter was in the store and contacted police on his
emergency radio . He attempted to reason with Whaley and even offered to exchange
himself for the female hostage. Police arrived and after almost an hour had elapsed
from the initial hostage taking, they were able to trade some simulated cocaine for the
hostage and subdued Whaley using a bean bag gun and chemical spray .
Whaley was arrested and taken to the police station for questioning . While there
and while still in handcuffs, he threw himself through a closed window onto the concrete
parking lot below suffering serious injury in the escape attempt .
He was tried before the circuit judge without a jury and sentenced to serve 44
years in the state penitentiary on his convictions for kidnapping, receiving stolen
property valued over $300, second degree . escape, second degree wanton
endangerment, third degree criminal mischief and second degree persistent felony
offender. His defense was voluntary intoxication . This appeal followed .
I . COMPETENCY HEARING
On a joint motion from the defense and the prosecution, the trial judge ordered a
competency evaluation. The mental health professional returned a report declaring
Whaley to be incompetent to stand trial because of his belligerence and refusal to take
part in the evaluation. The trial judge rejected the finding because it did not take into
consideration the legal requirements of competency and ordered a new evaluation. A
new report was submitted to the trial judge on the morning of trial finding Whaley to be
competent . Defense counsel waived any hearing and asked the trial judge to accept
the report as dispositive . Based on the report and the trial judge's own observations,
Whaley was ruled competent to stand trial .
The issue is not preserved but may still be reviewed to prevent manifest
injustice . RCr 10.26 . When an examination of a defendant's competency is performed,
the trial judge is required to conduct a hearing to determine if the defendant is
competent to stand trial. KRS 504.100(3) . We have previously determined that when a
hearing is not held, the standard of review is whether a reasonable judge "should have
experienced doubt with respect to competency to stand trial" . Mills v. Commonwealth ,
996 S .W .2d 473 (Ky. 1999).
The trial judge had significant interaction with Whaley . He conducted a hearing
determining that Whaley was able to function as pro se co-counsel in the case .
Whaley's attorney requested the waiver of the competency hearing in Whaley's
presence . There was nothing in his actions or behavior to suggest to anyone that he
was not capable of proceeding to trial . It is critical .that the trial judge made his
determination based not only on the report but on his own observations . The trial judge
had nothing before him causing any doubt with respect to Whaley's competency. Cf .
Thompson v. Commonwealth, 56 S .W .3d 406 (Ky. 2001), which was remanded for a
retrospective competency hearing when the trial judge's order included some doubt of
competency. There was no error.
II . BENCH TRIAL
The trial judge conducted a bench trial in this case. There is no formal written
waiver of a jury trial signed by Whaley. See RCr 9.26(1). On appeal, he now claims
error for the first time because the record does not contain a formal written waiver. This
issue is not properly preserved which is an important factual consideration in
determining if Whaley consented to a bench trial . There are methods other than a
formal written waiver that confirm a defendant has knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waived a jury trial. See Jackson v. Commonwealth , 113 S .W.3d 128 (Ky.
2003).
Whaley had ample opportunity himself to assert his right to a trial by jury. The
record is clear that he was fully aware of his rights and consented to the bench trial .
Defense counsel on several occasions consented to the waiver. Whaley himself
requested leave to act as pro se co-counsel . That request was granted and throughout
the proceedings, Whaley himself never requested a jury trial nor raised an issue
regarding the bench trial . Even when raising this issue for the first time on appeal,
Whaley only argues that he never signed a waiver. He does not claim that the bench
trial was contrary to his wishes. There was no error of a magnitude requiring further
action from this Court .
III . PRISONER CLOTHING
At the beginning of the bench trial, counsel sought a delay so that Whaley could
be allowed to appear in clothing other than a jail uniform . The trial judge denied this
request and emphasized that he would decide the matter solely on the evidence without
regard to Whaley's manner of dress . A defendant should not be forced to be tried
before a jury in jail clothing . Scrivener v Commonwealth , 539 S .W.2d 291 (Ky. 1976) .
The purpose is to make sure that the presumption of innocence is not tainted by forcing
a defendant to appear dressed as an already convicted felon . Estelle v. Williams , 425
U.S . 501 (1976).
The trial judge took great pains to explain that a jail uniform would not influence him
in any way nor influence his decision . Whaley does not suggest that his clothing
prejudiced him in any manner. Given an absence of even a hint of prejudice, there is
no reason to extend the clothing requirements to a bench trial environment . There was
no error.
IV . EVIDENCE OF ESCAPE
Whaley's generalized motion for directed verdict did not preserve this issue. It is
incumbent on any party to make known to the trial judge the action desired. RCr 9 .22 .
Absent a specific objection, an issue may not be first brought forward on appeal. CR
51 .01 . Even if not preserved and under the palpable error standard, there was
sufficient evidence to allow the charge to survive a motion for directed verdict. RCr
10.26 . Taken in the light most favorable to the opposing party there is no question that
Whaley is unable to show that it would have been clearly unreasonable for a jury to find
guilt. Commonwealth v. Sawhill , 660 S .W.2d 3 (Ky. 1983).
V. VICTIM IMPACT TESTIMONY
Before the trial began, the Commonwealth informed Whaley and the trial judge
that it intended to call the victim's daughter to testify regarding her observations of her
mother's actions before and after the offense. The trial judge correctly interpreted KRS
421 .500 as not imposing limitations on evidence that is relevant to sentencing . KRS
532.055(2)(a)(7). The daughter's testimony was strictly limited to her observations and
did not include improper hearsay or opinion testimony. There was no error.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed .
All concur, except Cooper, J., who would reverse and remand for the same
reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Jackson v. Commonwealth , 113 S .W.3d 128
(Ky. 2003) and Johnstone, J., who dissents without opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Donna L. Boyce
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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