WESLEY MEEKS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NO. 2004-SC-000518-MR
WESLEY MEEKS
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D. NICHOLLS, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 01-CR-00155
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
ME MORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
A Greenup Circuit Court jury convicted Wesley Meeks of second-degree
manslaughter, first-degree burglary, and theft by unlawful taking over $300, and then
fixed punishment at the maximum sentence of thirty-five years' imprisonment. The trial
court entered judgment accordingly. In his direct appeal from that judgment, Meeks
argues that the prosecutor's remarks to the jury in closing the penalty phase of the trial
were so coercive as to constitute a palpable error requiring reversal and retrial of the
penalty phase. We disagree and affirm .
Monte Montgomery returned home from work and interrupted a burglary in
progress . Montgomery's wife later discovered his lifeless body in a pool of blood on the
bathroom floor. He died as a result of multiple contact gunshots to the head. His body
appeared to have been beaten, and his pants were pulled down to his ankles. The
postmortem report disclosed evidence of blunt trauma to the penis consistent with the
force of human teeth and the presence of another's semen on Montgomery's body
around the penis and groin area .
The burglars took several items of personal property from the home and
drove away in two of Montgomery's vehicles . One of the vehicles was wrecked, and the
other was driven into a ditch . A neighbor who spotted the vehicles called for a wrecker;
and, upon arriving, the wrecker driver noticed Curtis Clifton nearby. Clifton had a
bloody hand that he had wrapped with a t-shirt. Clifton's bloody hand and the presence
of blood in one of the vehicles aroused the driver's suspicions, and he called law
enforcement. While waiting for law enforcement to arrive, the wrecker driver also
noticed Meeks, who appeared to be intoxicated . As Meeks approached, Clifton ordered
Meeks to sit quietly in a car lest he tell the truck driver "every damn thing" he knew.
When the state trooper arrived, Meeks and Clifton were arrested for public
intoxication . Jewelry was found in Meeks's pockets . Eventually, Meeks admitted taking
items from the Montgomery home ; but he told the police "[w]hen I got there, that dude
[Montgomery] was already dead ."
Along with Clifton, Meeks was indicted for murder, burglary in the first
degree, theft by unlawful taking over $300, sodomy in the first degree, and gross abuse
of a corpse . Clifton pled guilty to the charges and received a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole for twenty-five years . Meeks's case went to trial. At the close of the
Commonwealth's case, the trial court granted Meeks's motion for a directed verdict on
the sodomy and gross abuse of a corpse charges. Ultimately, Meeks was found guilty
of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter in the second degree, as well as burglary
in the first degree, and theft by unlawful taking over $300. The jury recommended that
Meeks receive the maximum sentence : twenty years' imprisonment for the burglary
conviction, ten years' imprisonment for the manslaughter conviction, and five years'
imprisonment for the theft by unlawful taking conviction, all to be served consecutively,
for a total sentence of thirty-five years' imprisonment. The trial court sentenced Meeks
in accordance with the jury's recommendation, after which Meeks filed this direct
appeal.'
Meeks's only argument on appeal is that the Commonwealth's closing
argument in the penalty phase was so improper as to require a new penalty phase trial.
Meeks admits that this alleged error is unpreserved . So our review is governed by
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26, which provides that "[a] palpable
error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be considered by . . . an
appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and
appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has
resulted from the error."
For an error to be palpable, it must be "easily perceptible, plain, obvious
and readily noticeable ."2 A palpable error "must involve prejudice more egregious than
See Ky. Const . § 110(2)(b) .
Burns v. Level , 957 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky. 1997) (citing BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY (6th ed.
1995)) .
that occurring in reversible error[.]"3 A palpable error must be so grave in nature that if it
were uncorrected, it would seriously affect the fairness of the proceedings. Thus, what
a palpable error analysis "boils down to" is whether the reviewing court believes there is
a "substantial possibility" that the result in the case would have been different without
the error . If not, the error cannot be palpable .
Meeks asserts that palpable error lies in the following excerpt taken from
the prosecutor's closing argument to the jury in the penalty phase . The jury's
deliberation in the penalty phase was brief as compared to the more than twelve hours it
spent in deliberation of the verdict in the guilt-innocence phase . According to Meeks,
the Commonwealth chided the jury so strongly that the argument impelled the jury to fix
a manifestly unjust penalty for the crimes:
It's a hard day when one of our citizens loses his life,
like Mr. Montgomery . There's nothing more precious than
our lives, to our citizens here in Greenup County. I want to
thank each one of you for [your] work on this jury, and the
time that you have spent here . I know folks are busy and
they don't have time-a year to spend on someone else's
family, in trying to exact a major [sic] of justice for this terrible
death that the Montgomerys have experienced in this case.
The fire inside of me temporarily died down . I respect your
verdict . I don't agree with it, but I'll live with it, because that's
what jury trials are all about. But, it's important that Mel and
Marydel and I try these cases and find out what jury's [sic]
think and how they do value the lives of their neighbors and
citizens . And, I'll take this into consideration, as we do all
trials-all jury trials, and the answers that you give, in
guiding our future decisions . I've done everything I can to
bring the facts before you. Maybe another lawyer could
have done better or worse, but nobody worked any harder
Ernst v. Commonwealth , 160 S.W.3d 744, 758 (Ky. 2005).
Schoenbachler v. Commonwealth , 95 S.W.3d 830, 836 (Ky. 2003) (quoting Abernathy v.
Commonwealth , 439 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Ky. 1969)).
than I did, than Mel did, than Marydel did and our staff, and
the many people that donated their time without pay, to this
case. And, I think you know that, and I think the
Montgomery family knows that. I hope they do. I hope they
will forever be my friends . Manslaughter in the first [sic]
degree, a class C felony . [sic] That's next to the lowest form
of a felony that we have in Kentucky, with class D being the
lowest. It carries five to ten years . And, somewhere in there
will be the price that you will exact for the death of
Mr. Montgomery. A death that occurred in his own home,
his own castle, an execution, I say, that was totally
unwarranted and unjustified no matter how much they seek
to reward-or excuse it, or find some excuse for what
happened here . I hope it never happens again in this
county. But, the way things are going in our world today, I
really doubt that. I believe it will happen again . All and all, I
think we're in a good place, because this seldom ever
happens . It's unfortunate that [it] happened to the
Montgomery family. It would be unfortunate for any family. I
ask you to exact the price within the range of penalty that
you have chosen, and certainly, the maximum. I don't know
if you could exact a price that would balance the scales of
justice in this case, for the death of Mr. Montgomery . But,
the closest that you can come to it now, is ten years . Keep
in mind, that second[-]degree manslaughter is not
considered to be a violent crime . It's considered to be a
crime of wantonness; a degree of culpability that rises just
above recklessness in this state . So, parole eligibility for
second[-]degree manslaughter is twenty percent; a
percentage of the price that you will exact for Wesley Meeks
for that life .
But, what I'm asking you to do-I'm asking you to consider
all of these instructions, but the Commonwealth contends
that this is the [sic] probably the most serious crime thateven though you haven't found thatit's still very serious,
when someone is killed in their own home, by shots to the
head. And, I'm asking you to run these sentences
consecutively, and I never do this-I never do this-I never
tell the jury what I think they should do, and this is probably
the first time that I have ever done this. But, I have to plead
to you to give the maximum to this man, to try to come as
close as you can, at this point, to exacting justice and
balancing the scales in this case and give him thirty-five
years .
Trial counsel has wide latitude to make for his or her client the most
persuasive closing argument s And although the transcript shows that this prosecutor
expressed regret that the jury found Meeks guilty of manslaughter in the second degree,
not intentional murder, it is well-established that a prosecutor may use the closing
argument to attempt to "persuade the jurors the matter should not be dealt with lightly. ,7
In the case at hand, the Commonwealth's closing argument, though cluttered with
irrelevant references to such matters as how hard the Commonwealth had worked on
presenting its case, is, in totality, merely a request that the jurors not take Montgomery's
death lightly .$ And we note that the Commonwealth had sought the death penalty for
Meeks and introduced evidence showing that Montgomery was killed without
provocation and suffered indignities of a sexual nature . So the Commonwealth's
expression of disappointment with the jury's failure to find Meeks guilty of intentional
murder and its exhortation to the jury to fix the maximum punishment allowed for the
lesser offense is neither surprising nor improper. Even if a timely objection had been
made, the Commonwealth's arguments would not constitute reversible error.
But even if we assume for the sake of thorough analysis that the quoted
portions of the Commonwealth's closing were erroneous, that error certainly would not
be so egregious as to rise to the level of palpable error. Our reported decisions contain
See, e.g., Wheeler v. Commonwealth , 121 S.W.3d 173,180 (Ky. 2003) .
Harness v. Commonwealth , 475 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Ky. 1971).
See Hamilton v. Commonwealth , 401 S.W.2d 80, 88 (Ky. 1966) (permitting Commonwealth
to recommend level of punishment to jury); Soto v. Commonwealth , 139 S.W.3d 827, 874
(Ky. 2004) (same).
statements of a far more ad hominem, coercive nature that have been found not to
constitute reversible error. 9 Since the statements at issue in the case before us are
decidedly more benign than many found not to warrant reversal, Meeks simply cannot
show that the Commonwealth's closing was so improper, prejudicial, and egregious as
to have undermined the overall fairness of the trial .' °
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Greenup Circuit Court .
ALL CONCUR.
9
See, e.g., Ferguson v. Commonwealth , 401 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Ky. 1965) (calling a
defendant a "beast") ; Holbrook v. Commonwealth , 249 Ky. 795, 61 S.W.2d 644, 645 (1933)
(calling a defendant a "desperado") ; Hamilton , 401 S.W.2d at 87 ("I'll put it this way. If you
don't inflict the death penalty in this case, then you are going to open the door to every
robber, to every person that wants to take advantage of a tavern operator-a store keeper,
anybody who handles money in their place of business . You are going to open the door and
tell them to come on in boy. If you don't get it or get shot at-shoot him down. And then after
it's all over you get life. That's what you are going to be saying .").
10
Soto . 139 S.W.3d at 873 ("[a]ny consideration on appeal of alleged prosecutorial misconduct
must center on the overall fairness of the trial . In order to justify reversal, the misconduct of
the prosecutor must be so serious as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair.") .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Donna L. Boyce, Esq.
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo, Esq .
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael L. Harned, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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