GERALD WILLIAMS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 21, 2006
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2004-SC-000383-MR
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GERALD WILLIAMS
V
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,
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MAGOFFIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO . 02-CR-00046
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING AND REMANDING
A Magoffin Circuit Court jury convicted Appellant, Gerald Williams, of
murder, for which he was sentenced to life in prison . He appeals to this Court as a
matter of right, Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b), asserting reversible error by the trial court in:
(1) improperly instructing the jury, (2) failing to strike two jurors for cause, (3) allowing
the Commonwealth to improperly impeach Appellant's character for credibility, (4) failing
to suppress evidence obtained by an inadequate search warrant, and (5) admitting
improper hearsay evidence . We agree that the improper instructions and improper
admission of impeachment evidence entitle Appellant to a new trial. We will not discuss
the jury issues, which are unlikely to recur upon retrial, or the hearsay issues, which
were not preserved for appellate review. We uphold the trial court's suppression ruling .
I. FACTS .
Tammy Howard, Appellant's domestic companion, died sometime during
the night of April 29-30, 2002. During the afternoon and evening of April 29, Appellant
and Howard had at least five guests at their residence : Chris Lemaster and his
girlfriend, Christina Hartman, and three brothers, Adam, Daniel, and Randall Minix.
Although Appellant denied to the police that he struck Howard, other witnesses testified
that he not only struck her on several occasions but "slung her around" inside the
residence. There was also evidence that at least two other visitors struck Howard and
that she fell at least once, striking the edge of the kitchen table . At one point during the
afternoon and evening of April 29, Howard allegedly overdosed on drugs, resulting in a
"911 " emergency telephone call and the arrival of emergency medical technicians
(EMTs) . However, when the EMTs arrived, Howard had regained consciousness and
declined treatment . The next morning, Howard's lifeless body was found on the floor of
the residence that she shared with Appellant . The cause of death was determined to be
closed head injuries due to blunt force trauma .
11. JURY INSTRUCTIONS .
Appellant was indicted only for intentional murder. KRS 507.020(1)(a) . At
the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial court permitted the Commonwealth to amend
the indictment also to charge wanton murder. KRS 507.020(1)(b) . The trial court used
a "combination instruction" for murder that permitted the jury to find either that Appellant
killed Howard intentionally or that he killed her wantonly under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to human life . The trial court also instructed the jury
on manslaughter in the first degree, KRS 507.030(1)(a) (intent to injure but not to kill),
as a lesser-included offense but refused to give Appellant's tendered instructions on the
lesser-included offenses of manslaughter in the second degree ("manslaughter 2nd"),
KRS 507.040, and reckless homicide, KRS 507.050 . As in Johnson v. Commonwealth ,
12 S .W.3d 258, 265-266 (Ky. 1999), and Hudson v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 106,
109 (Ky. 1998), the jury returned a general verdict of guilty under the combination
murder instruction and did not specify under which theory guilt was premised.
The trial court relied on Parker v. Commonwealth , 952 S.W.2d 209 (Ky.
1997), in refusing Appellant's tendered instructions on manslaughter 2nd and reckless
homicide . Unfortunately, that reliance was misplaced . In Parker, the defendant was
convicted of the intentional murder of his 22-month-old stepson . Like Appellant, he
denied hitting the victim (though he admitted he was at home alone with the child when
the fatal injuries occurred) . Id. at 211 . He did not claim that he injured the child
unintentionally while attempting to discipline or frighten the child and offered no
explanation for the child's fatal injuries. Id. at 211-212 . Unlike the case sub judice, no
other witnesses were available to testify to facts explaining the child's injuries. Thus, we
held :
[T]he evidence presented by the prosecution supports the
singular finding that the defendant acted with the specific
intent to cause the child's death . There is no reasonable
suggestion that the prosecution evidence supports a finding
that the defendant acted with a wanton or reckless mental
state .
Here, there was substantial evidence that Appellant struck Howard in
anger on several occasions and that he "slung her around" inside the house, indicating
wantonness, recklessness, or intent to injure, but not necessarily intent to kill. In fact,
the evidence of his lack of intent to kill was so substantial that the Commonwealth
sought and obtained an amendment to the indictment to charge wanton murder to
conform to the evidence ; and the trial court thought the evidence of the lack of intent to
kill was so substantial that it instructed the jury on two theories of unintentional
homicide, i.e., wanton murder and first-degree manslaughter (intent to injure but not to
kill) . Parker obviously has no application here . In fact, if, as the trial court believed,
there was no evidence of wantonness, Appellant would be entitled to a new trial
because the combination murder instruction deprived him of his right to a unanimous
verdict. Haves v. Commonwealth , 625 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Ky. 1981) (combination
murder instruction denied defendant right to unanimous verdict where the only evidence
indicated that the killing was intentional) .
As explained by the official Commentary to KRS 507.020(1)(b) (wanton
murder):
The culpable mental state for this type of homicide is
described in this section as "wantonness manifesting
extreme indifference to human life." To fully understand the
functional value of this language, it must be considered in
the light of KRS 507.040[,] which treats homicide resulting
from "wantonness" (not manifesting extreme indifference to
human life) as manslaughter in the second degree .
The two offenses described by these provisions,
murder by KRS 507.020(1)(b) and manslaughter in the
second degree by KRS 507.040, have three elements in
common : the conduct in question must have involved a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death to human life ; the
defendant, in causing the death in question, must have
consciously disregarded that risk[;] and his disregard must
have constituted "a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a reasonable person would [have observed] in
the situation ." Taken together, these three elements
constitute the culpable mental state defined in KRS 501 .020
as "wantonness[ ]" and[,] without more, will suffice for a
conviction of manslaughter in the second degree. If
accompanied by a fourth element, i.e., "circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to human life," they are
sufficient for a conviction of murder.
KRS 507.020(1)(b) (1974 Commentary).
Accordingly, we have held that a finding that the defendant killed wantonly
"under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life" elevates
manslaughter in the second degree to wanton murder. Barbour v. Commonwealth ,
824 S .W.2d 861, 863 (Ky. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Elliott v.
Commonwealth , 976 S.W.2d 416, 421 (Ky. 1998) . Conversely, a finding of wanton
killing, not "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life,"
reduces wanton murder to manslaughter in the second degree. By refusing to instruct
the jury on the lesser-included offenses of manslaughter 2nd and reckless homicide, the
trial court effectively held as a matter of law that Appellant killed Howard "under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life ."
The trial court, having correctly determined that the evidence was
sufficient to support a conviction of wanton murder, was required to also instruct the jury
on manslaughter 2nd as a lesser-included offense in the event the jury did not find
"wantonness manifesting extreme indifference to human life ." And since the only
distinction between wantonness and recklessness is whether the defendant was aware
of and consciously disregarded a risk of death, KRS 501 .020(3) (wantonness), or
whether the defendant failed to perceive a risk of death that a reasonable person would
have perceived under the circumstances, KRS 501 .020(4) (recklessness), the trial court
should also have instructed on reckless homicide as a lesser-included offense of
manslaughter 2nd. Commonwealth v. Wolford , 4 S.W.3d 534, 539 (Ky. 1999) (an
instruction on a lesser included offense is required if the evidence would permit the jury
to rationally find the defendant not guilty of the primary offense but guilty of the lesser
offense) . Since a lesser-included offense is in fact and principle a defense to the higher
charge, Slaven v. Commonwealth , 962 S.W.2d 845, 856 (Ky. 1997), the failure to
instruct on manslaughter 2nd and reckless homicide was prejudicial error .
III. IMPROPER IMPEACHMENT.
Appellant did not testify at trial . However, the Commonwealth played for
the jury an audiotape of the statement he gave to Detective David Maynard of the
Kentucky State Police after his arrest. In that statement, Appellant made no selfinculpatory statements, instead implying that Randall Minix was the probable killer .
Appellant specifically denied hitting Howard, stating several times that he loved her and,
on one occasion, that he intended to marry her:
Q47
I've got several people saying they saw you all
arguing Monday and saw you hitting her.
A.
I never hit that woman. Honest to God, I didn't.
Q48
I've got several people telling me that. I've got
several people telling me they saw you hit her with a
broomstick .
A.
I never hit that woman with a broomstick . I swear to
God, I didn't . I loved that woman. Honest to God, I
did. Me and her was going to get married the next
that morning, sure was.
Q49
You are still married to Debbie Risner, aren't you?
A.
Q50
. No. I had went down there and [Sheriff] Pat
Montgomery gave me my divorce papers that
morning. Sure did. That morning he took me to the
police station. Sure did. Honest to God. Pat said,
"[h]ere, I will serve them on you."
Why is everybody telling me they saw you hit her?
Different people?
I don't know why. I don't know. Doody Lemasters or
Chris Lemasters [sic] was right there, and he knows
that I wouldn't .
Apparently, Appellant believed being served with a petition for dissolution
of marriage was the same as being divorced . The very next witness for the
Commonwealth was Sandy Gullett, a deputy circuit clerk. Over Appellant's objection,
Gullett testified that Appellant's wife filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage to
Appellant on April 30, 2002, the same day Sheriff Montgomery arrested Appellant for
the murder of Howard, and that the divorce was not finalized until June 6, 2003. During
closing argument, the prosecutor used this evidence to portray Appellant as a liar:
I meant to go in and count how many times in that
statement he said, "I loved that woman, I loved that woman, I
loved that woman. 1 was going to marry her the next day."
And that was a lie. He was still married. He didn't have the
divorce papers served on him until the day after he'd beat
her and she had already died . He was going to get married
the next day. He told the police[,] "[w]e was going to get
married the next day." He was still married . The divorce
hadn't even been filed, as the clerk told you, until April 30th .
He wasn't going to marry her.
Obviously, Appellant's otherwise exculpatory statement to the police was
introduced by the Commonwealth for the sole purpose of laying the foundation for
Gullett's testimony that allowed the prosecutor to portray Appellant to the jury as a liar in
closing argument. Even though there is no provision in the Kentucky Rules of Evidence
prohibiting impeachment on a collateral fact, we have consistently recognized that
prohibition as a governing principle of evidence . Purcell v. Commonwealth , 149 S.W.3d
382, 397-398 (Ky. 2004) ; Neal v. Commonwealth , 95 S.W.3d 843, 849 (Ky. 2003);
Slaven , 962 S.W.2d at 858; Eldred v. Commonwealth , 906 S.W.2d 694, 705 (Ky. 1994),
abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Barroso , 122 S .W.3d 554, 563-564
(Ky.2003) .' Furthermore:
[A]Ithough a party can impeach his own witness, KRE 607,
he cannot knowingly elicit testimony from a witness as a
guise or subterfuge in order to impeach the witness with
otherwise inadmissible testimony.
Slaven , 962 S.W.2d at 858 . Likewise, while a defendant opens the door to
impeachment by introducing evidence of his own good character, the Commonwealth
should not be permitted to introduce artificial evidence of a defendant's good character
as a guise or subterfuge to justify introduction of evidence of his bad character .
Federal Rule of Evidence 607 permits the government to
impeach its own witness. However, the government must
not knowingly elicit testimony from a witness in order to
impeach him with otherwise inadmissible testimony. The
maximum legitimate effect of the impeaching testimony can
never be more than the cancellation of the adverse answer
by which the party is surprised . That is, impeachment is not
permitted where it is employed as a guise for submitting to
the jury substantive evidence that is otherwise unavailable .
United States v. Gomez-Gallardo , 915 F.2d 553, 555 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations and
quotations omitted) . See also United States v. Peterman, 841 F.2d 1474, 1479
(10th Cir. 1988) ; United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1192 (7th Cir. 1984) . In
In Purcell , we noted that there is also no mention in the Rules of impeachment by bias,
interest, or corruption and only limited coverage of impeachment by prior inconsistent
statements (noting that KRE 612 deals only with the foundation requirements, implying that
such impeachment is permissible) . 149 S.W.3d at 398 n .15 (citing ROBERT G. LAWSON, THE
KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK § 4.05[3] at 275 (4th ed. LexisNexis 2003)) .
determining the true intent of the impeaching party, the federal courts employ a "primary
purpose" test, i.e., was it the primary purpose of the impeaching party in introducing the
impeachable evidence to place before the jury evidence that was otherwise
inadmissible? United States v. Hoaan , 763 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1985) .
Remember, Appellant did not testify in this case. The only evidence
authorizing impeachment was the introduction by the Commonwealth of Appellant's
prior self-serving and arguably false unsworn statement. Absent Appellant's claimed
intent to marry Howard, evidence that Appellant was still married to another person was
completely irrelevant. Since nothing in Appellant's statement was inculpatory or
otherwise favorable to the prosecution, the primary purpose in introducing the statement
obviously was to lay a foundation for proof that Appellant arguably lied about a collateral
fact in that statement. However, since Appellant did not testify, he did not place his
credibility in issue. Thus, the Commonwealth's only apparent purpose for attacking his
credibility was to prove that he was a person of bad moral character, i.e., a person likely
to commit assault and murder.
The rules on character are based on an assumption
that human personality is highly integrated with respect to
moral qualities and behavior . The conduct of a given person
is assumed to be generally consistent in widely varying kinds
of situations : "[A] person who lies in one situation is not only
likely to lie in other situations, but is also highly likely to
cheat, steal, not feel guilty, and so on ."
LAwSON,
§ 4.05[3] n .1, § 2.15[2] at 97 (quoting BURTON, GENERALITY OF HONESTY
RECONSIDERED ,
70 Psychol . Rev. 481, 482 (1963)) .
If the evidence is the same upon retrial, i.e., Appellant does not testify or
otherwise introduce evidence that he intended to marry Howard the next day, the
Commonwealth shall be precluded from introducing evidence that Appellant was still
married to another person.
IV. SEARCH WARRANT.
The trial court overruled Appellant's motion to suppress a broken broom
handle that was found in the residence where Howard was killed and which the
Commonwealth theorized was the murder weapon .
Following his interview of Appellant, Detective Maynard sought a search
warrant to search the residence for possible weapons . He proceeded to the county
attorney's office where a secretary helped him prepare a warrant and an affidavit for the
warrant. Under the heading identifying the personal property for which the search was
to be conducted, the secretary wrote on both the affidavit and the warrant: "Anything
used to commit an assault or any illegal contraband." The "probable cause" portion of
the affidavit was filled out as follows:
On the 1 st day of May, 2002 at approximately
3 :35 p.m ., affiant received information from/observed :
No other information was inserted because neither Maynard nor the secretary knew
how to properly phrase the probable cause information . The secretary made a copy of
the partially completed affidavit and gave the original and the copy, as well as the
proposed warrant, to Maynard . Maynard then took all three documents to the trial
commissioner, Gordon B . Long; explained to Long the facts that were known to him;
and asked Long what information needed to be added to the affidavit to establish
probable cause for a search. Long advised Maynard to add the following language:
The victim, Tammy Howard, was assaulted on these
premises which resulted in her death . Access to this
property is needed to obtain possible evidence .
Maynard testified at the suppression hearing that he added that language in his own
handwriting to the original of the affidavit, but not to the copy. He then executed the
original affidavit in the presence of a notary public. Commissioner Long issued the
search warrant based on that affidavit. After executing the warrant, Maynard attached
both the original affidavit, which contained the added probable cause language, and the
copy of the affidavit, which did not contain the added probable cause language, to the
warrant and filed all three documents together. This led Appellant to believe that the
probable cause language in the original affidavit was added after Maynard's notarized
signature was affixed to it; thus, the probable cause language was not verified, failing to
satisfy the affidavit requirement of RCr 13.10(1) .
At the suppression hearing, Maynard testified under oath to the above
explanation and specifically swore that the additional probable cause language was
written on the original affidavit before his notarized signature was affixed to it. The trial
court found Maynard's explanation to be plausible and truthful. Since that finding is
supported by substantial evidence, it is conclusive . RCr 9.78.
Appellant also claims the "probable cause" statement added to the
affidavit was insufficient to establish the probable cause necessary to support the
issuance of the warrant. We disagree . The warrant was issued for the purpose of
locating the weapon used to assault Howard. Howard's body was found in the
residence sought to be searched . That was sufficient to establish probable cause to
believe that the weapon would be found in the residence . But even if that were not so,
Maynard added the exact language to the affidavit that was suggested by the issuing
magistrate . Obviously, Maynard executed the warrant under a "good faith" belief that
the warrant was valid. United States v. Leon , 468 U .S . 897, 922,104 S.Ct. 3405, 3420,
82 L.Ed .2d 677 (1984) ; Crayton v. Commonwealth , 846 S.W .2d 684, 686 (Ky. 1992) .
Thus, the trial court did not err in overruling the motion to suppress the fruits of the
search .
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the
Magoffin Circuit Court are reversed ; and this case is remanded for a new trial in
accordance with the content of this opinion .
Lambert, CJ, and McAnulty, Minton, and Roach, JJ., concur.
Wintersheimer, J ., dissents by separate opinion in which Graves and Scott, JJ., join .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Donna L. Boyce
Appellate Branch Manager
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 21, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,$uyrrmt (gourf of "rufurhV
Cc
2004-SC-0383-MR and
2005-SC-0035-TG
GERALD WILLIAMS
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MAGOFFIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, JUDGE
2002-CR-00046
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE WINTERSHEIMER
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because the instructions
were correct, the jury was properly seated, impeachment testimony was correctly
admitted, and the evidence was properly admitted .
1 . LESSER INCLUDED INSTRUCTIONS
The trial judge instructed the jury on both wanton murder and first degree
manslaughter . Williams tendered proposed instructions for second degree
manslaughter and reckless homicide . The trial judge refused to submit those lesser
included offense instructions to the jury.
Lesser included offense instructions are only appropriate when, considering the
totality of the evidence; a jury might reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty
of the lesser included charge and not guilty of the primary charged offense . Bills v.
Commonwealth , 851 S .W.2d 466 (Ky. 1993) . The trial judge reviewed the evidence and
found it did not support the requested instructions . We will not substitute our judgment
for that of the trial judge absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. See
Commonwealth v. English , 993 S .W.2d 941 (Ky. 1999) .
An instruction must have a source within the framework of the evidence . Smith
v. Commonwealth , 599 S .W.2d 900 (Ky. 1980) . The instruction must present the law
applicable to the particular facts of the case and instructions should only present the
issues from the evidence. See Patton v. Commonwealth , 199 S .W.2d 129, 303 Ky. 684
(1947) . It would be simple to create a bright line rule that lesser included offense
instructions should almost always be provided to the jury. A rule such as that would,
however, ignore the role of the trial judge in providing the law of a particular case to the
jury. The trial judge, having heard the totality of the evidence, remains in the best
position to decide how best to instruct the jury. Absent an abuse of discretion we
decline the opportunity to replace that judgment with our own. There is nothing in the
record that supports a need for William's tendered lesser included instructions . There
was no error.
II . MOTIONS TO STRIKE JURORS FOR CAUSE
Two potential jurors were a concern to Williams . One expressed having heard
about the case and told how much the manner of death had upset her. She indicated
that she had prayed about the situation . The trial judge denied the motion to strike for
cause and Williams ultimately used a peremptory challenge to remove this potential
juror from the panel . A second juror acknowledged knowing the victim and her family.
He was a teacher who had one of the victim's children in his class and had taught all of
her other children . He had previously visited his own relatives when the victim's family
also happened to be visiting at the same time. He acknowledged he attended the
funeral. The trial judge denied the motion to strike for cause and Williams ultimately
used another peremptory challenge to remove this potential juror from the panel . When
questioned, both potential jurors responded that they could set aside any personal
knowledge and judge the case on the merits alone .
Absent a clear abuse of discretion we will not substitute our judgment on a
factual issue such as juror selection for that of the trial judge. See Adkins v.
Commonwealth , 96 S .W .3d 779 (Ky. 2003) . The trial judge is best suited to determine
the possibility of preconceived bias or prejudice in the mind of a prospective juror. See
Pennington v. Commonwealth , 316 S.W.2d 221 (Ky. 1958). It is not inconceivable that
in a county with a relatively small population, many if not most of the people know one
another . That they should meet, interact and take part in community events together is
the norm and not unduly prejudicial . Each prospective juror was subjected to individual
questioning . The trial judge was able to hear their responses and analyze their
comments . Nothing in the record suggests any attempt by either of the prospective
jurors to hide any feelings about the trial or the defendant. They were both very
forthright in their answers .
There was no abuse of discretion after the trial judge evaluated both potential
jurors and allowed them to join the panel. There was no error.
III . COLLATERAL IMPEACHMENT TESTIMONY
During police questioning, Williams repeatedly stated he loved the victim and that
they were due to be married the next day. Portions of that taped interview were played
for the jury. An ambulance was called to the dwelling early in the morning. On that
same day, William's current wife filed for divorce . He was served the papers later in the
day well after the victim had been beaten . The victim, however, was still legally married
to another person at that time. A deputy clerk testified regarding the dates and content
of the divorce filings and when they had been served on Williams . He now argues that
this testimony was improperly admitted over objection as impeachment on a collateral
matter . We do not agree.
During the closing argument, the prosecutor reminded the jury that Williams
planned to marry the victim the next day. The prosecutor reminded the jury that both
Williams and the victim were still married to others and that Williams could not be
married to the victim the next day. He stated in the closing argument that because of
these facts, Williams was a liar.
There was nothing improper in the prosecutor's explanation of the evidence .
Each side is allowed to fairly comment on the evidence as it pertains to their view of the
case . The credibility of a witness is always in issue before the jury. Sanborn v.
Commonwealth , 754 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1988) . There was no abuse of discretion when
the trial judge allowed the collateral evidence presented as it provided the jury with a
measure of the credibility of the evidence . See Commonwealth v. English , 993 S.W.2d
941 (Ky. 1999) . There was no error.
IV. EVIDENCE SUPPRESSION
Williams sought to suppress the broom handle which may have been used to
administer the beating . The trial judge allowed the evidence to be admitted at trial .
The police secured a search warrant prior to retrieving the object from the
residence . The officer testified that he had two different copies of the affidavit . One had
been partially filled in and he completed the other by adding a hand written statement in
front of the magistrate before the warrant request was approved. Even if the affidavit is
itself flawed, the police had an objectively reasonable good faith belief in the
magistrate's probable cause determination and the sufficiency of the warrant . See
Crayton v. Commonwealth , 846 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1992) . It was not unreasonable for the
trial judge to accept the uncontroverted evidence that any errors did not affect the police
officer's belief in the sufficiency of the warrant. There was no error .
V. HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF LABORATORY RESULTS
The police officer testified from two different laboratory reports. Williams did not
object to this testimony at trial. Trial strategy could very well have been the reason to
allow this testimony. We will not generally review on appeal, those issues where the
trial judge did not have the opportunity to rule on an objection . Petrey v.
Commonwealth , 945 S .W .2d 417 (Ky. 1997) . It is only where palpable error which
affects the substantial rights of a party is created that we must act. Campbell v.
Commonwealth , 564 S.W.2d 528 (Ky. 1978) . A review of the record in this case shows
the testimony does not rise to the level that it would have affected the outcome of the
trial. See Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1996) . Any error was of such
insignificant proportion that we affirm .
VI . INVESTIGATIVE HEARSAY
The police officer testified about his interview of Williams' then current wife.
From that interview, the police officer was able to determine that Williams had spent the
night with her on the evening the victim was beaten . She was never called as a
witness . This testimony is a classic example of what is commonly referred to as
investigative hearsay. It is not proper. See Sanborn v. Commonwealth , 754 S.W.2d
534 (Ky. 1988).
Williams did not object to the introduction of this evidence . The trial judge must
be afforded the opportunity to correct any errors or the issue is waived on appeal.
Petrey , supra.
Only if the error rises to such a level that it is palpable and affects the substantial
rights of a party, will we intervene . Campbell v. Commonwealth , 564 S.W.2d 528 (Ky.
1978) . After a thorough review of the record in this case we determine the testimony
does not rise to the level that it would have affected the outcome of the trial. See Partin
v. Commonwealth, supra. Thus we affirm on this issue.
Williams received a fundamentally fair trial. He was not denied any of his due
process rights under either the state or federal constitutions .
I would affirm the conviction in all respects .
Graves and Scott, JJ ., join this dissenting opinion .
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