DWIGHT ALLEN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : FEBRUARY 23, 2006
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,Suprme (gourf of
~iO4
2003-SC-0776-MR
APPELLANT
DWIGHT ALLEN
V
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P . MORRIS, JUDGE
2003-C R-0555
APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from a judgment based on a jury verdict that convicted Allen of
third-degree burglary and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. He was
sentenced to an enhanced term of twenty years in prison .
The questions presented are whether Allen was entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal on the burglary charge and whether the trial judge abused his discretion in
denying a motion to remove a juror for cause.
Allen admitted at trial that he stole a wallet from a woman's purse . The crime
occurred during the afternoon in the offices of University Cardiothoracic Surgical
Associates (UCSA), which is on the 12th floor of the Rudd Heart and Lung Center
building of the Jewish Hospital complex in Louisville . The principal contention by Allen
was that he was not properly charged with third-degree burglary.
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As it was explained at trial, someone exiting the elevator on the 12 floor of the
aforementioned hospital building would enter a large waiting area for UCSA patients .
Physicians from this group usually see patients in the morning between 7-9 a.m . Allen
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notes in his brief that anyone exiting the elevator on the 12 floor during the afternoon
hours would simply enter a vacant waiting area.
There are two doors in the waiting room, one to the left of the elevators and one
to the right. The door on the left is a wooden door with a keypad which requires a code
to gain entry . This door leads to a hallway with offices for physicians and secretaries . It
is considered the academic area .
The door on the right is a glass door, with a regular key lock. According to the
employee who had her wallet stolen, the door is always closed, but is often unlocked .
The glass door leads to the patient examination rooms . If someone enters through this
door, the hallway loops around, so one would end up on the other side of the secured
wooden door . Apparently no signs are posted indicating that the glass door leads to a
restricted or secure area.
A receptionist is on duty during the morning hours when patients are being seen .
She is seated behind a glass window next to the glass door. When a patient is ready to
be seen, a nurse appears at the glass door and calls the patient who is then escorted to
the examination rooms. Patients are not brought into the academic area .
An administrative assistant working in the offices of UCSA indicated that Allen
made the loop from the patient exam rooms to the academic offices. When he walked
past her desk, she asked him what he was doing and he responded that he was looking
for a patient. Allen continued walking, and the administrative assistant observed him
bend down by the desk of another employee . The administrative assistant followed
Allen down the hall and asked him if she could help him. He responded no and said he
was leaving. Allen exited the hallway through the wooden door that leads to the waiting
room .
It was quickly discovered that Allen had taken a wallet from the purse of one of
the employees . He was confronted outside the elevators by several individuals and
initially denied taking the wallet. When further demands were made, he turned the
wallet over to the employee.
The jury convicted Allen of the burglary charge as well as being a first-degree
persistent felony offender . The latter offense was based on ten prior felony convictions
-- some multi-count -- for theft, burglary, forgery, possession of a forged instrument,
receiving stolen property and trafficking in a controlled substance . Allen was sentenced
to five years on the burglary charge, which was enhanced to twenty years for being a
persistent felony offender . This appeal followed .
I . Directed Verdict
Allen argues that the trial judge erred in refusing to grant a directed verdict of
acquittal as to the charge of third-degree burglary because the Commonwealth
allegedly failed to prove all the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. He
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contends that he cannot be convicted of burglary because the 12 floor of the hospital
was open to the public; there were no signs indicating restricted entry; and no one
ordered him to leave. Allen claims that there simply is no evidence that he entered or
remained unlawfully in the offices of UCSA with the intent to commit a crime . We
disagree .
Our standard of review of a denial of a directed verdict of acquittal is well-settled
and is stated in Commonwealth v. Benham , 816 S .W .2d 186 (Ky. 1991) as follows: "On
appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it
would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled
to a directed verdict of acquittal ." Id . at 187.
A person is guilty of third-degree burglary when he knowingly enters or remains
unlawfully in a building with the intent to commit a crime . KRS 511 .040 . A person
"enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon a premises when he is not privileged or
licensed to do so. KRS 511 .090(1). A license or privilege to enter or remain in or upon
premises which are only partly open to the public is not a license or privilege to enter or
remain in or upon a part of the premises which are not open to the public . KRS
511 .090(3) .
The fallacy of the argument offered by Allen is his contention that he had a
license of privilege to be in that part of the premises where he stole the wallet. He did
not. The academic area is not open to the public. Just because certain areas of the
hospital may be open to the public, it does not give a person a license or privilege to be
in other areas that are not. In this case, it was even more apparent from the time of day
and the absence of people from the reception area as well as the patient rooms that
this part of the hospital was not open to the public . The trial judge properly denied the
motion for a directed verdict.
Even if we accepted the claim by Allen that the area was open to the public, he
was still properly convicted of third-degree burglary . Allen terminated his license to be
on the premises when he committed the criminal act. See Bowling v. Commonwealth ,
942 S.W.2d 293 (Ky. 1997) .
II . Juror
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion by Allen to
remove juror #35496 for cause . This juror was challenged because he stated that he
did not like "thieves, cheats and liars." Allen exercised all of his peremptory challenges,
but did not strike Juror #35496. The juror sat on the petit jury. Allen explains that his
trial counsel attempted to use one of his peremptory challenges on this juror, but was
confused about the juror's number and removed the wrong person.
The trial judge has broad discretion in determining whether to excuse a juror for
cause . Mills v. Commonwealth , 95 S .W.3d 838 (Ky. 2003). That determination will not
be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion . Id . As the trial judge
indicated, if persons were honest, no one would particularly like thieves, cheats and
liars. It just happened that this juror expressed himself more than the other jurors .
When defense counsel asked if any potential juror could not be fair and impartial, no
one indicated that they could not. After reviewing the record, we find no abuse of
discretion by the trial judge in denying the challenge for cause.
Allen received a fundamentally fair trial. He was not denied any of his due
process rights under the state or federal constitutions .
The judgment of conviction is affirmed .
All concur except Roach, J ., who concurs in result only.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Emily Holt Rhorer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Rickie L. Pearson
Assistant Attorney General
George G . Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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