BEORIA ABRAHAM SIMMONS II V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 23, 2006
TO BE PUBLISHED
,Sixprrme Courf of ~ru
1989-SC-0736-MR & 2004-SC-0057-Mr
Q
C
BEORIA ABRAHAM SIMMONS, fl
V.
P
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HON . EDMUND P. KAREM AND HON . STEPHEN P. RYAN, JUDGES
1983-CR-885
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE WINTERSHEIMER
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from a decision of the Jefferson Circuit Court which denied the
motion by Simmons for RCr 11 .42 relief. Originally, Simmons was convicted of three
counts of first-degree murder, three counts of first-degree rape, one count of attempted
murder, one count of attempted rape, and four counts of kidnapping. He was
sentenced to death for each of the murders and for three counts of kidnapping ; twenty
years for the attempted murder ; ten years for the attempted rape ; and twenty years for
the fourth kidnapping count . His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct
appeal . Simmons v. Commonwealth , 746 S .W.2d 393 (Ky. 1988) . Thereafter, he filed
an RCr, 11 .42 motion requesting the trial court to vacate his convictions . After a 9-day
evidentiary hearing, the trial judge denied the RCr 11 .42 motion.
In this appeal, Simmons raises 15 assignments of alleged error arising out of the
denial of the RCr 11 .42 motion. We shall review each of the issues presented .
Standard of Review
We believe it is again useful to set out the standard of review of claims raised in
a collateral attack pursuant to RCr 11 .42, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at
the original trial. Such a motion is limited to issues that were not and could not be
raised on direct appeal . An issue raised and rejected on direct appeal may not be
relitigated in this type of proceeding by simply claiming that it amounts to ineffective
assistance of counsel . Haight v. Commonwealth , 41 S.W .3d 436 (Ky. 2001), which
cites Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W .2d 905 (Ky. 1998), as well as other
decisions of this Court.
The standards which measure ineffective assistance of counsel are set out in
Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S . 668, 104 S .Ct . 2052, 80 L.Ed .2d 674 (1984) ; accord
Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W .2d 37 (Ky. 1985). In order to be classified as
ineffective, the performance of counsel must be below the objective standard of .
reasonableness and so prejudicial as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial and a
reasonable result. Strickland , supra . "Counsel is constitutionally ineffective only if
performance below professional standards caused the defendant to lose what he
otherwise would probably have won." United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222 (6t" Cir.
1992). The critical issue is not whether counsel made errors, but whether counsel was
so thoroughly ineffective that defeat was snatched from the hands of probable victory.
Morrow, supra . The purpose of RCr 11 .42 is to provide a forum for known grievances,
not to provide an opportunity to research for such grievances . Gilliam v.
Commonwealth , 652 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1983) .
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance, the court must focus on the totality
of evidence before the judge or jury and assess the overall performance of counsel
throughout the case in order to determine whether the identified acts or omissions
overcome the presumption that counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance .
See Kimmelman v. Morrison , 477 U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed .2d 305 (1986);
Morrow; Haight, supra. A defendant is not guaranteed errorless counsel or counsel
judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel likely to render and rendering reasonably
effective assistance . Hai ht; See also McQueen v. Commonwealth , 949 S .W.2d 70
(Ky. 1997) .
Strickland notes that a court must indulge a strong presumption that the conduct
of counsel falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance . The right
to effective assistance of counsel is recognized because of the effect it has on the
ability of the accused to receive a fair trial .
The movant has the burden of establishing convincingly that he or she was
deprived of some substantial right which would justify the extraordinary relief provided
by post-conviction proceeding . Haight, citing Dorton v. Commonwealth , 433 S .W .2d
117 (Ky. 1968) . A reviewing court must always defer to the determination of facts and
witness credibility made by the circuit judge . Hai ht; Sanborn , supra ; McQueen v.
Commonwealth , 721 S.W .2d 694 (Ky. 1986) .
This Court has also held that an RCr 11 .42 motion must set forth all the facts
necessary to establish existence of a constitutional violation and that the court will not
presume that facts omitted from the motion establish existence of such a violation .
Sanders v. Commonwealth , 89 S.W.3d 380 (Ky. 2002) . See also Hodge v.
Commonwealth , 116 S .W.3d 463 (Ky. 2003) . A convicted defendant claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden of: 1) identifying specific errors by
counsel ; 2) demonstrating that the errors by counsel were objectively unreasonable
under the circumstances existing at the time of trial; 3) rebutting the presumption that
the actions of counsel were the result of trial strategy ; and 4) demonstrating that the
errors of counsel prejudiced his right to a fair trial . See Strickland . That case states
that "[n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take
account of the variety of circumstances faced by counsel or the range of legitimate
decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant." Id . at 688-89 .
A careful review of all the questions raised indicates that the circuit judge
correctly rejected all of the claims by Simmons following the nine-day evidentiary
hearing and properly overruled his RCr 11 .42 motion. Simmons has failed to
demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective, that he did not receive a fundamentally
fair trial, or that any other grounds warrant the relief requested .
The specific facts involved in the original trial are carefully set out in Simmons ,
supra . Simmons was represented by Daniel T. Taylor, III.
I . Dehumanizing of Simmons
Simmons claims that his defense counsel at trial showed distaste for him by
repeatedly dehumanizing him to the jury. He asserts that such actions violated the duty
of defense counsel of zealous advocacy and deprived him of the right to effective
assistance of counsel under both the federal and state constitutions . We must
disagree .
During opening statement, the prosecution detailed the 12-count indictment
against Simmons which had charged him with rape, kidnapping and murder of three
different women, and attempting to kidnap, rape and murder an additional underage
victim . The prosecution gave an explicit description of the details regarding each crime
and set out considerable forensic evidence which it intended to present. In addition,
there was a confession from Simmons, which although challenged, was not
suppressed, and a positive identification by the one surviving victim.
A careful review of the record indicates that attorney Taylor was a very zealous
advocate and when faced with the overwhelming evidence of guilt, selected a trial
strategy that sought to keep Simmons from being executed. That strategy was to admit
guilt and argue mental illness or insanity in an attempt to avoid a death sentence.
Almost all of the alleged dehumanizing references occurred in the opening
statement by defense counsel . The clear theme to be presented to the
jury was that
the behavior of the defendant was due to mental illness rather than that he was
inhuman . Considering the overwhelming evidence referred to in the opening statement
by the prosecution, it was a valid trial strategy to -admit guilt initially and begin the
process of trying to build a case that the defendant was mentally ill and that his life was
worth saving.
An admission of guilt also reduced some of the power of the prosecution's case
as well as giving a sense of reasonableness to the defense position. The nature of the
case was such that defense counsel had to use provocative language to describe
Simmons and equate him to other notorious serial killers . The Taylor strategy was not
intended to dehumanize Simmons, but rather to exhibit him as an extraordinary
offender who could aid scientific research into what causes such aberrant human
behavior . This could only be achieved if Simmons was spared the death penalty .
In closing arguments, the defense counsel repeated the concept of human
dignity and that he in fact had chosen a higher road by not insulting the
jury and trying
to fight an impossible factual case. By acknowledging guilt and seeking mercy by virtue
of mental illness, the strategy remained to save the life of the defendant . Defense
counsel acknowledged that Simmons had committed "unspeakable acts" nearly beyond
tolerance, but then immediately asked the jury to put aside the emotional part of the
case and use an intellectual approach to their decision .
A review of the record indicates that Taylor limited his disparaging remarks to
either opening or closing argument and there are no references that could be
considered derogatory or dehumanizing in the body of the trial . He also expressed
regret for the remark he made about this individual being a pitiable monster. The
record reveals an experienced defense counsel trying to sell the jury the story that his
client was sick and that he had visions and that a verdict of guilty but mentally ill would
be appropriate . At the RCr 11 .42 hearing, Taylor indicated that he did not adopt a trial
strategy intending to dehumanize the defendant.
Analysis of the entire trial indicates that the derogatory remarks were limited and
were used as part of a strategy to attempt to save the life of the defendant. No
prejudice, either actual or presumed, arose and Simmons received a fair trial and did
not have ineffective assistance of counsel . The behavior of defense counsel in this
case indicates that it is significantly different from that involved in Rickman v. Bell , 131
F.3d 1150 (6 th Cir . 1997) . The conduct here was not shocking and professionally
outrageous. None of the elements involved in Rickman , supra , arose in this case .
Thus, it is clearly distinguishable and actually serves to show why the representation
here was not ineffective.
II . Conflict of Interest
Simmons argues that the monster image presented in the opening statement
and the friendship of his counsel with his allegedly abusive parents adversely affected
the ability of defense counsel to discover and present compelling mitigating evidence.
Specifically, Simmons asserts that the extreme distaste for him created an actual
conflict of'interest that prevented Taylor from humanizing him and developing mitigating
evidence . In addition, he claims that counsel's friendship with the Simmons family
along with being paid by the parents resulted in a divided loyalty that adversely affected
his defense. Thus, he contends he was deprived of his right to conflict free assistance
of counsel . We disagree .
Counsel for Simmons continues to disagree with the strategy employed by trial
defense counsel . The defense strategy at trial was to portray Simmons as a serial killer
whose principal benefit to society would be saving his life for study rather than
sentencing him to capital punishment . Defense counsel used provocative and
sensational language regarding Simmons during his opening statement as well as
closing arguments . Obviously, he did so in an attempt to save Simmons from a death
sentence. The magnitude of the crimes demonstrates the reasonableness of such
tactics . Defense counsel showed Simmons as a very human person. His loyalty to his
client was not infringed upon by acknowledging the terrible circumstances of the crimes
involved .
The allegations that defense trial counsel had a divided loyalty because he
"became friends" with Simmons' family and was paid by the parents is without merit. A
review of the evidence indicates that the allegations are clearly misinterpreted and
misconstrued and there is no indication that Simmons or his parents ever suggested an
abnormal family life. It is interesting to note that the father did not know defense
counsel prior to retaining him and could not remember his name when he testified at
the RCr 11 .42 hearing . The fact that the parents paid for the representation of their son
in a case where the adult child is facing a death sentence is certainly to be expected .
There is no evidence that defense counsel allowed the parents to make critical
decisions in the case . The father testified that he did not share in the decision-making
and that all decisions were made between counsel and the son after their consultation .
Defense counsel testified that his obligation was to the son and not to the parents. In
the circumstances of this case, the relationship between Taylor and the parents did not
create any conflict of interest. Cf. Mickens v. Taylor , 535 U.S . 162, 122 S .Ct. 1237, 152
L. Ed.2d 291 (2002) .
Ill . Unreasonable Strategy
Counsel for Simmons now argues that the defense offered an unreasonable
strategy, presented harmful evidence and failed to develop and introduce mitigating
evidence, particularly during the penalty phase of the trial . We disagree .
A careful examination of the record indicates that Taylor, an experienced criminal
lawyer who had worked in the area of capital litigation, presented a reasonable strategy,
albeit unsuccessful . The defense tried to have the jury view Simmons as an
extraordinary and unique individual who was worthy of scientific study. It is reasonable
to believe that the background of the defendant, contrasted with the horrible nature of
his crimes, would intrigue the imagination of the jury to determine how an apparently
normal person could commit such heinous crimes . See Waters v. Thomas, 46 F .3d
1506 (11 th Cir. 1995), which concluded that the "spare him for science" argument was
reasonable trial strategy .
The tactic now suggested on this appeal would have been completely contrary to
the defense theory . The variety of alleged physiological, social and family problems do
not amount to such mitigating evidence as would have been beneficial to Simmons and
would have compromised the theory that could have saved his life . It is interesting to
note that during deliberations the jury asked a question that indicated they may have
been considering a sentence of life imprisonment.
The complaint by counsel about the lack of expert testimony is also
unpersuasive. Reliance on experts from KCPC was not ineffective assistance of
counsel . The argument that there was cumulative prejudice resulting from the errors of
the defense is unconvincing . The mere fact that appellate counsel disagrees with the
strategy and tactics employed by a veteran defense lawyer does not result in ineffective
assistance by that counsel . The colorful behavior of defense counsel was solely
intended to save the life of the accused .
IV. Concession of Guilt
Simmons contends that he was denied effective assistance at trial when, despite
a belief that he did not comprehend the ramifications of a guilty plea, defense counsel
admitted guilt without ascertaining whether Simmons understood what the strategy
would entail . We disagree .
As has been noted earlier, the strategy of defense counsel at trial was to admit
guilt but try to save the defendant from execution . In order to avoid the death penalty, a
concession of guilt when the evidence is overwhelming is not ineffective assistance of
counsel . See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S . 175, 125 S .Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004) ;
Sanborn.
Defense counsel testified at the RCr 11 .42 hearing that Simmons understood his
options and realized what the defense would be, understood that he could testify but
chose not to . Defense counsel also testified that he was attempting to "nudge just one
member of the jury." Counsel's statement in opening that the defendant did not know
what the defense would be was mere theatrics, again, in an attempt to influence just
one member of the jury to accept his theory . Defense counsel specifically testified that
Simmons knew what his defense was going to be, that he was repeatedly told, and that
the ultimate goal was to save his life . An examination of the testimony of Simmons as
to all the questions raised was limited and did not support any contention raised on this
appeal.
The testimony of Simmons was vague in that his response to questions was
usually answered by saying he did not recall . He did remember discussions about
saving his life, and being informed that he could testify. He vaguely remembered
discussing his being "saved for science ." The parents could not recollect any
discussions about strategy, but the mother indicated that Taylor may have discussed
how he was going to defend the action . The father recalled that Taylor stated he was
going to try as hard as he could to save the son's life, and the father also stated that he
had memory problems. Simmons and his parents were present throughout the trial and
the various hearings and no one expressed any concern about the strategy of the
defense . Following the trial, Simmons sent a letter to Taylor thanking him and his staff
for his efforts .
Finally, defense counsel did not shift the responsibility of the jury by mentioning
that any sentencing decision was subject to appeal. The remark was simply to
emphasize the importance of their decision and did not violate Caldwell v. Mississippi ,
472 U.S . 320, 105 S .Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) .
V. Mitigation Instruction
Simmons argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
mitigation instructions that did not allow the jury to give effect to the mitigating evidence
and created the ethical dilemma of which contradictory instruction to follow. This issue
is completely without merit .
After listing a number of mitigating circumstances that could be considered, the
mitigation instruction included a catch-all provision stating that the jury could consider
"[a]ny other extenuating or mitigating circumstances that you may find to exist." The
last component of the instruction then stated as follows :
In addition to the foregoing, you shall also consider those
aspects of the defendant's character and record, and those
facts and circumstances of the particular offense(s) of which
you will have found him guilty, about which he has offered
evidence in mitigation of the penalties to be imposed upon
him and which you believe from the evidence to be true.
The phrase "in addition to the foregoing," makes it abundantly clear that the last
component of the instruction is to be considered along with the mitigation evidence
discussed in the first part of the instruction . The jury instruction did not preclude the
jury from considering any aspect of the defendant's character or record, nor any of the
mitigating circumstances offered by Simmons. There was no error of any kind in the
instruction .
VI . Sentencing Jury Instructions
Simmons asserts that trial defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
sentencing instructions that shifted the burden of proof, created a presumption of death
and even mandated death, when aggravators and mitigators are even. We disagree .
The instructions were constitutionally proper and trial counsel was effective .
Simmons challenges Section 4(B) of the reasonable doubt instruction, which
stated that "if upon the whole case you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death, you shall recommend a sentence of imprisonment
instead." The same instruction was found to be sufficient to allow the jury to fix a
punishment of life imprisonment in Parrish v. Commonwealth , 121 S.W.3d 198 (Ky.
2003). See also Perdue v. Commonwealth , 916 S.W .2d 148 (Ky. 1995); Skaggs v.
Commonwealth , 803 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1990) ; Smith v. Commonwealth , 599 S .W.2d 900
(Ky. 1980).
Considering the instructions as a whole, they were constitutionally sufficient.
The preamble of the instructions noted that the jury was able to fix four possible
punishments : 1) life; 2) life without probation or parole for 25 years ; 3) a term of 20
years or any number of years greater than 20, up to and including life; or 4) death .
There is no violation of KRS 532 .025. The instructions do not mandate death upon a
finding that aggravators and mitigators were equal . The instructions permitted the jury
to properly consider the particular mitigating circumstances of the defendant.
VII . Jury Selection
Simmons alleges that the approach of trial counsel to voir dire was idiosyncratic,
demonstrated no reasonable strategy and was highly damaging to his chance of
receiving a sentence less than death. He states that trial counsel asked confusing
questions throughout the examination of the jury that failed to elicit information helpful
to determining whether a potential juror was qualified to serve . He claims that counsel
failed to properly challenge the prosecution's racially discriminatory use of peremptory
12
challenges and failed to request a change of venue. Upon careful review, we find that
all of the questions raised are without merit.
Defense counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he believed it was a
matter of judgment not to ask certain questions, observing that he did not want to lose
more than he would gain. He did not want to do anything that would unnecessarily
inflame the jury. His decision was based on his trial strategy which was to save the life
of Simmons.
Simmons complains that Taylor failed to timely challenge the racially
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges until after the jury was sworn. This Court
reviewed that question on direct appeal and found the objection was not timely . A
concurring opinion correctly noted that there was no basis for a Batson claim other than
mere speculation because the Commonwealth did not strike all of the black jurors .
Simmons . Moreover, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed .2d 69
(1986), was not the law at the time of the trial in February, 1985 . Defense counsel
testified that at the time of the trial he followed the then existing law, that being Swain v.
Alabama , 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965) . The authority relied on
by Simmons is unpersuasive .
Simmons also claims that trial counsel erred by failing to remove jurors who
would automatically vote for the death penalty . None of the four jurors identified by
Simmons indicated that they would not consider mitigating evidence and none indicated
that they would automatically vote for the death penalty .
The argument that a change of venue should have been obtained is without
merit . At the evidentiary hearing, Taylor testified regarding his 31 years of trial
experience and his familiarity with the other courts of northern and western Kentucky.
13
Based on his experience and his trial strategy, he determined that Simmons would do
better in Jefferson County because juries there tended to be more liberal and less
death penalty oriented . We find no error.
A careful review of the lengthy and detailed jury examination indicates that there
was no error and certainly no cumulative error. Simmons did not demonstrate any
extensive pretrial publicity or any showing that the jurors were predisposed toward the
death penalty.
VIII . Unreasonable Strategy
Simmons maintains that defense counsel was ineffective for having an
unreasonable trial strategy. He argues that presenting an insanity defense with no
evidence supporting it and conceding the sufficiency of evidence claims on rape and
kidnapping violated his right to an effective assistance . He recognizes that strategic
decisions and insufficiency of evidence are not grounds for RCr 11 .42 relief. However,
he couches his argument to the effect that counsel was ineffective for basing his
decision on intuition rather than a thorough investigation .
.
Once again, the strategy was based on 31 years experience as well as the
particular facts of this case which indicated strong evidence of guilt. It is worth noting
that the jury was instructed on both guilty but mentally ill and insanity. This Court has
previously examined the evidence and found it sufficient to support both the rape and
kidnapping charges. Simmons. This claim cannot be raised in a collateral attack .
IX . International Covenant
Simmons argues that his death sentence violated the "arbitrary deprivation of
life" provisions of Article VI of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights .
He asserts that this question cannot be waived because properly ratified treaties are
14
supreme law. Buell v. Mitchell , 274 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 2001), observed that the
International Covenant does not require its members to abolish the death penalty . As
that court noted, the United States has agreed to abide by the covenant only to the
extent that the Stn, 8th and 14th amendment ban cruel and unusual punishment. The
court also observed that the agreement was not binding on courts of the United States.
In any event, the claim that he was deprived of his life arbitrarily is without
foundation . He received a fundamentally fair trial in which a jury convicted him of
capital murder . The jury verdict and sentence was affirmed by this Court and he has
not been deprived of any legal right.
X. Delay in Execution
Simmons now contends that executing him after a delay of 19 years constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment. We find this argument incredible and without merit .
Any delay was necessary to permit Simmons to fully exercise all of his rights to
challenge his conviction and sentence . The record indicates that much, if not all, of the
delay is attributable to Simmons in not doing anything to expedite the review of his case
by the circuit court. Similar arguments have been rejected in Sanborn .
XI . 50 Page Limit
The denial of the motion for an extension of page limits on his brief in the RCr
11 .42 action did not deny Simmons due process under either the state or federal
constitution . Here, all of the material facts and legal arguments have been extensively
presented in the pleadings, subsequent supplemental filings and in the briefs . There is
no constitutional right to a certain number of pages in any appellate brief. See
Sanborn; see also Bowling v. Commonwealth , 981 S.W.2d 545 (Ky. 1998) .
XII . Conflicts on Appeal
Simmons complains that claims ordinarily raised on direct appeal must be
permitted in a RCr 11 .42 motion when trial counsel serves as direct appeal counsel
because this creates an inherent conflict of interest that prevents raising claims that
ordinarily would be raised on direct appeal. We disagree .
Trial defense counsel was one of the three direct appeal lawyers on behalf of
Simmons . The three counsel on appeal raised 34 issues in a 161 page brief.
As noted by the circuit judge, the RCr 11 .42 motion contains many of the same
questions that were dismissed by this Court on direct appeal, or some variation . Some
of the arguments are raised again under the guise of ineffective assistance of counsel .
As such, they cannot be discussed again and the circuit judge determined that only the
issues with possible merit should be considered . The conclusionary allegations made
by Simmons do not demonstrate any prejudice . Cf. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U .S. 259,
120 S .Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000) . There is no error.
XI II . Reopen Direct Appeal
There is no basis on which this Court could reopen the direct appeal simply
because of an allegation that defense counsel at trial was so ineffective that the direct
appeal amounted to no appeal at all. Simmons contends that the failure to reopen the
direct appeal would mean that he has no avenue to present claims that call into
question the reliability of his conviction and death sentence . We find no reason to
overrule Hicks v. Commonwealth, 825 S.W .2d 280 (1992), which holds that this Court
will not reexamine an appeal reviewed and decided by this Court . This Court previously
denied the motion of Simmons to reopen his direct appeal . There is no reason to
change that decision .
16
XIII . All Ineffective Claims
Neither due process nor equal protection principles require that Simmons be
allowed to raise all ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a collateral attack . RCr
11 .42 motions are limited to the issues that were not and could not be raised on direct
appeal. Hodge, supra . An issue raised and rejected on direct appeal may not be
reconsidered in an RCr 11 .42 proceeding by simply stating that it amounts to ineffective
assistance of counsel . Haight. See also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S . 387, 105 S.Ct. 830,
83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) . A collateral attack is not a substitute for appeal and the
principles governing direct appeals are not applicable to such motions. Hodge . We
decline to overrule Haight.
XV. Cumulative Impact
The argument that cumulative impact of the alleged errors violates the
constitutional rights of Simmons is without merit. The individual allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel presented here are not supported by fact and
consequently have no cumulative effect whatsoever. Sanborn. See also Campbell v.
United States , 364 F .3d 727 (6th Cir. 2004).
There have been no violations of any federal or state constitutional provisions
here . The claims presented do not undermine the reliability of the death sentence
imposed.
The order of the circuit court denying RCr 11 .42 relief is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
David M . Barron
John Palombi
Assistant Public Advocates
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Louis F. Mathias, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.