IMPORTANT NO,TICE THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PR OCED URE PR O1t7UL GA TED B Y THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL ATOT BE CITED OR USED AS A UTUORITY IN ANY OTHER
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTANT NO,TICE
NOT TO BEPUBLISHED OPINIQN
THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PR O1t7UL GA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL ATOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTUORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : NOVEMBER 23, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,~iuyrrmr OE'Llurf of
2005-SC-0321-WC
DONNIE MORRIS
V
D
--1j , A'
w
~l O J
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2004-CA-1707-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NOS . 01-97088 & 01-0854
W .A. KENDALL & COMPANY, INC . ; HON . W.
BRUCE COWDEN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal concerns an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ's) authority under KRS
342 .125 to withdraw and later revise an award on the ground that it was rendered before
the ALJ ruled on an outstanding motion to extend the time for submitting evidence .
Affirming a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board (Board), the Court of Appeals
determined that although the ALJ erred by revising the initial opinion pursuant to a
petition for reconsideration, KRS 342.125 permitted the ALJ to correct an admitted
oversight in failing to rule on the motion before considering the claim . Wheatley v. Bryant
Auto Service , 860 S .W .2d 767 (Ky. 1993) . We affirm .
This case involves an unusual procedural history . The claimant alleged workrelated back injuries of March 31, 2000, and February 14, 2001 . A different insurance
carrier covered the employer's liability on each date; therefore, the degree to which
each incident caused the claimant's disability became an issue . Within the scheduled
time for proof-taking, the parties submitted evidence from numerous physicians . On
March 27, 2003, the carrier responsible for the first injury (first carrier) deposed Dr.
Gregory Gleis, and the other carrier cross-examined him . The first carrier subsequently
included Dr. Gleis on its witness list and summarized his testimony as indicating that the
claimant sustained two injuries, that the first injury caused a 5% impairment, and that
the second necessitated surgery and caused a 7% impairment .
A memorandum of the June 12, 2003, benefit review conference (BRC) listed the
extent of pre-existing active disability regarding the second injury and whether the
second incident was an "injury" as being contested issues . Having reached a tentative
settlement with the claimant after the BRC, the first carrier did not appear at the June
26, 2003, hearing, and neither the hearing order nor the transcript of the proceeding
made any reference to Dr. Gleis's deposition . In July, 2003, the first carrier and the
claimant submitted their agreement to the ALJ for approval . It provided for a lump sum
payment of $15,000 .00, of which $1,000 .00 was for a waiver of the right to reopen and
$1,000.00 was for a waiver of future psychological care .
On August 18, 2003, the ALJ held a status conference at which the employer
was represented by counsel for both carriers. An order entered on that date noted the
discrepancy between the evidence that had been filed and that which was listed on the
hearing order.
It stated that Dr. Gleis's deposition would be included as evidence and
ordered that the contested issues would include the propriety of including Dr. Gleis's
deposition as evidence . The order also gave the second carrier 30 days to take further
proof, after which the case would stand submitted . The claimant failed to object.
On September 2, 2003, the employer (as represented by the second carrier) filed
a motion for an extension of time until December 1, 2003. The motion explained that an
evaluation by Dr. Wood was scheduled on August 19, 2003, but would not be performed
until November 20, 2003 . Again, the claimant failed to object.
On September 4, 2003, the AU entered a sua sponte order noting that the status
of the case had been reviewed and approval of the settlement deferred . The order gave
the parties until September 17, 2003, to attempt to reach a global settlement and stated
that the case would stand submitted on that date if they did not. The employer was
directed to fax any evidence to the AU on or before September 17, 2003.
On September 30, 2003, while the unopposed motion for an extension of time
remained pending, the AU approved the claimant's settlement regarding the first injury
and rendered an opinion on the merits of the claim for the second injury. Noting that Dr.
Gleis's deposition was taken during normal proof time, that both carriers participated,
but that the deposition was inadvertently left off the hearing order, the AU determined
that it could properly be considered . After considering the conflicting medical evidence
submitted by the parties, the AU relied on Dr. Gleis's testimony and concluded that
there were objective medical findings of a second injury, that it caused both a 7%
physical impairment and a 6% psychiatric impairment, and that the claimant lacked the
physical capacity to return to the type of work that he performed when he was injured .
On October 13, 2003, the employer filed a petition for reconsideration, pointing
out that its motion for an extension of time was pending on September 17, 2003, and
remained pending when the merits were decided . It requested that the opinion be set
aside, that the still-pending motion be granted, and that it be given an opportunity to
obtain and submit Dr. Wood's evaluation .
Objecting, the claimant asserted that the petition did not allege a patent error in
the opinion and award but was an attempt to re-litigate the merits . The claimant pointed
out that the employer had an ample opportunity during proof time to cross-examine Dr.
Gleis and to submit rebuttal medical evidence . He requested, therefore, that both the
motion for an extension of time and the petition for reconsideration be denied .
After a status conference with the parties, the ALJ entered an order on
November 14, 2003. The ALJ took exception to the employer's assertion that there was
a decision at the hearing not to admit Dr. Gleis's deposition as evidence but noted that
the outstanding motion for an extension of time had been overlooked and that the
settlement and the merits of the claim for the second injury were considered before
deciding it. On that basis, the ALJ ordered the opinion and award to be withdrawn and
granted the motion for an extension of time . The employer was given through
December 1, 2003, to introduce additional proof. The claimant was given 30 days
thereafter for rebuttal, after which the parties were given ten days in which to file
supplemental briefs .
The employer introduced a medical report from Dr. Wood, which indicated that
there was no causal relationship between any permanent harmful change in the human
organism and the February 14, 2001, injury. However, the claimant submitted no
additional evidence . In a revised opinion rendered on January 30, 2004, the ALJ relied
on Dr. Wood and found that any permanent physical or psychiatric impairment was due
to the injury that occurred in March, 2000 . Convinced, however, that the February,
2001, injury caused a temporary flare-up in the pre-existing condition that required
surgery, the ALJ determined that the second carrier was liable for the surgery and
temporary total disability benefits from the date of injury until the claimant reached
maximum medical improvement following surgery . Liability for any medical expenses
thereafter was the responsibility of the first carrier.
Asserting that counsel for the second carrier cross-examined Dr. Gleis and had
ample opportunity in the original proofing schedule to present rebuttal evidence, the
claimant maintains that it had no legal right to introduce additional proof. Although the
August 18, 2003, order offered the carrier an extra opportunity to do so, it was merely
gratuitous . Therefore, the ALJ's failure to decide the motion for an extension of time
before considering the merits of the claim was not reversible error. Nor was it the sort
of error that would permit a reopening under Wheatley v. Bryant, supra . The claimant
argues that the evidence presented within the proofing schedule was conflicting and
that the initial findings were reasonable ; therefore, there was no basis to reverse them
on appeal. Yet, by withdrawing the initial opinion, considering additional evidence, and
later revising the opinion, the AU effectively short-circuited the appellate process and
changed the result, which KRS 342.281 does not permit . Wells v. Ford , 714 S .W.2d
481 (Ky. 1986); Eaton Axle Corp . v. Nally, 688 S.W.2d 334 (Ky. 1985) ; Beth-Elkhorn
Corp . v. Nash, 470 S.W .2d 329 (Ky. 1971) ; see also , Francis v. Glenmore Distilleries ,
718 S .W .2d 953 (Ky. App . 1986). The claimant notes that reopening is not permitted in
order to submit evidence that could have been discovered with the exercise of due
diligence in the course of the original litigation but that the Board and the Court of
Appeals have effectively endorsed the use of the "mistake" provision to permit just such
evidence to be introduced .
KRS 342 .281 limits an ALJ to correcting errors patently appearing on the face of
an award . Although it permits an AU to make additional findings and to resolve
unresolved issues, it does not permit the merits of issues that were decided to be
reconsidered . Wells v. Ford , supra ; Eaton Axle Corp. v. Nally, supra ; Beth-Elkhorn
Corp. v. Nash, supra ; Wells v. Beth-Elkhorn , 708 S .W .2d 104,106 (Ky. App . 1985) ; see
also , Francis v. Glenmore Distilleries , supra . It is apparent that the ALJ withdrew the
initial opinion in this claim for the purpose of reconsidering the merits, which clearly was
prohibited . Furthermore, the decision was not rendered within the 10-day period that
KRS 342 .281 permits. At issue, therefore, is whether the result was properly affirmed
on the ground that KRS 342 .125 would have permitted a reopening to amend the award
to correct a mistake, such as occurred in Wheatley v. Bryant, supra .
In Wheatley v. Bryant, supra , the court acknowledged an apparent vacillation in
previous decisions regarding the authority to correct an admitted error in applying the
law in a workers' compensation proceeding but noted that CR 60.02 permitted a judge
to correct such a mistake in a civil proceeding . Concluding that the more recent
decisions more nearly comported with the General Assembly's intent, the court
determined that KRS 342 .125 permitted an ALJ to reopen a final award that had not
been appealed to a court in order to correct an admitted mistake in applying the law as
it existed at the time of the worker's injury . Therefore, it affirmed an ALJ's decision to
correct the duration of Wheatley's award sua sponte from 425 weeks to life.
In a subsequent case, counsel for the employer was not served with an order
denying its petition for reconsideration, so the ALJ set aside the order and reissued it to
enable the employer to file a timely notice of appeal. Fluor Construction International,
Inc . v. Kirtley, 103 S .W.3d 88 (Ky. 2003). The court relied on the analysis set forth in
Kurtsinger v. Board of Trustees of Kentucky Retirement Systems, 90 S.W.3d 454, 456
(Ky. 2002), in which the court noted that CR 60 .02 is a mistake-correcting rule that gives
a trial court broad discretion to vacate an order on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, or
excusable neglect. In Kirtley, the court determined that although the ALJ did not cite the
mistake provision of KRS 342.125, the statute offered the same relief under the
circumstances as CR 60.02 .
Wishing to consider all of the medical evidence before resolving the contested
issues in the second claim and considering the propriety of the settlement agreement,
the ALJ determined in the present claim that Dr. Gleis's deposition would be considered
as evidence although neither the claimant nor the second carrier had listed it in the
hearing order. The second carrier had both reason and opportunity to rebut Dr. Gleis's
testimony during the normal proofing schedule, and the regulations do not provide for
additional proof to be taken after a hearing . Nonetheless, the ALJ gave the carrier an
opportunity to submit additional evidence to rebut Dr. Gleis's testimony, and the
claimant failed to object . Under the circumstances, he waived any error regarding the
August 18, 2003, order.
The November 14, 2003, order did not cite KRS 342.125, but it explained that the
basis for withdrawing the initial decision was that the ALJ would have granted the
pending motion for an extension of time before considering the merits had he not
overlooked it. When viewed as being a statutory equivalent to CR 60.02, KRS
342.125(1)(c) would have permitted the ALJ to vacate the opinion on the ground that it
was a mistake to have rendered a decision on the merits before deciding a pending
motion to extend the time for taking proof. By failing to object to the order permitting
post-hearing proof and to the subsequent motion for an extension of time, the claimant
waived any error in granting them . Mindful that a correct result may be affirmed
although it was reached through erroneous reasoning, we conclude that the revised
decision rendered on January 30, 2004, was properly affirmed on appeal. Ve a v.
Kosair Charities Committee, Inc. , 832 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Ky. App. 1992) .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Zaring P. Robertson
Morgan, Madden, Brashear & Collins
1419 Lexington Road
Richmond, KY 40475
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Crystal Lynn Moore
167 E . Main Street, Ste. 1500
Lexington, KY 40507
Mark J. Hinkel
Landrum, Shouse & Patterson
106 W . Vine Street, Ste. 800
P.O. Box 951
Lexington, KY 40588
Ronald J . Pohl
Picklesimer, Pohl & Kiser, P.S .C.
167 W. Main Street, Ste . 1500
Lexington, KY 40507
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.