MELINDA LANGLEY, ETC., ET AL V. HON. JOHN R. GRISE, JUDGE WARREN CIRCUIT COURT, DIVISION II ET AL
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IMPORT,9NT NOTICE
NOT_ TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
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SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : AUGUST 25, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2005-SC-0308-MR r-MELINDA LANGLEY, GUARDIAN FOR
THE ESTATE OF TIMOTHY E .
LANGLEY, A DISABLED PERSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2005-CA-0018-OA
WARREN CIRCUIT COURT NO . 2004-CI-0278
V
HON . JOHN R. GRISE, JUDGE,
WARREN CIRCUIT COURT, DIVISION II
AND
DOUGLAS L . KEENE and
BRIAN SCHUETTE (REAL PARTIES IN
INTEREST)
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from an order of the Court of Appeals denying a petition for writ of
prohibition and mandamus . The original action sought to prohibit the circuit judge from
enforcing his order that denied a motion to disqualify an attorney from a pending case .
It also asked that the Court of Appeals enter an order directing the disqualification of
the attorney .
Stuart represented Langley in a personal injury action . Schuette was retained as
co-counsel . On June 6, 2003, Schuette enlisted the services of Keene, a jury trial
consultant from Texas, at a rate of $500 .00 an hour plus expenses . Those services
were terminated seventeen days later by Stuart . Less than two weeks after that, Keene
submitted fee and expense invoices totaling $25,212. On September 29, 2003, the
underlying tort case was settled for $2,850,000.
Langley filed a petition for a declaration of rights on the single issue of the
reasonableness of the fees claimed by Keene. She named both Schuette, whose
services had also been previously terminated, and Keene as respondents . After
Schuette declined to withdraw from his representation of Keene in that action, Langley
filed a motion to disqualify him .
The circuit judge entered an order denying the motion to disqualify Schuette . He
rejected Langley's reliance on SCR 3.130(1 .9) and Lovell v. Winchester , 941 S.W.2d
466 (Ky. 1997) . Langley subsequently filed an original action with the Court of Appeals,
seeking to prohibit the circuit judge from enforcing the order and to direct the
disqualification of Schuette . The Court of Appeals denied the requested relief. This
appeal followed .
Langley argues that the Court of Appeals did not properly apply SCR
3.130(1 .9) in allowing Schuette to represent Keene . She claims that it gave undue
weight to the "confidentiality" issue and too little weight to the "loyalty" issue in its review
and analysis of RPC 1 .9 and RPC 1 .6. Langley asserts that the Court of Appeals
erroneously equated the right of Schuette to defend himself against a lawsuit filed by a
former client, with his supposed right to also defend a third party. She cites Lovell,
supra, in support of her position that Schuette be disqualified from representing Keene .
Langley contends that she has no adequate remedy by appeal and great injustice and
irreparable injury will result unless Schuette is disqualified .
Schuette and Keene respond that the circuit judge correctly applied SCR
3.130(1 .9) to the facts of this case and, therefore, the Court of Appeals denial of the
petition for extraordinary relief should be granted. They claim that pursuant to the rules
of professional responsibility, Schuette is ethically permitted to take an adverse position
to Langley . Schuette and Keene maintain that there is nothing in the rule, the
commentary or any case law interpreting the rule that would suggest Schuette cannot
represent himself and Keene. They argue that Schuette's adverse position with respect
to Langley is mandated by SCR 3.130(1 .15) . Schuette and Keene contend that when
Stuart and Schuette entered into a binding contractual relationship with Keene, each
incurred the ethical obligation under SCR 3 .130(1 .15)(b) to assure that Keene was paid.
They assert that Langley failed to demonstrate to the circuit judge that she was entitled
to the disqualification of Schuette and the Court of Appeals correctly denied her petition
for extraordinary relief. Schuette and Keene argue that Lovell and the other cases cited
by Langley do not support her position .
A writ of prohibition or mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. Bender v. Eaton ,
343 S .W .2d 799 (Ky. 1961) . Such relief may be granted upon a showing that (1) the
lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no
remedy through an application to an intermediate court ; or (2) that the lower court is
acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no
adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will
result if the petition is not granted. Bender , supra . See also Hoskins v. Maricle , 150
S .W.3d 1 (Ky. 2004) .
This is nothing more than a fee dispute involving parties that were at one time
aligned on the same side in the underlying litigation . We can perceive no great injustice
and irreparable injury that will result if the petition is not granted . Consequently, we find
no abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals in denying the writ.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Flora Templeton Stuart
Natalie T. Stuart
607 East Tenth Street
Bowling Green, KY 42101
Peter L . Ostermiller
Kentucky Home Life Building
239 South Fifth Street, Suite 1800
Louisville KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES REAL
PARTIES IN INTEREST :
Brian Lee Schuette
1019 State Street
P.O. Box 48
Bowling Green, KY 42102-0048
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