ROBERT C. HAMLIN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM BAILEY V. HON. DARREN W. PECKLER, PRESIDING JUDGE IN BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT, 50TH CIRCUIT
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IMPOR 'ANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVI_L PR OCED URE PROMUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL ATOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : DECEMBER 22, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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ROBERT C . HAMLIN, ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM BAILEY
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
2004-CA-002087
BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT NO. 04-CI-00251
HON. DARREN W . PECKLER,
PRESIDING JUDGE IN BOYLE CIRCUIT
COURT, 50 T" CIRCUIT
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This case presents a question of whether a prior dismissal under CR
41 .02 amounts to res judicata and thus bars subsequent litigation of the same case.
The issue arises in the form of an appeal from an original action for an extraordinary
writ brought in the Court of Appeals and denied by that court.
In 1999, Decision One Mortgage Company, L .L .C. (Decision One) brought
a mortgage foreclosure action against William Bailey and subsequently added Robert
C . Hamlin, the Executor of Bailey's Estate, as a defendant. Decision One's successor
in interest, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) was substituted as a
party plaintiff for Decision One . The claim asserted default on a promissory note and
sought enforcement of a mortgage lien securing payment of the note . Discovery
disputes occurred and the trial court placed MERS on terms to comply with discovery or
risk involuntary dismissal . The court's terms were not met and dismissal of the claim
was ordered. In the order of dismissal there was no indication that it was without
prejudice and no appeal was taken from the order of dismissal.
In 2004, a subsequent action was brought by MERS asserting a new
claim under the note and mortgage . The only difference between the 1999 claim and
the 2004 claim was that MERS asserted a subsequent default on the note.
Significantly, however, the 1999 complaint and the 2004 complaint allege that the entire
debt became due on the same date, May 23, 1998 . Hamlin pled res judicata and the
trial court initially sustained this plea in open court and dismissed the subsequent
action . Under authority of CR 60 .02, however, the trial court, sua sponte, vacated its
dismissal order and reinstated the 2004 claim . From this order, Hamlin sought a writ of
prohibition .
These facts present several interesting questions of law . The first such
question is whether the order dismissing the 1999 claim may be asserted as res
judicata in subsequent litigation . The answer to this question would appear to be
obvious. CR 41 .02(3) provides that :
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this Rule, and any dismissal not
provided for in Rule 41, other than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, for improper venue, for want of prosecution
under Rule 77.02(2), or for failure to join a party under Rule
19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits .
In Commonwealth v . H icks' we held that an order of dismissal unaccompanied by a
notation that the dismissal was without prejudice would be deemed to be with prejudice .
1
869 S.W .2d 35 (Ky. 1994) .
Thus, there is little doubt that the dismissal of the 1999 claim is an order of the type that
would support a plea of res judicata.
Despite the foregoing, MERS insists that the 2004 claim was brought on
different grounds than the 1999 claim. It concedes that the parties are identical and
that the dismissal of the 1999 claim served as an adjudication on the merits, but it urges
this Court to adopt the view that there may be multiple defaults arising out of the same
underlying indebtedness, each of which gives rise to a separate claim . For this
proposition mortgagee cites Singleton v. Greyman Associates2 and Rousselle v.
Jewett, 3 decisions of two other jurisdictions' highest courts .
In the 1999 case, a claim was asserted for recovery upon a note and
enforcement of a mortgage lien that secured the note . That case appears to have been
in all respects a garden-variety mortgage foreclosure . As the note provided for
installment payments and both the note and the mortgage contain an acceleration
clause, the mortgagee's claim that the mortgagor was in default and demand for
payment of the entire indebtedness would appear to place in issue all .contract claims
arising out of the transaction . Prior to litigation such claims amounted to choses in
action . Upon the filing of the complaint, the choses in action were transformed into a
claim for relief . Upon entry of the order of dismissal, the claim for relief was thereby
extinguished and merged into the final order of dismissal .
No Kentucky case appears to squarely address whether there can be
subsequent defaults after suit is brought on an accelerated debt . However, the answer
882 So.2d 1004 (Fla. 2004) .
421 P .2d 529 (Ariz . 1966) .
4 See KRS 426 .005.
5 46 Am . Jur . 2d Judgments ยง 501 .
2
would appear to be "no" as one of the principal purposes of pleadings is to develop the
precise point in dispute by formulating the true issues .6 Thus, when the mortgagee
sought recovery of the entire unpaid indebtedness and sought to subject the real
property upon which the mortgage lien had been granted to payment of the
indebtedness, a default was asserted with respect to every installment of the debt,
foreclosing assertion of some subsequent claim of default .
In the present posture of this litigation, however, we will be unable to
reach the merits of the case. The trial court determined that its initial dismissal of the
2004 claim by mortgagee had been improvident and vacated the order. Thus, under
the trial court's order, the litigation with respect to the 2004 claim would go forward. In
the petition for extraordinary relief in the Court of Appeals, Hamlin asserted that the trial
court was acting without jurisdiction or acting erroneously within its jurisdiction and that
he will suffer immediate and irreparable harm and would be without an adequate
remedy by appeal . With this, we cannot agree . Res judicata is an affirmative defense
and has no jurisdictional dimension.' Furthermore, if the 2004 case is prosecuted to a
judgment adverse to the Hamlin, and if that adverse judgment is incorrect, it will be
subject to appellate correction . Our cases firmly hold that mere inconvenience, cost,
annoyance, etc., are insufficient to justify extraordinary relief.$
For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals' denial of extraordinary
relief is affirmed .
Lambert, C .J ., and Graves, Johnstone, Scott, and Wintersheimer, JJ .,
concur. Cooper and Roach, JJ., concur in result only.
6 Perry v. Livingston , 296 S .W .2d 217 (Ky. 1956) .
Yeoman v. Commonwealth, Health Policy Bd ., 983 S .W .2d 439 (Ky.1998) .
8 National Gypsum Company v. Corns, 736 S.W.2d 325 (Ky. 1987) .
4
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Charles W. Curry
109 North Mill Street
Lexington, KY 40507
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES :
Hon. Darren W. Peckler
Judge, Boyle Circuit Court
321 West Main Street, Second Floor
Danville, KY 40422
Brian E . Chapman
WELTMAN, WEINBERT & REIS
525 Vine Street, Suite 800
Cincinnati, OH 45202
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