RAYMOND COY WRIGHT V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPOR 'ANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY COUR T OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : AUGUST 25, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2005-SC-0122-TG
RAYMOND COY WRIGHT
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APPELLANT
TRANSFER FROM COURT OF APPEALS NO. 04-CA-1066
APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JERRY D . WINCHESTER, JUDGE
2003-C R-0006
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from a conditional guilty plea pursuant to RCr 8 .09. The circuit
judge entered a judgment of conviction of manufacturing methamphetamine and
sentenced Wright to twenty years in prison . The sole issue is whether Wright was
denied his right against unreasonable searches and seizures when the circuit judge
overruled the motion to suppress the search .
Wright was indicted for manufacturing methamphetamine while in the
possession of a handgun, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and as a firstdegree persistent felony offender . He entered a plea agreement with the prosecution
by which the Commonwealth agreed to dismiss Counts 2 and 3 of the indictment, to
omit the handgun enhancement and to recommend a twenty-year sentence. Wright
entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to the plea agreement, preserving the right to
appeal the denial of the suppression motion .
At the suppression hearing, the first witness was Wright who testified he lived in
a rented house and did not give permission for it to be searched . He stated that there
were two women, Cathy and Tiffany, at the residence when he left to go to work and
that he told Tiffany not to let anyone in .
A police officer, the second and final witness at the suppression hearing, stated
that an ex-girlfriend of Wright, Shannon, had obtained an arrest warrant for a violation
of an EPO . The officer testified he went to Wright's place of employment and was told
he had left after receiving a telephone call . The officer then went to the residence
where he talked to a female, Tiffany, and asked if Wright was there, but she indicated
he should be at work . The officer told Tiffany that Wright had left work and asked if he
could look around the residence to see if Wright was there. Tiffany consented and the
officer went inside to search unsuccessfully for Wright.
As he walked through a laundry room, the officer noticed items used to
manufacture methamphetamine. He then called another officer who specializes in
methamphetamine cases . When that officer arrived, the first policeman spoke with
Tiffany again, explaining that he had found several items used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine . He testified that she gave consent for a further search .
The ex-girlfriend, Shannon, who was staying at the house, advised the police
officer that she lived there and had several items in the house. She gave written
consent to search the house. The ex-girlfriend, who had obtained the EPO, took the
officer into the house and showed him several items belonging to her and some mail
she had received there . The officer also testified that the violation of the EPO occurred
that day at that residence, which made him assume that the ex-girlfriend lived there .
During a second search of the house, a handgun was found.
Wright argued that the ex-girlfriend did not have permission to be at the house or
give consent for a search . The trial judge overruled the motion to suppress . The
conditional guilty plea was entered . This appeal followed .
Under the factual circumstances testified to at the suppression hearing by the
police officer, the circuit judge correctly denied the motion to suppress . Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S . 573, 100 S .Ct. 71, 63 L.Ed .2d 639 (1980) and Steagald v. United
States, 451 U .S . 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L .Ed .2d 38 (1981) provide that an arrest
warrant together with a reasonable belief that the subject of the warrant was at his
residence authorized a search of that residence to attempt to locate the subject . Here,
the officer testified that he was advised that Wright would be at work and when he
arrived at work he was told that Wright had received a telephone call and had left. He
believed that Wright had probably gone home . The officer testified that he spoke with a
female, Tiffany, at the residence who said Wright should have been at work, but when
advised that he was not at work, she gave consent to the search .
Tiffany was in charge of the residence and when the officers sought consent for
the search, she agreed. It was reasonable for the officer to believe that the woman had
authority over the residence . See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U .S. 177, 110 S .Ct. 2793,
111 L .Ed .2d 148 (1990), which holds that a warrantless search incident to consent is
valid so long as the consenting party had authority over the premises . See also Colbert
v. Commonwealth , 43 S .W.3d 777 (Ky. 2001), in which we recognized the principle of
the apparent authority to authorize a consensual search. Both the first and second
searches were permissible .
In addition, the officer also had the consent of an ex-girlfriend for the more
extensive search for evidence of manufacturing . The ex-girlfriend told the officer that
she was living at the house and showed him various items that belonged to her. She
gave written consent for the search . Again, the information provided to the police
supported a reasonable belief that the ex-girlfriend had apparent authority to authorize
a search of the residence . Rodriouez, supra ; Colbert , supra.
In his reply brief, Wright notes for the first time that the record contains neither
oral nor written findings of fact or conclusions of law. He contends that this case must
be remanded for that reason . Wright further claims that this case should be remanded
for a new evidentiary hearing because the circuit judge improperly shifted the burden of
proof. He asserts that this occurred when he was called to testify first at the
suppression hearing .
These issues were not raised at the circuit court level or in the initial brief filed by
Wright. Accordingly, they are not properly preserved for appellate review. See CR
76 .12(4)(e) . See also Clark v. Clark, 601 S .W .2d 614 (Ky.App. 1980) .
We recognize that the circuit judge failed to enter either oral or written findings of
fact or conclusions of law in the record . Nevertheless, it is not always necessary to
remand the case to the circuit judge when the theory on which he based the ruling was
apparent from the record . Cf . Coleman v. Commonwealth , 100 S.W .3d 745 (Ky. 2003) .
Here, we can ascertain the basis for the decision by the circuit judge and remanding
this case is unnecessary .
There was no impermissible shifting of the burden of proof. Wright was called to
testify first, but he was directed to take the witness stand by his own defense counsel .
He has no basis to complain now.
The search in this case was conducted with the consent of a resident in control
of the premises and with the consent of an ex-girlfriend who had taken an emergency
protective order. The police had reasonable belief that the consenting parties in each
case had authority over the premises and the subsequent searches were valid. The
circuit judge correctly denied the motion to suppress .
The judgment of conviction is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Euva D . May
Assistant Public Advocate
Appellate Division
Damon L. Preston
Appeals Branch Manager
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 301, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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