IMPOR TANTNOTICE THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED B Y THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
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IMPORTANTNOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COUR T OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : OCTOBER 20, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2004-SC-1134-MR
JAMES LAWSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
2004-CR-0169
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from a judgment based on a jury verdict that convicted Lawson of
second-degree burglary, theft by unlawful taking less than $300 and being a firstdegree persistent felony offender . He was sentenced to a total of twenty years in
prison .
The questions presented are whether the trial judge erred when he overruled the
motion to suppress the victim's out-of court and in-court identification of the defendant;
whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions ; and, whether the closing
argument by the prosecutor was unduly prejudicial.
The victim testified about the burglary that occurred at his home at approximately
11 :00 p.m . He explained that after his son alerted him to hearing the garage door being
opened, he found the door ajar about .two feet . Upon further inspection, the victim
discovered an individual on his driveway loading tools into a cooler . The intruder fled
when the victim gave chase. When police presented the victim with a photograph later
that night, he positively identified Lawson as the burglar. He also identified Lawson incourt . The victim valued the tools and other items taken from his attached garage at
$305.
Among other things, police recovered a pill bottle and a pack of generic
cigarettes from the flight path taken by the intruder. The pill bottle bore the name
James Lawson and the cigarettes were the identical brand recovered from him when he
was arrested .
The defendant testified in his own defense and completely denied the charges.
He claimed that another individual had stolen his pill bottle earlier that day. The jury
convicted Lawson of second-degree burglary, theft by unlawful taking less than $300
and for being a second-degree persistent felony offender . He was sentenced to ten
years on the burglary charge, twelve months and a $500 fine for the misdemeanor, and
twenty years for being a persistent felony offender, for a total of twenty years . This
appeal followed .
I . Identification by the Victim
Lawson argues that the trial judge erred when he overruled his motion to
suppress the victim's out-of court and in-court identification . We disagree .
Defense counsel filed a motion before trial which in part sought to suppress
evidence of both the out-of-court and in-court identification of Lawson by the victim. He
claimed that the identification procedures used by the police were so suggestive that
they denied the defendant due process . A hearing was held on that motion and the
victim was the principal witness to testify on this issue.
At the suppression hearing, the victim testified to the facts leading up to his
discovering the intruder . He further explained that the intruder turned to face him when
he yelled and proceeded towards him . The victim stated that he had sufficient time and
lighting to see the face of the individual, noting that there was a street light across the
road from his house . The individual fled the area when the victim gave chase.
Among other items, the victim testified that a pill bottle bearing the name James
Lawson was found in the flight path taken by the burglar. The victim told police that the
burglar was wearing a red T-shirt, red hat, shorts and white tube socks. About 1 1 2 to
/
1 3 hours later, a police officer presented a single photograph to the victim and he had
/4
no doubt that the individual was the burglar.
The photograph shown the victim at the suppression hearing was similar, but not
the same, as the one he was shown the night of the burglary . He indicated that the
original photograph was larger and taller than the one introduced at the hearing . The
latter is a jail intake photo with the defendant's name typed at the top. The victim
acknowledged that on the night in question the police told him that James Lawson's
name was on the pill bottle . However, he could not recall whether the original
photograph contained the defendant's name, he only remembered the picture .
Neil v. Biggers , 409 U.S . 188, 93 S .Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), establishes
"a two-prong due process test," Wilson v. Commonwealth , 695 S.W.2d 854, 857 (Ky.
1985), under which the court "must first determine whether the confrontation
procedures employed by the police were 'suggestive."' Id. If not, the analysis ends and
the identification testimony is allowed . King v. Commonwealth , 142 S.W .3d 645, 649
(Ky. 2004). If the trial judge concludes otherwise, he must then assess the probability
that the witness would make an irreparable misidentification, based on the totality of the
circumstances . Neil, supra; Wilson, supra.
Neil identifies five factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of
misidentification: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the
crime ; (2) the witness's degree of attention ; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior
description of the criminal ; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
time of identification ; and, (5) the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation .
Here, the trial judge recognized the controlling precedent and applied that
precedent to the facts of the case . He concluded that the use of a single photograph in
these circumstances was unduly suggestive, but that the victim could still reliably
identify the person despite the improper identification procedure. Examining the five
factors set out in Neil , he found that the witness had a frontal view of the person who
fled and that there was a light on the street ; that the victim paid attention to how the
individual looked ; that the victim was able to describe the clothing and physical size of
the person ; that the victim had no doubt about the identification of the individual ; and,
that the victim identified the suspect in less than two hours time.
Under all the circumstances, we must agree with the determination by the trial
judge that the single photograph was unduly suggestive . We also agree with his
conclusion that the victim could still reliably identify the person despite the improper
identification procedure . His findings of fact as they relate to the five factors set out in
Neil are supported by substantial evidence and thus are conclusive . Having carefully
reviewed the record, we find no error in the decision of the trial judge to overrule the
motion to suppress the identification of the defendant by the victim .
II . Sufficiency of the Evidence
Lawson contends that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to sustain his
conviction . We disagree .
On a motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge must draw all fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth .
Commonwealth v. Benham , 816 S .W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991) . If the evidence is sufficient to
induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. Id. The standard for appellate review of a
denial of a motion for a directed verdict based on insufficient evidence is if under the
evidence as a whole, it would not be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find the
defendant guilty, he is not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal . Commonwealth v.
Sawhill , 660 S .W.2d 3 (Ky. 1983) .
Here, the victim positively identified the defendant both out-of-court and in-court.
He provided the police with a list of items taken from his garage as well as their value.
A prescription bottle bearing the name James Lawson was found in the path taken by
the individual when he fled. Also found on the flight path was a pack of generic
cigarettes, the same type recovered by police when Lawson was arrested . The victim
described the burglar as wearing a red T-shirt and red cap. Police later found a red Tshirt in the pickup truck belonging to Lawson's brother, the same truck in which the
defendant was seen riding in earlier that day.
Again, having carefully reviewed the record, it is clear that the Commonwealth
presented sufficient evidence to support the convictions . The trial judge properly
denied the motion by Lawson for a directed verdict .
III . Closing Argument
Lawson complains that the closing argument by the prosecution was unduly
prejudicial . He raises four separate incidents which we will address separately .
First, Lawson asserts the prosecutor impermissibly related a personal experience
he had with an intruder to make the point that a victim will remember such an individual .
There was no objection to this argument and further review pursuant to RCr 10.26 is
unwarranted .
Second, Lawson claims that the prosecutor commented on facts not in evidence
when he indicated that a police dispatcher had received information that a person
wearing a red cap and red shirt was at the homeless shelter earlier that day. Defense
counsel objected, claiming that the dispatcher never testified to that. The prosecutor
responded that he thought there was such testimony, but that he would straighten it out.
No further relief was requested . Consequently, any objection to these comments was
waived . Cf. Wilcher v. Commonwealth , 566 S .W.2d 812 (Ky. 1978) .
In any event, the prosecutor did not misstate evidence during his closing
argument. The investigating police officer had testified that the initial description from
the dispatcher was that the male burglary suspect was wearing a red hat and red shirt.
He was later given information at the police department that an individual matching that
description had been seen earlier that day at the homeless shelter . These alleged
misstatements are more accurately characterized as interpretations of the evidence . In
his closing remarks, a prosecutor may draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence and propound his explanation of the evidence and why it supports a finding of
guilt. Bills v. Commonwealth , 851 S .W .2d 466 (Ky. 1993) .
Third, Lawson alleges that the prosecutor impermissibly commented on the
credibility of the witnesses . Particularly, that he improperly advised jurors that a police
officer was more credible than the defendant, a convicted felon, because the police
officer risked his career if he lied on the stand .
The prosecutor is entitled to attack a defendant's credibility if the defendant
testifies as a witness on his own behalf. Tamme v. Commonwealth , 973 S .W .2d 13, 38
(Ky. 1998). The defense position throughout the trial was that the police officer was not
telling the truth about what actually happened . The prosecutor was entitled to give an
invited response . See Foley v. Commonwealth , 953 S .W .2d 924, 940 (Ky. 1997) .
Fourth, Lawson contends that the prosecutor improperly commented that "they
know this is a preposterous story they're telling ." We disagree . A prosecutor may
comment on tactics, may comment on evidence and may comment on the falsity of the
defense position . Slaughter v. Commonwealth , 744 S.W .2d 407, 411-12 (Ky . 1987),
cert. denied, 490 U . S . 1113, 109 S .Ct. 3174, 104 L.Ed.2d 1036 (1989).
Any consideration on appeal of alleged prosecutorial misconduct must center on
the overall fairness of the trial. Soto v . Commonwealth , 139 S .W .3d 827, 873 (Ky.
2004) . In order to justify reversal, the misconduct of the prosecutor must be so serious
as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair. Id . Here, there was no error with
regards to any of the statements . Obviously, because there was no individual error,
there is no basis to claim any type of cumulative error.
Lawson received a fundamentally fair trial. He was not denied any of his due
process rights under the state or federal constitutions .
The judgment of conviction is affirmed .
All concur except Johnstone, J., who concurs in result only.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Donna L. Boyce
Appellate Branch Manager
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ian G . Sonego
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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