CHARLES RAY ROGERS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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69upttr Courf of
2004-SC-0996-MR
L~=-J,
CHARLES RAY ROGERS
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
04-CR-00045
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Charles Ray Rogers, was convicted by a McCracken Circuit Court jury
of first-degree rape . The jury recommended a twenty year sentence, and the trial court
entered judgment accordingly . Appellant appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky.
Const ยง 110 (2)(b). For the reasons stated herein, we affirm .
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On the evening of November 6, 2003, Appellant and the victim, M.J., were
drinking alcohol . They had dated, but there was no intimate relationship at the time of
this incident . Appellant handcuffed M .J . and choked her until she was unconscious .
Appellant struck M .J. in the face and chest, and then moved her to the bed where he
forcibly engaged in intercourse . M .J. testified that she was unconscious part of the
time, but awoke as Appellant was having intercourse with her. Appellant ran from the
house after hearing M.J .'s son arrive at the front door.
The police took M.J . to the hospital for a rape evaluation . The treating physician
testified that the pelvic exam was normal with no sign of injury, although she was badly
bruised over the rest of her body. The doctor stated that a normal exam does not rule
out a rape . The rape kit was negative for Appellant's semen ; however, the lab
technicians testified that such a finding was not conclusive of absence of sexual
intercourse . The Commonwealth presented additional evidence which included
Appellant's boxer shorts that tested positive for M.J .'s blood.
Appellant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's case.
The trial court denied the motion, and Appellant failed to renew his motion at the close
of all evidence . Appellant also tendered jury instructions to the trial court on "lesser
included" offenses of kidnapping, first-degree unlawful imprisonment and seconddegree unlawful imprisonment . The Commonwealth opposed, and the trial court
denied, the instructions .
ANALYSIS
A. Jury Instructions
Appellant first argues the trial court erred by denying Appellant's tendered jury
instructions on kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment as lesser-included offenses .
Alternatively, Appellant claims he was improperly denied instructions on his theory of
the case . We disagree .
We address first Appellant's claim that he was entitled to jury instructions on
kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment as lesser-included offenses of first-degree rape .
While this issue is preserved for our review under RCr 9.54, denial of the instructions
was appropriate because kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment are not lesser-included
offenses of first-degree rape . This Court has previously held "[c]learly rape and
kidnapping are two separate criminal offenses." Bedell v. Commonwealth , 870 S .W.2d
779, 782 (Ky. 1993) . In Bedell , we reasoned that kidnapping was not a necessary
element of rape, and conversely, rape is not an element of kidnapping . Id .
Appellant opines that unlawful imprisonment is a lesser-included offense of rape
because both require the element of restraint . Appellant relies on KRS 505 .020 which
states that a lesser-included offense can be proven by "the same or less than all the
facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged." KRS 505.020 (2)(a) .
We disagree with Appellant's claim that rape and unlawful imprisonment require the
same proof of facts. First-degree rape requires "sexual intercourse with another person
by forcible compulsion ." KRS 510 .040 (1)(a) . Whereas first-degree unlawful
imprisonment requires knowing and unlawful restraint of "another person under
circumstances which expose that person to a risk of serious physical injury ."' KRS
509.020. Appellant attempts to equate the forcible compulsion element of rape with the
restraint requirement of unlawful imprisonment. We find the two are distinctly different.
Unlawful imprisonment is incapable of being factually reconciled as a lesser-included
offense of rape . Consequently, Appellant's claims fail to meet the requirements of a
lesser-included offense as described by KRS 505.020.
Appellant contends that there is a great weight of evidence supporting his
argument . We find the most accurate assessment of Appellant's claim is that
kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment are merely uncharged offenses in this case .
"The fact that the evidence would support a guilty verdict on a lesser uncharged offense
does not establish that it is a lesser included offense . . . ." Houston v. Commonwealth ,
975 S .W .2d 925, 929 (Ky. 1998).
' Appellant also requested an instruction on second-degree unlawful imprisonment
which requires only knowing and unlawful restraint. KRS 509 .030.
3
Appellant's alternative argument is that the trial court erred by denying jury
instructions on Appellant's theory of the case . At trial, Appellant's defense was that he
did not rape M.J . Appellant claims this theory entitles him to jury instructions on
kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment because he admittedly restrained her liberty, but
had no forcible intercourse . Appellant relies on Sanborn v. Commonwealth , 754 S .W .2d
534, 549 (Ky. 1988), for the proposition that a defendant is entitled to instructions on his
theory of the case where the jury could reach multiple conclusions based on the
evidence . Appellant overlooks, however, that defendant Sanborn actually requested
that the trial court permit an instruction on his theory. Id . In this case, Appellant only
requested instructions on kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment as "lesser included
offenses," never mentioning the possibility of an alternative theory of the case.
Accordingly, Appellant failed to properly preserve his claim for appellate review . We will
not allow Appellant to make the same argument twice, by merely couching his claims
within an "alternative theory of the case" on appeal.
A recent Court of Appeals case, Meadows v. Commonwealth , - S .W.3d (2003-CA-002482-MR, Opinion rendered June 3, 2005, final December 19, 2005) (Ky.
App . 2005), addressed this issue . Meadows claimed Sanborn entitled him to an
instruction on fourth degree assault as his theory of the case in a rape prosecution . The
court held,
[a]t trial, he requested the fourth-degree assault instruction
solely on the basis that it was a lesser included offense of
the rape charge. Having given a specific reason for his
objection to the trial court's failure to instruct on the fourthdegree assault charge, he may not now raise a different
ground .
Id .
Consequently, we find that Appellant's claims are without merit, and the trial
court did not err in denying jury instructions on kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment .
B. Directed Verdict
Appellant also claims the trial court erred by denying Appellant's motion for a
directed verdict of acquittal . We find that this issue is not properly preserved for our
review. Appellant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's
case ; however, he failed to renew the motion at the close of all the evidence . Appellant
opines that the renewal was "implied" after the defense rested because the trial court
noted counsel's objection to the jury instructions . We disagree .
It is well settled in Kentucky that "[a] motion for a directed verdict made at the
close of the plaintiff's (here the Commonwealth's) case is not sufficient to preserve error
unless renewed at the close of all the evidence . . . ... Kimbrough v. Commonwealth , 550
S .W.2d 525, 529 (Ky. 1977) ; See also, Baker v. Commonwealth , 973 S .W.2d 54, 55
(Ky. 1998). Even if the issue were preserved, Appellant does not have a viable claim .
"On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it
would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled
to a directed verdict of acquittal ." Commonwealth v. Benham , 816 S .W.2d 186, 187
(Ky . 1991). The evidence presented by the Commonwealth was sufficient to give this
case to the jury. The jury heard compelling testimony from the victim as well as
testimony regarding the scientific and physical evidence. As a result, the trial court
properly denied Appellant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal .
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the
McCracken Circuit Court .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Emily Holt Rhorer
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
James C. Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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