THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PRO CED URE PR OMUL CA TED B Y THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYINANY OTHER
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PROMUL CA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYINANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO UR T OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : NOVEMBER 23, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,*1IyTEritE (gaurf of
2004-SC-000806-MR
MICHAEL JACKSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FULTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. SHADOAN, JUDGE
01-CR-00032
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Michael Jackson, was convicted of murder and first-degree wanton
endangerment . He was originally sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for
twenty-five years for the murder and one year for the wanton endangerment with the
sentences to run consecutively . On Appellant's initial appeal, in an unpublished
memorandum opinion dated October 23, 2003, we remanded the case to the circuit
court for a new penalty phase, holding that the sentence was impermissible because
the jury had not found any aggravator that would allow the imposition of a life sentence
without parole . On remand, Appellant was sentenced to forty-eight years imprisonment.
Appellant argues that this sentence is also impermissible because the penalty phase
jury was not adequately advised as to facts he implies were developed during the guilt
phase of his trial . He appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b) .
Having found no error, we affirm Appellant's sentence .
Appellant's sole argument is that his sentence must be reversed because the
penalty phase jury on remand was given insufficient information with which to decide his
punishment . In particular, Appellant claims that his attorney failed to introduce evidence
that would have tended to show "possible motives [he] had for the killing of Jamie
Turner, including the crucial fact that Turner had raped [Appellant's] 13 year-old sister
the morning of the killing ."' While the omission of such evidence, if it exists, is
potentially troubling, standing alone it is not an error on the part of the trial court,
particularly when considered in light of the circumstances in the case.
At the outset, we agree that the jury received scant evidence with which to make
its decision . The following information was all that was presented to the jury: (1) a short
opening statement and summation of the facts by the prosecutor; (2) the testimony and
cross-examination of an employee of the State Department of Corrections' Division of
Probation and Parole ; and (3) short closing statements from both Appellant's attorney
and the prosecutor. From opening to closing statements, the entire sentencing hearing
lasted less than twenty-five minutes .
Despite the brevity of the proceeding and the limited information on which the
jury decided the sentence, we discern no error by the trial court. At no time did
Appellant's attorney make any objection as to the scope of the evidence that was
presented or suggest there was more evidence that the jury ought to consider .
Furthermore, the trial judge, Hon. William Shadoan, was careful to ensure that
Appellant's attorney at the penalty phase had every opportunity to present evidence that
might have benefited his client. During a pre-hearing conference, Judge Shadoan
asked Appellant's attorney, "[Counsel], do you want to address the jury too, or say
' Appellant does not cite to anywhere in the record in this case or in the guilt
phase of his original trial to support this assertion .
-2-
anything? You can if you want to." Counsel replied, "Depending on what Mr. Langford
[the prosecutor] says, but probably just for closing ." Similarly, after the opening
statement and recitation of the facts by Langford, Judge Shadoan asked, "[Counsel],
could you make any additions to the factual statements?" Counsel declined, replying
simply, "No sir." At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's proof, which consisted of the
testimony of a state parole officer as to the relevant parole eligibility guidelines, counsel
declined to offer any evidence on behalf of Appellant, stating, "No proof, your Honor."
Counsel did make a short closing statement, asking the jury to be lenient and
requesting they sentence Appellant to twenty years, the minimum term of imprisonment
for which he was eligible . It is clear that despite being given many opportunities by the
trial judge, Appellant's attorney repeatedly declined to offer substantial evidence or
argument on behalf of his client. If there was important, mitigating evidence of the type
alleged in Appellant's brief, it should have been presented by his attorney at the
sentencing hearing .
In addition to his decision not to present any significant evidence, Appellant's
attorney generally agreed with the hearing procedures followed by the trial court and did
not raise any objection pertinent to the issues discussed in this appeal. Despite this,
Appellant argues that the trial court nevertheless erred in failing to conform the resentencing proceedings to the requirements of Boone v. Commonwealth , 821 S.W .2d
813 (Ky. 1992). In that case, we laid out a framework to help trial courts determine the
appropriate scope of evidence to be presented during re-sentencing proceedings,
stating :
2 Appellant's counsel did inform the trial court that he had erred during voir dire
by mistakenly failing to use a peremptory strike as requested by his client. However,
this topic is not addressed by Appellant and is unimportant to his alleged claim of error.
-3-
[W]e believe it would suffice, in most cases, for the
jury to have read to it (a) the charges from the indictment of
which the defendant was found guilty; (b) any charge of
which the defendant was found guilty which was a lesserincluded offense to a charge set out in the indictment ; (c) the
jury instructions given by the trial court at the guilt phase;
and (d) the jury's verdict .
In addition to the matters set out above, should both
sides agree, each could read a concise summary of the
evidence which it offered and which was admitted at the guilt
phase of the earlier trial . Similarly, the closing arguments of
both sides from the guilt phase could be read or projected if
both agreed .
In the event that the parties cannot agree as to the
summaries of the evidence referred to above, then each
could submit its proposed summary to the opposing party
and the court, who could then determine what the
summaries would contain after hearing any objections and
argument from the opposing party.
Id . at 814-815 . While there is little question that the trial court in this case did not strictly
adhere to Boone, we have noted that the framework set forth in that case is not a rigid
requirement :
While the types of admissible evidence delineated in Boone
are guidelines for the trial court, we do not agree with
Appellant that Boone should be read as a strict limitation on
the types of evidence admissible in a penalty phase trial
where the defendant has pled guilty. Nor does Boone itself
purport to create such a strict limitation : the Court in Boone
provided a list of what types of evidence "might be pertinent."
. . . As noted in Boone itself, the sentencing jury cannot be
expected to fix punishment "in a vacuum without any
knowledge of the defendant's past criminal record or other
matters that might be pertinent to consider in the
assessment of an appropriate penalty." With that principle in
mind, the trial court must use its discretion in admitting
relevant evidence that will sufficiently inform the jury of the
crimes committed, while avoiding undue prejudice .
Thompson v. Commonwealth , 147 S .W.3d 22, 37 (Ky. 2004) (internal citations and
footnotes omitted) .
Both Boone and Thompson reflect the broad discretion a trial judge has to admit
evidence that is relevant to a jury's sentencing decision . In both cases, we rejected the
defendants' arguments that their sentences should be overturned because evidence
was admitted in error. The mere fact that trial courts have wide latitude in deciding the
admissibility of evidence does not give rise to a requirement that judges are responsible
for developing and presenting evidence for the jury to consider . This is especially true
where trial counsel repeatedly chose not to offer additional evidence on behalf of
Appellant despite being offered the chance to do so by the judge . Absent a showing
that the trial judge acted to prevent the production of relevant evidence, we cannot
conclude that the trial court erred .
Finally, Appellant asserts that the trial court's failure to ensure the jury was
informed of all facts pertinent to its sentencing decision was structural error, and is
thereby subject to automatic reversal despite being unpreserved . We would only note
that "[t]he category of structural error has been reserved for a `very limited class of
cases.' That class includes only the most pervasive and debilitating errors ." United
States v. Padilla , 415 F .3d 211, 219 (1 st Cir. 2005) (citing Johnson v. United States ,
520 U .S . 461, 468,117 S .Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed .2d 718 (1997)). Appellant's claim,
consisting of what amounts to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, does not fall
in this "very limited class of cases," thus we reject his contention that his sentencing
hearing was fatally flawed by the existence of a structural error.
The judgment of the Fulton Circuit Court is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Karen Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Gregory C . Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
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