IMPORTANTNOTICE THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CI VIL PR OCED URE PR OMUL GA TED B Y THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
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IMPORTANTNOTICE
NOT TO BEPUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PROMUL GA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : June 16, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2004-SC-0654-WC
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MORGAN KIRK
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2004-CA-0675-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO. 84-27402
RUTH CONTRACTORS ; KNOLL COUNTY MEDICAL
CLINIC ; HIGHLAND REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER ;
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY MEDICAL CENTER; MEDI
HOME CARE; HON . KEVIN J . KING, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE ; WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUNDS
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
On March 10, 1986, the claimant was found to be permanently and totally
disabled by coal workers' pneumoconiosis and was awarded income and medical
benefits . This appeal concerns the decision in a reopening by his employer to contest
the compensability of certain post-award medical services . In a decision that was
affirmed by the Workers' Compensation Board (Board) and the Court of Appeals, an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the services were unrelated to the
pneumoconiosis and, therefore, were not compensable . We affirm.
The claimant's last exposure to coal dust occurred on June 4, 1983. Relying on
unspecified evidence from Drs . Anderson, Bangudi, Bassali, Long, Potter, and White,
the "old" Board determined that he was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis due to his
occupational exposure to coal dust . Among other things, the opinion and award
required the employer to pay "such medical, surgical and hospital expenses as may be
reasonably required for the treatment of his occupational disease ."
On April 11, 2002, the employer moved to reopen in order to resolve a dispute
regarding whether treatment by various medical providers was related to the claimant's
occupational disease . KRS 342.125 ; Westvaco Corporation v. Fondaw , 698 S.W.2d
837, 839 (Ky. 1985) . Attached to the motion was a Utilization Review report from Drs.
Goldstein and McConnel . The motion was granted to the extent that the parties were
permitted to take additional proof.
The employer submitted evidence from Drs. Goldstein, McConnel, and Broudy .
Dr. Goldstein's report indicated that the claimant's present difficulties and resulting
medical treatment were related to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) that
was due to cigarette smoking . He did not think that the pneumoconiosis required any
further treatment . A report from Dr. McConnel noted that the claimant had a long
history of chronic bronchitis and underlying COPD and stated that although the medical
treatment was necessary and appropriate, it was not related to his black lung disease .
Dr. Broudy examined the claimant on the employer's behalf and conducted
diagnostic testing, after which he prepared a report and was deposed . The report
indicated that the claimant was exposed to coal dust while working underground for two
years, running a buggy, and for about 15 years on the surface, running heavy
equipment . He quit in 1983 due to a back injury . He had smoked half a pack of
cigarettes daily for 37 years before quitting in about 1991 . In Dr . Broudy's opinion, the
claimant did not suffer from pneumoconiosis or any other chronic disease caused by the
inhalation of coal dust, but he did have a severe obstructive respiratory impairment due
to pulmonary emphysema from cigarette smoking . Dr. Broudy stated that the disputed
medical services were related to the latter condition.
When deposed, Dr. Broudy testified that the claimant had a history of cigarette
smoking sufficient to cause his respiratory impairment and that the impairment
responded to bronchodilation, which would not have occurred if it had been due to
pneumoconiosis . He stated that if the impairment were due to pneumoconiosis, the
condition would have been evident on the claimant's x-rays, but it was not. Dr. Broudy
stated that pneumoconiosis and emphysema were two entirely different conditions .
When directed to assume that the claimant suffered from both conditions and then
asked about the purpose of each disputed medical service, he stated each time that the
service was to treat the effects of smoking rather than the effects of pneumoconiosis .
Asked how he could determine whether the claimant's lung problems were caused by
cigarette smoking rather than coal dust exposure, Dr. Broudy stated that the chest x-ray
showed hyperexpansion and pulmonary emphysema with no evidence of fibrosis or
pulmonary restriction, which one would expect to see in such a severe impairment if it
were due to pneumoconiosis. He stated that the claimant's history, physical exam, and
diagnostic test results were "classical" for an impairment due to a prolonged period of
heavy smoking and not what one would expect in an impairment due to
pneumoconiosis .
The claimant submitted a report from Dr. Sundaram, his treating pulmonologist .
It stated, in its entirety, as follows:
Mr. Kirk's breathing impairment and recurrent pulmonary infections
and industrial bronchitis are caused in part by his prolonged
exposure to coal dust. He is considered to be totally disabled .
In its brief to the ALJ, the employer noted that the contested medical bills
included some that, on their face, were unrelated to pneumoconiosis or any other lung
disease. Many of the bills, themselves, indicated that they were not work-related .
Although most were related to lung disease, the employer asserted that the claimant
suffered from two different lung diseases, pneumoconiosis and COPD. The award
pertained only to pneumoconiosis ; whereas, the contested expenses were for the
treatment of the non-work-related COPD and were not compensable.
Maintaining that the contested medical bills were compensable, the claimant
asserted that the law of the case was that he suffered "from pneumoconiosis which
does cause a totally disabling pulmonary impairment ." He argued that opinions by the
employer's experts were based on a finding that his pulmonary impairment was not
caused by his exposure to coal dust; therefore, they could not constitute substantial
evidence of the relationship between the expenses and his exposure to coal dust.
Furthermore, relying on authority in federal black lung cases, he asserted that Dr.
Broudy's opinion could not constitute substantial evidence because he found no
evidence of pneumoconiosis . Rejecting the argument, the AU relied on the employer's
experts and found in the employer's favor.
KRS 342 .285 designates the ALJ as the finder of fact in workers' compensation
claims, giving the AU the sole discretion to determine the weight, credibility, quality,
character, and substance of the evidence and to determine what inferences to draw
from it. Paramount Foods, Inc . v. Burkhardt , 695 S .W.2d 418, 419 (Ky. 1985) . That
discretion extends to conflicting medical evidence . Square D. Co. v. Tipton , 862 S.W.2d
308 (Ky. 1993) ; Pruitt v . Bugg Brothers , 547 S .W .2d 123, 124 (Ky. 1977) . If an ALJ's
finding in favor of the party with the burden of proof is supported by substantial evidence
in the record, it is reasonable and may not be disturbed on appeal . Special Fund v.
Francis , 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986). Substantial evidence has been defined as
being some evidence of substance and relevant consequence, having the fitness to
induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people. Smyzer v. B. F. Goodrich
Chemical Co. , 474 S .W .2d 367 (Ky. 1971) . The substantiality of evidence must take
into account whatever fairly detracts from its weight. Pierce v. Kentucky Galvanizing ,
Co., Inc . , 606 S .W .2d 165 (Ky.App .1980) . The existence of contrary evidence will not
compel a particular result unless it is so overwhelming that it renders the ALJ's decision
unreasonable. Special Fund v. Francis , supra ; Caudill v. Maloney's Discount Stores ,
560 S.W.2d 15,16 (Ky. 1977) .
The provisions of the claimant's award constituted the law of the case regarding
the existence of coal workers' pneumoconiosis and the compensability of any
reasonable and necessary medical expenses for the treatment of the disease and its
effects. For that reason, the burden was on the employer to prove that the contested
post-award medical expenses were not for the treatment of coal worker's
pneumoconiosis or its effects and, therefore, were not compensable. R. J . Corman
Railroad Construction Co. v. Haddix, 864 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. 1993) . Persuaded by the
evidence that the disputed expenses were for treating lung conditions that did not result
from the claimant's pneumoconiosis, the ALJ concluded that they were not
compensable. Hence, his burden on appeal is to establish that the ALJ's decision was
unreasonable because no substantial evidence of record supported it. Special Fund v.
Francis, supra .
As stated previously, the claimant's award established only that he suffered from
pneumoconiosis due to coal dust exposure and that he was entitled to medical benefits
for the treatment of pneumoconiosis and its effects. Pneumoconiosis is an interstitial
restrictive pulmonary disease ; whereas, chronic bronchitis, emphysema, and asthma
are types of obstructive pulmonary diseases . See Newberg v. Chumley , 824 S .W .2d
413, 415 (Ky. 1992). When caused by an exposure to coal dust, an obstructive lung
disease such as chronic occupational bronchitis may be compensable . Id . The fact
remains, however, that the claimant's award obliged the employer to pay for the medical
treatment of pneumoconiosis and its effects. It did not contain a finding he suffered
from a work-related obstructive pulmonary disease or any other occupational lung
disease in addition to pneumoconiosis; therefore, no such finding was the law of the
case at reopening.
Dr. Sudaram attributed the claimant's need for the disputed services to coal dust
exposure . He did not attribute it to pneumoconiosis or its effects. The employer's
experts testified that the claimant's pulmonary difficulties were due to his history of
cigarette smoking . Dr. Broudy's opinion that the claimant did not suffer from
pneumoconiosis affects only the weight that might reasonably be given to his opinion
that the claimant's emphysema was due to cigarette smoking rather than
pneumoconiosis . The fact remains, however, that his opinion of causation was
consistent with that of Drs. Goldstein and McConnel, neither of whom disputed the
presence of the disease. For that reason, we are not persuaded that the ALJ erred in
relying upon it as a partial basis for the decision . Three expert medical witnesses
indicated that the disputed medical services were performed for the effects of cigarette
smoking, not the effects of pneumoconiosis or the claimant's exposure to coal dust.
Under the circumstances, a decision in the employer's favor was reasonable and
properly affirmed on appeal .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
Lambert, C.J., and Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Scott, and Wintersheimer,
J .J., sitting .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Leonard Joseph Stayton
P.O. Box 1386
I nez, KY 41224-1386
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, RUTH CONTRACTORS :
H . Brett Stonecipher
Ferreri & Fogle
300 East Main Street, Suite 500
Lexington, KY 40507
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
DEPARTMENT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUNDS:
David W. Barr
Workers' Compensation Funds
1047 U .S . Hwy. 127 South, Suite 4
Frankfort, KY 40601
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