RONNIE FITTS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTA NT NOTICE
NOTTO
PUBLISHED (PINION
THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVI_L PROCED URE PR OMUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : OCTOBER 20, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Cloud of ~ft~~LJ
,$1tFrPxtCr
2004-SC-0653-MR
Ij
RONNIE FITTS
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FULTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM LEWIS SHADOAN, JUDGE
02-C R-68
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
On August 20, 2002, Appellant, Ronnie Fitts, was convicted of two counts of drug
trafficking relating to two separate sales of crack cocaine to a confidential police
informant, a Class C felony under KRS 218A.1412. Because he was previously
convicted of cocaine trafficking under former KRS 218A. 1 40(l), each count was
enhanced to a Class B felony, KRS 218A.1412(2)(b), and Appellant was sentenced to
serve two consecutive fifteen-year prison terms .
On October 23, 2003, this Court affirmed Appellant's convictions but reversed his
sentences because the instructions required the jury to find him guilty of trafficking in a
controlled substance in the first degree, second offense, without first requiring the jury to
find that Appellant was a subsequent offender within the meaning of KRS
218A .1412(2)(b) . Fitts v. Commonwealth , No. 2002-SC-1072-MR, slip op. at 6 (Ky. Oct.
23, 2003) . His case was remanded to the Fulton Circuit Court for a new sentencing
hearing. Id.
On remand, a new jury, properly instructed, found that Appellant was a second
offender and sentenced him to serve two consecutive twenty-year sentences - the
maximum allowed for two Class B felony convictions under KRS 532 .020(1)(c) and KRS
532.110(1)(c) . Appellant appeals his new sentence as a matter of right, Ky. Const .
ยง 110(2)(b), asserting that the trial court: (1) was vindictive in sentencing him to a
higher penalty on resentencing, thus violating his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
rights ; and (2) erred in instructing the jury on second-offense enhancement because, in
order to enhance his sentence under KRS 218A.1412(2)(b), the Commonwealth first
had to prove that the conduct giving rise to his prior drug trafficking conviction (under
former KRS 218A.140(1)) would support a conviction under current KRS 218A.1412 .
Finding no error, we affirm.
I. INCREASED PENALTY ON RESENTENCING.
"Due process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for
having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he
receives after a new trial." North Carolina v. Pearce , 395 U .S. 711, 725, 89 S.Ct. 2072,
2080 (1969) . Pearce held that a rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness arises when,
after a conviction is reversed, the trial judge imposes a more severe sentence after
retrial without an affirmative explanation for the increase . 395 U .S. at 725-26, 89 S .Ct.
at 2080-81 . The United States Supreme Court subsequently limited this presumption to
instances where there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the increase resulted from an
improper animus by the sentencing agent . Alabama v. Smith , 490 U .S. 794, 799-800,
109 S.Ct. 2201, 2205, 104 L. Ed .2d. 865 (1989) .
-2-
Appellant asserts that Pearce's presumption of vindictiveness applies to his
resentencing because the trial judge did not set forth a statement justifying the
increased sentence as required by Pearce . However, the Pearce presumption is
inapplicable here because it dealt with an increased sentence imposed by a sentencing
'ud e after a defendant successfully obtained reversal of a conviction . Pearce , 395
U.S . at 725, 93 S .Ct. at 2080 . An increased sentence handed down by a new jury panel
is expressly excluded from the Pearce presumption .
[T]he jury, unlike the judge who has been reversed, will have no personal
stake in the prior conviction and no motivation to engage in selfvindication . Similarly, the jury is unlikely to be sensitive to the institutional
interests that might occasion higher sentences by a judge desirous of
discouraging what he regards as meritless appeals .
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U .S . 17, 27, 93 S .Ct. 1977, 1983, 36 L.Ed .2d. 714 (1973) .
Our predecessor court stated further :
The rationale of Pearce was that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . could be violated if (1) a judge imposed both
sentences, and (2) the more severe sentence after a retrial indicated a
punitive and vindictive policy which had a deterrent effect upon the
defendant's exercise of his right to appeal . The Pearce decision was quite
limited in scope . Before the threat of violating the defendant's due process
right of appeal arises, there must be a correlating control of both
sentences bvthe same agency .
Bruce v. Commonwealth , 465 S .W .2d 60, 61 (Ky. 1971) (emphasis added) . In
Kentucky, a judge can decrease a sentence fixed by a jury if the judge deems the
sentence unduly harsh, KRS 532.070(1), but cannot increase a sentence fixed by a jury.
RCr 9 .84(1); Dotson v. Commonwealth , 740 S .W.2d 930, 931 (Ky. 1987) .
Because Appellant's increased sentence on retrial was fixed by a new panel of
jurors, the presumption in Pearce is inapplicable . There was no "correlating control of
both sentences by the same agency" under Bruce . 465 S .W .2d at 61 ; see also Texas v.
McCulloughh, , 475 U .S . 134, 140, 106 S.Ct . 976, 979, 89 L.Ed .2d. 104 (1986) (The
-3-
Pearce presumption is inapplicable when "different sentencers assess[] the varying
sentences . . . received . In such circumstances, a sentence 'increase' cannot truly be
said to have taken place .") ; Luttrell v. Commonwealth , 952 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Ky. 1997)
("The trial judge was not required to justify imposing a more severe sentence after
[defendant's] retrial because the trial judge simply imposed the sentence that had been
fixed by the jury in both trials.").
The sentencing authority has "wide discretion in the sources and types of
evidence used to assist [it] in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be
imposed within limits fixed by law." Williams v. New York , 337 U .S. 241, 246, 69 S .Ct.
1079, 1082, 93 L.Ed . 1337 (1949) . Absent Pearce 's presumption, Appellant must
affirmatively prove actual vindictiveness on behalf of the sentencing authority in order to
challenge the increased sentence under the Due Process Clause . Wasman v . United
States, 468 U .S . 559, 569 104 S .Ct. 3217, 3223, 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984) . Appellant has
offered no evidence of actual vindictiveness.'
"The first prerequisite for the imposition of a retaliatory penalty is knowledge of
the prior sentence ." Chaffin , 412 U .S. at 26, 93 S.Ct. at 1982 . Nothing in the record
suggests that the jury had any knowledge of the previous sentence . Without evidence
that the jury had knowledge of the previous sentence, there can be no actual
vindictiveness . For these reasons, Appellant fails to establish a violation of his due
process rights .
' Appellant alleges that the trial judge responded to objections to the increased
sentence with the statement: "He asked for a jury trial." Appellant's Reply Brief, at 1 . A
review of the video transcript reveals only a similar statement made by the prosecutor,
not the trial judge . Even if this allegation were true, such a statement is not sufficient to
establish vindictiveness when the judge merely accepts the jury's recommended
sentence .
4
III . SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT .
Appellant argues that his 1992 trafficking conviction under former KRS
218A.140(1) does not qualify as a prior conviction under KRS 218A.010(25) and thus
cannot support a sentence enhancement under KRS 218A.1412(2)(b) . 2 Specifically, he
argues that without proof that his violation of former KRS 218A.140(1) arose from
conduct that would violate current KRS 218A.1412(1), his former trafficking conviction is
not a prior conviction under KRS 218A.010(25), and his recent conviction does not
qualify as a "subsequent offense" that sustains an enhancement under that subsection .
The 1991 version of KRS 218A.140(1) provided : "No person shall traffic in any
controlled substance except as authorized in this chapter ."
KRS 218A.1412 provides :
(1) A person is guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first
degree when he knowingly and unlawfully traffics in : a controlled
substance . . . classified in Schedules 1 or 11 which is a narcotic drug ; . .
(2) Any person who violates the provisions of subsection (1) of this
section shall:
(b) For a second or subsequent offense be guilty of a Class B
felony.
"Subsequent offense" is defined in KRS 218A.010(25) :
[A]n offense is considered as a second or subsequent offense, if, prior to
his conviction of the offense, the offender has at any time been convicted
under this chapter, or under any statute of the United States or of any
state relating to substances classified as controlled substances , except
2 The Commonwealth does not assert that consideration of this issue is barred by the
"law of the case" doctrine, Thomas v. Commonwealth , 931 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Ky. 1996),
perhaps because Appellant did not raise this issue on his first appeal and we did not
address it sua sponte. However, "[t]he doctrine as defined by the decisions, is that one
adjudication settles all errors relied upon for a reversal, whether mentioned in the
opinion of the court or not, and all errors lurking in the record on the first appeal which
might have been, but were not expressly, relied upon as error." Commonwealth v.
Schaefer, 639 S.W.2d 776, 777 (Ky. 1982) (quoting Sowders v. Coleman , 223 Ky. 633,
4 S .W .2d 731, 731 (1928)). We will address the issue on this appeal solely to avoid the
necessity of revisiting it in the context of a potential RCr 11 .42 motion.
-5-
that a prior conviction for a nontrafficking offense shall be treated as a
prior offense only when the subsequent offense is a nontrafficking offense .
(Emphasis added .) The definition of "second or subsequent offense" is broad : any
"conviction at any prior time in any jurisdiction" qualifies as a subsequent offense so
long as the remaining conditions in KRS 218A .010(25) are satisfied . Morrow v.
Commonwealth , 77 S.W.3d 558, 560 (Ky . 2002) .
The faulty premise of Appellant's argument is that the conduct previously
adjudged criminal, rather than the resulting conviction , disposes of the enhancement
question . Contrary to Appellant's assertion, a previous conviction is the sine qua non
for a second conviction to constitute a "subsequent offense ;" the prior conduct which led
to the conviction is not. Fulcher v. Commonwealth , 149 S .W.3d 363, 380 (Ky. 2004)
("[E]nhancement is not premised upon an offense-to-offense sequence but upon a
conviction-to-conviction sequence .") . So long as the prior trafficking conviction "relat[es]
to substances classified as controlled substances," KRS 218A.010(25), it will sustain
enhancement under KRS 218A .1412(2)(b) . Clearly Appellant's prior conviction for
trafficking in cocaine sufficiently "relates to substances classified as controlled
substances" that it makes his recent conviction for trafficking in cocaine a subsequent
offense .
Canons of statutory interpretation also compel this outcome . Appellant's
proposition is in direct contradiction with the statute's language. His construction would
render meaningless the phrases "under any statute" and "at any time [convicted]"
in KRS 218A .010(25) . "Our main objective is to construe the statute in accordance with
its plain language and in order to effectuate the legislative intent ." Cabinet for Families
& Children v. Cummings , 163 S .W.3d 425, 430 (Ky. 2005) . Appellant's construction is
in direct contradiction with the plain language of the statute.
Appellant seems to argue that the conduct constituting the offense of which he
was previously convicted must be reevaluated under a new statute to see if it would
constitute the same offense under present law. 3 That argument makes no more sense
than would an argument by the Commonwealth that a defendant's conduct, which led to
a misdemeanor conviction years ago, should be reevaluated to see if it would constitute
a felony under present law and, if so, that it could be used for second-offense
enhancement of a present felony conviction . The proposition is untenable under either
scenario .
Accordingly, the sentences imposed by the Fulton Circuit Court are affirmed .
All concur .
3 To entertain this argument, one must assume arguendo that the legal standards for
trafficking have changed. In fact, the legal standards for a trafficking conviction under
former KRS 218A.140(1) and current KRS 218A.1412 are the same. We find no
authority suggesting that more evidence is needed to obtain a conviction under the new
statute than under the old.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Linda Roberts Horsman
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
State Capitol
Frankfort, KY 40601
Susan Roncarti Lenz
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.