RANDY KURTZ V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 22, 2005
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2004-SC-0650-MR
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RANDY KURTZ
i/A\ LLLI
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHILLIP R. PATTON, JUDGE
2003-CR-110
V
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE GRAVES
Vacatinq an d Remanding for a New Trial
A jury of the Barren Circuit Court convicted Appellant, Randy Kurtz, of firstdegree rape, two counts of first-degree sodomy, three counts of first-degree sexual
abuse, and attempted first-degree sodomy in connection with the molestation of his
girlfriend's children . For these crimes, Appellant was sentenced to thirty years
imprisonment, plus three years conditional discharge as required by KRS 532.043 .
Appellant now appeals to this Court as a matter of right . Ky . Const. ยง 110(2)(b) . For
the reasons set forth herein, we must vacate Appellant's convictions and remand for a
new trial.
The evidence presented at trial tended to show that Appellant's girlfriend and her
children, L .S., F .T. (also known as F .M .), J.M ., and D .M ., were living with Appellant from
1996 until November 2002, when allegations of sexual abuse surfaced at the
elementary school attended by the three youngest children . The oldest child, L .S ., a
high school student at the time, stated that she had never been subjected to abuse and
was not aware of her siblings being abused . The three youngest children testified to
various acts of sexual abuse that had been perpetrated by Appellant. The children's
therapist testified regarding the general characteristics and habits of child sex abuse
perpetrators, stating that interfamilial perpetrators tend to target victims who live in the
home and that it is not uncommon for some children within a familial unit to be abused
while others are not. The therapist also testified regarding how children store
memories, stating that children tend not to remember dates, but use association to store
memories . Finally, the therapist testified regarding her treatment of the children, giving
clinical histories for the children and more detailed explanations regarding abuse which
was disclosed by the children during therapy. Other witnesses also testified for the
Commonwealth, but their testimony need not be recounted herein for the purposes of
this appeal.
.
Appellant presented several witnesses on his behalf . These witnesses testified
that he had a normal and loving relationship with both the children and their mother, that
he had good character and a good reputation in the community, and that he participated
in social activities with his girlfriend and the children . The witnesses also testified that
he built several things around the house, including an above ground pool, for the
children's use. Further testimony was given by Appellant's ex-wife, who stated that
Appellant had a loving and appropriate relationship with their two daughters, and that he
had a normal sexual relationship with her while they were married .
The jury returned verdicts of guilty on nearly all counts submitted to it. Appellant
asserts several assignments of error upon which he requests relief. We address each
assignment of error in turn :
I . Finding of Compelling Need Pursuant to KRS 421 .350(3)
KRS 421 .350(3) states in pertinent part:
The court may, on the motion of the attorney for any party and upon a
finding of compelling need, order that the testimony of the child be taken
outside the courtroom and be recorded for showing in the courtroom
before the court and the finder of fact in the proceeding .
KRS 421 .350(5) defines "compelling need" as "the substantial probability that the child
would be unable to reasonably communicate because of serious emotional distress
produced by the defendant's presence." Appellant contends the trial court erred when it
allowed the children to testify by video deposition (which was later played to the jury at
trial) pursuant to a finding of compelling need under this statute . A trial court's finding of
compelling need pursuant to KRS 421 .350 is reviewed for abuse of discretion . Danner
v. Commonwealth , 963 S .W.2d 632, 634 (Ky. 1998) .
In this case, the trial court considered the testimony of Julie Griffey, the children's
mental health counselor, and from that testimony determined that the children's ages,
nine, eleven, and twelve, their history, their course of treatment, and the opinions of
Julie Griffey regarding the children's well-being and their ability to testify supported a
finding of compelling need . Appellant argues that the sole testimony of Julie Griffey is
inadequate to support such a finding and that the trial court erred by failing to find a
compelling need for each individual child . We disagree .
Appellant did not (and does not now) object to the admissibility of the various
opinions expressed by Ms . Griffey during her testimony . Accordingly, we must presume
her statements to be admissible for the limited purpose of determining this issue .
3
Commonwealth v. Maricle, 15 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Ky. 2000) ("[T]his Court is limited to the
review of those issues that were raised and ruled on by the trial court .") . When Ms.
Griffey's testimony is considered in its entirety, we find the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it found the content of the testimony to be sufficient to support a finding
of compelling need for each child .
II. Proffer of Expert Testimony Pursuant to KRE 702
Appellant next claims the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted Ms.
Griffey to testify regarding how children store and recall memories . Additionally,
Appellant claims error by the trial court in allowing the expert to testify as to her
qualifications in open court, rather than conducting a review of her qualifications outside
the presence of the jury.
Initially, we find the issue of whether it was error to allow the expert to be
qualified in open court to be unpreserved because Appellant's counsel did not request
the hearing to be held outside the presence of the jury. See Maricle , supra .
Nonetheless, KRE 104(c) states that hearings on preliminary matters, such as the
qualification of a witness, shall be conducted outside the jury's presence when the
"interests of justice require ." After careful review of the circumstances in this case, we
find the interests of justice did not require the trial court to order, sua sponte, Ms.
Griffey's qualification to be made outside the presence of the jury.
Next, Appellant alleges the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that Julie
Griffey was qualified to testify regarding how children store and recall memories . Ms .
Griffey testified that she had a master's degree in Marriage and Family Therapy, was a
licensed marriage and family therapist in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, was a
member of the American Association of Marriage and Family Therapists and has
twenty-seven years experience as a family therapist. She further testified that she
specialized in counseling victims of child sexual abuse and was required by the
Commonwealth of Kentucky to attend continuing education classes each year to
maintain this specialty. She stated that knowledge regarding child memory was
obtained and accumulated through education, training, and experience during her
twenty-seven year career. She further testified that the topic was covered each year
during her continuing education classes .
Appellant alleges that such qualifications were not sufficient to establish that Ms .
Griffey's testimony was reliable in the above referenced subject area pursuant to
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 509 U .S. 579, 113 S .Ct. 2786, 125
L.Ed .2d 469 (1993), and Mitchell v. Commonwealth , 908 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1995),
overruled on other grounds, Fugate v. Commonwealth , 993 S .W.2d 931 (Ky. 1999) . In
Mitchell , supra, at 101, this Court adopted the standard of review set forth in Daubert,
supra . Daubert , supra , held that expert testimony must be both relevant and reliable in
order to be admissible pursuant to KRE 702 . Id . at 589, 113 S.Ct. at 2795, 125 L.Ed .2d
at 480 .
The reliability of proffered expert testimony is a preliminary question of fact
reserved for the trial court and accordingly, a trial court's reliability ruling in this area is
reviewed for clear error. Miller v. Eldridge , 146 S .W.3d 909, 916 (Ky. 2004). Appellant
argues that Ms . Griffey's testimony was inherently unreliable because none of the
Daubert factors (whether the theory has been tested, whether it has been subjected to
peer review, whether the rate of error is known, and whether the theory is generally
accepted in the relevant field of study) were either considered or addressed by the trial
court in this instance . We disagree .
In Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company v. Thompson , 11 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Ky.
2000), this Court stated that "[t]he consideration of reliability entails an assessment into
the validity of the reasoning and the methodology upon which the expert testimony is
based ." We emphasized that the inquiry into reliability is a "flexible one," and that the
factors enumerated in Daubert, while applicable to all types of knowledge, are "neither
exhaustive nor exclusive ." Id . In Miller , this Court held that the Court of Appeals erred
by relying "too heavily" on the Daubert factors, stating that "the factors identified in
Daubert may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability depending on the nature of
the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony." Miller ,
supra , at 918-919 (quoting Kumho Tire Co ., Ltd . v. Carmichael , 526 U.S . 137, 150, 119
S .Ct. 1167, 1175, 143 L .Ed .2d 238 (1999) (emphasis in the original)) .
In this case, Ms. Griffey did not promote any theories or processes regarding
how children store and recall memories which were susceptible to review under the
factors listed in Daubert . Rather, she presented empirical evidence and basic
conclusions derived therefrom which functioned to describe the manifest characteristics
of how children store and recall memories. For example, Ms . Griffey testified that
children's memories tend to be more simplistic and less rich in detail than the memories
of adults . Ms. Griffey went on to testify that children tend to recall memories like one
might view a snapshot. She explained that children do not tend to recall timelines and
dates, but rather, they will recall only scenes or certain events.
In cases such as this where the testimony is merely describing the manifest
characteristics of a particular subject and does not involve the application of any
theories, processes, or methods of novel or controversial origin, "actual experience and
long observation" is sufficient to qualify a person as an expert in the relevant subject
area. See Farmland Mutual Ins . Co. v. Johnson , 36 S .W.3d 368, 388-389 (Ky. 2000).
We find Ms. Griffey's twenty-seven years of education, training, and experience in the
area of counseling and talking to children about their memories to be more than
sufficient to qualify her as an expert in describing the manifest characteristics of child
memory . Accordingly, we find no clear error by the trial court .
III. Testimony of Julie Griffey regarding Habit and Profile Characteristics
Appellant next argues that reversible error occurred when Ms. Griffey testified
regarding the general habits and characteristics of the typical child sex abuse
perpetrator . Because such testimony is expressly prohibited pursuant to Dyer v .
Commonwealth , 816 S .W.2d 647, 652 (Ky. 1991) and Miller v. Commonwealth , 77
S.W.3d 566, 572 (Ky. 2002), we must reverse Appellant's conviction and remand for a
new trial .
Ms . Griffey testified that in her twenty-seven years of experience counseling child
sex abuse victims, she found that perpetrators of such crimes tended to possess certain
common characteristics - they tend to be members of the victim's family or have some
kind of special access to the victim, they tend to be in a role of some power, such as a
parental or supervisory position, and they tend to be older than the victim . Ms . Griffey
went on to testify that it is common for the perpetrator to groom the potential victim, by
providing praise, gifts, or economic assistance, as a way of breaking down the victim's
defenses . Ms . Griffey further testified that it was not unusual for perpetrators to abuse
only some of the children in a specific household and that perpetrators will tend to target
only certain children whom they believe are easily intimidated by their authority and
thus, more likely to capitulate to abuse and then keep it secret . Appellant's counsel
objected to the testimony, however, his objection was overruled by the trial court .
In Dyer, the prosecution presented evidence in a child sex abuse case which
tended to show that the defendant possessed characteristics of a pedophile . 816
S.W .2d at 652 . We held that "such profile evidence is inadmissible in criminal cases to
prove either guilt or innocence." Id. In Miller , where a victim had delayed reporting of
abuse, we held improper the testimony of a seasoned child sex abuse investigator
stating that it was common, in her experience, for sexually abused victims to delay
reporting of the abuse. 77 S .W .3d at 571-72 . We held that "a party cannot introduce
evidence of the habit of a class of individuals either to prove that another member of the
class acted the same way under similar circumstances or to prove that the person was
a member of that class because he/she acted the same way under similar
circumstances." Id . (citing Johnson v. Commonwealth , 885 SW.2d 951, 953 (Ky.
1994)) .
Ms . Griffey's testimony regarding the typical sex abuse perpetrator unmistakably
touched on both the habits and the profile characteristics of that class of individuals
which we have held is not relevant or permissible for the jury to consider during the
Commonwealth's case-in-chief. The Commonwealth contends that a portion of the
testimony was offered in rebuttal to anticipated arguments and evidence which were to
be offered by Appellant. We find this argument to be a non-issue in this case because
there is absolutely no authority for the concept of "preemptive rebuttals" by the
Commonwealth .
Appellant was alleged to possess many of the characteristics and habits
described by Ms . Griffey and the entirety of Ms. Griffey's testimony was reviewed a
second time by the jury during its deliberations in this case . A careful review of these
circumstances, when viewed in light of the entire record, compels us to deem the error
in this case prejudicial and as such, Appellant is entitled to a new trial pursuant to the
settled law.
Due to our holding, we elect not to address Appellant's additional arguments
regarding prosecutorial misconduct or the trial court's refusal to grant his motion to
correct or modify the record pursuant to CR 75.08 because such alleged errors are
either (1) unlikely to recur on retrial, or (2) they are rendered moot by this opinion .
The judgments of the Barren Circuit Court are vacated ; the case is remanded for
a new trial consistent with this opinion .
All concur. Roach and Wintersheimer, J .J ., concur in result only.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Randall T. Bentley
498 Steam Mill Road
Smiths Grove, KY 42171
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Gregory C . Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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