JOHN ROBERT TILLMAN II V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
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SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : AUGUST 25, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2004-SC-0605-MR
JOHN ROBERT TILLMAN II
APPEAL FROM GRAVES CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN T . DAUGHADAY, JUDGE
2003-CR-0145
V
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, John Robert Tillman II, was convicted by a Graves County jury of firstdegree manslaughter and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment . He appeals to this
Court as a matter of right, asserting the following trial court errors: (1) instructing the
jury on first-degree manslaughter, (2) allowing the Commonwealth's Attorney to
comment on matters not in evidence during closing argument, and (3) allowing
comments on Tillman's post-arrest silence . For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm
Tillman's conviction.
Facts
In October 2002, Tillman was indicted for trafficking in a controlled substance.
While this drug charge was pending, Tillman became a confidential informant for the
Graves County Sheriffs Office. He continued to maintain relationships with several
individuals involved in drug trafficking, known by their street names as "Face," "Skeet,"
"Yellow," and "Murder One ." Meanwhile, for safety reasons, Tillman's wife and children
left Kentucky for Mississippi, Tillman's childhood home . In their absence, Tillman
began a relationship with Misty Wright.
On February 28, 2003, Tillman wore a wire while performing a controlled
purchase of drugs with Murder One . Face, Skeet, and Yellow were also present. The
transaction ended abruptly, however, when a member of the group spotted what he
believed was the police. Everyone departed before the transaction could be completed .
The house where the attempted transaction took place was burned down immediately
thereafter . A few days after the attempted controlled purchase, Face, Skeet, and
Yellow came to Tillman's house. Because of the botched transaction, Tillman was
concerned the other men had learned that he was an informant .
Tillman testified that he went into the living room of his home while Face, Skeet,
and Yellow remained in the dining room . Through a series of wall mirrors, Tillman saw
Face and Skeet give Yellow a hand gesture to draw his gun. Face and Skeet then
departed, leaving only Tillman and Yellow, whose given name is Carlos Walker.
According to Tillman, the two men began to play a game of dice. At one point, Walker
threw the dice a little further than was necessary and, while Tillman retrieved them,
Walker drew a gun from his pocket. Tillman stated that he grabbed a hammer that had
been used earlier that day for household repairs and hit Walker twice in the head .
Walker died immediately. Tillman testified that he did not call the police because he
feared losing his chance for parole . Instead, he called a friend and the two of them
disposed of Walker's body and the hammer used to cause his death .
At trial, the Commonwealth disputed Tillman's version of events. Though Tillman
testified that he buried the gun and a quantity of money with the body, neither was
found . The Commonwealth also emphasized the testimony of Misty Wright, Tillman's
girlfriend . Wright testified that Tillman had told her a very different version of events .
According to Wright, after Walker pulled the gun, Tillman hit him on the head with the
hammer then retreated to the bathroom to wash blood off himself . When he returned,
Walker had apparently survived that blow and managed to pull himself onto the couch .
Tillman then began hitting Walker again with the hammer until he died . To further
undermine Tillman's self-defense theory, the Commonwealth also highlighted the
physical differences between Tillman and Walker : Tillman is more than six inches taller
than Walker and outweighs him by forty pounds.
Following the incident, Tillman left Kentucky for Mississippi, purportedly to visit
his wife and children . When he learned of the charge, Tillman surrendered himself to
law enforcement and waived extradition . Kentucky State Police Detective Shawn
Ramage traveled to Mississippi and brought Tillman back to Kentucky for trial. He was
thereafter indicted by a Graves County Grand Jury. He was tried and found guilty of
first-degree manslaughter. Further facts will be developed as necessary.
First-Degree Manslaughter Instruction
Tillman first argues that it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on
manslaughter in the first degree as a lesser-included offense to murder . He seems to
argue that it was error to give this instruction because there was no evidence of any
extreme emotional disturbance . The record reveals, however, that the jury was not
instructed on first-degree manslaughter while acting under extreme emotional
disturbance . Only one first-degree manslaughter instruction was given and it read, in
pertinent part:
If you do not find the Defendant, John Robert Tillman, II,
guilty of Murder under Instruction No . 3, you will find the
Defendant guilty of First-Degree Manslaughter under this
Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence
beyond reasonable doubt all of the following :
A . That in this county on or about February 28, 2003, and
before the finding of the indictment herein, he killed Carlos
D. Walker by striking him in the head with a hammer; AND
B. That in so doing he did not intend to kill Carlos D. Walker
but intended to cause serious physical injury to Carlos D .
Walker; AND
C . That he was not privileged to act in self-protection .
Therefore, the jury in this matter was instructed on first-degree manslaughter pursuant
to KRS 507.030(x), not KRS 507 .030(b) .
Tillman also seems to assert that the trial court erred in giving a first-degree
manslaughter instruction, as the evidence supported only a murder instruction . We
disagree . The trial court is required to not only instruct on the law as to the indicted
offense, but on the law as to any offense supported by the evidence. Sanborn v.
Commonwealth, 754 S .W.2d 534 (Ky. 1988) . "Where the evidence is such that the jury
could come to any of several conclusions, the trial court is required to submit the
instructions on the various alternatives ." Id . at 549.
The first-degree manslaughter instruction required a finding that Tillman did not
intend to kill Walker but intended to cause serious physical injury . Tillman's own
testimony provided sufficient basis for the giving of this instruction : he testified that he
was only trying to disarm Walker, and that he was "just hitting" with the hammer. Later,
Tillman testified that he was swinging the hammer in an attempt to disarm Walker, but
that he was not aiming for any particular part of Walker's body. This testimony was
more than sufficient to support a jury's finding that Tillman did not intend to kill Walker,
but only intended to cause serious physical injury. Therefore, the trial court did not err.
Prosecutor's Comments During Closing Arguments
Tillman's second argument is that the trial court erred in allowing the
Commonwealth's Attorney to refer to matters not in evidence during his closing
argument. The issue is preserved by defense counsel's objection during the
Commonwealth's closing argument, which was overruled . The issue was raised again
in defense counsel's subsequent motion for a new trial, which was also denied . While
we conclude that it was error for the trial court to permit certain portions of the
Commonwealth's closing argument, the error does not require reversal .
Defense counsel delivered the first closing argument, during which he noted that
Tillman's family was in the courtroom to support him, while Walker's family was absent.
Defense counsel then offered, by way of explanation, that Walker's only family was his
fellow drug dealers and that they had essentially abandoned him . During his closing
argument, the Commonwealth's Attorney stated that he wanted to respond to defense
counsel's comments concerning Walker's family. The Commonwealth explained that
Walker did, in fact, have a family but that they were financially unable to attend . The
Commonwealth's Attorney went on to explain that his wife was the victim's advocate in
the case, and that Walker's family was indeed upset over his death . The
Commonwealth's Attorney recounted that his wife had frequent conversations with
Walker's mother, and that she cried every night over his death.
At the outset, we reiterate the principle that attorneys are afforded great latitude
in making their closing arguments . Slaughter v. Commonwealth , 744 S .W.2d 407, 412
(Ky. 1987) . When the alleged misconduct occurs during closing arguments, "we must
determine whether the conduct was of such an 'egregious' nature as to deny the
accused his constitutional right of due process of law." Id . at 411-12 ( citing Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo , 416 U .S . 637, 94 S . Ct. 1868, 40 L . Ed . 2d 431 (1974)) . On appeal, we
focus on the overall fairness of the trial, as opposed to the culpability of the prosecutor.
Id.
Furthermore, in some instances, a defense argument may invite a response that
otherwise may be improper. Rupyard v. Commonwealth , 475 S.W .2d 473 (Ky. 1971) .
Upon thorough review of both closing arguments, we conclude that Tillman was
not denied due process of law as a result of the Commonwealth's statements during
closing argument. The Commonwealth's remark that Walker's family was not financially
able to attend, though unsupported by the evidence, was clearly made in response to
defense counsel's assertion that Walker had no family other than his colleagues. In
short, this statement was invited by defense counsel's prior remarks. See Rupyard ,
supra . See also White v. Commonwealth , 394 S .W .2d 770, 773 (Ky. 1965) (finding
prosecutor's commentary on defendant's silence permissible as it was clearly in
response to defense counsel's statements) .
The Commonwealth's Attorney exceeded the limits of proper closing arguments,
however, by referencing his wife as the victim's advocate, and relaying her tearful
conversations with Walker's mother to the jury. These conversations had not been
admitted into evidence and therefore were not available for commentary during closing
arguments . Attorneys must limit their closing remarks to commentary and explanation
of the evidence presented, and reasonable inferences to be drawn from it. Garrett v.
Commonwealth , 48 S.W.3d 6 (Ky. 2001). Here, the Commonwealth commented on
matters that were not in evidence, and that were plainly irrelevant to the issue of
Tillman's guilt. It is axiomatic that reference to matters not in evidence threatens the
fairness of the proceedings . The Commonwealth is well aware that such statements
bear the potential to inflame the jury or otherwise unduly prejudice a criminal defendant.
Nonetheless, we cannot conclude that the Commonwealth's statements were so
egregious as to deny Tillman due process of law. Examining the Commonwealth's
closing argument in its entirety, we note that the improper statements constituted a very
brief portion of an otherwise proper argument. See Lycans v. Commonwealth , 562
S .W .2d 303 (Ky . 1978) . Also, though the Commonwealth improperly recounted the
conversations between the victim's advocate and Walker's mother, the substance of the
conversations contained no incriminating evidence . Cf. Mack v. Commonwealth , 860
S .W.2d 275 (Ky. 1993) (defendant was denied due process of law when, during closing
arguments, prosecutor referred to incriminating evidence that had been excluded from
trial) . Most importantly, we note the substantial and compelling evidence of Tillman's
guilt, in part: his incriminating statements to Misty Wright, his surreptitious burial of
Walker's body and subsequent departure to Mississippi, his failure to inform police of
Walker's death despite his relationship with the Graves County Sheriffs Department,
and the fact that Walker's gun was never located either at the scene of the crime or with
Walker's body. By contrast, Tillman offered little evidence to support his claim of selfdefense other than his own testimony . Upon review of the entire case, it is clear that
Tillman received a fundamentally fair trial . Reversal is not required .
Reference to Tillman's Post-Arrest Silence
Tillman's final assignment of error is that Detective Ramage was improperly
permitted to twice reference Tillman's post-arrest silence during his testimony . Though
defense counsel's objection to the first reference was sustained, no objection was
made to the second reference . Tillman also argues, herein, that the error resulting from
Ramage's testimony was compounded by the Commonwealth's additional reference to
Tillman's post-arrest silence during its closing argument. He maintains that reversal is
required .
During direct examination, Detective Ramage explained that he arrested Tillman
in Mississippi and returned him to Kentucky, and that Tillman did not make any
statements about the case during that trip . Defense counsel objected to the testimony
and an admonishment was delivered to the jury, but defense counsel declined to seek a
mistrial, citing tactical reasons. Later, during cross-examination, defense counsel
questioned Ramage about whether Tillman had been charged with an unrelated double
homicide in Mississippi, a claim that Tillman had made to Misty Wright, among others.
The Commonwealth returned to this subject during its re-direct examination, asking
Ramage if he had found any record of these prior charges, which he had not.
Essentially, the Commonwealth was seeking to establish that Tillman had a habit of
telling untruthful stories that tended to give him a "tough" persona . To this end, the
Commonwealth asked Ramage if he had been able to verify any of these "stories."
Ramage's response can only be described as long-winded and rambling . At one point
Ramage explained that he had not been able to verify certain statements attributed to
Tillman by other witnesses because, "I had no statement from [Tillman] . There's
nothing wrong with that. That's his prerogative ." Though defense counsel did not
object to this second reference to Tillman's silence, the trial court sua sponte halted
Ramage's testimony as non-responsive . Later, in chambers, defense counsel
requested an admonition ; the request was denied .
We find no error in the trial court's refusal to give a second admonition to the
jury. No contemporaneous objection was made pursuant to RCr 9.22; in fact, the trial
court interrupted Ramage and directed the Commonwealth to move on with the witness.
Furthermore, the jury had already been cautioned to disregard any reference to
Tillman's post-arrest silence. There is no indication that the trial court acted outside the
limits of its discretion in denying Tillman's request .
We also do not detect that any palpable error resulted from Ramage's second
reference to Tillman's post-arrest silence as to require reversal . RCr 10.26 . "The usual
situation where reversal occurs is where the prosecutor has repeated and emphasized
post-arrest silence as a prosecutorial tool ." Wallen v. Commonwealth , 657 S .W.2d 232,
233 (Ky. 1983) . There is no evidence that the Commonwealth was using Tillman's
silence as a prosecutorial tool ; in fact, Ramage's second reference to Tillman's silence
was completely unsolicited . Ramage also qualified his statement by adding that it was
Tillman's prerogative to remain silent, which further lessened any chance of prejudice .
Furthermore, we are not convinced that any alleged prejudice was compounded
by the Commonwealth's reference to Tillman's silence during its closing arguments, as
Tillman maintains . The Commonwealth commented during closing argument that
Tillman's testimony at trial was the "first time" he had told that version of events,
emphasizing the very different story he had told Misty Wright . We find this comment to
be a permissible and reasonable attack on Tillman's credibility based on the evidence
presented . See Garrett v. Commonwealth , 48 S .W.3d 6 (Ky. 2001).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Graves Circuit Court is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Dennis L. Null
Null, Thomas, Samson & Paitsel
223 North 7 th Street
P. O . Box 5040
Mayfield, KY 42066
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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