EUGENE PAUL JOHNSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : DECEMBER 22, 2005
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EUGENE PAUL JOHNSON
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVE ALAN WILSON, JUDGE
04-CR-00006-002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE ROACH
AFFIRMING
I . INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Eugene Paul Johnson, was convicted of First-Degree Robbery by
Complicity and of being a Second-Degree Persistent Felony Offender. On appeal, he
makes four independent allegations of error: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to
support his conviction ; (2) that, during voir dire and in the presence of potential jurors,
the prosecutor impermissibly defined the "reasonable doubt" standard ; (3) that evidence
of his alleged statements of intent to commit another robbery was improperly admitted ;
and (4) that the jury instructions were improper, violating his right to due process .
Having found no error, we affirm Appellant's conviction .
II . BACKGROUND
On December 29, 2003, between 9 :00 and 9 :30 p.m., Jason Brannock robbed
Vette City Liquors ("liquor store") in Bowling Green . It is undisputed that Appellant
accompanied Brannock to the liquor store, but he denies any culpability for the crime.
The two men were arrested together at a service station just a few hours after the
robbery when police recognized that Brannock's car matched the description of the
getaway car used in the robbery .
Jeremy Poston and Wanda Ferguson, employees of the liquor store, were the
first witnesses to testify, and they focused on the specific facts of the robbery . Although
each of them had seen the perpetrator and observed that he was armed with a shotgun,
neither could identify him because of the bandanas he wore on his head . Poston
identified the getaway car and reported to police that the suspect had left in a red, latemodel Chevrolet Cavalier with four doors . He did not observe or remember the car's
license plate number. Poston and Ferguson also testified that the perpetrator had
stolen money from both the cash register and Poston's wallet. Poston testified that the
perpetrator had taken a payroll check as well .
Jason Brannock admitted his role in the crime and was the Commonwealth's
principal witness in this case . He testified that he and Appellant had spent the
afternoon together at Appellant's apartment. Brannock stated that earlier in the day, at
approximately 6:00 p.m., he and the Appellant had driven to the liquor store where
Appellant purchased a small bottle of whiskey. He testified that on their trip back from
the liquor store, he and Appellant had jokingly discussed the possibility of robbing such
an establishment .
Later that evening, Brannock claimed that he asked Appellant to take him back to
the liquor store . He testified that Appellant drove the car, a red 2002 Chevrolet
Cavalier, which belonged to Brannock. Shortly after their arrest Brannock stated to
police that he had driven the car to and from the liquor store during the robbery . Upon
arriving at the liquor store, Brannock directed Appellant to drive by the liquor store,
allowing him to determine if there were any customers inside, and to park the car in the
back. After they parked, Brannock exited the car and donned a camouflage jacket and
two bandanas, which he used to cover his face and head . Brannock testified that he
also took a shotgun from the car. Brannock stated that the shotgun had been stowed
beside his seat and was unknown to Appellant . He also testified that Appellant had no
knowledge of his intention to rob the liquor store.
Brannock testified that after the robbery was complete, he returned to the car and
informed Appellant that he had just robbed the liquor store . He claims that Appellant
asked if he planned to turn himself in to the police. After he replied that he intended to
do no such thing, Appellant then threatened to call the police if Brannock did not split
the proceeds of the robbery with him . The two men drove to the parking lot of a nearby
shopping mall and divided the money. Brannock stated that he then drove the car back
to Appellant's apartment, where he changed clothes and disposed of most of the
clothes he had worn during the robbery in an outdoor trash receptacle .
Later, the two left the apartment in Brannock's car. They were arrested after two
Kentucky State Police vehicles recognized Brannock's car in the parking lot of a service
station . Poston was brought to the service station, but he could not identify the
perpetrator . He did, however, identify Brannock's car as the one he had seen leaving
the liquor store parking lot.
Miriam Hunter, Appellant's roommate, also testified for the Commonwealth . She
stated that she arrived at the apartment she shared with the Appellant at approximately
8 :45 p .m . on the night of the robbery . She testified that Brannock and the Appellant had
arrived together a short time later and that both men were acting strangely. She also
claimed Appellant gave her a small amount of money but would not disclose its source.
Most significantly, she testified that she had previously overheard Appellant and
Brannock discussing the possibility of robbing an area pawn shop.
Although Appellant declined to testify or present any evidence at trial, he did
participate in a videotaped interview with Detective David Bragg, the lead investigator in
the case . During that interview Appellant denied any prior knowledge or intent to
commit the crime . He admitted that he had driven to the liquor store with Brannock, but
he claimed that Brannock had been driving . He also stated that after they arrived he fell
asleep in the car and was not awakened until Brannock returned and he announced he
had just robbed the store . Another police officer testified that at the time of Appellant's
arrest, a search of his person revealed $188.00 in cash . The case was submitted to the
jury for a verdict at the close of the prosecution's case . The jury found Appellant guilty
and he was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. He appeals to this Court as a
matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) .
III. ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant's primary argument is that there was insufficient evidence to support
his conviction of First-Degree Robbery by Complicity. Appellant preserved the error
with a timely motion for a directed verdict. The standard of review for a trial court's
denial of a motion for directed verdict is set forth in Commonwealth v. Benham , 816
S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991) . In that case we held :
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all
fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of
the Commonwealth . If the evidence is sufficient to induce a
reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be
given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court
must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is
true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility
and weight to be given to such testimony .
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if
under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant
is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal .
Id . at 187 (internal citations omitted) .
Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that
he had the requisite prior knowledge and intent necessary to justify his conviction for
robbery by complicity . He argues that the evidence proved, at best, his guilt as an
accessory after the fact to the robbery . We disagree . There was significant
circumstantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Appellant was
guilty . Appellant and Brannock had discussed the possibility of committing a similar
crime at an area pawnshop .' On a visit to the site of the robbery earlier in the day, the
two men joked about the possibility of robbing a liquor store. Upon returning to the
liquor store that evening, Brannock instructed Appellant, who was driving Brannock's
car, to park behind and to the side of the store. Brannock entered the liquor store
wearing a camouflage jacket, a camouflage bandana on his head, and a red bandana
covering his face . He was carrying a shotgun . Although Brannock testified that
Appellant had no prior knowledge or intent that Brannock would commit the robbery, he
admitted that he had donned this apparel and brandished the shotgun in the Appellant's
presence immediately after exiting the car. The two men shared the proceeds of the
crime. In light of this evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
Commonwealth, the jury's verdict of guilt was clearly reasonable .
' Appellant's objection to the admission of this evidence is discussed infra at Part
-5-
B. Voir Dire Statement
Appellant next alleges that his conviction should be reversed because of the
prosecutor's allegedly impermissible remarks concerning the reasonable doubt standard
during voir dire. The entire voir dire statement, including, for context, the ensuing bench
conference and the conclusion of that portion of the Commonwealth's presentation, is
as follows :
Attornev for the Commonwealth :
Now ladies and gentlemen, this defendant, as he sits here, is
entitled to the presumption of innocence. Every criminal
defendant anywhere in the United States, including
Kentucky, is entitled to the presumption of innocence . We in
the Commonwealth, the prosecutor's office, we have no
problem with that. We're all for it. That's been one of the
main tenets of the criminal justice system in the AngloJudeo-American law since the Middle Ages, since the
Magna Carta. We don't have any problem with that.
Now, since he is entitled to the presumption of innocence,
then it is-the burden is on the Commonwealth, if it can, to
prove the case against Mr. Johnson, Eugene Paul Johnson .
Now, since we have that burden of proof we have to prove
the case against him, and since he is entitled to the
presumption of innocence, which the Judge will instruct you
later that he is entitled to, we have to prove the case beyond
a' reasonable doubt . Now, everything is interactive these
days. Let's try an interactive thing . Let me get a show of
hands . How many have heard the term "Beyond a shadow
of a doubt"?
[Prospective jurors respond .]
I think it's safe to say everybody raised their hand . Not
surprisingly because this week, especially since I've
mentioned it, you'll see it on the TV or you'll hear it on the
radio, or you'll read it in the newspaper, or you'll read it in a
novel or a book or something-beyond a shadow of a doubt .
Now listen carefully . There ain't no such thing in the criminal
justice system in the United States of America . That's one of
the myths that has arisen . Nobody has to prove anything
beyond a shadow of a doubt .
Attorney fo r Appellant:
Judge, can we approach? Judge, the law in Kentucky is
clear that nobody can describe a reasonable doubt . . . by
saying that there is no such thing as a shadow of a doubt.
That is defining reasonable doubt by ruling out alternatives,
and I object to it.
Trial Judae:
The voir dire question is-he isn't saying what reasonable
doubt is . He's just saying what the law is not.
Attorney for Appellant:
But, by implication, he'sTrial Judge :
I understand . And if I felt like he were going to cross that
line I would sustain it. However, having heard this colloquy
before, I know that we fall well short of that. But I
understand the nature of that .
Attorney for Appellant:
Well, you understand that I haven't heard this colloquy
before.
Trial Judge :
I understand that . And that's why I say I will overrule it.
Attorney for the Commonwealth (continuing voir dire to the
'u pool):
As I was saying, the shadow of a doubt, I don't care how
many times you've heard it, it's myth . What the
Commonwealth has to prove is the case beyond a
reasonable doubt. Now, I can't tell you what a reasonable
doubt is . The law won't let me. It won't let Mr. Brown .
Believe it or not, even the Judge can't tell you what a
reasonable doubt is in his instructions . That's up to you to
determine . Whether or not the Commonwealth proves the
case beyond a reasonable doubt .
(Emphasis added) .
In Commonwealth v. Callahan , 675 S .W .2d 391 (Ky. 1984), we held : "trial courts
shall prohibit counsel from any definition of reasonable doubt at any point in the trial,
and any cases in this jurisdiction to the contrary are specifically overruled ." Id. at 393
(emphasis in original) .
We reiterate that holding today .
In that same decision, however, we noted that the prosecutor stated :
Now I submit to you that [defense counsel's definition] is not
reasonable doubt . Now, the judge has instructed you in the
instructions on what reasonable doubt is . There is a little
doubt about whether we are even here today . When I went
to college I had some teachers that could practically prove to
you that we weren't even here today . But that's not what
reasonable doubt is . The judge has instructed you in the
instructions as to what reasonable doubt is and you read that
and follow it .
Id . at 392 . (emphasis added) . We concluded that the prosecutor's statement did not
constitute "any attempt to define the phrase `reasonable doubt,' . . . ." Id . Thus, in the
very case that announced the prohibition against defining reasonable doubt, we held
that the prosecutor's allegedly improper statement, which, at most, attempted to show
what reasonable doubt was not, did not amount to a violation of the rule against defining
"reasonable doubt ."
There is no difference between the prosecutor's discussion of reasonable doubt
in Callahan and the prosecutor's short statement in this case that "beyond a shadow of
a doubt" is not the same as "beyond a reasonable doubt ." Notably, in this case the
prosecutor went on to tell the jury pool that he could not define reasonable doubt
because such a definition was up to them to determine .
Appellant also cites to Marsch v. Commonwealth , 743 S .W.2d 830 (Ky. 1987).
The comments in Marsch , however, differ significantly from those in this case . In
Marsch , the prosecutor
engaged at length in a discussion of reasonable doubt. He
asked [prospective juror] Kirk if he equated "beyond a
shadow of a doubt" with "reasonable doubt." He provided an
example using himself as a hypothetical witness to an
accident and suggested to the prospective juror that his
hypothetical testimony would satisfy the "reasonable doubt"
standard, but might not eliminate any possibility of doubt .
Finally, the attorney for the Commonwealth explained that
there was a significant distinction between being convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt and being convinced beyond all
or a shadow of a doubt .
Id . at 832 . In Marsch , the prosecutor spoke at long length about the reasonable doubt
standard . He even went so far as to provide a hypothetical, in which he was a witness,
stating that while his testimony alone might satisfy the reasonable doubt standard, it
could never eliminate all doubt. It should also be noted that the reversal in Marsch was
not based on this error alone; we found multiple other errors in the jury selection.
In contrast, the prosecutor in this case simply informed the jury that the
Commonwealth did not have to prove its case beyond a shadow of a doubt and that the
proper standard was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. He offered no hypothetical to
explain "beyond a reasonable doubt" and did not engage in a lengthy discussion of the
standard . Furthermore, the prosecutor in this case told the jury that he could not define
"reasonable doubt ." He stated :
Now, I can't tell you what a reasonable doubt is. The law
won't let me . It won't let Mr. Brown. Believe it or not, even
the Judge can't tell you what a reasonable doubt is in his
instructions . That's up to you to determine . Whether or not
the Commonwealth proves the case beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Thus, even if his prior discussion of "beyond a shadow of a doubt" approached error,
any prejudice was alleviated by this follow-up statement .
Additionally, even if one is convinced that the statement by the prosecutor in this
case constituted error, that error was harmless . We have applied harmless error on this
precise issue, even in capital murder cases, each time affirming a conviction and
sentence of death. In Sanders v. Commonwealth , 801 S.W.2d 665, 671 (Ky. 1990), we
considered an objection under Callahan to a prosecutor's voir dire question. The
question was : "In a criminal trial, do you realize that the Commonwealth has the burden
of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that does not mean beyond
all doubt or a shadow of a doubt?" We concluded, "[a]ssuming, without deciding, that
an error would have occurred had objection been raised and overruled, we are wholly
unconvinced, considering the circumstances, that absent this putative error the
defendant may not have been found guilty of a capital crime, or the death penalty may
not have been imposed." Id. at 671 (internal footnote omitted) .
Sanders was quoted approvingly in Caudill v. Commonwealth , 120 S .W.3d 635
(Ky. 2003), another capital case, wherein we noted that "[t]he prosecutor's statement
that 'just because there is a question or some unanswered part of the case, that there is
automatically reasonable doubt' did not impermissibly define 'reasonable doubt."' Id . at
675 . Given our long-standing treatment of this issue, even in the most serious of cases,
we conclude that the error alleged in this case was, at worst, harmless .
Finally, the dissent's suggestion that we have departed from the rule set forth
clearly in Callahan is mistaken . To the contrary, this opinion explicitly reiterates that
standard while concluding, just as the court did in Callahan , that the prosecutor's
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statements were not an impermissible definition of reasonable doubt . Likewise, our
decision does not question the correctness of the cases which have relied on Callahan .
Quite simply, the foregoing is little more than the application of Callahan , and we neither
reverse nor alter its rule today . Notwithstanding the suggestion of the dissent, trial
counsel would be loathe to conclude otherwise .
C. Statements of Intent to Commit Another Robbery
The trial court admitted the testimony of Appellant's roommate, Miriam Hunter, in
which she stated that Appellant and Brannock had discussed, some time prior to the
robbery, the possibility of committing a similar crime at a nearby pawn shop. It is well
established that determinations as to the relevance and admissibility of evidence are left
to the sound discretion of the trial court. Simpson v. Commonwealth , 889 S .W.2d 781,
783 (Ky. 1994) . Likewise, a judge's decision to admit certain evidence is subject to
reversal only after a finding that the decision amounted to an abuse of discretion . Love
v. Commonwealth , 55 S .W .3d 816, 822 (Ky. 2001) . "The test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by
sound legal principles ." English v. Commonwealth , 993 S .W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)
(citing 5 Am . Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 695 (1995)).
It is with this standard in mind that we must review Appellant's claim of error. He
argues that the admission of Hunter's testimony was error because it was irrelevant and
unduly prejudicial . The Commonwealth argues that the evidence was relevant, as
evidence of Appellant's state of mind, and that its probative value substantially
outweighed any prejudicial effect it might have had.
First, Appellant's argument that the evidence was irrelevant is simply without
merit . Relevant evidence is defined in KRE 401 as "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence ." The very nature
of Appellant's defense--that he was merely present and was not complicit in the
commission of the crime--requires that the jury consider issues of Appellant's
knowledge and intent in deciding the case. Hunter's testimony, which tends to show
that Appellant and Brannock discussed the possibility of committing a crime similar to
the one at issue here, is clearly relevant to the Appellant's knowledge and/or intent.
Second, Appellant claims that the evidence was unduly prejudicial and should be
barred because it was presented in order to show his propensity to commit the crime in
violation of KRE 404(b). Appellant cites Marshall v. Commonwealth , 482 S .W.2d 765
(Ky. 1972), where we held that it was reversible error to admit evidence of codefendants' prior convictions to prove their propensity to burglarize a store. However,
this case is clearly distinguishable on its facts. As discussed above, Hunter's testimony
was submitted as evidence of Appellant's prior knowledge and/or specific intent on the
night of the robbery and not for any prohibited purpose . .Admission of evidence
describing "other crimes, wrongs or acts" is permissible, "[i]f offered for some other
purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent , preparation, plan, knowledge ,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident ." KRE 404(b)(1) (emphasis added). As the
evidence was introduced for a limited purpose, it was admissible under an exception to
the general rule barring the introduction of evidence of other acts .
D . Jury Instructions
Appellant argues that the jury instructions used at his trial were in error and
violated his right to due process . The allegedly erroneous instruction is as follows, with
emphasis added:
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Instruction No. IV
Robbery in the First Degree by Co mplicity
You will find the Defendant guilty of Robbery in the
First Degree by Complicity under this instruction if, and only
if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
all of the following :
A. That in this county on or about December 29,
2003 and before finding of the Indictment herein,
he, alone or in complicity with another, stole
money and checks from Jeremy Poston ;
B . That in the course of so doing and with intent to
accomplish the theft, he, alone or in complicity
with another, used or threatened the immediate
use of physical force upon Jeremy Poston;
AND
C. That when he, alone or in complicity with another,
did so, they were armed with a shotgun.
Appellant claims that inclusion of the word "alone" in the jury instructions effectively
allowed the jury to convict him either as an accomplice, as he was charged, or as a
principal, though he was not charged as such . Appellant admits that this error was not
properly preserved at trial, but he insists we review it as palpable error pursuant to RCr
10 .26 .
To review an unpreserved error under this rule, the error must be palpable, must
affect the substantial rights of the defendant, and must result in manifest injustice . RCr
10.26; see also Nichols v. Commonwealth , 142 S .W.3d 683, 691 (Ky. 2004). The
Commonwealth conceded in its brief that no evidence was introduced proving that
Appellant acted as a principal in the robbery . In fact, the Commonwealth's arguments
at trial premised Appellant's culpability for the crime solely on the theory of complicity .
The prosecutor made statements during both voir dire and during his opening statement
to the jury that Appellant never entered the store and waited in the car during the
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robbery. In short, there was neither any suggestion by the Commonwealth nor any
evidence presented on which a reasonable juror could conclude that Appellant had
acted as a principal in the robbery . Given these circumstances, we conclude that any
error in the jury instructions was not palpable, did not affect Appellant's substantial
rights, and did not result in manifest injustice .
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's conviction is affirmed .
Graves, Johnstone, Scott and Wintersheimer, JJ ., concur. Cooper, J., dissents
by separate opinion in which Lambert, C.J ., joins .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Irvin Halbleib, Jr.
PO Box 16175
Louisville, Kentucky 40256
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
RENDERED : DECEMBER 22, 2005
TO BE PUBLISHED
,*Uyrrntr C~nixrf of ~t~tnfixxhv
2004-SC-0516-MR
EUGENE PAUL JOHNSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVE ALAN WILSON, JUDGE
04-C R-6-2
V
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE COOPER
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."
George Santayana, The Life of Reason or The Phase of Human Progress 284 (2d ed.
1924) .
[A]11 counsel shall refrain from any expression of the meaning or definition
of the phrase "reasonable doubt."
Commonwealth v. Callahan ,
675
S.W.2d 391, 393 (Ky. 1984) . Unfortunately, those who
have joined the majority opinion in this case either have forgotten or choose not to
remember what led this Court to that ruling . As noted in Callahan , id . at 392, that case
was simply "part of the progeny spawned by Taylor v. Kentucky ,
1930, 56 L. Ed.2d
436 U .S .
478, 98 S.Ct .
468 (1978) ."
In Merritt v. Commonwealth , 386 S .W.2d 727 (Ky. 1965), our predecessor court
had addressed the issue as follows :
There have been many definitions of reasonable doubt, and we are
not so presumptuous as to fancy we can coin a better one here . But it
should be observed that a reasonable doubt cannot mean any doubt.
There is some doubt about everything. A reasonable doubt is a
substantial doubt, a real doubt, in that the juror must ask himself not
whether a better case might have been proved, but whether after hearing
the evidence the juror himself actually doubts that the defendant is guilty .
Id . at 729.
Presumptuous or not, our predecessor court subsequently amended RCr 9 .56 to
adopt the Merritt definition and require that juries in every criminal case be instructed,
inter alia, as follows :
If upon the whole case you have a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt, you will find him not guilty. The term "reasonable doubt"
as used in these instructions means a substantial doubt, a real doubt, in
that you must ask yourself not whether a better case might have been
proved but whether after hearing all the evidence you actually doubt that
the defendant is guilty.
In Taylor, the issue was not whether this instruction properly defined "reasonable doubt"
but whether it was also necessary to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence.
Following existing Kentucky precedent, our Court of Appeals had held that "as long as
the trial court instructs the jury on reasonable doubt an instruction on the presumption of
innocence is not necessary." Taylor v. Commonwealth , 551 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Ky. App.
1977) (citing Swango v. Commonwealth , 291 Ky. 690,165 S .W.2d 182 (1942) ; Mink v.
Commonwealth , 228 Ky . 674,15 S .W.2d 463 (1926)) . We denied discretionary review,
but the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari . Taylor v. Kentucky, 434 . U .S .
964, 98 S.Ct. 502, 54 L.Ed .2d 449 (1977) .
In holding that it was prejudicial error to refuse to instruct the jury on the
presumption of innocence, the U .S. Supreme Court characterized the trial court's
instructions as "skeletal" and "Spartan ." Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S . 478, 486, 98
S.Ct. 1930, 1935, 56 L.Ed .2d 468 (1978) . The Court noted further that the trial court's
"truncated discussion of reasonable doubt . . . was hardly a model of clarity" and "often
has been criticized as confusing ." Id . at 488, 98 S .Ct . at 1936. The Court proceeded to
hold that the failure to separately instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence,
especially in light of the "confusing" definition of reasonable doubt coupled with certain
inherently misleading assertions made by the prosecutor during opening and closing
arguments, denied the accused his right to due process of law. Id . at 486-90, 98 S.Ct.
at 1935-38.
Rather than attempt to formulate a new, less "confusing" definition of "reasonable
doubt," our predecessors on this Court "[threw] in the towel," Whorton v .
Commonwealth , 570 S.W .2d 627, 631 (Ky. 1978), rev'd , Kentucky v. Whorton , 441 U.S .
786, 99 S .Ct. 2088, 60 L.Ed.2d 640 (1979), and amended RCr 9.56 to read :
(1) In every case the jury shall be instructed substantially as
follows :
"The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of a crime, and the
indictment shall not be considered as evidence or as having any weight
against him or her. You shall find the defendant not guilty unless you are
satisfied from the evidence alone and beyond a reasonable doubt that he
or she is guilty . If upon the whole case you have a reasonable doubt that
he or she is guilty, you shall find him or her not guilty."
(2) The instructions should not attempt to define the term
"reasonable doubt ."
(Emphasis added.)
That, of course, did not prevent prosecutors and defense counsel from
formulating their own sometimes elaborate explanations of what was or was not a
"reasonable doubt" during voir dire, opening statements, and closing arguments .' In
fact, our predecessor court probably invited this practice when it said in Cox v. Cooper,
' I remember one particularly tedious closing argument during which defense counsel
attempted to explain the meaning of "reasonable doubt" by telling the jurors to imagine
a giant curtain across the courtroom that blocked their view of the witness stand, then
gradually opening the imaginary curtain while informing the jurors that even that much
blockage constituted a reasonable doubt.
-3-
510 S .W .2d 530 (Ky. 1974) : "Our approach to instructions is that they should provide
only the bare bones, which can be fleshed out by counsel in their closing arguments if
they so desire ." Id. at 535 . Thus, in Callahan , defense counsel defined "reasonable
doubt" as "any doubt," and the prosecutor told the jury that "[thhere is a little doubt about
whether we are even here today ." Callahan , 675 S .W .2d at 392. Noting the incongruity
of prohibiting trial judges from defining "reasonable doubt" while permitting the parties to
invent their own self-serving definitions, the Court extended the RCr 9 .56(2) prohibition
against attempting to define "reasonable doubt" to trial counsel.
Having prohibited the court from definition of the term "reasonable
doubt" in the instructions by RCr 9.56(2), we can hardly condone a clientserving definition by defense counsel or prosecutor in either voir dire,
opening statement or closing argument. As stated in Taylor , supra [Taylor
v. Kentucky , 436 U.S . at 488-89, 98 S .Ct. at 1936], " . . . arguments of
counsel cannot substitute for instructions by the court." We do not intend
by this holding that counsel cannot point out to the jury which evidence , or
lack thereof, creates reasonable doubt, but all counsel shall refrain from
any expression of the meaning, or definition of the phrase "reasonable
doubt." As stated in Wigmore, supra [9 Wigmore, Evidence , § 2497
(Chadbourn rev. 1981)], page 408:
The effort to perpetuate these elaborate unserviceable definitions is
a useless one and serves today chiefly to aid the purpose of the
tactician . It should be abandoned .
Id . at 393 (emphasis added).
In Sanborn v. Commonwealth , 754 S.W .2d 534 (Ky. 1988), we held that "[t]he
prosecutor improperly defined reasonable doubt to the jury," id. at 544, but did not recite
the nature of the remark. However, in Marsch v. Commonwealth , 743 S .W.2d 830 (Ky.
1987), we held that a "clear-cut violation" of Callahan occurred when the prosecutor told
a juror during individual voir dire that "there was a significant distinction between being
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and being convinced beyond all or a shadow of a
doubt." Id . at 832-33 .
As in Marsch, the prosecutor in the case sub judice undertook to express the
meaning of "reasonable doubt" (not which evidence or lack thereof created reasonable
doubt) by informing the jurors during voir dire, over Appellant's objection, that "beyond a
reasonable doubt" does not mean "beyond a shadow of a doubt ."
Let me get a show of hands . How many have heard the term "beyond a
shadow of a doubt"?
(Prospective jurors respond by raising their hands.)
I think it's safe to say everybody raised their hands. . . . Now listen
carefully . There ain't no such thing in the criminal justice system in the
United States of America . That's one of the myths that has arisen .
Nobody has to prove anything beyond a shadow of a doubt.
. . . [T]his "shadow of a doubt," I don't care how many times you've heard
it. It's a myth . What the Commonwealth has to prove is a case beyond a
reasonable doubt .
The majority opinion's reliance on Caudill v. Commonwealth , 120 S.W .3d 635,
675-76 (Ky. 2003), and Sanders v. Commonwealth , 801 S.W .2d 665, 671 (Ky . 1990), is
misplaced. Unlike the case sub judice , there was not a contemporaneous objection to
the prosecutor's discussion of the meaning, of reasonable doubt in either Caudill or
Sanders . In both cases, we applied the standard of review for unpreserved errors in
death penalty cases and held that "we are wholly unconvinced, considering the
circumstances, that absent this putative error the [appellants] may not have been found
guilty of a capital crime, or the death penalty may not have been imposed ." Caudill , 120
S.W.3d at 675-76; Sanders , 801 S .W.2d at 671 .
With today's decision, we have regressed to where we were in 1978 . Trial courts
cannot instruct juries as to the meaning or definition of "reasonable doubt," but
prosecutors and defense counsel can urge juries to adopt their own client-serving
definitions (for surely this Court is not holding that a prosecutor can tell the jury its
version of the meaning of reasonable doubt but defense counsel cannot) . If jurors are
to be instructed on the meaning or definition of reasonable doubt, the instruction should
come from the neutrality of the bench, not the advocacy of counsel . However, I believe
Callahan struck the right chord, as one can only surmise what definition would pass
constitutional muster. Taylor was not the last case reversed by the United States
Supreme Court because of an improper definition of "reasonable doubt." In Cage v.
Louisiana , 498 U.S . 39, 111 S .Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), abrogated on other
grounds by Estelle v. McGuire , 502 U.S . 62, 73 n.4, 112 S .Ct. 475, 482 n.4, 116
L .Ed .2d 385 (1991), the Court held that it was reversible error for a state court to
instruct the jury as follows:
"[A reasonable doubt] is one that is founded upon a real tangible
substantial basis and not upon mere caprice and conjecture . It must be
such doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your minds
by reasons of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence or lack thereof.
A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It is an actual
substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable man can seriously
entertain . What.is required is not an absolute or mathematical certainty,
but a moral certainty.
Id. at 40, 111 S.Ct. at 329 . I perceive no real distinction between an "absolute or
mathematical certainty" and "beyond a shadow of a doubt ." If a trial court cannot
instruct a jury that "reasonable doubt" does not mean "beyond a shadow of a doubt,"
then a prosecutor should not be allowed to do so.
Accordingly, I dissent.
Lambert, C.J., joins this dissenting opinion.
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