STEVE ELDRIDGE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 22, 2005
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2004-SC-0475-MR
STEVE ELDRIDGE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WOLFE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LARRY MILLER, JUDGE
2001-CR-24
V.
APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from a judgment based on a jury verdict that convicted Eldridge of
murder, first-degree assault and two counts of first-degree robbery . He was sentenced
to a total of seventy years in prison .
The questions presented are whether the trial judge erred in refusing to dismiss
the jury panel based on an allegation of a substantial deviation in the jury selection
process ; whether a juror should have been removed for cause; and, whether certain
documentary evidence was properly admitted .
Eldridge was indicted for the murder of one victim, the first-degree assault of a
second victim and one count of first-degree robbery against each of the victims . The
second victim was found incompetent to testify at trial, apparently due to the severity of
his injuries .
Among other evidence, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of an
accomplice, McIntosh. He testified that after Eldridge obtained a .22 caliber gun from a
relative, they drove to the home of the deceased victim in order to rob him .
Eldridge
eventually entered the home alone while McIntosh remained in the car. During that
time, he heard four gunshots . When Eldridge reemerged three to four minutes later, he
told McIntosh that the best thing he could do was keep his mouth shut. Eldridge then
gave him $100 and four pills . After they stopped and injected drugs, they went to
McIntosh's home . That is when Eldridge threw the gun over the hill and burned the
wallet of the second victim in a fire pit .
Another witness for the Commonwealth testified about a conversation he had
with Eldridge while they were in a detention center . The witness stated that Eldridge
told him that he had shot the two victims and that he divided the money evenly with
McIntosh . Eldridge admitted throwing the gun over the hill from where McIntosh's
parents lived .
The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of a witness who was married
to Eldridge's step-daughter . He indicated that sometime before the murder, Eldridge
borrowed a .22 caliber gun from him, but never returned it. He was able to positively
identify the gun that was recovered by police and introduced at trial as his own .
Eldridge did not testify, but the defense offered evidence that attempted to
implicate McIntosh in the crimes . The jury convicted Eldridge of all the charges and
recommended a sentence of fifty years for the murder and twenty years each on the
remaining counts, to run consecutively for a total of 110 years in prison . The trial judge
ultimately ran the twenty year sentences concurrently, but consecutive to the fifty year
sentence for a total of seventy years in prison . This appeal followed .
I . Jury Panel
Eldridge argues that the trial judge committed reversible error when he refused
to dismiss the jury panel that had been summoned to hear his trial. He bases his
complaint on six allegations which he maintains resulted in the trial judge substantially
deviating from the relevant statutes and Administrative Procedures of the Court of
Justice concerning jury selection. They are as follows : 1) the trial judge excused and
postponed numerous jurors before they appeared for orientation ; 2) the trial judge
automatically exempted students from service ; 3) the trial judge excused from service
numerous jurors who did not demonstrate "undue hardship" or "extreme
inconvenience" ; 4) the trial judge invented an unauthorized process of "alternate" jurors
who served on stand-by ; 5) the trial judge permitted jurors to call the clerk's office and
excuse themselves for reasons such as illness or attending to family business ; and, 6)
the trial judge delegated authority to the circuit clerk to excuse/postpone prospective
jurors. We will address these individual complaints separately .
A . Excusal and Postponement of Jurors before Orientation
Eldridge contends that the trial judge improperly excused and postponed
numerous jurors before they appeared for orientation . We disagree .
According to the pertinent statute and administrative procedure, the chief circuit
judge or his designee shall determine on the basis of the information provided on the
juror qualification form whether a prospective juror is disqualified from service . See
KRS 29A .080 and AP II, §8(1), which materially differ only as to who qualifies as a
designee. A prospective juror is disqualified from service on a jury if he or she : a) is not
eighteen years of age ; b) is not a United States citizen ; c) is not a resident of the
county; d) does not have sufficient knowledge of the English language ; e) is a convicted
felon and has not been pardoned ; f) is presently under indictment; or, g) has served on
a jury within the past twelve months . See KRS 29A.080(2) and AP ll, §8(2) .
Upon the request of a prospective juror, the chief judge or the trial court,
depending on the circumstances, is permitted to excuse an individual upon a showing
of undue hardship, extreme inconvenience, or public necessity . See KRS 29A.100 and
AP II, §12(1) . The statute further states in relevant part as follows : "On the day on
which the prospective jurors are summonsed to appear, any person not previously
excused who desires to be excused shall be heard . . ." KRS 29A .100(1). Similar
language is employed in AP II, §9.
Clearly, the statutes and administrative procedures permit the trial judge to
excuse a prospective juror before they appear at the designated time in court. The
argument by Eldridge to the contrary would require substituting the word "disqualified"
for the word "excused" so that the statute and administrative procedure read "any
person not previously `disqualified'." That position is simply untenable . Additionally, to
implement the procedure suggested by Eldridge would be an utter waste of time for all
persons involved in the judicial process . The trial judge did not err in excusing and
postponing jurors before they appeared for orientation .
B. Automatically Exempting Students
Eldridge claims that the trial judge automatically exempted students from jury
service. We disagree .
Responding to the complaint by Eldridge of automatic excusal, the trial judge
explained that he excused students who had contacted him under the hardship
exemption . He also indicated that not all of the students had asked to be excused on
their qualification forms and that he may have inadvertently excused them orally. The
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trial judge further stated that he directed the students he excused orally to return to the
clerk's office and to make the proper notation on the form, but that they may have failed
to do so.
We fully recognize that there are no automatic exemptions from jury service .
See KRS 29A .090 and AP II, §11 . Here, the trial judge granted no such automatic or
per se exemptions . Instead, he applied the hardship provision of KRS 29A .100 and AP
II, §12(1), and did so correctly. That such application tends to allow the trial judge to
excuse students who have to focus their attention on the pursuit of their education is
almost an inevitable result of a hardship exemption .
However, this is not the sort of
"systematic exclusion of a distinctive group" that is prohibited in jury selection. Bratcher
v. Commonwealth , 151 S.W .3d 332, 346 (Ky. 2004) quoting Commonwealth v.
McFerron , 680 S .W .2d 924, 927 (Ky. 1984) .
Eldridge also complains that Jurors 387 and 242 only asked for service to be
postponed, but that the trial judge excused them entirely. Juror 242 stated that she was
a full-time student at Wolfe County High School. She requested that her jury service be
postponed, but did not indicate until when . Juror 387 declared that in order to graduate
in May, he needed student teaching hours and that he was a currently a student
teacher at Morgan County High School . He requested postponement until after
graduation in June 2004.
When possible, the trial judge is to favor temporary postponement of service or
reduced service over permanent excuse . See KRS 29A.100(3) and AP II, §12 . Here,
even if the trial judge should have postponed or reduced service instead of excuse it,
Eldridge has no basis to complain . The trial in this case occurred on April 26 -29, 2004.
Neither of the prospective jurors would have been available to serve at that time.
C . Excusing Jurors for Extreme Inconvenience and Undue Hardship
Eldridge asserts that the trial judge substantially deviated from the prescribed
procedures by using an "easy excuse" process to shrink the jury pool . He maintains
that the reasons given by the prospective jurors in requesting to be excused from
service were not good enough .
Neither the statutes nor the administrative procedures set forth any type of test
for determining undue hardship or extreme inconvenience . The criteria for excuse or
postponement are very broad, requiring the exercise of substantial interpretation and
discretion . Commonwealth v. Nelson , 841 S .W .2d 628 (Ky. 1992).
Here, the trial judge noted that he reviewed each individual claim and made his
decision accordingly. Again, it is not required that the jurors appear at orientation
before they are excused . The statute and regulation permitting the juror to be heard is
for their benefit not their detriment. Having examined the record, we find no abuse of
discretion by the trial judge . The statistical analysis undertaken by Eldridge is
unconvincing .
D. Unauthorized Process
Eldridge makes a one sentence accusation in his brief that "the court invented an
unauthorized process of `alternate' jurors who served on stand-by ." In his reply brief, he
acknowledges that "while this specific point may not have been raised by trial counsel,
he may have been unaware of it or forgotten it." Obviously, this issue was not properly
preserved for appellate review. Carrier v. Commonwealth , 142 S.W.3d 670 (Ky. 2004) .
Regardless, the process used by the trial judge was consistent with the directives of
KRS 29A.100(3) and AP 11, §12.
E . Allowing Jurors to Excuse Themselves
Eldridge claims that the trial judge allowed jurors to call the clerk's office and
excuse themselves for reasons such as illness or attending to family business . This
allegation apparently stems from events occurring just prior to the beginning of trial .
Defense counsel noticed that six names on the jury list were circled and questioned the
court on the significance of that. The trial judge indicated that when jurors were
qualified they were directed to call the clerk's office and inform the clerk if they were
unable to be there that day. The circuit clerk confirmed that the names were circled for
that reason . Once that was verified, defense counsel expressed satisfaction .
Consequently, this issue has been waived.
In any event, there is nothing in the record that the jurors had asked to be
excused or that they had been excused entirely. Instead, the jurors were granted
temporary absences due to unavoidable conflicts . We find nothing in the statutes or
administrative regulations that would prohibit this procedure.
F. Excusal by the Clerk
Eldridge argues that the trial judge delegated authority to the circuit clerk to
excuse/postpone prospective jurors . He contends that the circumstances surrounding
prospective Juror 347 establish that the circuit clerk was excusing or at least postponing
jurors.
Prospective Juror 347 had his service postponed until the resolution of a pending
civil case involving his son . His juror qualification form which was signed by the chief
circuit judge/trial judge reflected that reason. He returned to court, however, claiming
he had received a letter from the circuit clerk telling him he had been placed back in
service. Apparently the civil case was still pending, so the trial judge reiterated that his
service was postponed until its completion .
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the trial judge did not have
discretion to postpone jury service and then summon the juror back in before the
postponement had expired. The trial judge denied the motion because the situation
had been discovered and did not in any way prejudice Eldridge .
It is clear from our review of the record that Eldridge did not base his motion for a
mistrial on an allegation that the clerk, rather than the trial judge, had given the
postponement . Consequently, this issue is not properly preserved for appellate review.
Carrier, supra . Regardless, the record does not support the claim raised on appeal.
The juror qualification form postponing the service of Juror 347, like all the other forms,
was signed by the chief circuit judge/trial judge. The circuit clerk may have
communicated decisions to prospective jurors, but those decisions were still made by
the trial judge .
Having reviewed the record, we find no substantial deviation from the
requirements set forth in the statutes and administrative procedures . There was no
abuse of discretion by the trial judge in his decision regarding prospective jurors and
certainly none that prejudiced the defendant in any manner .
Il . Removal for Cause
Eldridge contends that the trial judge committed reversible error by refusing to
excuse for cause Juror 3 who advised that her work responsibilities would probably
weigh on her mind during jury service . We disagree .
Juror 3 initially stated that her service on the jury may be burdensome to her
employer . She also said that if she were chosen to sit, it may weigh on her mind and
probably make it difficult for her to concentrate. Upon further questioning, however,
Juror 3 indicated that her work situation would probably not affect her concentration .
She then stated, "You know, if I have to be here, I will be here . I will do my job." The
motion by defense counsel to excuse this juror was denied . He exhausted all of his
peremptory challenges .
The trial judge has broad discretion in determining whether to excuse a juror for
cause. Mills v. Commonwealth , 95 S .W.3d 838 (Ky. 2003) . That determination will not
be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion . Mills, supra. Here, the juror
indicated that she would be able to remain focused and unequivocally stated that she
could do the job of a juror. There was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in
denying the motion to excuse this juror.
Ill . Admission of Evidence
Eldridge asserts that the trial judge committed reversible error by admitting
Commonwealth's Exhibit 6, a piece of paper seized from his residence, without any
proof that the writings on the paper were made by him . Specifically, he complains that
the paper was not admissible due to a lack of foundation, was irrelevant, was hearsay
and was not properly authenticated.
The piece of paper was found in the living room dresser drawer in the Eldridge
residence . It contained multiple names and notations, including the name of one of the
victims - written repeatedly, names of members of the Eldridge family, and words such
as "stealing" and the number "500 ." Defense counsel objected to the admission of the
exhibit without a proper foundation, arguing there would be no evidence as to who
made the notations, when it was done and what they mean . The Commonwealth
conceded it could not prove who wrote the paper . Nevertheless, it argued that the
paper was relevant because it was found in the home of the defendant and that there
was evidence that he took $500 from the victim . The trial judge overruled the objection .
Circumstances associated with a writing may be sufficient to support a finding
that it is what it is claimed to be. See Apple v. Commonwealth , 296 S .W.2d 717 (Ky.
1956). Here, the paper was found in the living room dresser drawer in the Eldridge
residence . Though it was admitted that the author was unknown, the location of the
item along with its contents was adequate to authenticate the evidence .
The only objection by Eldridge at trial was that there was a lack of a proper
foundation . Consequently, the other issues he raises are not properly preserved for
appellate review. Carrier. Even if we were to conclude otherwise and determine that
the paper was not properly admissible, considering the overwhelming evidence of guilt,
especially the testimony of his accomplice, the error would be deemed harmless . RCr
9.24.
Eldridge received a fundamentally fair trial. He was not denied any of his due
process rights under the state or federal constitutions .
The judgment of conviction is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gail Robinson
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Susan Roncarti Lenz
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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