GARY DEAN VAUGHN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
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SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO UR T OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : JUNE 16, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
6$Uyumt Courf of Aof
2004-SC-0462-MR
GARY DEAN VAUGHN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JERRY D . WINCHESTER, JUDGE
2003-CR-0201
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from a judgment based on a jury verdict which convicted Vaughn
of first-degree assault, first-degree robbery, first-degree arson and as a first-degree
persistent felony offender .
He was sentenced to life in prison on each count to run
concurrently.
The sole question presented here is whether it was an abuse of discretion by the
trial judge to decline to allow Vaughn to cross-examine a police officer regarding
statements made to the victim because it infringed on the right to present a defense .
Vaughn went to the home of the victim seeking employment . After talking a few
minutes and drinking a beer, the victim told Vaughn he did not have any work for him at
that time . Vaughn left the home but returned at approximately 11 p.m ., demanded
money, beat up the victim, took a small amount of money and set the house on fire .
The victim testified that Vaughn muttered that he could not let the victim live and that he
did not have "no trouble killing [my daughter]," that is the defendant's daughter .
At trial, the victim testified regarding the statement uttered by Vaughn during the
attack . Defense counsel did not object to the comment regarding the daughter of
Vaughn and did not question the victim about the remark. The prosecution called the
sheriff to testify as to the report of the crimes which he did. Defense counsel attempted
to cross-examine the sheriff about his work on an unrelated prior crime, the death of the
defendant's daughter . The prosecution objected to the cross-examination on the basis
of relevancy. The trial judge considered the arguments of both counsel and concluded
that the cross-examination was not relevant to the proceedings underway. At the
conclusion of the trial, the jury found Vaughn guilty of all charges. This appeal followed .
Vaughn now argues that the refusal of the trial judge to permit the defendant to
cross-examine the police officer regarding statements made to the victim is reversible
error because it infringes on the right of the defendant to present a defense . We
disagree .
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in limiting the cross-examination of
the police witness in regard to an unrelated crime . The trial judge has broad discretion
to regulate cross-examination .
Commonwealth v. Maddox , 955 S .W .2d 718 (Ky.
1997). See also Moore v . Commonwealth , 771 S.W.2d 34 (Ky. 1988) . The trial judge
has the authority to establish the proper boundaries on cross-examination . We
recognize that KRE 611 permits a witness to be cross-examined on any relevant matter
to any issue in the case. However, the rule still allows the trial judge to limit crossexamination . Such limitation is permitted when necessary to further the search for
truth, avoid waste of time or protect witnesses against unfair and unnecessary attack .
DeRossett v. Commonwealth , 867 S .W .2d 195 (Ky. 1993), citing Lawson Kentucky
Evidence Handbook ยง3 .20(11) (3d ed . 1993) .
In general, the role of cross-examination is to permit the defendant an
opportunity to impeach a particular witness as to credibility. A defendant cannot be
denied the opportunity to impeach a witness for bias or from presenting facts from
which the jury could draw inferences regarding the credibility of the witness. Delaware
v. Van Arsdall , 475 U .S . 673, 106 S.Ct . 1431, 89 L.Ed .2d 674 ; Davis v. Alaska, 415
U .S . 308, 94 S .Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed .2d 347 (1974) . However, limiting cross-examination
does not unduly infringe on the confrontational clause of the United States Constitution
which is only implicated if the cross-examination concerns a matter giving the witness
reason to testify falsely during the trial at hand . Cf. Beaty v. Commonwealth , 125
S .W .3d 196 (Ky. 2004) . The confrontation clause does not limit the discretion of the
trial judge in imposing limits on cross-examination if there is a problem about confusion
or relevancy . Cf. Delaware , supra .
Here, the questioning and testimony which Vaughn attempted to elicit from the
deputy did not expose facts from which the jury could draw reasonable inferences
relating to the credibility of the witnesses.
Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S . 227, 109 S .Ct.
480, 102 L.Ed .2d 513 (1988) . Vaughn concedes that the line of testimony was not
intended to reveal motive, bias or reliability of the witness . Clearly, it was intended as
factual testimony regarding an unrelated criminal investigation . The cross-examination
was not intended to show bias or animus against the defendant . The questioning of the
deputy was factual in nature . KRS 611 was not intended to allow a criminal defendant
to introduce evidence on his own behalf or to create confusion about the facts of the
case under consideration . A defendant is not allowed to present unsupported theories
in the guise of cross-examination and invite the jury to speculate as to some cause
other than the one supported by the evidence . Maddox , supra . Questioning the deputy
regarding the truth of the matters in the statement began to introduce irrelevant
testimony into the proceedings at hand. Although partiality and bias will always be
relevant to discredit a witness, the issue here is whether the testimony on crossexamination was relevant to this trial . DeRossett , supra .
The defense wanted to show that Vaughn was not a suspect in the death of his
daughter, an unrelated crime . He wanted to cross-examine the deputy regarding
information discovered in that investigation . As such, it was entirely unrelated to the
current charges. Even if cross-examination may reveal some relevant information, the
trial judge can still limit the questioning because it may confuse or mislead the jury on
the present issues . See Maddox .
The victim testified during trial regarding the defendant's daughter and the
defendant did not object to the testimony, nor follow with any questions on it. The
prosecution called a deputy sheriff to testify as to the first report of the crimes and the
subsequent investigation . Defense counsel attempted to cross-examine the deputy
about his work on a prior crime in the area, that is, the death of Vaughn's daughter .
The prosecution objected to that line of questioning on the grounds of relevancy, and
after considering the arguments of both counsel, the trial judge ruled that the direction
of the cross-examination was not relevant to the case at hand. Other than the victim
himself, no other witness mentioned anything regarding the role of Vaughn in the death
of his own daughter.
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in limiting the cross-examination of
the police witness in regard to an unrelated crime.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed .
Lambert, C .J ., Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Scott and Wintersheimer, JJ ., sitting .
All concur except Johnstone, J ., who concurs in result only.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Karen Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Robert E . Prather
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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