DARRYL BATTS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT TO BE PUBLISHEDOPIANION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "ATOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVI_L PR OCED URE PR OMUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL ATOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO UR T OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : DECEMBER 22, 2005
AS MODIFIED : JANUARY 26, 2006
140;~_TQ_aB
~I !/A\E I I
ixprexttr (gaurf of
'fit
2004-SC-000364-MR
DARRYL BATTS
V.
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HON . BARRY WILLETT, JUDGE
99-C R-02134
APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
I . INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Darryl Batts, was convicted of ten counts of First-Degree Robbery,
one count of First-Degree Possession of a Controlled Substance, and one count of
First-Degree Persistent Felony Offender status . He now contends that the trial court
erred (1) by refusing to suppress the drugs found on his person at the time of his arrest;
(2) by omitting an element of First-Degree Robbery from the jury instructions ; (3) by
denying his request to use psychological records to impeach the testimony of a witness
for the prosecution ; (4) by allowing the prosecution to use its peremptory challenges in a
racially-discriminatory manner; (5) by failing to enter a directed verdict on his behalf ;
and (6) by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of speedy trial
rights . Finding no error, we affirm Appellant's convictions .
II. BACKGROUND
On August 16, 1999, Louisville police received a phone call from a retired police
officer, James Owen, about some suspicious behavior he had observed . According to
Owen, he had noticed a suspicious vehicle near a local Dairy Mart . Owen saw a black
man, later identified as Darryl Robertson, step out of the vehicle, a blue Mercury Grand
Marquis, and attempt to cover the license plate with a towel. Despite Robertson's
efforts to conceal the license plate number, Owen was able to read and record some of
the obscured number as 329-AL . Robertson reentered the car and was driven by
another man to the Dairy Mart, where Robertson got out of the car and walked into the
store . A few minutes later, Robertson returned to the car, and he and the other man
drove away. Based on his experience as a police officer, Owen suspected the men
were "casing" the Dairy Mart in preparation for a robbery.
Detective Mark Handy, a member of the Louisville Police Department, called
Owen several days later to discuss his tip . Detective Handy was investigating a series
of robberies in the Louisville area involving a car similar to the one described by Owen.
Detective Handy asked Owen to accompany him to Appellant's home in an attempt to
identify the vehicle he had seen, and Owen agreed . A blue Mercury Grand Marquis
was parked outside Appellant's home, and Owen identified it as the one he had seen
the previous week at the Dairy Mart . The license plate number on the vehicle matched
the partial number Owen had recorded .
After Owen's identification, Louisville police initiated surveillance of the vehicle
outside Appellant's home . On August 24, 1999, after receiving information about a
robbery in southern Indiana involving a car similar to the blue Mercury Grand Marquis,
police began searching for Appellant's car. Later that day, they found it sitting empty
outside a residence, but neither Appellant nor Robertson were in sight. Officers waited
for the men to return to the car. Later, as Appellant and Robertson approached the car,
the police confronted and arrested them for robbery. The police then searched the two
men and found a small amount of cocaine in Appellant's sock. The police then took the
two men to police headquarters, where they were kept in separate areas . Although
Appellant denied the charges against him, Robertson confessed to the robberies and
Appellant's involvement in them .
Appellant and Robertson were indicted on eighteen counts of First-Degree
Robbery each . Appellant was also charged with First-Degree Possession of a
Controlled Substance and being a First-Degree Persistent Felony Offender. Appellant
was tried in December 2003 . The jury convicted him on ten counts of First-Degree
Robbery, one count of First-Degree Possession of a Controlled Substance, and one
count of being a Persistent Felony Offender in the First-Degree . Appellant was
sentenced to fifty years in prison .
He appeals to this court as a matter of right. Ky.
Const. § 110(2)(b) .
III. ANALYSIS
We address the issues in the order in which they appear in Appellant's brief.
A. Suppression of Drugs
Appellant first claims that his motion to suppress the cocaine found on his person
should have been granted . Appellant's arrest was warrantless and was based only on
probable cause . Appellant argues that there was no probable cause, thus rendering his
arrest and the subsequent seizure of the cocaine from his sock unlawful .
We believe the police had probable cause to arrest Appellant in this case . They
had received information from Owen, a retired police officer, concerning suspicious
-3-
behavior outside a Dairy Mart in Louisville. According to Owen, the two men who were
"casing" the Dairy Mart drove a blue Mercury Grand Marquis, which matched the
description of a car that had been observed at the scene of other robberies . Owen
identified the car in front of Appellant's home as the same car he had seen behind the
Dairy Mart. Soon thereafter, the police received a call from Indiana about a possible
robbery involving a get-away car fitting the description of the blue Mercury Grand
Marquis . Later, they found Appellant with the car . The combination of these facts,
especially Owen's description of the "casing" behavior and identification of the car, was
sufficient to give the police probable cause to arrest Appellant .
Appellant also argues that even if his arrest was lawful, the search of his person,
which led to the discovery of the cocaine, exceeded the permissible scope of a search
incident to arrest because it had no reasonable relationship to the charge. Appellant's
argument is predicated on the language : "[t]he scope of the search must be `strictly tied
to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible ." Terry v.
Ohio , 392 U .S. 1, 19, 88 S .Ct. 1868, 1878, 20 L.Ed .2d 889 (1968). This argument
confuses the scope of the search allowed under a Terry stop, which requires only that
the police have a reasonable suspicion, with that allowed under an arrest, which
requires the higher standard of probable cause.
Whereas a Terry stop is limited to a "pat down" or a "stop and frisk," a full search
is allowed incident to a lawful arrest. It has long been the law that "[w]hen a man is
legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his control which
it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used to prove the offense may be seized
and held as evidence in the prosecution ." Carroll v. United States , 267 U .S . 132, 158,
45 S .Ct. 280, 287, 69 L .Ed . 543 (1925) (emphasis added); see also Chimel v.
California , 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S .Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed .2d 685 (1969) ("When
an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested
in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest
or effect his escape . Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated . In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction .") ; United States v. Childs , 277 F.3d 947, 952 (7th Cir. 2002)
(noting specifically the distinction: "a person stopped on probable cause may be
searched fully, while a person stopped on reasonable suspicion may be patted down
but not searched"). To answer Appellant's claim more bluntly, a search incident to
arrest is simply not limited to a search for evidence related to the charge that serves as
the basis of the arrest . The search of Appellant was not part of a mere Terry stop .
Rather, it was part of a full (and lawful) arrest, thus seizure of the cocaine was lawful .
B. Incorrect Jury Instructions
Appellant argues that the jury instructions were incomplete because they did not
require the jury to find that Appellant intended for Robertson, the principal, to commit
the robberies and because they omitted an element of first-degree robbery, namely, the
element of the use or threat of immediate use of physical force upon the victim .
Appellant did not object to the jury instructions at trial and now asks us to review his
claim for palpable error pursuant to RCr 10 .26 .
The trial court instructed the jury on fourteen counts of First-Degree Robbery
using an instruction in the following form :
You will find the defendant guilty of First-Degree
Robbery under this instruction if you believe from the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following :
F]
A. That in Jefferson County on or about the
day
of August, 1999, Darryl Wayne Robertson stole or attempted
to steal money from [person and location] ;
B . That in the course of doing so and with the intent to
accomplish the theft, Darryl Wayne Robertson was armed
with a BB gun ;
C . That the defendant acted in complicity with Darryl
Wayne Robertson.
The instructions also included the following definition of "complicity" :
Complicity - Means that a person is guilty of an
offense committed by another person when, with the
intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of an
offense, he solicits, commands, or engages in a conspiracy
with such other person to commit the offense, or aids,
counsels, or attempts to aid such a person in planning or
committing the offense .
As to Appellant's first claim about the failure to instruct on intent, we have
previously stated that "[o]ften, th[e] element of intent is satisfied by giving a separate
instruction defining complicity ." Crawley v. Commonwealth , 107 S .W .3d 197, 200 (Ky.
2003) . The separate complicity definition used in this case is identical to the one we
approved in Crawley. Thus, the intent aspect of the instruction was not even an error,
much less a palpable one.
We agree with Appellant that the trial court improperly failed to instruct on the
element of the use or threat of immediate use of physical force upon the victim. See id.
("Robbery requires not only the element of an intent to accomplish a theft, but also the
element of the use or threat of immediate use of physical force upon the victim.").
However, we cannot say that this error rose to the level of palpable error. In the context
of harmless error analysis, we have previously noted that prejudice is presumed when
the jury is instructed erroneously . Esc . , McKinney v. Heisel , 947 S.W.2d 32, 35 (Ky.
1992) ("[E]rroneous instructions to the jury are presumed to be prejudicial ; that an
appellee claiming harmless error bears the burden of showing affirmatively that no
prejudice resulted from the error.").
But mere prejudice does not necessarily rise to the level of "manifest injustice" as
required under RCr 10 .26, the palpable error rule. "Under this rule, an error is
reversible only if a manifest injustice has resulted from the error. That means that if,
upon consideration of the whole case, a substantial possibility does not exist that the
result would have been different, the error will be deemed nonprejudicial ." Graves v .
Commonwealth , 17 S .W.3d 858, 864 (Ky. 2000).
Here, numerous witnesses to the
robberies gave statements describing Robertson brandishing a weapon and demanding
money from the cashier or other victim . Robertson himself testified that he would point
the gun at the victim and demand money, sometimes cocking the gun in a menacing
fashion . Although no witnesses testified that explicit threats were made to these
individuals, pointing a gun at an individual and ordering him or her to hand over money
includes an implicit threat of violence . Furthermore, the jury instructions, as given, at
least required the jury to find that Robertson was armed with a gun when committing his
robberies in order to find Appellant guilty. In light of these facts, it is unlikely that the
result would have been different had the instructions been correct . As such, there was
no manifest injustice and thus no palpable error.
C. Impeachment of Robertson
Appellant contends that the trial court improperly denied him the opportunity to
use psychiatric records to impeach Robertson. In response to a question about his
mental health history, Robertson testified that he had never experienced hallucinations .
This statement contradicted psychological reports that the trial court had received from
KCPC . Those records indicated that Robertson had complained of hallucinations during
-7-
a hospitalization in 1985, fourteen years before the robberies and eighteen years before
the trial. Based on the contradiction between Robertson's testimony and the medical
records, Appellant's lawyer moved to introduce the records to impeach Robertson.
Relying on Commonwealth v. Huber, 711 S .W .2d 490 (Ky. 1986), the trial court ruled
that although Robertson's testimony did conflict with the records, they could not be
admitted because they were too remote in time and thus collateral to the relevant time
period of the robberies and the trial .
The trial court ruled correctly . As we noted in Huber:
The prior mental treatment of a witness is not relevant as to
the credibility of that witness unless it can be demonstrated
that there was a mental deficiency on the part of the witness,
either at the time of the testimony or at the time of the matter
being testified about . The mere fact that a particular witness
has been treated for any kind of psychiatric problem in the
past is of no significance in the impeachment of that witness
unless it can be shown that the psychiatric problems relate in
some way to the credibility of the witness .
Id . at 491 . Appellant's attorney failed to show that Robertson's hallucinations in 1985
had any relevance to the time of the robberies or the time of the trial. Absent such a
showing, impeachment of Robertson's statement about hallucinations would be nothing
more than impeachment on a collateral fact, that is, one that "could not have been
introduced into evidence for any purpose absent the contradiction ." Robert G . Lawson,
The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 4.05[2], at 272 (4th ed . 2003) .
Appellant attempts to evade the effect of Huber by claiming that it has been
abrogated to some extent by Eldred v. Commonwealth , 906 S .W.2d 694 (Ky. 1994) .
Eldred , however, addressed when psychological records are discoverable , not when
they are admissible . Id . at 702 ("[I]f a trial court is confronted with articulable evidence
that raises a reasonable inquiry of a witness's mental health history, the court should
permit a defendant to discover that history ." (internal quotation marks and indications of
alteration omitted)). Thus, it is clear that Eldred is inapplicable to this case.'
D. Batson Challenge
Appellant claims that the prosecutor purposefully excluded black jurors from the
venire on the basis of race, thus violating Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U .S . 79, 106 S .Ct.
1712 (1986) . The jury panel initially consisted of forty jurors, eleven of whom were
black. Three jurors, one of whom was black, were excused for cause . Thus, when the
parties exercised their peremptory strikes, the jury panel consisted of thirty-seven jurors,
ten of whom were black . In exercising his peremptory strikes, the prosecutor eliminated
five of the ten black jurors on the panel . After both parties exercised their peremptory
strikes, twenty-one jurors, five of whom were black, remained . The trial court randomly
drew off seven jurors, leaving fourteen jurors (twelve plus two alternates) to hear the
case . All five of the black jurors who remained after the peremptory strikes were
eliminated by the seven random strikes .
The next day, Appellant objected, claiming that the complete elimination of black
jurors was a Batson violation . In response, the prosecutor offered his reasons for
exercising peremptory strikes against five of the black jurors . Appellant claims that
those reasons were mere pretext .
' We also note that Appellant has failed to mention that Eldred itself has been
abrogated in part on this issue by Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S .W.3d 554 (Ky.
2003), which held that a more restrictive approach was called for and required receipt of
evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable belief that the records contain exculpatory
evidence before an in camera review of a witness's psychotherapy records will be
authorized .
2 Neither parties' brief discusses the fact that the last five black jurors were struck
as the result of the random draw-off. In fact, both parties claim, incorrectly, that all the
remaining black jurors were removed by the prosecutor's exercise of his peremptory
strikes .
First, the prosecution claimed that Juror 67602 was struck because of her
"vocal" nature and her conviction that the criminal justice system treated blacks unfairly.
Juror 16121 was struck because the prosecutor thought his position as a minister and
his concomitant persuasive speaking ability would allow him to unduly persuade the
other jurors, thus allowing him a large degree of control over deliberations . Juror 26336
was struck because the prosecutor thought he had no desire to serve as a juror, had
said he would be more worried about his job than the case, and had supplied little
information on his jury information form . Juror 63763 was struck because of a past
criminal conviction (he had pled guilty to violation of a no-contact order) . Finally, Juror
49600 was struck because she had been caught sleeping during the lengthy voir dire
and had said nothing in response to voir dire questioning . The trial court held that these
reasons were sufficiently race-neutral . We agree and hold that the prosecutor's use of
peremptory strikes against these jurors was not a Batson violation .
Appellant further urges us to accept the reasoning of Justice Combs's dissent in
Commonwealth v. Snodgrass , 831 S .W .2d 176 (Ky. 1992), and require that any raceneutral reasons offered by the prosecutor be based on responses to questions during
voir dire, that is, answers given under oath . Such a restriction, however, would prevent
prosecutors from taking advantage of information gained through the direct observation
of the demeanor of potential jurors and would force them to be bound by the answers
given by jurors, even though such answers contradict other information known to the
prosecutors . Moreover, the additional questioning and separate evidentiary hearings
that would result from acceptance of Justice Combs's dissent would unnecessarily
burden the trial process and, in effect, further raise the requirements for exercising
peremptory challenges toward the level required for exercising for-cause challenges .
We decline Appellant's invitation to overrule Snodgrass .
Appellant also claims the trial court erred by not inquiring into whether the
prosecutor's proffered race-neutral reasons might also apply to the white jurors who
remained on the jury. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has recently held
that "[i]f a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well
to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to
prove purposeful discrimination . . . ." Miller-El v. Dretke , -_ U.S. __, 125 S .Ct. 2317,
2324 (2005). Appellant, however, has failed to offer any evidence that non-black jurors
who were similarly situated to the stricken black jurors were allowed to serve, and, as
previously noted, we will not burden the trial court with the duty to engage sua sponte in
an unnecessarily lengthy voir dire investigation .
Finally, the fact that almost half of the prospective black jurors were eliminated
during the random draw-off, after both parties had exercised their strikes, further
undermines Appellant's Batson claim . The prosecutor had no hand in striking the final
seven jurors, and thus his behavior was not the sole cause of all the black jurors being
eliminated from the jury pool . And while we recognize that it was extremely unlikely for
all five of the remaining black jurors to be eliminated during the random draw-off in this
case, we must also acknowledge that such a result was not impossible . Notably,
3 In fact, there is only about a 0.1 %, or 1 in 1000, chance of this occurring under
the given facts. In other words, when 5 of 21 jurors are black, it is highly unlikely that in
randomly drawing off 7 of those jurors, all 5 of the black jurors would be eliminated .
Though most readers will not be interested, we include the following discussion of how
we arrived at this number to show that it was not pulled out of thin air.
In general, the probability of an event is determined by dividing the number of
ways the event can occur by the total number of possible outcomes. This can be
represented by the equation
Appellant neither claims nor points to any evidence in the record that the trial court
acted in bad faith or pursuant to an improper motive in randomly striking the jurors .
Although this result was certainly anomalous, we can only conclude that it was due to
random chance . The vagaries of chance do not rise to the level of constitutional error.
Indeed, they do not amount to error at all .
where p(A) is the probability of event A, x is the number of ways the event can occur,
and y is the total number of possible outcomes .
The difficulty in this situation consists of ascertaining the value of x and y. These
numbers can be determined using the concept of "combinations" from combinatorial
mathematics. A "combination" calculates the number of different ways there are of
choosing k objects out of a larger group of n objects, where the order of choosing the
objects does not matter. This number is the binomial coefficient "n choose k," which
can be represented as
~k)
The mathematical formula for calculating "n choose W is:
(n) _
n!
k
k!.(n - k
Using these concepts, we can calculate the probability that the trial court would
strike all of the remaining black jurors when it randomly removed 7 jurors from the panel
("event A" discussed above). Simply stated, this probability can be determined by
dividing the number of ways in which all 5 black jurors are eliminated by a 7 juror-draw
by the total number of ways in which 7 jurors are eliminated from the 21 person pool .
The total number of ways to draw 7 jurors out of 21 is simply "21 choose 7." This
number is going to be the denominator, y, in our probability calculation . Determining the
numerator, x, is somewhat more complicated . It is necessary to recognize that in this
situation, calculating the combination for drawing off exactly five black jurors is the same
thing as calculating how many ways to draw off exactly two non-black jurors . This is
because drawing exactly two non-black jurors when drawing 7 total jurors means that
the other 5 must all be black jurors . The number of ways of drawing exactly 2 non-black
jurors out of the 16 non-black jurors that are in the jury pool is "16 choose 2 ."
Applying these numbers to our probability formula, we reach the following result :
(16)
16!
2!-(l 6 - 2)) _
21!
7 )
~
~ 7!-(21- 7) )
120
116 280
000103199174
Rounding to one significant digit, this yields a probability of 0 .001, or 0 .1 percent.
In terms of odds, the likelihood of this result is approximately 1 in 1000 .
-1 2-
E. Directed Verdict
Appellant contends the trial court improperly denied his motion for a directed
verdict . "On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as
a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then is the
defendant entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal ." Commonwealth v. Benham, 816
S .W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) . We look at all of the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, Stopher v. Commonwealth , 57 S .W .3d 787, 802 (Ky . 2001), and we
leave all questions as to credibility to the jury. Benham, 816 S .W.2d at 187.
Appellant claims he was convicted solely on the testimony of Robertson, who he
describes as a "mentally-compromised, crack-addicted, lying thief ." He points to the
fact that Robertson signed an affidavit in 1999 stating that Appellant was not involved in
the robberies, and claims Robertson appeared to have been coached in his testimony .
Despite this, we still cannot say that the trial court erred by failing to grant a directed
verdict. First, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty based solely upon the
testimony of Robertson . The decision as to Robertson's credibility, specifically whether
he lied on the stand in light of his prior affidavit, was solely within the province of the
jury.
Additionally, Appellant's assertion that Robertson's testimony was the only
evidence offered against him is simply incorrect. In fact, there were numerous other
witnesses to these events . James Owen testified that he observed Robertson "casing"
a local Dairy Mart while being driven by another person in a blue Mercury Grand
Marquis with a partial license plate number 329-AL . A car matching this description was
found outside Appellant's home, and Appellant was later arrested when he was
approaching the car. Detective Ray Patterson testified that when he searched the car,
-1 3-
he found what appeared to be a black, semi-automatic weapon, which was later
identified as a BB gun that had been used in several of the robberies . Rochelle
Duncan, who was accosted by Robertson in a Winn-Dixie parking lot where he
attempted to rob her, said that she saw Robertson get into the same blue Mercury
Grand Marquis that was in front of Appellant's home and that another person was in the
car. Correlle Marshall, Rose Fortney, Troy Vincent, and Natalie Robertson, who were
victims of the robberies, further corroborated Robertson's testimony in many respects .
Though Robertson was the only person who confirmed Appellant's role in the
robberies as the getaway driver, this testimony was not so implausible as to have
required a directed verdict. Indeed, the testimony of the other witnesses, particularly
the police officers who conducted surveillance at Appellant's home and observed the
getaway car, provided another strong connection between Appellant and the crimes .
Thus, the trial court properly denied the directed verdict motion.
F. Speedy Trial
Appellant raises the dual claim that his rights under KRS 500 .110 and his right to
a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment were violated . Given the confusing and
lengthy course of events between Appellant's indictment and his trial, including eight
trial continuances, it is necessary to discuss briefly the timeline of the motions and other
events leading up to trial before engaging in a discussion of the legal issues presented.
Appellant was indicted on August 31, 1999 . When he was arraigned, his case
was set for trial on February 22, 2000, and he was assigned a public defender.
Appellant's court appearance on February 22, 2000 was treated simply as a pretrial
hearing because discovery was not complete ; the trial court continued the trial to August
15, 2000 . Appellant and his attorney were present when the continuance was granted .
-1 4-
On April 17, 2000, a new attorney, on contract with the public defender's office, was
assigned to Appellant's case because his prior attorney had left the public defender's
office for private practice. On August 15, 2000, Robertson, Appellant's codefendant,
pled guilty, and Appellant's trial was continued until March 13, 2001 .
On the March 13, 2001 trial date, Appellant's attorney requested a continuance .
The trial court offered dates in May 2001 and October 2001, and Appellant's attorney
opted for the October date . In 2001, Appellant's contract public defender moved to
withdraw from the case; the motion was granted . Appellant was assigned a new public
defender, and the trial court rescheduled Appellant's trial for February 26, 2002. In
December 2001, Appellant's attorney moved that the trial be continued again because
he was to be out of the country on February 26, 2002 . The motion was granted and the
trial was rescheduled for June 18, 2002 .
On February 27, 2002, Appellant filed a pro se motion to dismiss the indictment
against him for the failure to grant him a speedy trial. On May 20, 2002, Appellant
mailed a Notice of Submission-of Case for Final Adjudication with regard to his motion
to dismiss the indictment. On June 5, 2002, the trial court notified Appellant's attorney
that the trial would have to be continued again because of a scheduling mistake by the
court . That same day, Appellant's attorney moved the trial court to rule on all previously
filed motions, including Appellant's pro se motion . On July 12, 2002, Appellant filed a
pro se petition for mandamus against the trial court with the Court of Appeals. The
petition asked for a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to "review the facts and
circumstances of the facts in th[is] . . . case, and to determine . . . whether [Appellant] has
been denied his Sixth Amendment Right to a Fast and Speedy Trial ."
The trial court finally ruled on Appellant's pro se motion on July 29, 2002 . In
doing so, the trial court engaged in the four part analysis required under Barker v.
Win-go, 407 U.S 514, 530, 92 S .Ct. 2182, 2192 (1972), noting : (1) that the then 34
month delay was presumptively prejudicial ; (2) that the delay had been caused by
Appellant's attorney, the prosecutor, and the court, though most of the delay was due to
Appellant's attorney ; (3) that Appellant effectively asserted his speedy trial right by filing
his pro se motion on February 27, 2002; and (4) that Appellant had presented no
evidence of prejudice given that his parole related to earlier robbery convictions had
been revoked and he was serving a twenty year sentence . The trial court then found
that while the delay seemed excessive, there had been no violation of Appellant's
speedy trial rights in light of the Barker factors. As a result of this ruling, the Court of
Appeals later dismissed Appellant's petition for writ of mandamus as moot . Appellant's
trial was also rescheduled for January 21, 2003 by order entered July 29, 2002 .
On November 19, 2002, Appellant sent his attorney a profanity-laden letter
accusing him of ineffective assistance -of counsel and asking that he investigate and
pursue the case more vigorously. On January 2, 2003, Appellant moved to have his
public defender removed and to be assigned a new attorney. On March 3, 2003,
Appellant's public defender also asked to be removed from the case due to a pending
bar complaint filed by Appellant and irreconcilable differences between himself and
Appellant . Appellant's attorney's motion to withdraw was granted on June 11, 2003,
and new counsel was appointed on July 8, 2003.
A petition for a writ of prohibition against the trial court, dated January 9, 2003,
also appears in the record . The petition was based on the claim that the trial court was
proceeding without jurisdiction, having failed to hold Appellant's trial within 180 days of
-1 6-
his February 26, 2002 motion to dismiss for failure to grant a speedy trial. In his
petition, Appellant alleged that his February 26, 2002 motion was a request pursuant to
KRS 500.110, which contains the 180 day trial requirement that is part of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers . The petition was filed under the same Court of Appeals case
number as the prior petition for mandamus, and it is unclear whether the petition was
actually filed with the Court of Appeals (no ruling on the petition appears in the record
and the Court of Appeals' case information website does not indicate that this second
petition was ever filed).
The trial court ordered another continuance at a January 14, 2003 pretrial
hearing . In continuing the trial that was to be held the next week, the trial court noted
that Appellant had recently moved to fire his attorney and that his petition for a writ of
prohibition was pending before the Court of Appeals . Appellant's trial was continued to
September 23, 2003. When the parties appeared on that date, a short continuance was
granted by agreement of the parties to allow for final trial preparation . Appellant was
finally tried on December 16, 2003.
1 . KRS 500.110
The statute that Appellant now claims he invoked provides :
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of
imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of this
state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of
imprisonment there is pending in any jurisdiction of this state
any untried indictment . . . on the basis of which a detainer
has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to
trial within one hundred and eighty (180) days after he shall
have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and
the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction
written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his
request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment
. . . ; provided that for good cause shown in open court, the
prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having
-1 7-
jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or
reasonable continuance .
KRS 500.110 (emphasis added). Failure to meet the statute's 180 day limitation can
strip the circuit court of jurisdiction to try a criminal defendant. Spivey v. Jackson , 602
S .W .2d 158 (Ky. 1980) .
However, a defendant can only claim the statute's protection after three things
have occurred : (1) a detainer has been filed ; (2) the defendant requests final disposition
of the pending indictment; and (3) the defendant puts the prosecutor and trial court on
notice of his place of imprisonment and his request for final disposition of his indictment .
Id . ; see also Donahoo v. Dortch , 128 S .W.3d 491 (Ky. 2004) (focusing on the detainer
and notice requirements and noting that defendant has the burden of showing service of
the notice on the prosecutor) . Though there is no direct evidence of a detainer having
been filed in this case, several reports from the prison where Appellant was
incarcerated indicate that a detainer had indeed been filed, thus likely satisfying the first
element of the statute .
Despite Appellant's plea for application of the rule of leniency, however, we
simply cannot rule that Appellant actually requested final disposition of his indictment in
the February 2002 motion. Appellant claims his discussion of the statute in the motion
is enough to satisfy this requirement, but his only reference to KRS 500 .110 is: "As
such, this Defendant asserts that the requirements of KRS 500 .110 that his right to a
Fast and Speedy Trial will be afforded within 180 days once such a request is made, is
inapplicable ." This language comes in Appellant's discussion of the Barker v. Wingo
factor that looks into whether the defendant has asserted his speedy trial right.
Appellant discussed the statute only because he thought that its requirement that "final
-1 8-
disposition" be affirmatively invoked also applied to the more general Sixth Amendment
speedy trial right.
Ultimately, however, the pro se motion asked only that the case be dismissed
due to violation of Appellant's Sixth Amendment requirement of a speedy trial .
Appellant never prospectively asked for final disposition of his indictment . Failure to put
the prosecutor and the trial court on notice alone is grounds for denying relief under the
statute . Donahoo , 128 S .W.3d at 495 . Consequently, failure even to request final
disposition must also be grounds for denying relief under the statute.
2. Sixth Amendment
Given the nature of Appellant's pro se motion to the trial court, and the way the
issue is treated in Appellant's brief (namely as part of an extended discussion of Barker
v. Wingo ), his claim is analyzed more appropriately as a Sixth Amendment violation,
rather than a statutory violation . As the trial court correctly noted, the Sixth Amendment
speedy trial right is analyzed under a balancing test involving four factors : 1) the length
of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a
speedy trial; and 4) the resulting prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo , 407 U .S.
514, 530, 92 S .Ct. 2182, 2192 (1972).
The trial court was correct in its memorandum opinion denying Appellant's pro se
motion to dismiss in that the length of the delay, then 34 months, was presumptively
prejudicial . See Gabow v. Commonwealth , 34 S .W.3d 63, 70 (Ky. 2000) (finding 34
month delay to be presumptively prejudicial) ; McDonald v. Commonwealth , 569 S.W.2d
134 (Ky. 1978) (three year delay) . There is little question then that the ultimate delay
between indictment and trial in this case, over four years, was presumptively prejudicial,
thus requiring that we extend our inquiry to the other factors .
-1 9-
The trial court concluded that the delay, at least after 34 months, was due in
large part to Appellant . During this period, Appellant changed counsel two times, and
one of his attorneys made at least one of the motions to postpone the trial date . After
the trial court ruled on the pro se motion, Appellant filed a bar complaint against his
attorney and asked that his attorney be fired . This led to the appointment of his fourth
attorney and, of course, further delay. Though we cannot quantify exactly how much of
the delay was due to Appellant's difficulties with his many lawyers, it is clear that a
significant portion of the delay was due to these conflicts . Only two of the
continuances-when the codefendant pled guilty and when the trial court made a
scheduling mistake-were caused solely by the trial court or the prosecutor . The other
continuances were related to a change in Appellant's representation, the result of a
motion by Appellant, or the product of an agreement to continue the case. We can only
conclude that Appellant was responsible in large part for the delay.
Though the question of assertion of the right is not dispositive, it is a factor to be
considered . Appellant never asserted his speedy trial right. Despite -the trial court's
conclusion otherwise, the February 2002 pro se motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy
trial cannot be considered a motion for a speedy trial. See McDonald v.
Commonwealth , 569 S.W.2d 134,137 (Ky. 1978) ("We cannot say that a motion to
dismiss for lack of a speedy trial is the same as a motion for a speedy trial in that it
unequivocally puts the trial court on notice that the defendant demands a speedy trial.
The motion to dismiss presents an issue which must be decided by the trial court based
on the delay prior to the motion . Here the trial court was never put on notice that
McDonald demanded or wanted a speedy trial ."). Additionally, Appellant was present
most of the times when the trial court continued his trial date, yet the record fails to
-20-
indicate that he ever objected, even after he filed his motion to dismiss . "If a defendant
acquiesces in a delay, he cannot be heard to complain about the delay." Gabow, 34
S.W .3d at 70 ; see also Wells v. Commonwealth , 892 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Ky. 1995) ;
Preston v. Commonwealth , 898 SW.2d 504, 506 (Ky.App . 1995) .
Finally, Appellant fails to show any prejudice . Prejudice to the defendant
should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants
which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This
Court has identified three such interests : (i) to prevent
oppressive pretrial incarceration ; (ii) to minimize anxiety and
concern of the accused ; and (iii) to limit the possibility that
the defense will be impaired . Of these, the most serious is
the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system .
Barker, 407 U .S . at 532, 92 S .Ct. at 2193 (footnote omitted) .
Appellant was already serving a twenty-year sentence while awaiting trial (and,
as noted above, failed to invoke any statutory protection he might have had in this
respect) . Thus, there was little impact on the first two interests identified in Barker.
Appellant argues that he was prejudiced by the fact that his parole was revoked
because of the indictment and his parole hearings were deferred twice because of the
outstanding indictment during the four years he was waiting for trial. But this has little to
do with the interests identified in Barker (and much more to do with the interests KRS
500.110 was designed to protect), especially since Appellant offers no proof that he
would have been granted parole had the indictment in this case been resolved . As for
the last interest to consider under the prejudice prong, Appellant does not even claim,
much less show, impairment of his defense .
The length of the delay in this case clearly weighs in favor of Appellant . While
the reason for the delay factor does not weigh completely against Appellant, since at
least some of the delay was caused by the prosecutor or the trial court, most of the
-21-
delay is attributable to him or his attorney . Appellant's failure to request a speedy trial
and failure to establish any prejudice further undercuts his claim of a Sixth Amendment
violation . Balancing these factors, we conclude that Appellant was not denied his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial .
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Appellant's conviction .
All concur. Lambert, C.J ., also concurs by separate opinion in which Graves and
Scott, J.J ., join.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Linda Roberts Horsman
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane - Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
RENDERED : DECEMBER 22, 2005
AS MODIFIED : JANUARY 26, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,Suprrme (9ourf of `rxtf~xx~tg
2004-SC-0364-MR
DARRYL BATTS
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HON. BARRY WILLETT, JUDGE
NO. 99-CR-02134
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
CONCURRING OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LAMBERT
The initial venire in Batts' trial consisted of forty potential jurors, at least
eleven of whom were African-American . Initially, the trial court dismissed one AfricanAmerican juror because she indicated that it would be a hardship for her to find child
care during the trial . At this time, a Caucasian male was also dismissed because the
trial court believed he was trying to inflame the jury with his comments during the court's
voir dire . Another potential juror whose race is unknown was dismissed for reasons
unclear from the record.
After the attorneys conducted voir dire, the Commonwealth challenged
one juror, an African-American female, for cause . The trial court denied the challenge .
Accordingly ; thirty-seven potential jurors remained when the attorneys exercised their
peremptory strikes . Each side was allowed nine peremptory strikes. Defense counsel
exercised all nine strikes and the Commonwealth used eight of its strikes . Five of the
Commonwealth's eight strikes were exercised against African-Americans. It is not clear
from the record how many, if any, of defense counsel's nine strikes were exercised
against African-Americans .
Both counsel made their peremptory strikes
simultaneously and, ultimately, one juror was stricken by both defense counsel and the
Commonwealth . Thus, twenty-one potential jurors remained after peremptory strikes
were announced . Of the twenty-one remaining jurors, five were African-American . The
trial court then randomly struck seven of the twenty-one to seat twelve jurors and two
alternates . Of the seven who were randomly stricken, five were African-American .
Thus, the five African-Americans who remained in the jury pool after the exercise of
peremptory strikes were all removed by the trial court's random draw-down, leaving no
African-Americans on the jury.
Defense counsel made a Batson challenge and the trial court required the
Commonwealth to state the reasons for each of its five peremptory strikes against
African-American jurors. One was used against the juror the Commonwealth had
sought to strike for cause . During voir dire, this juror revealed that she had had a
cousin wrongfully convicted of a rape, who, ultimately, had been found innocent after
serving ten of his twenty-year sentence . One strike was used against a minister. The
Commonwealth stated that this juror had great speaking skills and from his comments
during voir dire, the Commonwealth feared that he would potentially influence jurors
based on social and philosophical ideals rather than the evidence . The Commonwealth
struck another juror because he stated that he needed to work during the day, he did
not want to serve and he did not fill out the requested information on his juror form .
When defense counsel stated that he would be interested to know whether the
Commonwealth struck a Caucasian juror who had said that missing work would cause
him a hardship, the trial court checked the Commonwealth's strikes and it had, in fact,
struck this juror as well . Another African-American juror was struck by the
Commonwealth because she did not respond to any of the attorneys' questions and the
Commonwealth said she was sleeping during voir dire. And, finally, the Commonwealth
struck a black juror because he had previously pled guilty to a no-contact order. The
trial court found that each of these reasons was an acceptable race-neutral reason.
As the facts heretofore set forth demonstrate, I have painstakingly
reviewed the record in an effort to determine whether a Batson violation occurred .
Based on my understanding of Batson and Miller-El v. Dretke', I am unable to say that
there was such an error. Nevertheless, one must wonder how an all white jury could
have been seated in this case when the forty juror venire started with at least eleven
African-American jurors . Factually, of course, one African-American juror was excused
on a plea of hardship and she, along with two other jurors who were also excused,
brought the panel number to thirty-seven . Thereafter, the prosecution used five of its
nine allotted peremptory challenges to remove African-Americans, but the trial court
believed the reasons given were race-neutral . Finally, the five remaining AfricanAmerican jurors were excused when a random draw to eliminate seven of twenty-one
jurors included the remaining five African-American jurors.
Despite the absence of articulable legal error justifying relief on appeal, it
astounds me that there could not have been at least one or two African-American jurors
among the final fourteen when in fact there were eleven or more among the forty who
began.
2005 WL 1383365, - U .S . - (Ky. 2005).
I reluctantly conclude, therefore, that this Court's rule2 whereby the
number of peremptory challenges is established is too generous and should be reduced
significantly. I have always believed that counsel and parties should have some ability
to eliminate jurors who possess unrevealed personal animus, but allowing a sufficient
number of peremptory challenges to permit elimination of all or most members of a
racial minority is too many.
The 1999 Hearst Survey for the National Center of State Courts found
that "fifty-six percent of respondents agree that "Most juries are not representative of
the community .,'3 Moreover, the Hearst Survey reveals a wide gap in the relative trust
or distrust of judicial institutions between white and African-American citizens.4 AfricanAmerican citizens have a significantly higher level of distrust of the courts than do white
citizens .5 "Almost 70% of African-American respondents think that African-Americans,
as a group get `Somewhat Worse' or `Far Worse' treatment from the courts . ,,6 The
absence of black jurors in cases involving black defendants exacerbates this level of
distrust, and judicial policy-makers should endeavor to correct the problem . I fear,
however, that so long as litigants are awarded substantial numbers of peremptory
challenges, they will use those challenges in a racially stereotypical manner. In most
cases, observance of racial stereotypes is without a racial animus component, but will
merely reflect observance of conventional perceptions of behavior based on race .
When called upon to give race-neutral reasons for the use of peremptory challenges,
2 RCr 9.40 .
3Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, How the Public Views the State Courts: A 1999 Survey
1999), p.7, available at http ://www .ncsc.dni.us/ptc/results/resuIts .pdf.
Id .
5 Id
.
6Id. at 8 .
even minimally adept counsel will be able to state a reason that a trial judge cannot find
to be pretextual .
For the foregoing reasons, I must concur.
Graves and Scott, JJ., join this concurring opinion .
'Suprtutt avurf of '~firufurhv
2004-SC-0364-MR
APPELLANT
DARRYL BATTS
V.
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HON . BARRY WILLETT, JUDGE
NO . 99-CR-02134
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
ORDER OF CORRECTION
The Opinion of the Court entered December 22, 2005, is hereby corrected
on its face by substitution of the attached page 1 of the majority opinion and page 1 of
Chief Justice Lambert's Concurring Opinion in lieu of the original first pages of the
opinions . The purpose of this Order of Correction is to correct an error on the
Concurring Opinion as to publication and does not affect the holding of the Opinion .
ENTERED : January 26, 2006 .
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.