DENNIS J. ISAACS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NO T TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVI_L PR OCED URE PR OfUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : JUNE 16, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,s ixuxme (91TUrf Of
2004-SC-000106-MR
DENNIS J. ISAACS
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN P. RYAN, JUDGE
03-CR-001549
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Dennis Isaacs, was convicted of Wanton Murder, First-Degree
Robbery, and Tampering with Physical Evidence . He was also determined to be a FirstDegree Persistent Felony Offender and received a total sentence of life imprisonment.
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the Wanton Murder
charge, and therefore, the trial court should have granted his motion for directed verdict
on that charge. Because the jury's decision to convict Appellant of Wanton Murder was
not clearly unreasonable, we hold that the trial court properly denied Appellant's motion
for a directed verdict . Accordingly, we affirm Appellant's convictions .
II. BACKGROUND
Appellant and his girlfriend, Ann Hill, visited JT's Brookline Inn around midnight
on May 23, 2003. While at the bar, Hershell Engle, an eighty-year old patron of the bar,
approached Appellant and Hill and introduced himself, and the three talked for some
time . Appellant and Hill eventually decided to leave and asked Engle if he would like to
accompany them. Engle agreed, and the three left the bar together. According to Hill,
she and Appellant intended to walk Engle to his home .
When the three reached Bellevue Avenue, Engle mentioned hailing a cab. Then,
according to Hill, Appellant struck Engle, causing him to fall to the ground . Engle's fall
was particularly violent and loud . In fact, Eric Sherzer, who lived across the street from
where the body was found, testified that he heard a brief argument followed by a "loud,
dull thud" in front of his house. After knocking Engle to the street, Appellant began
rummaging through Engle's pockets . Finding Engle's wallet, Appellant removed the
contents and threw the wallet to Hill, ordering her to get rid of it. Finally, Appellant
dragged Engle across the street by the seat of his pants so that his face was scraped by
the pavement and left him in front of a parked car. Appellant and Hill then left the
scene .
Later that morning, at around 5:00 a .m., Robert Hatfield, a local resident just
returning from work, noticed Engle's body next to the curb. Police were summoned to
the scene, and an investigation was conducted . Initially, it was unclear whether Engle's
death should be treated as a homicide . According to the assistant chief medical
examiner, Dr. Barbara Weakley-Jones, Engle died as the result of cranial trauma from
being struck below his chin . Also, Engle suffered a fractured skull, likely caused by the
back of his head hitting the street. Furthermore, Dr. Weakley-Jones opined that Engle's
injuries were not consistent with a normal fall, but rather suggested that he had either
been pushed or hit, lending additional weight to the homicide suspicion . Ultimately, Dr.
Weakley-Jones concluded that Engle died as the result of closed head injuries
consistent with an assault and a resultant fall to the ground, though the actual
mechanism of death was asphyxiation .
Appellant was indicted on June 16, 2003, and was charged with Murder, FirstDegree Robbery, Tampering with Physical Evidence, and with being a First-Degree
Persistent Felony Offender ("PFO") . The jury convicted Appellant of Wanton Murder,
First-Degree Robbery, and Tampering with Physical Evidence and determined that he
was a First-Degree PFO. The jury recommended enhanced sentences of life for both
the Wanton Murder and the First-Degree Robbery convictions and an enhanced
sentence of 20 years for the Tampering with Physical Evidence conviction . The trial
court sentenced Appellant to a total sentence of life imprisonment . Appellant appeals to
this court as a matter of right.
111. ANALYSIS
Appellant's sole claim of error on appeal is that the trial court improperly denied
his motion for directed verdict on the Wanton Murder charge. He contends that the
evidence was insufficient evidence to support a jury's conviction on this charge . We
disagree and affirm Appellant's conviction .
"On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if, under the evidence as a
whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then [is] the
defendant . . . entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal . ,,2 Furthermore, we have stated
that "in ruling on a directed verdict motion, the trial court must draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth and assume that the
Commonwealth's evidence is true, leaving questions of weight and credibility to the
KY . CONST. § 110(2)(b).
2 Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S .W .2d 186,187 (Ky. 1991) .
-3-
jury. "3 Thus, we will only reverse a judge's decision not to grant a motion for directed
verdict when a guilty verdict would be "clearly unreasonable ."
Appellant claims that the jury acted unreasonably in convicting him of Wanton
Murder. According to Appellant, the evidence in this case would, at most, support a
conviction for First-Degree Manslaughter, which--under one alternative-requires proof
of intent to inflict serious physical injury . Conviction of Wanton Murder, however,
requires proof of an "extreme indifference to human life," which Appellant contends is
missing in this case .5 Although Appellant correctly notes a difference Between FirstDegree Manslaughter and Wanton Murder, we disagree with his assertion that the
circumstances of this case render his conviction for the latter crime unreasonable. In
McGinnis v. Commonwealth , we said, "wanton killing must exhibit `purposeful or
knowing' indifference, `conduct evidencing a "depraved heart" with no regard for human
life ."'' And Brown v. Commonwealth ,$ upon which Appellant relies, provides support for
the jury's decision in this case . In Brown , we identified certain characteristics common
to wanton murder cases, such as "`(i) homicidal risk that is exceptionally high ; (ii)
circumstances known to the actor that clearly show awareness of the magnitude of the
3 Slaughter v. Commonwealth , 45 S.W .3d 873, 875 (Ky.App . 2000); see also
Nichols v. Commonwealth , 657 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Ky. 1983) .
4 KRS 507 .030(1)(a) ("A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when :
(a) with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he caused the death of
such person or of a third person .").
5 KRS 507.020(1)(b) ("A person is guilty of murder when : . . . (b) including, but
not limited to, the operation of a motor vehicle under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to human life, he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a
grave risk of death to another person and thereby causes the death of another
person .") .
6 875 S.W.2d 518 (Ky. 1994) .
Id . at 520 (quoting KRS 507 .020, Commentary) .
8 975 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. 1998) .
risk; and (iii) minimal or non-existent social utility in the conduct ."'9 Although these
factors are by no means an exhaustive list of the elements a jury will consider in any
individual case, they do provide guidance when trying to determine whether the
defendant manifested an "extreme indifference to human life."
In this case, Appellant, who was 5' 11" and weighed 230 pounds, punched the
80-year old victim, who was 5' 10" and weighed only 146 pounds, and knocked him to
the ground with such force that, according to a witness in a nearby building, an audible
"thud" was produced. Then, after immobilizing the victim, Appellant rifled through the
victim's pockets, apparently oblivious to the victim's condition. Finally, upon finding the
victim's wallet and taking cash from it, Appellant dragged the victim across the street,
face down, leaving him in front of a parked car. As Appellant left the scene, he
admonished his girlfriend, Hill, not to talk about the incident to anyone, and, if
questioned, Hill was told to say that the victim was last seen walking away from Hill and
Appellant . Again, there is no evidence that Appellant took any heed to the victim's
condition and the possibility, if not the likelihood, that he could be seriously injured . In
fact, the evidence is to the contrary. Appellant showed no concern for the value of his
victim's life . 1o
Based upon these facts, which were not disputed at trial, when considered in
light of the Brown factors, we conclude that it was not unreasonable for the jury to find
that Appellant had acted with extreme indifference to human life, thus warranting a
conviction for wanton murder . First, as to the risk of homicide, the sheer disparity in
9 _Id . at 924 (quoting
322 (1998)).
1°
LAWSON AND FORTUNE, KENTUCKY CRIMINAL LAW
§ 8-c(2), at
Johnson v. Commonwealth , 885 S .W.2d 951, 952 (Ky. 1994) ("This Court has
held that a conviction of wanton murder is reserved exclusively for offenders who
manifest virtually no concern for the value of human life .").
size and age between Appellant and the victim lead inescapably to the conclusion that
there was a high risk of death resulting from Appellant's conduct. Appellant, a fortyseven year old man who outweighed the victim by eighty-four pounds, attacked the
victim, an eighty-year old man, knocking him to the concrete with tremendous force .
Given these facts, the risk of death was exceptionally high . Second, the evidence
indicates that Appellant was aware of the risk. Appellant's admonition to Hill not to tell
anyone about the incident indicates knowledge of the seriousness of the situation, i .e .,
the victim was seriously injured . Also, the fact that the attack occurred in the middle of
a street early in the morning, a time when any aid was highly unlikely, reveals that
Appellant was aware of the magnitude of the risk. Third, it is beyond dispute that
Appellant's behavior in this case had no social utility .
Finally, we note that the determination as to whether a defendant's conduct
manifests extreme indifference to human life, though often unclear, is best left to the
jury." So, unless there is no credible evidence to support a jury's finding of extreme
indifference to human life, the trial court should not grant a motion for directed verdict on
the issue of wanton murder. In this case, the jury's decision to find Appellant guilty of
wanton murder was reasonable, and we affirm the conviction .
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the evidence, it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to find that
Appellant acted wantonly in causing the victim's death "under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to human life." We, therefore, find no error in the trial
1 ' Brown, 975 S .W.2d at 924 (quoting KRS 507.020, Commentary) ("`Whether
recklessness is so extreme that it demonstrates similar indifference is not a question
that, in our view, can be further clarified ; it must be left directly to the trier of facts ."') .
court's decision to deny Appellant's motion for a directed verdict, and we affirm
Appellant's convictions, including his conviction for Wanton Murder.
Lambert, C.J . ; Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Scott and Wintersheimer, JJ., concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
J . David Niehaus
Deputy Appellate Defender
Office of the Louisville Metro Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Samuel J . Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
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