MPOR 'ANT NOTICE J THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CI VIL PR OCED URE PR OMUL GA TED B Y THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYIN ANY OTHER
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MPOR 'ANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CI VIL PR OCED URE PROMUL GA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYIN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERD : FEBRUARY 17, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2003-SC-0869-MR
Q
THOMAS TALLEY III
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M . SHAKE, JUDGE
02-CR-1445
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Thomas Talley III, was convicted in Jefferson Circuit Court of reckless
homicide, tampering with physical evidence and being a persistent felony offender in the
first degree . He received concurrent sentences totaling twenty years . Appellant argues
that the trial court committed reversible error in five instances and appeals to this Court
as a matter of right.
The central dispute between Appellant and the victim, Tony Gore, concerns a
woman, Monique Moore. For seven years, Appellant and Moore had a relationship,
during which time, Moore also had a relationship with Gore. As a result, hostility
developed among all three, which culminated in the June 22, 2002, shooting death of
Gore . Appellant claims that he acted in self-defense . Additional facts will be presented
in addressing each of Appellant's arguments .
I.
Appellant's first claim of error is a violation of his Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation by admitting a 911 audiotape recording into evidence . Appellant also
claims the recording contains inadmissible hearsay.
Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted . KRE 801(c) . Hearsay is not admissible unless it meets one of our well
established exceptions . Wells v. Commonwealth , 892 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Ky . 1995).
These exceptions grew from ancient common law, supported by the theory that the
character and context of such statement adds sufficient reliability to permit admission .
Id . Appellant argues that declarations from an anonymous caller to 911 dispatch stating
that a shooting had just occurred, describing the shooter, and his flight from the scene
are unreliable hearsay statements and not within any exception . We disagree .
The present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule, KRE 803(1),
defines the exception as, "a statement describing or explaining an event or condition
made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately
thereafter ." Bray v. Commonwealth , 68 S .W.3d 375 (Ky. 2002) (satisfying the exception
when a statement describes or explains the event prompting the call, the declarant had
personal knowledge of the event, and the statement is substantially contemporaneous
with the event it described). This rule allows a slight lapse in time between the
perceived event and hearsay statement. Jarvis v. Commonwealth , 960 S.W.2d 466,
470 (Ky . 1998). Under this exception, the availability of the declarant to testify is
irrelevant . KRE 803. Here, the trial court held that the audiotape recording qualified as
a present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. Upon examination of the
recording itself, we also conclude that the call qualifies :
Operator : Louisville Police, EMT .
Caller: Yes, Ma'am . I'm over here at St. Catherine . . .
Operator : Uh, huh.
Caller: . . . and Preston . A guy has just been shot and the guy is in a car, in
a, green truck riding off. He's got a girl with him . The guy is laying on the
sidewalk .
Operator : So, the one on the sidewalk has just been shot? What's the
address?
Caller: Uh, I don't know (inaudible)
Operator : Is it in front of your house?
Caller: Uh, Yeah . . .
Operator : What's your address?
Caller: It's the apartments across the street. Smoketown Apartments I
think is what it's called .
Operator : Okay. Is it, 300 Block of East St. Catherine?
Caller: Yes.
Operator : Okay and give me . . .
Caller: The guy just left in a green, oh, it's kind of like a Bronco, but it ain't,
it's a little bit longer .
Operator : Okay. Black male? White male?
Caller: And he's got a girl hostage with him .
Operator : Okay. Black male? White male?
Caller: It's a black male, he's about probably 6'5" or 7'. He's got a black tshirt on and a pair of, uh, blue jean shorts, I think . The guy's laying over
there, I think he's dead.
Operator: Okay, well. Do you know which direction?
Caller: Yeah . He's headed down towards, uh, oh, headed towards First
and all that street.
Operator : (Inaudible) .
Caller: He had that gun to her head and made her get into the truck with
him .
Operator : Okay . I got someone on the way over there .
Caller: All right . Thanks .
Operator : Uh, huh . Bye .
The standard of review for admissibility of evidence is abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v . English , 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) . The test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial judge's ruling was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles . Id. We conclude that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion .
However, Appellant points to the recent United States Supreme Court case of
Crawford v. Washington , 541 U .S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L .Ed .2d 177 (2004), and
contends that this evidence violates his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation . U .S .
CONST.
amend . VI . In Crawford , the Supreme Court held that the admission of a wife's
out-of-court statements to police officers, regarding an incident in which the defendant,
her husband, allegedly stabbed the victim, violated the Confrontation Clause . Crawford ,
supra . The Supreme Court abrogated its previous holding in Ohio v. Roberts , 448 U .S.
56, 100 S . Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), by holding that a witness's testimonial outof-court statement is barred under the Confrontation Clause, unless the witness is
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness,
regardless of whether such statement is deemed reliable by the trial court. Id . at 1364 .
4
The United States Supreme Court applied a stricter standard only to the admission of
testimonial hearsay. Concerning nontestimonial hearsay, the Supreme Court noted :
"Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers'
design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law--as does
Roberts , and as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation
Clause scrutiny altogether." Id. at 1374 . The text of the Confrontation Clause applies to
"witnesses" against the accused--in other words, those who "bear testimony." Id . at
1364. "Testimony," in turn, is typically, "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact."
Id . The Supreme Court also gave
examples of the type of statements that are testimonial and with which the Sixth
Amendment is concerned--namely, "prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a
grand jury, or at a former trial ; and . . . police interrogations ." Id . at 1374 .
We are persuaded that a 911 audiotape recording, admissible under KRE 803(1),
is not prohibited by Crawford because it is not a testimonial statement . A 911 call does
not implicate the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed . Leavitt
v . Arave , 383 F.3d 809, 830 n .22 (9th Cir. 2004) ; State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22 (N .C .
App . 2004) . Appellant's argument that government officers were involved in its
production is misplaced and does not comport with the reasoning of Crawford .
Although the Confrontation Clause is not coterminous with the common law hearsay
rule, they both "stem from the same roots" and are "designed to protect similar values."
Ohio, supra . Thus, a finding that a statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception means that it contains sufficient reliability to satisfy the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause . Haggins v . Warden, Fort Pillow State Farm , 715 F.2d 1050,
1056 (6th Cir.1983) .
II .
Appellant's second claim of error is violation of his Constitutional right to counsel
by admitting incriminating statements made to another inmate. Appellant argues that
Larry Thomas was acting as an undisclosed government agent when Appellant made
statements to him pertaining to the instant case. Upon Appellant's motion, the trial court
conducted a suppression hearing prior to the beginning of trial on July 21, 2003 .
Testimony from inmate Larry Thomas, Detective Gary Huffman, and Assistant
Commonwealth's Attorney Shane Young revealed that Thomas was serving a 13-year
federal prison sentence. He was brought to Louisville Metro Corrections in July, 2002,
to testify in an unrelated state drug case . While at Louisville Metro Corrections, he was
housed in the same dormitory with Appellant . Thomas stated that he and Appellant
conversed on four separate occasions and that three conversations pertained to the
shooting of Tony Gore. The first conversation was in the "day room" and lasted about
an hour. Appellant discussed the shooting and the fact that Monique Moore had played
him and Gore against each other. On July 26, 2002, Assistant Commonwealth's
Attorney Shane Young visited Thomas at the jail to discuss his upcoming testimony in
the unrelated state drug case . During this visit, Thomas told Young that he had
obtained information concerning a murder and kidnapping from another inmate .
Thomas confirmed that he only told Young that he had information, but did not disclose
the information . Young stated that he would have the proper authorities contact
Thomas . Though Thomas was subsequently moved out of Appellant's dorm, he
remained on the same floor.
The second and third conversations were in passing : once when leaving the
visitation area and the other when Appellant walked by Thomas' cell . Appellant claimed
that Moore's brother had assured him that Moore would not testify against him.
Detective Gary Huffman met with Thomas on two occasions . During these meetings,
Thomas provided information detailing the relevant statements . Both Huffman and
Young testified that they neither told Thomas to interrogate Appellant, nor told anyone
to tell Thomas to interrogate Appellant . There was no promise of any consideration for
Thomas' statements or any arrangements for placing Thomas near Appellant in the jail.
Thomas testified that Appellant volunteered the information and that he had made no
deal with his federal prosecutor.
Appellant argues, however, that Thomas knew from prior experience and
conversations with his federal prosecutor that any information he could provide in other
cases would be looked upon favorably and could result in a sentence reduction . In fact,
Thomas had provided information in other cases . Furthermore, following Thomas'
meeting with Huffman, the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney said he would write a
letter to his federal prosecutors to inform them that Thomas had cooperated by
testifying . Lastly, Appellant cites that Thomas induced Appellant to talk by implying that
he did not like Tony Gore. Thomas boasted that Appellant had no idea he was
informing police.
The trial court, after hearing arguments from counsel, and upon review of United
States v. Henry, 447 U.S . 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed .2d 115 (1980) and Thurman v.
Commonwealth , 975 S .W.2d 888 (Ky. 1998), concluded that Thomas was a voluntary
informant and that the arrangement was not deliberately designed by the government to
elicit statements . Larry Thomas was permitted to testify . Appellant now argues that the
trial court failed to properly apply Henry and Thurman and that Massiah v. United
States , 377 U .S . 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed .2d 246 (1964) and its progeny require
reversa I .
RCr 9 .78 provides the procedure for conducting suppression hearings and sets
the standard for appellate review. On review, appellate courts use a two-part analysis to
inquire as to: (1) whether the findings of fact made by the trial court are supported by
substantial evidence and (2) if so, whether the trial court applied the appropriate legal
analysis . Adcock v. Commonwealth , 967 S .W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998) . "If supported by
substantial evidence the factual findings of the trial court shall be conclusive ." RCr 9 .78 .
Both briefs agree as to facts underlying the trial court's decision allowing Thomas to
testify . We find the trial court applied the appropriate legal analysis .
The rule expressed in Massiah and its progeny, apply to interrogations by the
government or agents acting on its behalf. Thus, the primary concern of the Massiah
line of decisions is secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the
equivalent of direct police interrogation . Kuhlmann v . Wilson, 477 U .S. 436, 106 S .Ct.
2616, 91 L .Ed .2d 364 (1986) . Therefore, to establish a Sixth Amendment violation,
Appellant must show that Thomas was acting as a government agent. "The role of the
government in the deliberate elicitation of such statements is of crucial importance, for
`the Sixth Amendment is not violated whenever--by luck or happenstance--the State
obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel has
attached ."' United States v. Love, 134 F .3d 595, 604 (4th Cir. 1998) . Appellant has
failed to establish this connection .
"[A]n informant becomes a government agent for purposes of [Massiah only
when the informant has been instructed by the police to get information about the
particular defendant ." United States v. Johnson , 338 F .3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2003) .
There is no evidence of any agreement between Thomas and the government .
Because there is no evidence of Thomas acting on behalf of the government when
listening to Appellant's jailhouse statements, the Sixth Amendment claim lacks merit.
Although Thomas had previously cooperated with the government in other cases,
there was neither evidence that such cooperation extended in any manner to the
investigation of Appellant nor any suggestion that Thomas was intentionally placed by
the government near Appellant . When Thomas spoke with Appellant, he had not
received any instructions from the government . Thomas was not paid for providing
information concerning Appellant. The mere fact that Thomas knew from prior
experience and conversations with his federal prosecutor that any information he could
provide in other cases may be looked upon favorably, the fact that the Assistant
Commonwealth's Attorney said he would write a letter to his federal prosecutor and
inform them that Thomas had cooperated and had testified after learning of Thomas'
conversations, and the fact that Thomas used various tactics to engage Appellant in
conversation, collectively, does not rise to the level of government facilitation prohibited
by the Sixth Amendment. Entrepreneurs and volunteers are not agents of the
government . United States v. Watson, 894 F .2d 1345 (D .C . Cir. 1990) . An informant's
initiating contact with an indicted defendant--whether because of conscience, curiosity,
or even potentially to curry an unpromised future favor from the government--cannot be
attributed to the government . Thomas v. Cox, 708 F.2d 132, 136 (4th Cir. 1983).
Accordingly, Appellant's Sixth Amendment and Section 11 claim is rejected .
III.
Appellant's third claim of error is that the trial court admitted evidence of his using
cocaine after the shooting . Appellant states this evidence not only is irrelevant and
prejudicial, but also a violation of his rights to due process and a fair trial by jury, as
guaranteed by the 6th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution and
Sections 2, 7, and 11 of the Kentucky Constitution .
Prior to trial, Appellant moved to exclude any evidence of his cocaine use on the
day of the shooting . The trial court granted Appellant's motion, but stated that the ruling
would be modified if Thomas testified or if Appellant otherwise opened the door to such
evidence. The cocaine issue was raised twice during trial .
First, during opening statements, counsel told the jury about an incident where
Appellant had taken the victim's cocaine from Monique Moore's apartment. In an effort
to establish his self-defense claim, Appellant argued that this incident led to an
altercation with Gore and that Appellant had feared for his life. Based upon this
reference to cocaine, the Commonwealth moved to introduce evidence of Appellant's
cocaine use on the day of the shooting because Appellant had opened the door . The
trial court reserved its ruling .
On cross-examination, Moore testified that Appellant flushed some of Gore's
cocaine down the toilet. Moore explained that he did not want her around the cocaine .
She further added that Gore was very upset and that Gore and Appellant had "gotten
into it" over the cocaine . The Commonwealth moved to introduce evidence of
Appellant's cocaine use because this evidence had given the jury an incorrect
impression, namely that Appellant was not involved in drugs and was protecting Moore .
The trial court found that Appellant had attempted to portray himself as a "knight in
shining armor." Accordingly, Moore was asked whether Appellant had used cocaine
following the shooting . Because she was unable to recall, Moore was impeached by the
testimony of Detective Huffman . Detective Huffman testified that Moore stated to
10
police on July 8, 2002, that Appellant had either inhaled or snorted cocaine sometime
during the afternoon of June 22, 2002, but that she did not know the amount or number
of times .
Appellant argues that the admitted evidence violates the KRE 404 prohibition on
character evidence and evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
The relevant question is `why did Appellant introduce evidence concerning the
cocaine?' As previously mentioned, the trial court found that Appellant had attempted to
portray himself as a "knight in shining armor." The standard of review for admission of
evidence is whether there has been an abuse of discretion . Commonwealth v. English ,
993 SW.2d 941, 945 (Ky . 1999) . The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial
judge's ruling was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles. Id . Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the ruling was arbitrary,
unreasonable or unfair. Contrary to Appellant's position, it is obvious that Moore not
only testified regarding Appellant's state of mind toward Gore, but also as to the motive
behind his actions . Appellant elicited this testimony through a series of leading
questions and could have prevented these extraneous statements through witness
preparation and more narrowly tailored questions .
When a defendant opens the door, the Commonwealth may introduce evidence
of bad acts that might otherwise be inadmissible . Muncy v. Commonwealth , 132
S .W.3d 845, 848 (Ky . 2004) ; Commonwealth v. Higgs , 59 S .W.3d 886, 894 (Ky . 2001)
("[A] Defendant pays a price for attempting to show his good repute by opening "the
entire subject which the law has kept closed for his benefit and [thus making] . . .
himself vulnerable where the law otherwise shields him .") .
no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge .
Further, we find there was
The probative value of the cocaine
use was not substantially outweighed by any undue prejudicial effect. See KRE 403.
Under the circumstances, we believe it was necessary to present the evidence of the
cocaine use so the jury could consider the entire case, specifically as it relates to
evidence of Appellant's virtuous intentions .
In our view, it is obvious that Appellant opened the door to the information related
to the cocaine use, if only slightly, when he elicited testimony from Moore that he
flushed Gore's cocaine down the toilet to keep it away from her. We find no error.
Appellant's fourth claim is that the trial court erred by improperly instructing the
jury regarding his constitutional right to remain silent and not testify during the trial .
More specifically, Appellant requested, pursuant to RCr 9 .54(3), that the jury be
instructed, as follows, in the second paragraph of his tendered Instruction No . 4--Right
to Remain Silent. The tendered instruction appears to be formed partly from the
language employed in RCr 9 .54(3) and partly from the language employed in 1 Cooper,
Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Criminal) §2 .04B (1999) :
Thomas Talley did not testify at this phase of the trial, as
was his absolute right. You shall not draw any inference of
guilt from this choice. You shall not allow this choice to
prejudice him in any way.
The trial court stated that it would instruct the jury on the right to remain silent, but did
so as part of Instruction No . 11--Presumption of Innocence, by stating :
The defendant is not compelled to testify, and the fact that
he does not cannot be used as an inference of guilt and
should not prejudice him in any way.
Appellant claims that the submitted instruction is an inaccurate statement of law.
He argues that the language used by the trial court that "the defendant is not compelled
to testify" improperly suggests that the prosecutor wanted Appellant to testify, but could
12
not force him to do so . Additionally, Appellant argues that the trial court's instruction
only told the jury that Appellant's decision not to testify "should not prejudice" him, when
it should have ordered the jurors that they "shall not" allow this choice to prejudice him .
Consequently, Appellant argues that the instructions deprived him of his right to remain
silent and to have his decision create no adverse inference at his trial .
The instruction given in this case mirrors the model instruction set forth in 1
Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Criminal) §2.04A (1999) . The constitutionality
of this instruction was implicitly affirmed in Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U .S. 288, 101 S .Ct.
1112, 67 L.Ed .2d 241 (1981), and we believe that the holding therein is dispositive of
this issue. In Carter , a trial judge refused a defendant's request to instruct the jury that,
"[t]he defendant is not compelled to testify and the fact that he does not cannot be used
as an inference of guilt and should not prejudice him in any way." Id. at 289. Carter
held that a judge is required to give such an instruction, when requested by the
defendant, and that the given instruction must "minimize the danger that the jury will
give evidentiary weight to a defendant's failure to testify ." Id . at 305 .
Appellant fails to recognize that the trial judge can only use the unique power of
the jury instruction to reduce the speculation to a minimum of why a defendant chooses
not to testify, but cannot entirely prevent jurors from doing so. Id. a t 303 . There is no
magic language that a trial judge must use in carrying out this duty and Carter does not
require that the trial court use the exact wording proposed by a defendant. United
States v. Ladd , 877 F .2d 1083, 1089 (1st Cir. 1989) . A jury instruction is not rendered
unconstitutional merely because a trial judge does not employ the exact wording used in
RCr 9 .54(3) . RCr 9.54(3) explicitly states that the tendered instruction use wording that
is "to the effect" of that used in the rule . See United States v . Headspeth , 852 F.2d 753,
13
756 (4th Cir. 1988) ("[s]ince the district court gave an instruction on testimonial privilege
that accurately and adequately stated the governing law . . . its failure to give the
precise instruction requested by Headspeth was not reversible error.") rev'd on other
grounds, Taylor v. United States , 495 U .S. 575, 110 S .Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed .2d 607
(1990) . The trial court's instruction in this case satisfied the Carter and RCr 9 .54(3)
mandate and we therefore find no error.
V.
Lastly, Appellant alleges that the trial court erred when it failed to conduct an
evidentiary hearing regarding the jury's possible use of a Bible during deliberations.
Appellant states that, after the combined PFO and penalty phase had concluded and
the jury had returned its verdicts, defense counsel spoke to four of the jurors . Appellant
states that one juror commented that another juror had broken a tie during the PFOsentencing phase deliberations by referring to a passage in the "Good Book ." Appellant
states that it appeared to counsel that the juror was holding a book covered by a
magazine, which may have been a Bible . Finally, Appellant states that days later the
prosecutor received a phone call from a juror who stated that a specific Bible passage
had been referenced when deciding to impose the forty year sentence . Appellee does
not discuss this assertion in his brief. Nevertheless, shortly after trial, Appellant filed a
written motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a motion
for a new trial pursuant to RCr 10 .02(1) and RCr 10.24. The motion contained the
information concerning the jury's possible use of a Bible . At final sentencing on
However, in Appellee's response to Appellant's motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial he discusses the issue.
Therein, Appellant states that a juror told him how another juror quoted a passage from
the Bible to help break the deadlock over whether to impose a thirty or forty year
sentence .
14
September 24, 2003, Appellant moved the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing
to examine jurors in order to determine if a Bible was, in fact, used during deliberations .
The trial court denied the motion, finding an insufficient basis to conduct such a hearing .
We find no abuse of discretion .
"The granting of a new trial is a matter of judicial discretion, and unless there has
been an abuse of that discretion, we will not reverse ." Jillson v. Commonwealth , 461
S.W.2d 542, 545 (Ky . 1971) . RCr 10.04 states that a juror cannot be examined to
establish a ground for a new trial, except to establish that the verdict was made by lot .
RCr 10.04 . Moreover, when reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to alter or amend
or vacate a judgment (judgment notwithstanding the verdict), we are to consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and give it every reasonable
inference that can be drawn from the record . See Brewer v. Hillard , 15 S .W .3d 1, 9 (Ky.
App. 1999) . In addition, we are to affirm the trial court's denial of the motion, "unless
there is a complete absence of proof on a material issue in the action, or if no disputed
issue of fact exists upon which reasonable men could differ." Taylor v. Kennedy , 700
S .W .2d 415, 416 (Ky . App . 1985) . Finally, a finding of fact by a trial judge will not be
disturbed unless clearly erroneous . Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp . v . Golightly , 976
S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky . 1998) .
Our decisions prohibit the use of the Bible by jurors and witnesses. See etc .
Grooms v. Commonwealth , 756 S .W.2d 131 (Ky . 1988) (reversing on other grounds, but
ordering the trial court to not allow jurors to take Bibles with them into the deliberation
room upon remand) ; Brown v . Commonwealth , 983 S .W .2d 513 (Ky. 1999) (finding of
prejudicial error to allow witness to testify while holding a Bible). Jurors should only
consider the evidence presented at trial, and extraneous materials, whether they be
15
dictionaries, law books, or Bibles, unless properly received in evidence, are not allowed
in the jury room for use by a deliberating jury. McNair v. State, 706 So. 2d 828 (Ala .
Crim . App . 1997) .
However, no per se rule requires the trial court to investigate the internal
workings of the jury whenever a defendant asserts juror misconduct. United States v.
Barshov , 733 F.2d 842, 851 (11th Cir.1984) . "The duty to investigate arises only when
the party alleging misconduct makes an adequate showing of extrinsic influence to
overcome the presumption of jury impartiality ." United States v. Cuthel , 903 F.2d 1381,
1383 (11th Cir. 1990) . To justify a post-trial hearing involving the trial's jurors, the
defendant must do more than speculate ; he must show "'clear, strong, substantial and
incontrovertible evidence . . . that a specific, nonspeculative impropriety has occurred ."'
United States v. lanniello , 866 F .2d 540 (2d Cir. 1989) . Appellant's reliance upon
Remmer v. United States , 347 U .S . 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed2d 654 (1954), and Smith
v. Commonwealth, 645 S .W.2d 707 (Ky. 1983) is misplaced . Furthermore, Appellant's
interpretation of Cuthel , supra, is misguided .
In this case, Appellant's motion is primarily conjecture and unsupported by
evidence. It does not appear as though the Bible was consulted as an extra-legal
source of authority. Appellant offered no affidavits, conceded that it was unknown
whether or not a Bible was ever taken to the jury room, and failed to allege that the book
was actually a Bible, but rather that it "may" have been a Bible. Appellant states that no
further action was taken to inquire whether or not a Bible was used. Conscientious
people who are faced with a decision often resort to their religious scruples in making
such decisions . Such deep introspection does not prejudice the defendant. A
defendant will not be allowed to engage the trial court in post verdict inquiries of, "jurors
16
merely to conduct a fishing expedition ." United States v . Moten , 582 F.2d 654, 667 (2d
Cir. 1978) (collecting cases). As such, we find no error in the trial court's decision .
Accordingly, the judgment and sentence of the Jefferson Circuit Court are
affirmed .
Graves, Johnstone, Keller, Scott, and Wintersheimer, J .J . concur.
Lambert, C .J ., and Cooper, J ., concur in result only.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Elizabeth B . McMahon
200 Advocacy Plaza
719 West Jefferson St.
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Carlton S. Shier
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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