COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. JOSIAH DANIEL GORDIN
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IMPOR -ply NT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PROMUL GA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : MAY 19, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2003-SC-000517-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES WEDDLE, JUDGE
02-CR-00036
V.
JOSIAH DANIEL GORDIN
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
1. INTRODUCTION
Appellee, Josiah Gordin, was convicted of First-Degree Manslaughter and FirstDegree Robbery, and sentenced to two concurrent twenty-year sentences. The
Commonwealth contends (1) that the trial court erred in its decision to dismiss at the
close of the evidence a First-Degree Wanton Endangerment charge as being barred by
double jeopardy, and (2) that the trial court erred in rejecting the jury's recommendation
of consecutive sentences and instead imposing concurrent sentences . The dismissal
was, in effect, an acquittal of Appellee on the wanton endangerment charge, and under
Section 115 of the Kentucky Constitution, the Commonwealth cannot appeal from a
judgment of acquittal . And a trial court is not required to follow the jury's sentencing
recommendation . Accordingly, we reject the Commonwealth's claims of error and affirm
the judgment .
7 (--
II. BACKGROUND
Appellee, Josiah Gordin, robbed Ryan Harris, and a high-speed car chase
ensued . During the chase, Appellee fired several shots from Joey Reynolds's vehicle,
in which he was riding, at Harris's pursuing vehicle . Eventually, Harris decided to end
the chase, but as he was turning around to leave, Appellee exited Reynolds's stopped
vehicle, approached Harris's vehicle, and shot him, from approximately 15 feet away
while Harris was still in his vehicle . Harris died shortly thereafter from the gunshot
wounds .
Police arrested Appellee and he was later indicted for Murder, First-Degree
Wanton Endangerment, and First-Degree Robbery .
During the trial, at the close of all of the evidence, the defense made a motion to
dismiss the wanton endangerment charge, arguing that the charge merged with the
murder and robbery charges . The judge either granted the motion or merged the
wanton endangerment charge with the other charges, finding that "the charged is barred
because of double jeopardy ." The jury convicted Appellee of First-Degree
Manslaughter and First-Degree Robbery and recommended two consecutive twentyyear sentences . The judge rejected the jury's recommendation and sentenced Appellee
to two concurrent twenty-year sentences.
III. ANALYSIS
The Commonwealth asserts two grounds for reversal. First, the Commonwealth
argues that the trial court improperly granted Appellee's motion to dismiss the wanton
endangerment charge or to merge it with the other charges . Second, the
Commonwealth contends that the trial judge abused his discretion in substituting his
own sentence for the jury's recommendation .
The jury had been sworn, thus jeopardy had attached .' The judge's decision to
grant Appellee's motion for dismissal of the wanton endangerment charge or to merge it
with the other charges, whichever, and not instruct separately on it was, in effect, a
directed verdict of acquittal . As such, double jeopardy precludes retrial.
Section ยง115 of the Kentucky Constitution provides : "[I]n all cases, civil and
criminal, there shall be allowed as a matter of right at least one appeal to another court,
except that the Commonwealth may not appeal from a judgment of acquittal in a
criminal case, other than for the purpose of certification of law. ,4 If the Commonwealth
had sought a certification of law pursuant to CR 76.37(10), then we would have
jurisdiction to address this issue . Here, however, the Commonwealth seeks a reversal
of the lower court's dismissal of the wanton endangerment charge by way of a matter of
right appeal, and we are without jurisdiction to do so .5
The Commonwealth also maintains that the trial judge erred in substituting his
sentence for the jury's recommendation . This argument, however, is in conflict with our
previous interpretation of the jury's sentencing recommendation . In Dotson v.
' Commonwealth v. Littrell , 677 S.W .2d 881, 886 (Ky . 1984) ("[O]nce the
defendant was again placed on trial by the swearing of a legally impanelled jury and the
reception of evidence, he was in jeopardy .").
2 Kotila v. Commonwealth , 114 S .W .3d 226, 236 (Ky. 2003) ("The trial judge did
not instruct the jury on [Manufacturing Methamphetamine], effectively granting a
directed verdict of acquittal on that issue . . . .") .
3 _Id . at 256 n. 2 ("The proscription against double jeopardy precludes retrial of the
same offense after a directed verdict of acquittal ."); Hourigan v. Commonwealth , 883
S .W.2d 497, 498 (Ky. App . 1994) ("If the trial court's action truly were 'the functional
equivalent . . . of a verdict of acquittal,' retrial is prohibited .") .
4 (Emphasis added .)
5 Commonwealth v. Bailey , 71 S .W .3d 73, 76 (Ky. 2002) ("[T]he Kentucky
Constitution prohibits the Commonwealth from appealing a judgment of acquittal in a
criminal case . . . . .. ).
Commonwealth , we held that although "the jury shall `recommend' whether the
sentences shall be served concurrently or consecutively[,] [t]here is nothing mandatory
or binding upon the judge as to the recommendation ."' "The recommendation remains
only a recommendation and has no mandatory effect.
,8
Here, the jury recommended
consecutive sentences . The judge, however, disagreed with the jury's recommendation
and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently ; this action was well within his
power. A judge's decision not to sentence a defendant according to the jury's
recommendation on whether the sentences run concurrent or consecutive is not subject
to reversal .
IV. CONCLUSION
The trial judge's decision to grant Appellee's motion for dismissal of the wanton
endangerment charge or to merge it with the other charges was, in effect, a directed
verdict of acquittal, which cannot be appealed for the purpose of seeking reversal
because of double jeopardy . And, the jury's recommended sentence has no mandatory
effect on the judge's sentencing determination . Therefore, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Lambert, C .J. ; Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Keller and Scott, JJ ., concur.
Wintersheimer, J ., dissents without opinion .
6 740 S .W.2d 930 (Ky. 1987) .
Id . at 931 .
8 Id .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Thomas L. Lockridge
Assistant Commonwealth Attorney
104 North Main Street
Nicholasville, Kentucky 40356
David A. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Rodney McDaniel
236 West Main Street
PO Box 1788
Frankfort, Kentucky 40602-1788
Adam G . Zeroogian
116 North Main Street
Suite 2
Nicholasville, Kentucky 40356
Shannon Dupree
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 301, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
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