x W[urf TRACY GLASS LAMB ; SHARON JOHNSON ; AND THE ESTATE OF LILIAN MONTGOMERY V LUCY HOLMES, AS NEXT FRIEND OF A .L ., A MINOR ; AND RENITA WEATERINGTON, AS NEXT FRIEND OF T .W ., A MINOR APPELANTS
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2003-SC-000495-DG
TRACY GLASS LAMB ; SHARON
JOHNSON ; AND THE ESTATE OF
LILIAN MONTGOMERY
V
APPELLANTS
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2001-CA-2550
FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT NO. 99-CI-01649
LUCY HOLMES, AS NEXT FRIEND
OF A .L., A MINOR; AND RENITA
WEATERINGTON, AS NEXT FRIEND
OF T .W ., A MINOR
APPELANTS
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE SCOTT
REVERSING
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDUAL BACKGROUND
The Appellees in this case brought five separate counts against the
Appellant teachers and administrators of a Kentucky high school . Among these
were a claim under 42 U .S .C.A . §1983 for violation of their right to be free from
unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, a claim under §2 of the Kentucky Constitution for deprivation of due
process and three tort claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
invasion of privacy and negligence . The claims were based on the
following facts :
On November 17, 1998, during a physical education class at Lexington's
Tates Creek Middle School, a student reported missing a pair of shorts . The
classroom teachers, Terri Least and Sharon Johnson, told the students they
would be given five minutes to return the missing shorts . When the shorts were
not returned, Least went to the principal's office and returned with Tracy Lamb,
an administrative intern, who gave the students an additional five minutes to
return the shorts . After five minutes passed, Lamb left the class and returned
with a security guard and Lillian Montgomery, an assistant principal at the school .
They informed the students that they would be searched in an effort to find the
shorts . The students were then taken in pairs to a locker room and searched.
The Appellee's children, A.L., S.W. and T.W., all females, were taken to
the girls' locker room, where A .L. and T.W. were searched. S .W . refused to be
searched . There is a factual dispute as to how the search was conducted . A.L.
and T.W . allege the girls were required to pull their shorts down beneath their
knees and to raise their shirts above their breasts, exposing their underwear to
those around them. The teachers/administrators argue they only required each
student to turn her waistband down so they could tell if the students were
wearing the missing shorts .
At all relevant times, the school board ("Board") had in effect a policy
regarding student searches, which provided : "[i]n no instance shall [a] school
official strip search any student ." "Strip search" was not defined anywhere within
the Board's policies.
Appellees filed a complaint against the Board, teachers, assistant principal
and administrative intern alleging their wrongful acts caused the students to
suffer extreme indignities and humiliation as they had been "held up to ridicule
before their peers ."
Following discovery, the school board moved for summary judgment on
behalf of all Defendants . In response, Appellees conceded that the Board was
immune from suit. They also conceded that the teachers and administrators
were immune from suit in their official capacities . However, Appellees contended
that the teachers were not entitled to qualified official immunity for the searches
in their individual capacities .
In its order granting summary judgment and dismissing the complaint, the
trial court concluded the students' rights had not been violated . In a subsequent
order, the trial court clarified its ruling and stated that it was dismissing all of the
claims brought by Appellees against all Appellants in their individual capacities .
Lucy Holmes, as next friend of her daughter, A.L., and Renita
Weatherington, as next friend of her minor daughters, S .W. and T.W., appealed
from the summary dismissal of their complaint . The Court of Appeals concluded
the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the §1983 claim as well as the state
claims for violation of the right of privacy and negligence. The Court of Appeals
found no error in the dismissal of Appellees' claims for the tort of outrage or
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court also affirmed the summary
judgment of the trial court as it pertained to the dismissal of claims against Terri
Least, whom they agreed did not participate in the searches of the students, and
former plaintiff S .W ., who had refused to be searched. The Court of Appeals
found Appellees' claim for violation of their substantive due process rights had
not been raised in the proceedings, and therefore, would not be considered on
appeal. In all other respects, the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the
judgment for further proceedings consistent with its opinion . We granted
discretionary review and now reverse the Court
of
Appeals.
II. Issues
The questions
of
law before this Court, as stated in the Motion for
Discretionary Review, are whether the Court of Appeals (1) correctly found the
actions of the teachers/administrators violated the Fourth Amendment ; (2)
correctly denied qualified immunity to the teachers/administrators ; and/or (3)
erroneously determined the actions of the teachers/administrators were in the
performance of a ministerial duty or to have been clearly violative of a Board
policy.
A. Fourth Amendment Rights Violation
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees all
U.S . citizens the right to be free from unreasonable searches. Appellees herein
contend their Fourth Amendment rights were violated when they were searched
by the Appellant teachers/administrators .
In analyzing the constitutionality
of
a search conducted within the school
setting, we turn to the guidance provided in New Jersey v. T.L .O., 469 U.S . 325,
105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985), wherein the U .S . Supreme Court
determined first that the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable
searches applies to searches performed by public school officials as opposed to
exclusively law enforcement officers. Second, the Court outlined that because of
the "special needs" of the school environment a standard lesser than probable
cause should be utilized to assess the legality of school searches. See Id. at
333, 738 . The Court promulgated a simple "reasonableness standard" in
reviewing the circumstances of a school search and quoted from Terry v. Ohio,
392 U .S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed .2d 889 (1968), which requires a
two-fold inquiry for interpreting the reasonableness of any search: (1) whether
the search was "justified at its inception", and (2) whether the search was
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the [search] ."
The Court in T.L.O. outlined that a search by a teacher/administrator of a
student would be `°justified at its inception' when there are reasonable grounds
for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated
or is violating either the law or the rules of the school" and would be "permissible
in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives
of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the
student and the nature of the infraction." 469 U .S. at 342, 105 S .Ct. at 743.
Recently, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals confronted a case factually
similar to the case before us. In Beard v. Whitmore Lake School District, 402
F.3d 598 (6th Cir., 2005), the court addressed a §1983 claim against a police
officer and teachers involved in strip searching high school students after another
student in the high school gym class reported a theft of money . Approximately
20 boys were taken to the boys' locker room and individually asked to remove
their shirts and lower their pants and underwear, while 5 female students were
taken to the girls' locker room and made to pull up their shirts and pull down their
pants while standing in a circle . Neither the boys nor girls were touched during
the searches and the girls were not made to remove their underwear . The stolen
money was never discovered as was the case here .
The searches in Beard were found to be unconstitutional . The Court of
Appeals also found, however, that at the time the searches were performed the
law regarding the reasonableness of a strip search under these circumstances
was not "clearly established ." Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's
denial of the Defendant's motion for summary judgment regarding the §1983
claim.
In determining the searches conducted on the students were
unconstitutional in scope, the court was guided by the analysis found in Vernonia
Sch . Dist. 47J v. Acton , 515 U .S . 646,115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995),
which sets forth the relevant criteria for evaluating searches performed in the
absence
of
individualized suspicion . In Vernonia, the Supreme Court considered
three factors to determine if the school searches were reasonable, (1) the
student's legitimate expectation of privacy, (2) the intrusiveness of the search,
and (3) the severity of the school system's needs that were met by the search.
Id. at 664-65 .
The 6th Circuit in Beard found the students' privacy interests were great,
quoting from T.L.O ., wherein the Supreme Court noted that the "search of a
child's person . . . is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of
privacy." See T .L.O., 469 U .S. at 337-38, 105 S .Ct. at 740-741 . The 6th Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, found that one's presence in a locker room lowered
one's privacy expectations so that a child searched within a locker room would
not be as deprived of a privacy interest as a child searched within an office, for
example. See Beard v. Whitmore Lake School District , 402 F.3d 598, 605
(6th
Cir. 2005).
The Court of Appeals in Beard found the scope of the search to be
determinative as to its constitutionality, as the scope exceeded what a student
would normally expect, even in a locker room situation . The court pointed out
these students did not voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation as
in the Vernonia case where the students were high school athletes being
randomly drug tested . The court also noted the character of the intrusion on the
student's privacy interests was greater and would reveal more than the limited
information at issue in the Vernonia drug testing .
The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals also found the governmental interest in
this fact scenario was not as great as in cases like Vernonia dealing with drug
issues, even though it could be said there is a valid interest in "maintaining an
atmosphere free from theft." Id. The court elaborated on governmental interests
saying a search to find items that pose a threat to the health or safety of students
would serve a weightier governmental interest than one merely to find money or
stolen property, and a search conducted without "individualized suspicion" also
decreases the governmental interest in conducting a search.
The Beard court ruled the male searches were unconstitutional, saying:
[I]n light of the highly intrusive nature of the [male]
searches, the fact the searches were undertaken to find
missing money, the fact the searches were performed on a
substantial number of students, the fact that the searches
were performed in the absence of individualized suspicion,
and the lack of consent, taken together, demonstrate that
the searches were not reasonable, . . .[and thereby] under
T.L.O. and Vernonia , the searches violated the Fourth
Amendment.
Id.
The Court of Appeals then separately analyzed the female searches,
concluding they were also unconstitutional for much of the same reasoning. The
only difference being the 5 females were not required to remove their underwear,
but did undress in front of each other. The court cited Reynolds v . City of
Anchorage , 379 F .3d 358, 365 (6th Cir. 2004), wherein the
6th
Circuit Court of
Appeals analyzed the reasonableness of a strip search occurring in a juvenile
group home and found it important that the search was "conducted in a way
designed to minimize its intrusive effect" and that the search took place "in the
presence of only a single staff member ."
In the case at hand, we deal with three girls, one who refused to be
searched, and two others who were searched in the girls' locker room by female
teachers . The searches were actually conducted on three classrooms of
students, but we only address today two of the girls' complaints . There is a
factual dispute as to what was required of the girls during these searches . The
students contend they were required to raise their shirts and lower their shorts,
revealing their underwear . The teachers claim the girls were only required to turn
their waistbands down, not revealing their underwear.
If the facts are as the students allege, we have almost the exact situation
as that analyzed in Beard by the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals . If the facts are as
the teachers allege, the searches would appear to be less intrusive than those
discussed in Beard, as the girls' underwear was not revealed, and the searches
could hardly be described as "strip searches".
The searches the students described, which involved removing their
clothing to the extent of exposing their underwear to the teachers, would now be
considered unconstitutional because (1) the searches were intrusive in nature,
(2) the searches were conducted to find a missing pair of shorts, (3) a large
number of students were subject to the searches, (4) the searches lacked
individualized suspicion, (5) the students did not consent to the searches, and (6)
the searches were conducted in front of other students . This analysis mirrors
that articulated by the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in Beard .
If
the searches were conducted as the teachers/administrators describe,
the searches were not unconstitutional (or didn't violate the Fourth Amendment)
in that the scope of such a search would not exceed what a student would expect
in a locker room setting and could not be deemed as intrusive as a search
requiring exposure
of
one's underwear to others, be they students and/or
teachers/administrators .
However, we have concluded we need not remand this case for a factual
determination of which search described by the parties actually occurred,
because we hold today that the law, at the time these searches were conducted,
did not clearly establish searches conducted in either described manner would
be unreasonable, and therefore the teachers/administrators are entitled to
qualified immunity .
B.
Qualified Official Immunity
Officials who are sued for monetary relief under §1983 may assert either
an absolute immunity or qualified immunity defense. The Supreme Court has
generally limited absolute immunity to officials who perform judicial, prosecutorial
and legislative functions, but has allowed qualified immunity to be asserted by
school officials. See Wood v . Strickland , 420 U.S . 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d
214 (1975) .
Qualified immunity protects state and local officials who carry out
executive and administrative functions from personal liability so long as their
actions do not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known ." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U .S.
800, 818, 102 S. Ct . 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) .
The Harlow objective reasonableness standard "is intended to provide
government officials with the ability to `reasonably anticipate when their conduct
may give rise to liability for damages."' Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U .S . 635,
647, 107 S .Ct. 3034, 3043, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)(uotin
Davis v. Scherer , 468
U .S. 183, 195, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3019, 82 L.Ed .2d 139 (1984)). In Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U .S. 730, 122 S .Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed .2d 666 (2002), the Supreme Court held
the objective reasonableness standard requires a determination as to whether
the defendant official had "fair warning" that his/her conduct violated federal law.
The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in Beard found T.L.O . and Vernonia , while
instructive in the area of analyzing school searches, "do not offer the guidance
necessary to conclude that the officials were, or should have been, on notice that
the searches performed in this case were unreasonable ." Beard v. Whitmore
Lake School District, 402 F .3d 598, 607(6 th Cir. 2005)(internal citations omitted) .
The court found "[t]he 6th Circuit cases involving strip searches also do not clearly
establish the unconstitutionality of the searches in the instant case." Id. at 607.
The only precedent the Court of Appeals found regarding the
constitutionality of strip searches came from the Seventh Circuit, which had held
a strip search of a student in particular circumstances was not reasonable . The
court, however, cited the applicable rule to follow regarding precedent, discussed
in Williams v. Ellington , 936 F.2d 881, 885(6th Cir. 1991)(uotin from Ohio Civil
Service Employees Ass'n v. Seiter , 858 F.2d at 1171, 1177(6th Cir. 1988), which
says :
In the "rare instance" where it is proper to seek
guidance from outside this circuit, the law will
only be clearly established where the cases
outside the circuit "both point unmistakably to the
unconstitutionality of the conduct complained of and
[are] so clearly foreshadowed by applicable direct
authority as to leave no doubt in the mind of a
reasonable officer that his conduct, if challenged on
constitutional grounds, would be found wanting ."
We agree with the 6 th Circuit Court of Appeals that the current law, much
less the law in effect when these searches occurred in 1998, did not give "fair
warning" to the school teachers/administrators that their actions would be in clear
violation of a federal statutory or constitutional right. The 6th Circuit Court of
Appeals in Beard examined the available federal precedent and the only state
decision available on the issue of strip searching students is Rone v. Daviess
County Bd. of Educ . , 655 S.W.2d 28 (Ky. App. 1983), which held there were
reasonable grounds for strip searching a student to determine whether he was
carrying drugs and that student was never offensively touched. This available
case law could hardly be described as "clearly establishing" the students' rights
as to warn the teachers/administrators herein their actions would be in violation
of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution .
C.
Ministerial Duties and the Board Policy against Strip Searches
The third issue raised by Appellants in their Motion for Discretionary
Review was whether the Court of Appeals erroneously determined the actions of
the teachers/administrators were in the performance of a ministerial duty or to
have been clearly violative of a Board policy.
This issue is critical because the Supreme Court in Harlow v. FitZgerald ,
457 U .S . at 818, 102 S .Ct . at 2738 (1982), limited the application of a qualified
immunity defense to "officials performing discretionary functions ." Harlow left
unresolved the immunity applicable to officials who perform ministerial acts and
the lower federal courts are in conflict on this issue .
The Harlow qualified immunity defense, however, does not apply to
violations of state law claims . These claims are governed by state immunity law.
Kentucky immunity law is discussed in the Kentucky Supreme Court decision,
Yanero v. Davis , 65 S .W.3d 510 (Ky. 2001), which explains "official immunity" is
"immunity from tort liability afforded to public officers and employees for acts
performed in the exercise of their discretionary functions ." Id. at 521 .
Quoting from 63C Am .Jur.2d, Public Officers and Employees, §309
(1997), we explained in Yanero , supra, when public officers and employees are
sued in their individual capacities, they "enjoy only qualified official immunity. . ."
Id. at 522. The court further explained, quoting from the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, §895D, that qualified official immunity applies to the negligent
performance by a public officer or employee of : (1) discretionary acts or
functions, i.e., those involving the exercise of discretion and judgment, or
personal deliberation, decision, and judgment; (2) in good faith; and (3) within the
scope of the employee's authority. Id.
Appellees in this case argue the written Board policy preempted any claim
that appellants' actions were discretionary . Appellees also contend that in the
context of school searches, the term "strip search" contemplates something far
less than a nude search, and therefore, the written school policy regarding such
searches would apply, and the teachers/administrators are not entitled to
qualified immunity against the state claims .
We believe the actions of the teachers/administrators were made in good
faith, were discretionary in nature and were within the scope of their authority
because the Board policy did not clearly apply to the searches conducted on
these female students . The term "strip search" was not defined any where within
the school's policies. This would imply the term should be given its ordinary
meaning, that which a reasonable person would interpret the term to mean . The
majority of cases using the term "strip search" have defined it as requiring the
removal of clothing . (See McGee v. State , 105 S .W.3d 609 (Tex .Crim.App.
2003) ; Craddock v. Com ., 580 S.E .2d 454 (Va .App . 2003); Roberts v. Rhode
Island, 175 F.Supp.2d 176 (D .R .1 . 2000); State v. Esguivel , 987 S.W.2d 481
(Mo.App.W .D . 1999))
If the facts are as the students allege in this case, the searches do not
involve removal of the girl's clothing, but rather lifting their shirts above their bras
and lowering their shorts to their knees. Their underwear was never touched or
altered in any way, nor was their clothing fully removed from their bodies.
We have issued many decisions expressing the common rule that the
"plain meaning" of statutes controls when interpreting statutory language. See
Wheeler & Clevinger Oil Co., Inc. v. Washburn , 127 S .W.3d 609, 614 (Ky . 2004) .
And the only time the "plain meaning" rule is not to be applied is when doing so
"would constitute an absurd result ." Id. at 614 . We think the interpretation of
policy language follows this same "plain meaning" rule and therefore, the "plain
meaning" of "strip search" should be applied to the Board's policy as such would
not produce an absurd result, but rather the most reasonable outcome .
There were four cases prior to 1998, when these girls were searched,
dealing with "strip searches" of students . We think these cases define the term
"strip search" as a nude search, or search far more invasive than those endured
by the female students in this case .
The Kentucky Court of Appeals case involving "strip searching" a student
is Rone v. Daviess County Bd . of Educ, 655 S.W .2d 28 (Ky. App . 1983), which
describes the involved strip search as:
Although appellant was requested during the search
to lower both his trousers and undershorts, those
articles of his clothing were never removed . Additionally,
the appellant was never offensively touched during any
part of the search. The only clothing completely removed
from the appellant was his jacket and shoes. The
avowed purpose of having the appellant lower his shorts
and undershorts to his thighs was to determine if either
contained drugs or marijuana, underclothing being a
prime hiding place for controlled substances.
Id. a t 30 .
We believe this description entails a search where clothing and underwear
are at least partially removed .
The Supreme Court case, Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U .S . 1022, 101 S .Ct.
3015, 69 L.Ed .2d 395 (1981), involved a strip search of a 13 year old female
student performed after a police dog "alerted" to the presence of drugs on her
person . The dissent from this case reads :
Petitioner was met at the nurse's office by two adult
women, one a uniformed police officer. After denying
that she had ever used marihuana, petitioner was ordered
to strip. She did so, removing her clothing in the presence
of the two women . The women then looked over petitioner's
body, inspected her clothing, and touched and examined the
hair on her head.
Id. a t 1023-1024, 3016.
This case at least indicates the strip search involved full removal of the
girl's clothing . The opinion later references the "nude search" of the girl's body,
again indicating, a level of search exceeding that performed on the two girls in
15
this case .
The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals case, Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881
(6th Cir. 1991), is the closest case to describe strip searching in a way that would
come close to encompassing the alleged searches in this case . In Williams , the
opinion reads:
Ellington asked Easley to take Williams into her office
and search her person, in the presence of a female
secretary. Inside Easley's office, Williams was asked
to empty her pockets which she promptly did. Easley
then asked the girl to remove her T-shirt . . .[which she
did]. Williams was then required to lower her blue
jeans to her knees . In her deposition, Williams
testified that Easley pulled on the elastic of her
undergarments to see if anything would fall out, but
Easley disputes this contention.
Id . at 883 .
We believe this description still exceeds the severity of the searches
conducted in this case, and does not clearly define the term "strip search" to
mean a search much less intrusive than a nude search.
The remaining 6th Circuit Case, Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 (6th Cir.
1984), involves a student who had been detained and searched by school
officials because of suspicion of marijuana possession and possible dealing. The
court describes the involved search as, "Pursuant to defendant's request, David
Tarter emptied his pockets, removed his jacket, boots and shirt. . . . . Raybuck and
Spargur then asked Tarter to remove his pants; Tarter refused, the search
ceased, and the police were summoned." Id. at 979-80. The court later
addresses the search saying, "[Tarter's] eventual refusal to be strip-searched . . .",
id. at 980, which would indicate the court did not feel the search that had
occurred was a complete strip search.
Although this case does not involve student strip searches, we believe the
6th Circuit Court of Appeals said it best in Spear v. Sowders , 33 F.3d 576 (6 th Cir.
1994): "A "strip search," though an umbrella term, generally refers to an
inspection of a naked individual . . . ." Id . at 581 .
As the above mentioned cases were the only pre-1998 cases which the
Board could refer for the definition of "strip search" within the context of a school
setting, we hold the Board's policy did not apply to the searches alleged in this
case as the term "strip search" used within the policy contemplated nothing less
than a nude search of the type described in these cases or common language of
the day. We also find the acts of the teachers/administrators were made in good
faith, were discretionary in nature and within the scope of their authority, and
thus, they are also entitled to qualified immunity against the state claims .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the judgment
of the trial court is reinstated .
Lambert, C .J ., Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, and Wintersheimer, JJ .,
concur. Keller, J ., dissents by separate opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Robert L. Chenoweth
121 Bridge Street
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
David R. Marshall
271 West Short Street
111 Security Building
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
RENDERED : MAY 19, 2005
TO BE PUBLISHED
'$UyrrM:V V.T
6 i'vurf of
krufurkV
2003-SC-000495-DG
TRACY GLASS LAMB ; SHARON JOHNSON ;
AND THE ESTATE OF LILLIAN MONTGOMERY
APPELLANTS
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2001-CA-2550
FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT NO . 99-CI-01649
LUCY HOLMES, AS NEXT FRIEND OF A.L., A
MINOR; AND RENITA WEATHERINGTON, AS
NEXT FRIEND OF T .W ., A MINOR
APPELLEES
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE KELLER
I respectfully dissent for two reasons .
First, this was a strip-search . The young girls were required to do far
more than roll up their shirt sleeves or turn out their pockets . They were required
to raise their shirts above their breasts and to drop their pants below their knees,
thus moving their clothing so as to expose their underwear . Though they were
not required to strip naked, they were still required to move their clothing from its
normal position and to expose areas of their bodies usually considered private .
That is a strip-search.
Second, in the Fayette County Public Schools, there is no uncertainty
about whether a strip-search is permitted . To its credit, the Fayette County
Board of Education has adopted a policy against strip-searches . The existence
of that policy means that the persons conducting the search knew it was
prohibited .
Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals and remand this case to
the trial court for further consideration of the Appellants' claims .
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