CHARLES EDWARD HENSLEY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : OCTOBER 20, 2005
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2003-SC-000470-TG
CHARLES EDWARD HENSLEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES L . BOWLING, JR
00-CR-00187
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Charles Hensley, Jr., was convicted in the Harlan Circuit Court of firstdegree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment . He appeals to this Court as a
matter of right.
Appellant was convicted of stabbing Rocky Haywood to death with a knife. The
crime occurred beside an automobile parked in a ditch on the side of the road near
Appellant's home . The crime occurred on October 19, 2000. Additional facts will be set
forth as necessary.
I.
Appellant's first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred when it permitted
the Commonwealth to play his taped police statement without redacting the detective's
repeated comments stating that he was lying.
Shortly after Haywood's death, Appellant gave a taped police statement. On the
tape, as Appellant maintains his innocence and gives his account of the events, the
interviewing detective repeatedly makes comments such as "I don't believe you," "what
you're telling me does not match the evidence," and "you know how many times people
tell me the non-truth because they don't want to get caught." Appellant argues that the
detective's comments constitute inadmissible opinion testimony of a witness regarding
the truth of the testimony of another witness . Moss v. Commonwealth , 949 S .W.2d 579,
583 (Ky. 1997) .
This Court has recently considered an identical argument to the one made by
Appellant in the case Lanham v. Commonwealth , 2005 WL 2043703 (Ky. 2005). In
Lanham , the jury heard an audiotape of the defendant's police statement. As the
defendant tells his story, the interviewing detective makes at least fifteen comments
stating that the defendant was lying and had "better start telling the truth ." Id. a t *3 . The
majority opinion examined case law from other jurisdictions to decide this issue of first
impression. This Court determined that these comments did not constitute
impeachment evidence . Id. at *10 . The purpose of the detective's comments was not
to convince anyone that the defendant was lying . Rather, the comments were made as
a legitimate interrogation technique . Id . As such, the comments were admissible
because they were necessary to provide a context for the defendant's answers . Id .
This Court further held that the detective's statements were only admissible for
contextual purposes, and were not admissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted
(that the defendant was in fact lying) . We recognized that the inclusion of such
comments would run the risk of causing prejudice to this effect . However, we found that
redacting the officer's comments and having the officer give live testimony as to how the
defendant's story progressed in response to questioning was "unworkable ." Redacting
the tape would fragment the recording and would do little to mitigate the risk of
prejudice . This Court held that the best remedy against possible prejudice would be a
limiting admonition that informed the jury that the officer's comments are "offered solely
to provide context to the defendant's relevant responses ." Id . at *11 (quoting State v.
Demery , 30 P .3d 1278, 1283 (Wash . 2001)).
Consistent with our ruling in Lanham , we find that Appellant's remedy in the
instant case would have been a limiting admonition . Because Appellant did not request
an admonition, his objection in this regard was incomplete and thus unpreserved as to
this issue . See Lanham , supra , at *11 .
II .
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress certain statements . First, he alleges that statements made at the crime scene
were inadmissible because they were obtained during a custodial interrogation prior to
his being Mirandized . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U .S. 436, .86 S .Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed .2d 694
(1966).
At the crime scene, Trooper Saylor initially asked Appellant several questions
while inside Appellant's trailer. Appellant went outside, and Saylor asked him to remain
on the porch until someone could take a statement from him. Appellant agreed . Saylor
asked Deputy Caudill to keep an eye on Appellant . Saylor testified that his main
objective at this point was to secure the crime scene, keep track of witnesses, and
preserve the evidence . When Saylor noticed two men talking to Appellant, he asked
them to leave, and asked Appellant to bear with him until someone could take his
statement . At this point, Appellant volunteered that, during the crime, he had taken the
knife away from Haywood's attacker and had cut his finger in doing so . He also stated
that he threw the knife into his yard .
Appellant now claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
these statements because they were made during a custodial interrogation . The trial
court determined that Appellant volunteered his statements, and thus, they were not the
product of a custodial interrogation . We find that the facts are consistent with the trial
court's ruling on this matter.
Appellant's next argument pertains to his police statement . On the night in
question, Appellant was taken to the police station . There, he was subject to an
interrogation after waiving his Miranda rights . Appellant argues that the trial court erred
in denying his motion to suppress his statement made at the police station for two
reasons. His first stated reason, that the statement was an attenuation of a previously
unlawful custodial interrogation, is both unpreserved and without merit for reasons
discussed above.
His second argument in favor of suppression is that his statement at the police
station was involuntarily given due to his need for medical care. This claim is properly
preserved for review. Appellant sustained injuries to his mouth, which resulted in two
broken teeth . Appellant now argues that, at a suppression hearing, the Commonwealth
failed to meet its burden to prove that the statement was voluntarily given . We
disagree . The record reveals that Appellant was Mirandized, and that he waived his
rights in writing . The officers testified that Appellant did not request medical attention
and never asked to stop the questioning . There was no evidence that Appellant's
injuries were of the kind that could call into question whether his statement was
voluntary . Upon review, a decision to admit evidence is within the discretion of the trial
court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion . Commonwealth v. King,
950 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Ky. 1997). We find no abuse of discretion.
III .
Appellant also alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new
trial. In his motion, Appellant informed the trial court that one juror provided information
that another juror had a concealed bias against defendants who exercise their right to
not testify during trial, and that this bias was revealed during jury deliberations .
Appellant now claims that this bias demonstrates that the juror was not honest during
voir dire,
and as such, he deserves a new trial. This issue is not properly preserved for
review because Appellant made no mention of truthfulness during voir dire in his motion
for a new trial on this matter. Review of a motion for a new trial on appeal is limited to
the grounds raised by the motion. RCr 12.04(3). Nevertheless, Appellant's argument is
without merit, as RCr 10 .04 clearly states, "a juror cannot be examined to establish a
ground for a new trial, except to establish that the verdict was made by lot."
IV.
.
Appellant's next arguments pertain to the blood evidence taken from the scene of
the crime. He alleges that the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to
introduce DNA and blood evidence despite the fact that it failed to protect the integrity of
the evidence, that it "lost significant other potentially exculpatory blood evidence," and
did not test all of the blood samples recovered .
Appellant first argues that the Commonwealth failed to sufficiently establish a
chain of custody for the blood evidence that was introduced . At trial, the
Commonwealth put forth testimony regarding the evidence's chain of custody,
explaining the history of its possession . Upon review, we find that the chain of custody
was sufficiently established . "It is unnecessary to establish a perfect chain of custody or
to eliminate all possibility of tampering or misidentification, so long as there is
persuasive evidence that 'the reasonable probability is that the evidence has not been
altered in any material aspect."' Love v. Commonwealth , 55 S .W.3d 816, 821 (Ky.
2001) (quoting Rabovsky v. Commonwealth , 973 S .W .2d 6 (Ky. 1998)) .
Appellant also claims that the police failed to properly maintain the integrity of the
crime scene, thereby destroying potentially exculpatory DNA evidence . Absent a
showing of bad faith, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a
denial of due process . Arizona v. Youngblood , 488 U .S. 51, 58, 109 S .Ct. 333, 102
L.Ed .2d 281 (1988); Collins v. Commonwealth , 951 S .W .2d 569 (Ky. 1997) .
Appellant alleges that the police acted in bad faith by failing to preserve
potentially useful evidence . Appellant's defense at trial was that a third person had
attacked and killed the victim . He claims that the police only collected evidence that
strengthened its case against Appellant, and were uninterested in exculpatory evidence .
Appellant lists twelve alleged deficiencies in the investigation and collection of evidence,
but none of these alleged deficiencies substantiates his claim that the police acted in
bad faith .
Appellant also alleges error in the Commonwealth's failure to test all of the blood
samples that were collected . We disagree . The samples that were tested were
representative samples, and Appellant does not put forth a persuasive reason as to why
each and every sample should have been tested .
V.
Appellant argues that he was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury when the
trial judge questioned multiple witnesses. Appellant claims that this questioning,
combined with the trial judge's belligerent demeanor towards defense counsel,
improperly biased the jury against him .
First, we disagree with Appellant's claim that the trial judge often demonstrated
belligerence towards defense counsel . Appellant only cites to one incident where the
trial judge allegedly exhibited hostility towards defense counsel in front of the jury
through his tone and demeanor.' We do not find that Appellant's rights were affected in
light of the entire record, which reveals that the trial judge was fair and temperate as a
whole . See Wilson v. Commonwealth , 836 S.W.2d 872 (Ky. 1992) (whether
defendant's rights were violated by trial judge's intemperate remark must be viewed in
light of the whole record), overruled on other grounds by St. Clair v. Roark, 10 S .W.3d
482, 487 (Ky. 1999) .
We now turn to Appellant's claim of error pertaining to the trial judge's
questioning of multiple witnesses . Appellant lists instances where the trial judge
questioned witnesses, however, defense counsel only objected to one such incident.
Without delving into the issue of whether one objection sufficiently preserved
Appellant's complaint on review, even if all instances of questioning were preserved, we
find no error. KRE 614(b) grants the trial court the authority to interrogate witnesses.
' Appellant also cites to a post-trial hearing that involved a heated exchange between
the trial judge and defense counsel. We do not believe that this post-trial argument is
indicative of any animus of the trial judge against the defense counsel during the trial.
The trial judge did not, as Appellant alleges, admit frustration with defense counsel
during trial . After this exchange, the trial judge withdrew his rulings on the post-trial
motions and recused himself. The trial judge acted providently in this regard .
2 Appellant acknowledges that there was only one objection, but argues that repeated
objections to the trial judge's questions would further highlight the appearance that the
trial judge was on the Commonwealth's side. To support this proposition, Appellant
cites to United States v. Hickman, 592 F .2d 931, 936 (6th Cir. 1979), a case decided by
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and previously cited by this Court as authority
(although not on this precise issue).
This Court recently elaborated upon KRE 614(b) in Terry v. Commonwealth , 153
S .W .3d 794 (Ky. 2005) .
During a lengthy and complex trial, judicial intervention may be
effective as a means of clarification . Id . at 803. A trial judge should not ask questions
in a manner that indicates "to the jury his opinion as to the credibility of the witness
being interrogated or the guilt or innocence of the accused ." Id . at 802 (citing Caudill v .
Commonwealth , 293 Ky. 674, 170 S.W.2d 9, 10 (1943). In the instant case, the trial
judge asked questions to help clarify the testimony of witnesses on complex issues .
The trial judge asked questions in an impartial manner; he did not reveal his opinion,
nor did he assume the role of prosecutor in his questioning . Id . at 803 ("A trial judge
cannot ask questions that place him `in the role of a prosecutor rather than an arbiter ."'
(quoting LeGrande v. Commonwealth, 494 S .W .2d 726, 731 (Ky.1973))). As such, we
find no error.
VI.
Lastly, Appellant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a
change of venue. Appellant claims that a change of venue was necessary due to pretrial publicity surrounding the trial, and in particular, the local media's reporting of
hearsay statements at a pre-trial hearing .
"The mere fact that jurors may have heard, talked, or read about a case is not
sufficient to sustain a motion for change of venue, absent a showing that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the accounts or descriptions of the investigation and judicial
proceedings have prejudiced the defendant." Brewster v. Commonwealth , 568 S .W .2d
232, 235 (Ky. 1978) . Further, "[t]here is no requirement that prospective jurors be
completely ignorant of the facts . The real test is whether, after having heard all the
evidence, the prospective juror can conform his views to the requirements of the law
and render a fair and impartial verdict ." Bowling v. Commonwealth , 942 S.W.2d 293,
299 (Ky. 1997).
Appellant cites to several instances of pre-trial publicity, including media
coverage of a previous mistrial, but he fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that
prejudice resulted from it. The trial court has discretion to determine whether to grant a
motion for change of venue, and we find no abuse of discretion . Kordenbrock v.
Commonwealth, 700 S .W.2d 384 (Ky. 1985) .
The judgment and sentence of the Harlan Circuit Court are affirmed .
Lambert, C.J ., Graves, Johnstone, Roach, Scott, and Wintersheimer, J .J concur.
Cooper, J, dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Lanham v.
Commonwealth , No. 2003-SC-0268-MR (Ky. Aug . 25, 2005).
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Rebecca B . Diloreto
Julie Namkin
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Drive, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Susan Roncarti Lenz
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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