JAMES GOWANS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYIN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 22, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2003-SC-0401-MR
JAMES GOWANS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R . ADAMS, JUDGE
02-CR-949
V
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
A Fayette Circuit Court jury convicted Appellant, James Gowans, of
manslaughter in the first degree, KRS 507 .030, and sentenced him to twenty years in
prison . He appeals to this Court as a matter of right, Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b), claiming
that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to give a proper "Allen charge" to
a deadlocked jury and in refusing to grant a mistrial because of such failure . Finding no
error, we affirm .
On the night of June 29, 2002, Appellant was with his wife at the Rainbow Tavern
in Lexington, Kentucky. Appellant was armed with a handgun that he had borrowed
from his neighbor to provide protection for himself and his wife . Paul Payne, the victim,
entered the bar a few minutes after Appellant's arrival. There was a history of
altercations between Appellant and Payne . According to Appellant, when he exited the
bar's restroom, Payne started shouting at him and moved toward him in a threatening
manner. Appellant pulled his handgun out of his back pocket and shot Payne twice,
killing him .
Appellant was indicted and tried for murder . At the conclusion of Appellant's twoday trial, the jury deliberated for approximately four and one-half hours, then informed
the bailiff that it was deadlocked and unable to reach a verdict . The trial court informed
the attorneys of this fact and stated :
I'm not fond of the Allen charge at all, but I'd be willing to bring them out
and ask them if any further deliberations would benefit them. I'll phrase it
in the context that if anybody thinks it would, raise their hand. That way
we'll know if we need to send them back in .
While Appellant's attorney expressed his doubts that this proposed inquiry would
produce a verdict, he did not object or offer an alternative procedure . Once the jurors
were in the courtroom, the trial court then questioned and instructed them as follows :
Do any of you feel, and you can raise your hand to express this if this is
accurate, do any of you feel like further deliberations would benefit you as
far as resolving the issues that have been submitted to you?
[One juror raised her hand.]
Let me ask the reverse question ; does anybody think that it would not
benefit you at all to continue to deliberate?
[No jurors raised their hands .]
All right, then I'm going to ask you to go back and deliberate a little longer,
and see how things go and progress . If you feel like that, after a
reasonable period of time, that you are unable to reach a verdict, then just
notify us at that point. At this point, you can go back and resume your
deliberations . Thank you .
After the jury retired for further deliberations, Appellant's attorney objected to the court's
instruction, arguing that by requiring additional deliberations of a deadlocked jury, the
court had sent a message to the jurors that they needed to reach some sort of
compromise. The objection was overruled . The jury deliberated for approximately ten
minutes and returned a verdict finding Appellant guilty of manslaughter in the first
degree . Subsequently, at the conclusion of the penalty phase, Appellant moved for a
mistrial based upon the trial court's instruction to the jury to resume its deliberations .
That motion was overruled .
As an initial matter, Appellant's objection to the trial court's instruction to the jury
was untimely . Appellant's attorney was specifically informed that the jury was
deadlocked, that the trial court did not intend to give them the so-called "Allen charge,"
and that the trial court intended to determine whether additional deliberations would be
beneficial, and if so, to send the jury back for additional deliberations . Despite this
knowledge, Appellant's attorney failed to object to the proposed inquiry and instruction
until after the jury had resumed its deliberations . This untimely objection was
insufficient to preserve Appellant's claim for appellate review. Ernst v. Commonwealth ,
160 S.W.3d 744, 766 n.5 (Ky. 2005) ; Hopper v. Commonwealth , 516 S .W.2d 855, 857
(Ky. 1974) . Accordingly, reversal is warranted only if the trial court's charge to the jury
was a palpable error that affected Appellant's substantial rights and resulted in manifest
injustice . RCr 10.26.
The so-called " Allen charge" referred to by Appellant and by the trial court in this
case stems from Allen v. United States , 164 U .S . 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed . 528
(1896), in which the United States Supreme Court approved a set of lengthy instructions
given to a deadlocked jury. Id. at 501-02, 17 S.Ct. at 157. While the " Allen charge"
enjoyed a period of acceptance in this state, Earl v. Commonwealth , 569 S.W.2d 686,
688 (Ky. App . 1978), the wide discretion previously afforded to trial judges in instructing
deadlocked juries has since been superseded by RCr 9.57(1). That Rule provides :
If a jury reports to a court that it is unable to reach a verdict and the court
determines further deliberations may be useful, the court shall not give
any instruction regarding the desirability of reaching a verdict other than
one which contains only the following elements :
(a) in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree to that verdict;
(b) jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a
view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to
individual judgment;
(c) each juror must decide the case, but only after an impartial
consideration of the evidence with the other jurors;
(d) in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexamine
his or her own views and change his or her opinion if convinced it is
erroneous ; and
(e) no juror should surrender his or her honest conviction as to the weight
or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of other jurors, or
for the mere purpose of returning a verdict .
(Emphasis added .) As the emphasized language indicates, the five listed elements are
required only when a trial court proposes to give "any instruction regarding the
desirability of reaching a verdict." If the trial court decides to give such an instruction,
these elements are mandatory and exclusive, although they need not be recited
verbatim . Commonwealth v. Mitchell , 943 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Ky. 1997) .
However, upon learning that the jury is deadlocked and ascertaining that further
deliberations may be useful, a trial court is not re uired to instruct the jury as to the
desirability of reaching a verdict . Rather than instructing the jury regarding the
desirability of a verdict, the trial court in this case merely instructed the jurors to
continue their deliberations for a "reasonable period of time ." When a trial court makes
a statement that does not discuss the desirability of a verdict, the issue is not whether
the statement complies with RCr 9 .57(1), but whether the statement was coercive . Mills
v. Commonwealth , 996 S.W.2d 473, 493 (Ky. 1999) ; Mitchell, 943 S .W .2d at 628 .
Appellant cites as evidence of coercion the fact that the jury deliberated for
approximately four and one-half hours before informing the trial court that it was
deadlocked, and subsequently returned a verdict only ten minutes after being instructed
to continue its deliberations . While the time lapse between the alleged coercive
comment and the verdict may be relevant as part of the totality of circumstances, we
have specifically declined to find coercion based on the time lapse alone . Mitchell , 943
S .W .2d at 628. Instead, our focus is primarily on the language of the statement or
instruction itself, id., bearing in mind that "[t]he ultimate test of coercion is whether the
instruction actually forces an agreement on a verdict or whether it merely forces
deliberation which results in agreement ." Abbott v. Commonwealth , 352 S .W .2d 552,
554 (Ky. 1961) .
Here, after ascertaining that one juror thought that additional deliberations would
be helpful, the trial court instructed the jury "to go back and deliberate a little longer, and
see how things go and progress," and to notify the court if it was still unable to reach a
verdict "after a reasonable period of time ." The trial court's statement implied that the
jury would not be required to deliberate ad infinitum , and would be dismissed if it was
unable to reach a verdict after a reasonable period of additional deliberations . The
language of the statement did not contain any indicia of coercion and thus merely forced
deliberation that resulted in agreement . Mitchell , 943 S .W.2d at 628 ; Abbott, 352
S .W .2d at 554. See also Lewis v. Commonwealth , 463 S .W .2d 137,138-39 (Ky. 1970)
(holding that no coercion occurred where jury announced inability to reach verdict after
one hour and fifteen minutes of deliberations and trial court instructed jury to "go back
and try to reach a verdict") . As Appellant was not deprived of a substantial right and
manifest injustice did not occur, there was no palpable error. RCr 10.26.
Finally, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a
mistrial, which was based on the same instruction to the jury. A trial court's decision to
deny a motion for mistrial will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Maxie v.
Commonwealth , 82 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Ky. 2002) . Declaration of a mistrial is an
extraordinary remedy, which should only be granted when the record demonstrates
"manifest necessity ." Maxie, 82 S.W .3d at 863; Skaggs v. Commonwealth , 694 S.W.2d
672, 678 (Ky. 1985), habeas corpus granted on other grounds by Skaggs v. Parker, 235
F .3d 261, 275 (6th Cir. 2000) . As previously stated, the trial court's statement properly
instructed the jury to continue its deliberations and contained no indicia of coercion . As
such, there was no "manifest necessity" to declare a mistrial, and the trial court did not
err in overruling Appellant's motion .
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the Fayette
Circuit Court are AFFIRMED .
All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Shelly R. Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601-1133
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Room 118
State Capitol
Frankfort, KY 40601
David A . Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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