WALTER GARY MATTHEWS, JR . V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2003-SC-0364-MR
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WALTER GARY MATTHEWS, JR.
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
2001-CR-0195
APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE WINTERSHEIMER
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from a judgment based on a jury verdict that convicted Matthews
of manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, possession of drug
paraphernalia and being a first-degree persistent felony offender . He was sentenced to
a total of forty-five years in prison .
The questions presented are whether an alleged violation of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers (IAD) required dismissal of this case ; whether prosecutorial
misconduct occurred ; whether the trial judge abused his discretion by failing to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the IAD issue ; whether Matthews was denied effective
assistance of counsel ; whether the defendant's confession should have been
suppressed ; whether Matthews was entitled to a directed verdict on the manufacturing
methamphetamine charge ; and whether the trial judge erred by failing to hold a Faretta
hearing before making Matthews co-counsel .
Matthews was arrested following a high speed car chase in Paducah, Kentucky.
The car he was driving turned out to be a "rolling meth lab." Matthews was questioned
by police and then released on bond. Before he was indicted, his parole on a federal
conviction was revoked and he was sent back to prison in Illinois . Matthews was
eventually returned to Kentucky and was tried on charges of manufacturing
methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia and
being a first-degree persistent felony offender . He was convicted of all the charges and
sentenced to forty-five years in prison . This appeal followed .
I . Interstate Agreement on Detainers
Matthews argues that the trial judge erred by failing to grant his motion to
dismiss the indictment based on the Commonwealth's failure to bring him to trial within
the 120 days allotted under Article IV of the IAD. We disagree .
When a state initiates a request for temporary custody pursuant to Article IV of
the IAD, the trial must begin no later than 120 days from the date the defendant arrives
in that jurisdiction . KRS 440.450, Article IV(3) . Under Article III, when a defendant
requests a final disposition of retainer, the time limit is 180 days from the date of receipt
of the prisoner's request . KRS 440.450, Article 111(1) .
The Commonwealth filed the appropriate form with the holding state of Illinois on
September 30, 2002, proposing to bring Matthews to trial within the time specified in
Article 1V of the !AD, i.e., within 120 days of the prisoner's arrival in the jurisdiction . On
October 10, 2002, Illinois sent a letter and the proper forms to Kentucky indicating that
Matthews requested disposition of pending charges under Article III of the IAD. Again,
that article requires a prisoner to be brought to trial within 180 days after he files the
appropriate request.
If the 120-day limit applies, absent other circumstances, Matthews, who arrived
at the McCracken County jail on November 6, 2002, should have been tried by March 6,
2003. The trial was ultimately held on March 17, 2003. On the other hand, if the 180
day time limit applies, then Matthews was tried within the time specified .
The question before this Court is what time limit applies when both the
Commonwealth and the prisoner file documents to effectuate speedy disposition .
Courts across the country have generally taken three different approaches to this issue.
The first approach holds that where the defendant initiates Article III proceedings he
invariably waives his Article IV rights, including the shorter time limit. Yellen v. Cooper,
828 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir .1987) ; United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1979) ;
State v. York, 583 N.E.2d 1046 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) . These cases determine that, as
Article IV procedures and Article III procedures are inconsistent, an Article III filing
automatically waives those Article IV procedures favorable to the defendant.
The second approach holds that the determining factor is which party first
initiates IAD procedures . State v . Webb, 570 N .W .2d 913 (Iowa 1997) (Article IV
applies where state is first to file after a detainer on the charges is lodged with the other
jurisdiction); Shewan v. State , 396 So.2d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (180-day limit
applied where defendant made Article III request for disposition before State took
custody) .
The third approach applies both articles when both parties initiate !AD
procedures and ascertains which, if any, provisions have been violated in determining
which time limit applies. State v. Willoughby , 927 P.2d 1379 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996)
(Article IV applies where state was first to file request and Article IV time limit expired
first) ; State v. Burrus, 729 P.2d 926 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (Article III governs where
defendant initiated by letter, state indicated willingness to accept transfer under either
Article III or Article IV, and 180-day limit expired first) .
Before deciding the proper approach, we must dispel the notion that it is
unnecessary for this Court to reach this issue . On December 13, 2002, in open court
and without objection by defense counsel, trial in this case was scheduled for March 10,
2003 . Thus, it would appear that even if we applied the 120-day time limit, defense
counsel's agreement to a trial date outside this IAD period bars the defendant from
seeking dismissal on the ground that trial did not occur within that period . New York v.
Hill , 528 U .S. 110, 120 S.Ct. 659, 145 L.Ed .2d 560 (2000).
The problem here is that on March 6, 2003, the trial judge after "being advised
that the trial scheduled in this matter needed to be continued," entered an order
continuing the trial until March 17, 2003. There is nothing in the record to indicate
whether one of the parties sought the continuance or whether the trial judge acted on
his own. Hill, supra, does not involve a purported prospective waiver of all protection of
the IAD's time limits or of the IAD generally, but merely agreement to a specified delay
in trial . That case also observed that the IAD allows the court to grant "good-cause
continuances" when either the "prisoner or his counsel" is present . Hill .
In this case, Matthews only agreed to a specified delay in trial, that is, until March
10, 2003. An order was entered continuing the trial until March 17, 2003, but there is
nothing in the record to support that it was granted for good cause or that either the
prisoner or his counsel was present when that determination was made .
Returning to the central issue, after careful consideration of the three
approaches taken by other jurisdictions, we are persuaded that the first approach is the
better way to proceed . Article IV affords the prisoner certain procedural and
substantive rights . See United States v. Mauro , 436 U .S. 340, 98 S .Ct. 1834, 56
L.Ed .2d 329 (1978). These rights may be waived, however, when the prisoner makes
an affirmative request to be treated in a manner contrary to the procedures prescribed
by Article IV. Yellen , supra : Eaddy , supra ; York, supra . Here, Matthews completed an
IAD form on October 10, 2002, expressly requesting disposition under Article III . Such
affirmative action on his part clearly constituted a waiver of any rights he may have had
as the result of the state's Article IV request on September 30, 2002 . Yellen ; Eaddy;
York.
We must observe that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held in Eaddy that if "a prisoner is aware of and understands the provisions of [the IAD],
as well as his rights thereunder, a prisoner can waive those rights, so long as the waiver
is voluntary ." Id . at 344. Matthews contends that there is no evidence in the record
which demonstrates that the waiver was knowing and voluntary . The 6th circuit also
stated, however, that a prisoner may waive his IAD rights, even though he is not aware
of those rights, "where there is an affirmative request to be treated in a manner contrary
to the procedures ." Id . Here, Matthews made an affirmative request to be treated in a
manner contrary to the procedures in Article IV when he sought disposition under
Article III . Accordingly, we hold that the Commonwealth had one hundred eighty days
from October 10, 2102, within which to bring Matthews to trial and that such
requirement was satisfied in this case . The trial judge did not err in overruling the
motion to dismiss .
II . Prosecutorial Misconduct
Matthews makes an assertion of prosecutorial misconduct based on his
allegation that the prosecutor lied to the court about which party was the first to file
under the IAD. When evaluating claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the appellate
court must focus on the overall fairness of the trial and not the culpability of the
prosecutor. Slaughter v. Commonwealth , 744 S .W .2d 407 (Ky. 1987) . The relevant
inquiry is whether the conduct of the prosecutor was of such an egregious nature as to
deny the accused his constitutional right of due process. Donnelly v . DeChristoforo ,
416 U.S. 637, 94 S .Ct . 1868, 40 L.Ed .2d 431 (1974) .
Here, there is no credible evidence in the record that the prosecutor deliberately
lied or misled the court in who filed first under the IAD. Although the record is now clear
that the Commonwealth filed first, this fact did not impact the overall fairness of the trial
and did not deny Matthews his constitutional right of due process.
Matthews also claims that the Commonwealth made three offensive statements
during the persistent felony offender penalty phase . He concedes that no objection was
made to any of the statements, but seeks review pursuant to RCr 10 .26.
The first statement complained of by Matthews was as follows : "The
misdemeanor sentences you gave the defendant have no meaning under the law."
Matthews also complains of this statement: "if you give him life, he is parole eligible as
a PFO after ten years . It really has no meaning that 20 - life . It really has no meaning
that 20 - life other than he may end up serving that 20 years to life but he is parole
eligible at least at 10 ;;ears ."
The first statement has been taken out of context . The prosecutor continued by
explaining that the misdemeanor sentences have no meaning because they will run
concurrent with the felony sentences . The second statement was attempting to explain
when Matthews would be eligible for parole . Neither of these statements diminished
the role of the jury in this case and neither constitutes palpable error.
Finally, Matthews finds fault with this statement: "He has committed more crimes
than what you have already seen the record of." We must agree that the statement
was inappropriate . However, this isolated comment certainly does not rise to the level
of palpable error. Matthews received a fair trial and was not denied any of his due
process rights .
III . Evidentiary Hearing
Matthews argues that the trial judge abused his discretion by failing to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the IAD issue. He contends that he presented the trial judge
with evidence that the Commonwealth filed first under the IAD and that Illinois
responded to that request. Matthews concedes that this issue is not preserved for
appeal, but maintains that the error is palpable .
This argument has no merit . Under the approach adopted by this Court, it is
irrelevant that the state filed first. Further, there was no requirement for the trial judge
to hold a hearing on this matter . Thus, there could be no palpable error.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Matthews asserts that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument, the IAD violations, and to request an
evidentiary hearing on the IAD. We decline to address this issue on direct appeal. See
Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 870 (Ky. 1998) .
V. Confession
Matthews claims that the trial judge erred by failing to suppress his confession .
We disagree .
The trial judge held a hearing on the motion to suppress and the two police
detectives that interviewed Matthews were the only witnesses that testified . Following
the hearing, the trial judge made findings of fact and conclusions of law and ordered
that the statements given to the first detective be suppressed, but, pursuant to Michigan
v. Mosley , 423 U.S . 96, 96 S .Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), he allowed the
statements given to the second detective wherein Matthews admitted his involvement in
illegal methamphetamine activity.
The following is a summary of the findings of fact made by the trial judge :
Approximately one hour after his arrest, the defendant was first questioned by a police
detective and invoked his right to remain silent . After being told that his conversation
was not being recorded, the defendant began speaking with the detective . The
defendant admitted smoking marijuana that evening, but denied that the
methamphetamine lab was his. Contrary to what he had been told, all of the
defendant's statements were videotaped and audio taped by the police.
Some four hours after the questioning by the first detective ceased, the
defendant was re-approached by a second detective and was asked if he would answer
questions . Matthews denied any responsibility for the methamphetamine lab in the car,
but when told he was going to be charged with manufacturing based on other evidence
gathered, he began to change his story. The detective read Matthews his Miranda
warnings, and told the defendant if he were to give a statement, he would be waiving
those rights . The defendant stated that he understood and would talk. He then gave a
taped confession to knowingly transporting the methamphetamine lab found in his car
and attempting to evade a police officer who had chased him.
Whenever the defendant asked, the two detectives provided the defendant with
drinks, allowed him to use the bathroom, allowed him to smoke, and brought him food.
The defendant's statement to the second detective after his Miranda warnings were
read to him was a knowing, voluntary and valid waiver of his right to remain silent . The
statement was an attempt to talk his way out of trouble after he learned he would be
charged with manufacturing methamphetamine .
Our review of the record indicates that the findings of the trial judge are
supported by substantial evidence, and thus are conclusive . RCr 9 .78. Further, the
trial judge correctly concluded from the record that Matthew's statement to the second
detective was admissible pursuant to Mosley, supra . In that case, the U.S . Supreme
Court held that the police may question a defendant after he has initially asserted his
right to remain silent, provided they have not attempted to talk him out of asserting his
privilege, and provided a time lapse occurs between his initial assertion of his privilege
and a subsequent questioning . Here, the police did not attempt to talk Matthews out of
asserting his privilege and six hours elapsed between his initial assertion of his privilege
and his subsequent questioning by the second detective . The questioning of Matthews
by police was proper .
Matthew's confession was voluntary. Viewing the taped confession in its
entirety, there is no evidence of police coercion of a confession obtained by physical
violence or a deliberate means calculated to break the will of Matthews . See Ore ` on v.
Elstad , 470 U .S. 298, 105 S .Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed .2d 222 (1985) . As correctly found by the
trial judge, Matthew's statement was his attempt to talk himself out of trouble .
The deception employed by the police was not coercive, nor could it have
overborne Matthew's will. The mere employment of a ruse, or "strategic deception,"
does not render a confession involuntary so long as the ploy does not rise to the level
of compulsion or coercion . Illinois v. Perkins , 496 U.S . 292, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110
L .Ed.2d 243 (1990). Matthews may not have made incriminating statements to the
detectives if he had known the conversation was being recorded, but his ignorance of
the concealed recording system could hardly have compelled him to confess .
The question of whether a defendant has voluntarily waived his Miranda rights is
analyzed somewhat differently than the question of whether the underlying confession
is voluntary . In order for a confession obtained by state action to be admissible, the
Commonwealth only needs to prove a waiver of Miranda rights by a preponderance of
the evidence . A statement is not compelled for Fifth Amendment purposes if an
individual voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waives his constitutional privilege .
Colorado v. Sgring, 479 U.S. 564,107 S .Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987); Mills v.
Commonwealth , 996 S .W .2d 473 (Ky. 1999) .
The inquiry of whether a waiver is coerced "has two distinct dimensions." Moran
v. Burbine , 475 U .S. 412, 106 S .Ct.1135, 89 L.Ed .2d 410 (1986) : First, the
relinquishment of the right by the defendant must have been voluntary in the sense that
it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or
deception . Id. at 421, 1141 . Second, the waiver must have been made with a full
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of
the decision to abandon it. i d . Only if the 'totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation' reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension
may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived by the
10
defendant . Id . (quoting Fare v. Michael C . , 442 U.S . 707, 725, 99 S .Ct . 2560, 61
L.Ed .2d 197 (1979)) .
As to the first prong of the inquiry, the record does not demonstrate any credible
evidence of police coercion . Therefore, we must conclude that Matthews voluntarily
waived his Fifth Amendment privilege . Considering the second prong of the inquiry, the
record reveals that Matthews was read his Miranda rights and was fully aware of the
nature and consequences of abandoning his rights. Based on the totality of the
circumstances, it is clear that Matthews waived his Miranda rights . The trial judge did
not err in denying the motion to suppress the statement by Matthews given to the
second detective .
VI . Manufacturing Methamphetamine
Matthews argues that the trial judge erred to his substantial detriment by
instructing the jury on the manufacture of methamphetamine. He claims that the trial
judge should have directed a verdict on this issue because the Commonwealth failed to
prove he possessed all the chemicals or equipment . (Mathews was prosecuted under
KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) as opposed to subsection (1)(a) of that statute .) Specifically, he
asserts the officers did not find anhydrous ammonia or lithium batteries. We disagree .
According to a police detective, Matthews admitted that the container recovered
from the scene was methamphetamine that was cooking . Contrary to the claim by
Matthews, this was not the only evidence of the presence of the two disputed
ingredients . A police officer who responded to the scene testified that the container that
was dropped during the pursuit was smoking and had a strong smell of amirronia .
Further, a state crime lab technician stated that when he opened the sample sent to
him, it had a strong ammonia smell. This was sufficient evidence that ammonia was
present and used to manufacture methamphetamine . See Varble v.
Commonwealth, 125 S .W.3d 246 (Ky. 2003).
As to the lithium, the lead detective was shown a videotape of the crime scene
where he had been present and specifically identified the dark strips on the bubbling
container as the lithium . Interestingly, the lab technician was shown an inventory list at
trial from American Enviro-Services, Inc ., which had cleaned up the site on the night in
question . He examined the list and said that it contained everything to make
methamphetamine by the Nazi method except for the lithium batteries . However, our
examination of the document shows that among other items on the inventory, the fifth
line reads: Anhydrous Ammonia, L [or possibly Li], pill dough (cooking) . A key at the
bottom of the document reveals that L is an abbreviation for Lithium . Matthews clearly
possessed the lithium .
After careful review of the record, we find that there was sufficient evidence that
Matthews possessed all the chemicals necessary to manufacture methamphetamine .
The trial judge properly denied the motion for a directed verdict.
VII . Faretta Hearing
We next address the issue raised in Matthew's supplemental brief. He contends
that the trial judge erred to his substantial detriment by failing to hold a Farettta hearing,
Faretta v. California , 422 U.S . 806, 95 S .Ct. 2525, 45 L .Ed .2d 562 (1975), before
making him co-counsel in this case . We disagree .
Prior to trial, Matthews filed a pro se motion to dismiss based on the
Commonwealth's alleged violation of the IAD . The trial judge overruled the motion,
stating that the defendant had counsel and counsel had to file the motion . At a hearing
in March, the defendant asked why he could not file his own motions and the trial judge
12
informed him he had not asked to be made co-counsel . Matthews inquired how to be
made co-counsel and the trial judge told him to ask. The defendant did and the trial
judge granted the request, stating, "it is as simple as that." No hearing was held on the
issue .
In Hill v. Commonwealth, 125 S .W .3d 221 (Ky. 2004), a majority of this Court
determined that a trial judge's "Faretta duties" in response to a defendant's waiver of
counsel manifest themselves in three concrete ways : (1) the trial judge must hold a
hearing in which the defendant testifies on the question of whether the waiver is
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent ; (2) during the hearing, the trial judge must warn the
defendant of the hazards arising from and the benefits relinquished by waiving counsel ;
and (3) the trial judge must make a finding on the record that the waiver is knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary . The waiver of counsel is ineffective unless all three
requirements are met. The majority also held that the accused need not proceed
completely pro se in order to trigger the trial judge's Faretta duties.
Under the circumstances presented here, Farretta , supra, and Hill, supra , have
no application . Unlike the defendants in Hill , Farretta , and similar cases, Matthews did
not participate as counsel at trial in front of the jury. He did not ask questions of the
witnesses nor did he make opening or closing statements . His only participation upon
being made co-counsel was to file pro se motions and, like other defendants, confer
with his counsel . Matthews never waived his right to counsel in any manner. No
Farretta hearing was required in this circumstance .
Finally, we have considered the issues in Matthew's pro se supplemental brief
and find no additional merit in his arguments . His ineffective assistance of counsel
13
claim is better considered in an RCr 11 .42 motion . Matthews was not denied any of his
due process rights under the federal or state constitutions . He received a fair trial.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed .
All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Euva D . May
Assistant Public Advocate
Appellate Division
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
Walter Gary Matthews, Jr.
#165929
EKCC
200 Road To Justice
West Liberty, KY 41472
Pro se
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C . Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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